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ABSTRACT 
This work is concerned with the nature and scope of 
ideology. It begins with an examination of the relationship 
between theory and practice in the relatively uncontentious area 
of education. An analysis of different kinds of educational 
theory reveals the nature of the most comprehensive form of such 
theorising to be problematic. It is argued that a solution to 
this problem depends upon the solution to the wider problem of 
the nature of political ideology, to which the discussion 
therefore shifts. Existing theories of political ideology being 
deemed inadequate, a fresh start is made by showing how this form 
of theory combines the descriptive and the evaluative in a 
particular way and with particular logical consequences. These 
consequences characterise ideology as a peculiar form of ethical 
understanding, involving a distinctive way of thinking and having 
a logical structure of its own. However, these characteristics 
which make ideology distinctive are not inherently political, and 
the possibility of there being several different forms of 
ideology is discussed. With these conclusions it becomes 
possible to return to the problem of comprehensive educational 
theory and show that it is composed of a number of forms of 
ideology, some related to political ideology and some not. The 
work concludes with some reflections upon the extent to which 
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This work is concerned with the nature and scope of 
ideology. The intense controversy surrounding the subject makes 
it a difficult one to deal with, but is equally a measure of its 
importance. While the origins of the concept may lie in political 
theory, its significance is much wider, embracing any form of 
activity where belief and theory might be involved, and therefore 
virtually our whole practical life within society. The problem 
of ideology goes to the root of the relationship between thought 
and action, theory and practice. In this sense, the nature of 
ideology touches all of us. We may ignore or be entirely 
ignorant of intellectual pursuits, but we cannot avoid the need 
to act, or to judge the consequences of our actions for others; 
and we cannot, unless our circumstances are peculiarly desperate, 
avoid making choices about how we ought to live. Such actions 
and judgements and decisions involve beliefs, and it is in this 
sphere of social belief that the nature of ideology lies. But 
for all its importance and all the attentions of theorists of 
various stripe, its nature has not been clarified. It remains, as 
Raymond Plant points out, a "much invoked but little analysed 
concept" [1]. Blame falls particularly heavily upon philosophers 
whose professional concern is conceptual analysis. Bhiku Parekh 
has correctly observed: 
•.• we have not so far devoted enough thought 
to the analysis of the logical structure of 
political doctrines and inquired where 
precisely to locate their identity. Political 
doctrines are highly complex and fluid 
conceptual structures, with one foot in the 
world of abstract ideas and the other in the 
humdrum world of human practice. Unless we 
know where to look for their identity, we are 
bound to end up misunderstanding them. [2] 
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If the concept of ideology really is as important in human 
affairs as has just been suggested then the failure to analyse it 
implies that much of our thinking on a variety of important 
matters may be in a state of chronic confusion. 
There may be any number of reasons for this failure, but 
one or two can be explored which might point to a more adequate 
analysis. First, and most important, is the relationship between 
political and moral philosophy. There is a great philosophical 
tradition, going back at least to Socrates, of substantive 
ethics, of seeking to determine the fundamental principles by 
which men ought to live. Indeed, it is widely believed that this 
is philosophy's central concern, an assumption summed up in the 
common phrase 'philosophy of life'. But there is a gulf between 
the popular conception of philosophy and its systematic pursuit 
as 'academic philosophy'. This has arisen because the 
traditional pursuit of ethical certainty through philosophy has, 
in the 20th Century, faltered and almost come to a stop. 
Although the logic goes back to David Hume, modern philosophers 
have increasingly doubted that any moral system can be given a 
foundation in objective reality; and if this is taken away it is 
difficult to see upon what secure theoretical foundation of 
whatever sort morality can be based. And if there is no such 
basis, then it is questionable whether it is possible to have an 
objective decision procedure of any kind that could determine 
whether one set of moral beliefs is any better than any other. 
Certainly none has been found that enjoys any degree of 
consensus among philosophers. 
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Not all philosophers accept that ethics can not be given 
such a foundation, but it has been the dominant philosophical 
view tor several generations, and embraced by a range of 
philosophers whose approach to ethics is in other respects 
radically different, including Charles L. Stevenson, R.M. Hare 
and D.Z. Phillips. [3] Bernard Williams has written: 
There cannot be any very interesting, tidy or 
self-contained theory of what morality is, nor, 
despite the vigorous activities of some present 
practitioners, can there be an ethical theory, 
in the sense of a philosophical structure 
which, together with some degree of empirical 
fact, will yield a decision procedure for moral 
reasoning. This latter undertaking has never 
succeeded, and could not succeed, in answering 
the question, bu what right does it legislate 
to the moral sentiments? [4] 
This implies that it is not the business of philosophy to 
determine by which moral principles men ought to live, and that 
philosophers have nothing that qualifies them better than anyone 
else to pronounce upon substantive ethical questions. The point 
is elegantly made by Peter Winch: 
•.. philosophy can no more show a man what he 
should attach importance to than geometry can 
show him where he should stand. [5] 
But if this is correct then much that passes for philosophy, and 
much that has long been accepted as philosophy, is not philosophy 
in the strict sense and must be something else. 
This puts political philosophy, and for that matter 
educational philosophy, in an odd light. For within the broad 
sphere of philosophy these two might be said to be the last 
bastions of the traditional belief in the responsibility of 
philosophy for determining the correct ethical principles which 
men should follow. Any number of general books on political 
philosophy [6] explicitly or implicitly are recommending the 
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author's own political values; that is, his views on democracy, 
freedom, justice and the like. But this is precisely the sphere 
of political doctrine or ideology. It is this failure of ethical 
detachment that is the root of the failure to analyse ideology. 
And only the rigorous observance of ethical neutrality is likely 
to make progress. 
The traditional belief that it was the function of 
political philosophy to provide the rational and moral principles 
of political action was so ingrained that when it was challenged 
by logical positivism those who were convinced of its ethical 
implications promptly pronounced political philosophy to be 
dead.[7J Theorising about politics, they thought, was now the 
proper province of empirical social science, and sociology in 
particular. But this was nat a noticeably successful move. The 
quagmire condition of social scientific theory tends to spread 
confusion to everything it touches. And nowhere is this more 
true than in the sociology of ideas. This is the second reason 
why the nature of ideology has remained opaque to us. The 
introduction of sociological conceptions has compounded the 
confusion. 
It will be argued in the fallowing chapters that the 
beginnings of wisdom in this matter lay in the recognition that 
determining the nature of ideology is a problem of political 
philosophy, understood here as an ethically neutral exercise in 
conceptual analysis that is sharply differentiated from normative 
political theory. Failure to make the distinction land it is a 
common failure) involves a fatal confusion of the method of 
analysis with what it is supposed to be analysing. It will also 
be argued, on the other hand, that ideology is too closely 
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identified with normative political theory. Ideology has 
commonly been thought to pervade all kinds of thinking, perhaps 
every kind, but its influence is always presumed to, so to speak, 
radiate from the political. However, this assumption can be 
challenged. 
The term 'political theory' is something of a misnomer, 
though a understandable one. Political theory is concerned with 
how men should live together, and not just with the narrow 
practice of politics. The business of politics is the 
organisation of society, the provision of a framework for social 
life. Political theory, on the other hand, particularly that 
aspect of it that might be identified as ideological, is 
concerned with the substance of that life; it is concerned with 
the good life, politics merely being the means of achieving it. 
We concentrate on politics and talk in terms of political theory 
or ideology because politics is pre-eminently the means of 
securing and maintaining the way of life we seek. And so we tend 
to conceptualise the problem in political terms, with education, 
art, economy and whatever else we deem pertinent, subsumed within 
it. The first concern of ideology, therefore, is how we live and 
we turn to politics in search of the means. But it is not the 
only means. Ideologies can, and have, built upon other practices 
which are structurally central to our lives, including art and 
economy and education. So another way of exploring ideology is 
to examine it with one of these other central practices at the 
focus. 
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In selecting one of these practices for further 
examination, education is the obvious choice. For that too is a 
practice that mu~t be informed by some notion of the society we 
desire, in a way that economic and artistic thinking do not, at 
least not directly. Indeed, politics and education suggest a 
continuum, for no political theory can fail to have implications 
for education; and, not surprisingly, many of the major 
political thinkers- Plata, Rousseau and others- have been major 
educational thinkers. The ideal society that ideologically 
inspired politics strives for (or strives to preserve) cannot 
survive unless its citizens are educated into it, so that the 
principles that inform such educational practice must be the same 
as inform political practice. In this sense educational theory 
is a necessary adjunct to political theory. On the other hand, 
this is too narrow a conception to embrace the whole sphere of 
education. Educational theory is no more an extension of 
political theory than educational practice is an extension of 
political practice. There are many differences. Education is, 
or can be, a largely autonomous practice generating a largely 
autonomous body of thought. There are also many practical 
differences. There are, for example, no handbooks of political 
practice, nor political training colleges. It may be, therefore, 
that ideology has a different role to play, and involves 
different values for educational practice than it does for 
politics. On the broader front, it is possible for the problems 
of identifying and achieving the good life to be conceived in 
educational terms separately from, and even in despite of, 
politics. We can put education at the centre of our ideological 
concern. Thus, there is more than one way of conceiving ideology 
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in relation to education. Indeed, it might well be that 
considering the nature of ideology in a non-political context 
necessitates the development of a more complex notion of ideology 
than is sufficient for dealing with politics. This alone would 
justify extending the discussion to educational matters. 
But there are other good reasons for examining 
educational theory beyond exploring the range of ideology. There 
are advantages in making an initial approach to ideology by way 
of a less contentious and, so to speak, less populated route. 
Educational theory is not quite the crowded battlefield that 
political theory is. The issues are clearer and the ground 
firmer. For one thing, education is a more limited and more 
readily definable activity than is politics. This is 
particularly important for the essential preliminary task of 
sorting out the relationship between theory and practice, with a 
view to locating ideology with more precision. For this reason 
it is with educational theory that we will begin. 
*** 
The opening section, therefore, deals with the nature of 
theory and its relationship to practice within the realm of 
education. This helps to isolate a form of theory that might be 
classified as ideological. However, testing this possibility 
necessitates leaving education for political theory where the 
main theoretical work has been done. Here the initial task of 
surveying the ground suggests that, despite many contenders, no 
adequate theory of ideology exists, and that philosophical 
analysis is the only likely means of reaching one. After 
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sketching a background of identifiable forms of understanding, 
the analysis proceeds by way of attempting to establish a 
ideological type of thinking that might take its distinctive 
place within this array of forms. Various dimensions and 
possibilities are explored culminating in a conception of 
ideology as a form of moral understanding built upon conceptions 
of human nature. An attempt to deal with objections and possible 
counter-examples leads to a widening of the concept, increasing 
its applicability beyond the world of politics. With this more 
developed concept it is possible to return to education and 
complete the analysis of theory, examining the various possible 
roles for ideology within this sphere. The concluding chapter 
attempts to draw the threads together and speculate on why it is 
that a demonstrably unsatisfactory form of thinking like ideology 
may nevertheless play such a large and seemingly necessary part 
in our thinking. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE NATURE OF EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
1. Three Views of Theory 
There is a long standing dispute within the philosophy of 
education concerning the nature and scope of educational theory. 
The chief protagonists have been D.J. O'Connor, holding fast to 
the scientific paradigm, and Paul Hirst, standing by the more 
traditional comprehensive view of educational theory. They have 
been locked together motionless for some time now so that their 
dispute has come to seem somewhat arid. A resolution is overdue. 
O'Connor might be fairly described as an unreconstructed 
logical positivist. For him the only genuine theories are 
scientific theories, the only genuine knowledge scientific 
knowledge, the only proper explanations scientific ones. <There 
is logic of course, and mathematics, but these, though useful, 
are only composed of tautologies, they tell us nothing about the 
world.) What passes for educational theory is little more than 
"muddle, twaddle and quacksalving", a "pretentious and 
contemptable waste of time". Cp. 47) [1] What is wrong with 
educational theory is, of course, that it is not scientific; it 
is infested with values (not to say metaphysics) for which there 
is no agreed logic and which vitiates its status as theory. It 
is not falsefiable, not value free, not explanatory; it is a 
mess. The 'theory' in 'educational theory' is just a "courtesy 
title". (p. 48) Education should be like medicine or 
engineering, soundly based on science and operating within the 
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framework of "the currently accepted concept of human welfare". 
lp. 48) Unfortunately, education (unlike, say, economics) comes 
nowhere near this ideal. This is perhaps an odd circumstance 
since the sciences envisaged as providing the bedrock of a 
adequate educational theory - sociology, psychology and possibly 
a little economics - generally produce, according to O'Connor, 
conclusions which we all knew already, because as humans we 
already know a great deal about each other and our society before 
we begin to study them scientifically. This is the gist of 
O'Connors case, although he does add some gratuitous remarks 
about teachers having got on perfectly well for centuries without 
benefit of educational theory which only became necessary with 
the demand for mass education (with some dark hints about sows 
ears and silk purses - a reference, apparently, to teachers as 
well as pupils, pp. 60-2). 
Hirst agrees with O'Connor on a number of points: that the 
purpose of educational theory is to produce "rational principles 
for educational practice" Cp. 66); such theory must be both 
explanatory and refutable; that it also must be concerned with 
improving and guiding practice; and must be concerned to promote 
human welfare. Despite this, Hirst firmly rejects O'Connors' 
brute positivism with a number of arguments, some of which are 
telling. He argues, quite correctly, that there are more kinds 
of explanation and knowledge than just the scientific, and that 
it is false to judge everything by the standards of science. In 
particular, the explanation of human action in terms of reasons 
instead of causes lies outside the realm of scientific reasoning. 
Hence, "explanations in terms of beliefs and values, of reasons 
as well as causes seem to be logically necessary" Cp. 67>. !What 
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the relationship between reasons and causes of the same human 
events might be Hirst nowhere explains, and this is perhaps a 
weakness of his whole position for it is at least arguable that 
the two are incompatible.) Hirst also rejects, again quite 
rightly, O'Connor's view that the conclusions of social science 
can only be platitudinous; rightly if only because the claims of 
social science go far beyond the platitudinous. Indeed, Hirst 
goes on to insist on "the necessity for a background of 
scientific knowledge for rational educational, practice" (p. 741. 
However, science is not all that is needed for such a practice to 
be 'fully rational'. 
Hirst's major departure from O'Connor is in seeing those 
aspects of the social sciences that bear upon education as only 
elements of a much wider educational theory which integrates them 
along with "other elements, including philosophical beliefs and 
value judgments" (p. 72>, into a coherent whole. Hirst accepts 
as: 
••. legitimate in educational theory all the 
elements that must occur if it is to fulfil its 
function for educational practice, including 
the rigorous critical discussion of values, 
even when this calls in question prevailing 
ideas of human welfare. ( p. 71 l 
There are a number of oddities about these statements which it 
might be useful to point out before a more substantial discussion 
of Hirst's case. To take the final clause first, O'Connors view 
of 'prevailing notions of human welfare' as unproblematic and all 
that is needed to give direction to practice and theory proper, 
is clearly vulnerable to extensive criticism. But Hirst does not 
so much reject it as place a pedantic question mark against it 
(perhaps because he believes in the establishment of an absolute 
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ethics by philosophy and that these will not differ greatly from 
notions of human welfare prevailing in our own society). In fact 
Hirst seems much more exercised by O'Connor's assumption that 
education may be guided by aims which are separate from 
educational theory instead of internal to it; Hirst strongly 
objects to this, although without putting up much in the way of 
arguments. Another oddity, though perhaps a trivial one, is that 
Hirst expresses himself in such a way as to suggest that 
'rigorous critical discussion of values' is part of the theory 
which is his ideal, rather than as part of the business of 
theorising by which such a theory is achieved. A similar slip is 
the inclusion of 'philosophical beliefs', by which he seems to 
mean such beliefs as Communism, Liberalism, Christianity and the 
like. Surely Hirst just wants to include these in the ambit of 
discussion and presumably, as he would see it, come to some 
conclusion as to which is the most 'rational', not have a 
representative sample of each in the final theory? But oddest of 
all is Hirst's acceptance as legitimate whatever is needed for 
educational theory to fulfil it's role for educational practice. 
This seems to be both tautological (education needs whatever 
education needs) and begging the question in that need does not 
guarantee possibility (men have always felt the need to foretell 
the future, but ..• ), and Hirst appears to be indulging in 
wishful thinking. And Hirst's further point, that O'Connor's 
version of educational theory does not square with the way people 
actually discuss education, is equally question-begging. Yet it 
is on the basis of such question-begging assumptions that Hirst 
ultimately rejects O'Connor's view; because "it does not seem to 
me able to provide what educational practice needs." (p. 71) 
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What Hirst needs is not simplistic assumptions like these 
but arguments to show that a logically coherent theory that 
satisfies O'Connor's criteria of being explanatory and refutable 
and yet at the same time contain all Hirst's 'necessary 
elements', is a possibility. But we are not given arguments but 
hope; not reason but optimism. Critical to Hirst's case is the 
logic of values. For his view of theory to make sense he needs 
the means to show that some sets of values are more rational than 
others and that they can be systemtically related to facts about 
man and the world. He rejects O'Connor's positivism on the 
grounds that it "assumes an ultimate dissociation of fact and 
value that seems to me contrary to their relationship in the 
actual conduct of educational debate." (p. 711 But this is no 
argument when O'Connor has cheerfully dismissed the kind of 
debate Hirst has in mind as just so much hot air. Hirst admits 
that "we cannot at the moment give an adequate philosophical 
account of moral discourse in general and of the fact 
value-relationship in particular" (p. 70) but is nevertheless 
undeterred. He seems to think that 'finding an adequate logic' 
means discovering the relationships that will confound the 
positivists and relativists, which is perhaps another example of 
the wishful thinking noted earlier; for it is in the face of 
widespread scepticism among moral philosophers that such 
relationships are there to be discovered. However, Hirst is 
sufficiently 'encouraged' by work in moral philosophy (though 
what work he does not say, p. 69) to promote the continuance of 
the kind of theory-building he feels education needs. But this 
is as far as it goes. Neither in his direct reply to O'Connor 
nor in his other writings does Hirst explain how his 
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comprehensive theory might be articulated, how the parts might 
fit together. On exactly how our 'lore-ridden educational 
practice' might be made 'fully rational' Hirst is systematically 
elusive. 
However, T. W. Moore in Educational T!Jeorp: an 
Introdt.tct.ion [2] does journey where Hirst fears to tread, though 
with results which perhaps suggest that there is some wisdom in 
Hirst's vagueness. Moore makes it quite clear from the outset 
whose side he is on. He rejects the positivist's insistence on 
confining the term 'theory' to scientific theory. There are 
other kinds of theory, different but equally valid, of which 
practical theory is one kind. Practical theory - including 
political theory, educational theory, etc. - is not descriptive 
and explanatory but prescriptive, and it is pointless to condemn 
it for what it is not. Theories about education may be of a 
scientific nature and thus subject to scientific criteria of 
truth and adequacy, but theories o' education, educational 
theory proper, though not subject to these criteria, is 
nevertheless subject to criteria of its own. It is not the case, 
as some (such as Brenda Cohen [JJ have argued), that in this kind 
of theorising anything goes. Moore writes: 
It will be maintained that educational theory 
is theory and that an educational theory, taken 
as a whole, may be open to criticism of a 
sufficiently stringent kind as to warrent its 
status as a candidate for confirmation or 
reasoned rejection. (p.2l 
Educational theory is thus defined as: 
- 16 -
.•. a higher order enterprise, a practical 
theory which aims at guiding those engaged in 
educational activities, in schools and 
elsewhere. lp. 8) 
It is a higher order activity relative to practice, though not as 
high as educational philosophy which, so to speak, ~ccupies the 
attic. 
Moving on to the actual nature of educational theory 
proper, Moore makes an initial distinction between limited theory 
and general theory. Limited theory concerns particular teaching 
subjects or situations, the best way to teach this or handle 
that. Moore offers such examples as proceeding from the concrete 
to the abstract, or the 'injunction' to always start from what 
the pupil already knows. This does sound more like helpful hints 
for initiates of the prune-roses-in-March sort, rather than 
anything that might reasonably be called 'theory'; the result of 
reflecting on experience rather than of 'theorising'. It is the 
generality of such recommendations that Moore considers 
sufficient justification for the 'theory' label. However, we 
will return to this matter later. Moore is much more concerned 
with general theory. What Moore offers, which Hirst does not, is 
an analysis of the structure of such theories. 
It is claimed that the structure of a practical theory is 
as follows: 
(1) p is desirable as an end. 
12) In the circumstances, q is the most effective way of 
achieving p. 
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(]) Therefore, do whatever q involves. (p. 16) 
Now this none-too-informative formula would seem to refer to 
'limited theories', but Moore insists that it reveals the 
structure of general theories as well. This will be examined in 
greater detail later, though a few points may be made now. Moore 
writes: 
A general theory of education will have the 
structure of a practical theory as set out 
above; that is, granted that some educational 
end is desirable, then certain procedures are 
recommended to bring that end about. Cp.l7> 
To begin with, Moore seems to take the 'desirable end' as a 
given, something independent of the theory itself (in the manner 
of O'Connor), when it is clearly a central part of the theory. 
Indeed, such ends are the most important part of general 
theories, not the practical recommendations. There could only be 
a contingent relationship between the two, and if the recommended 
practice did not produce the desired end it can be replaced with 
something else leaving the ends and the structure of the theory 
intact. More importantly, the formula hardly does justice to the 
complexity of general theory which Moore proceeds to describe. 
A general theory of education, Moore contends, has a 
composite structure and contains different kinds of assumptions 
embracing the possible and the desirable; assumptions about aims 
and values, about the nature of man and the characteristics of 
children, about what constitutes knowledge and sound method, and 
so on. These assumptions may be scientific in character, or 
philosophical or moral, etc., and are consequently subject to the 
standards of truth and adequacy appropriate to their different 
fields. Thus, all elements are open to critical scrutiny and any 
assumption can be rejected on the grounds that it is either 
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demonstrably false or untestable. Untestable assumptions, Moore 
insists, are no more acceptable than false ones; Froebel's 
assumption that children develop according to some divine 
pattern, for example, is dismissed because there is no way such 
an assumption could be tested. lp. 23). But criticism need not 
be confined to particular elements. The whole structure must 
have internal coherence, the lack of which may be grounds for 
rejection. Finally, since we are dealing with practical (i.e. 
prescriptive) theory, there is the very basic matter of whether 
the aims set out in the theory are in fact achieved by the 
methods which the theory recommends. 
All this seems reasonable enough. However, rather more 
is being claimed here than Moore can in fact substantiate. 
Moore's principal claim is that traditional educational theory is 
criticisable, testable and refutable and so has a status as 
theoretical knowledge comparable with, though different from, 
that of science. The positivists who reject educational theory 
<traditionally conceived) as theory proper and say that 'anything 
goes' have simply failed to note the possibilities of testing and 
reasoned rejection that such theories are open to. Now it may 
well be that certain elements of general theory are indeed open 
to test and refutation but this hardly applies to values; it is 
not even clear what could constitute testing and refuting a set 
of values. A system of values may have internal incoherences that 
may be pointed out (though this may cut little ice with those of 
firmer faith, particularly if they claim access to some deeper 
mystery or higher logic than is available to the questioner), but 
the notion that there is one and only one system of values that 
is fully rational and hence demonstrably superior to all others 
- 19 -
is arguably an illusion, though one still pursued by some. On 
the contrary, there would seem to be many such systems, perhaps 
an indefinite number, with no way of deciding whether one is 
ultimately any better than any other. Now if this is so, it rules 
out the possibility of educational values, and therefore general 
theory, coming within the sphere of truth and knowledge. 
Different individuals and groups have their different moral 
beliefs and that is that. This undermines Moore's position 
completely. 
What is surprising is that Moore appears to accept all 
this. What Moore says is that "we do not have nowadays the clear 
certainty about values some of our predecessors enjoyed", and 
that general theories that can be widely accepted are perhaps 
impossible; but since every teacher needs a general theory then 
"the teacher must be his own general theorist of education" (p. 
69) This is not possible tor those professionally engaged in the 
study of education because, apparently, their work has become 
much too specialised; it is therefore up to each teacher to 
construct his own general theory out of, presumably, his own 
beliefs and values together with whatever bits and bobs of social 
science he deems appropriate. Now there is much that might be 
said about the strangeness of this conclusion, but it is 
sufficient for present purposes to say that if it is correct then 
it would suggest that general educational theory really is the 
flabby, incoherent mess that the positivists say it is. 
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Needless to say, Moore's retreat into subjectivism is a 
departure from Hirst's position. But Hirst's more disciplined 
view is only sustained by a rather optimistic belief in an 
immanent revolution in logic with will inject some certainty into 
moral reasoning. However, philosophy is about demonstration 
rather than hope, and the relativism that Moore seems unwittingly 
to arrive at is arguably the logical conclusion of the 
traditional view of theory which Hirst accepts, given the absence 
of that revolution the intimations of which are so eagerly 
canvassed and without which educational theory seems doomed to 
relativism and the scorn of positivists. 
It might be argued that no fate so horrible must 
necessarily befall anything of such complexity as educational 
theory when the problematic area is only one of several aspects. 
But this would be wrong. Values are not just one element among 
others; they are the essence without which the rest has no 
relevance. A general educational theory promotes a set of 
values; the educational aims set out in the theory express those 
values; the methods recommended are the means of achieving those 
ends embodying those values; while the supporting scientific and 
other factual components are there to show the possibility of, 
and the efficacy of the methods for arriving at, those desired 
ends which the values determine. The values are quintessential 
and they are also fixed, whilst the factual and methodological 
elements can be changed; experience may show that one method of 
achieving a given end happens to be more effective than the one 
suggested in the theory, while the 'fact' -sociological, 
psychological or whatever - must always be open to revision. 
Consequently, facts and methods can only bear a contingent and 
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not a necessary relationship to those values and aims which the 
theory seeks to further - unless, that is, those values are in 
some way smuggled into and embeded in the factual and 
methodological elements, in which case a different notion of 
'fact' and different logical relations obtain (but more of this 
later). Thus, unless means be found of definitively settling the 
relative status and priority of different values then the 
traditionalist case, insofar as it has claims to truth and 
knowledge, must fall. 
But does this mean that the positivist case therefore 
stands? Well, not exactly. The positivist case has a number of 
quite fatal flaws. In the first place, the assertion that 
science provides the only proper knowledge of the world cannot be 
substantiated. Hirst is quite correct in insisting that there 
are other forms of knowledge, different though equally valid, 
such as philosophy and history, although as we shall see in a 
later chapter, there are not as many of them as Hirst imagines. 
What Hirst lacks is an adequate understanding of what constitutes 
an academic discipline, for it is this which is the crucial test; 
that is, whether general educational theory conforms to the 
standards of truth and adequacy provided by the academic 
disciplines, which, as we have seen, it does not. 
Secondly, O'Connor's conception of the straightforward 
application of scientific method to education is hugely 
simplistic; his simple positivism is positively Victorian. There 
are two points to be made here. First (already mentioned) is the 
assertion that the conclusions of sociology and psychology can 
only be platitudinous, merely confirming what we already know. 
This is simply not true. Within social science there is a whole 
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variety of what are rather misleadingly called 'perspectives', 
such that for any given human phenomenon there are a host of 
explanations which are rarely consistent with each other and are 
often far from commonsensical. And since there is no recognised 
means of deciding between these competing explanations, the 
notion of 'established conclusions in social science' is 
something of an illusion. But secondly and more importantly, the 
absence of a decision-procedure for dealing with the competing 
interpretations of different 'perspectives' calls into question 
the status of these studies as academic disciplines, and in so 
doing calls into question the status of their conclusions as 
knowledge in the full academic sense. And not only this. There 
are arguments to suggest that the coherent and agreed conceptual 
framework, which alone would provide such a decision-procedure is 
an illusion. Thus, the supposedly solid scientific foundations 
of O'Connor's conception of educational theory are just not 
there. 
Finally, O'Connor's belief that educational theory can be 
confined to technical matters, like engineering, operating within 
the framework of prevailing 'concepts of human welfare' is 
equally simplistic and naive. What constitutes human welfare in 
education as in many other things is a matter of great and 
persistent controversy, and cannot be taken for granted in this 
way. The need is for the nature and role of values to be 
properly understood, not to have them ignored. 
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Thus, neither the traditionalist case not the positivist 
case offers a satisfactory analysis of educational theory. A 
more adequate account depends on two things: a proper 
understanding of the autonomy of practice, and a proper analysis 
of the possible relationships that different kinds of theory -
academic and practical - can have to practice. The first of 
these is provided by a third view of educational theory, which 
can conveniently be called the 'sceptical case'; it will be the 
purpose of the second part of this chapter to provide the second. 
The sceptical case is the most recent approach to 
educational theory and is perhaps best represented by D.I. 
Lloyd's 'Theory and Practice', and supplemented by another 
article of the same name by Howard Mounce. [4] Lloyd is 
particularly critical of Hirst's assumption that any adequate 
practice must be firmly based on theory and that practice based 
on what is dismissively called 'folklore' must be progressively 
eliminated, as if practice without theory were mindless and 
theoryless teachers were brutishly inferior. Lloyd points out 
that there are a multitude of practices which are carried on 
perfectly well without any thought of theory, while even O'Connor 
admits that there have been centuries of adequate educational 
practice innocent of theory. Instead of theory Lloyd puts his 
fa~th in what has stood the test of experience and the wisdom 
and insight of the experienced practitioner. Lloyd writes: 
My purpose so far has been no more than to 
encourage a little scepticism towards the view 
that we need a theory of education, in the way 
theory is used by O'Connor and Hirst. <p. 105) 
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This is not to deny that some theoretical conclusions may be of 
some use to the teacher. What it does deny is that a 'fully 
rational' <to use Hirst's persistent phrase) educational practice 
is one that is necessarily subordinate to theory, that it is 
merely putting theory into practice. Nor is it to advocate blind 
habit or adherence to tradition as a substitute for theory. 
Thinking seriously about what we are doing is not necessarily to 
theorise. 'Reflecting upon experience', as Lloyd calls it, is 
not the accumulation of data upon which to base a generalisation 
which is then mechanically applied, in the manner of science. It 
is rather the examination of particular cases with a view to the 
cultivation of sensitivity and insight and good judgement. As 
Lloyd says: 
My case is that understandinq is more likely 
to be acquired by examining particular cases. 
(p. 107) 
The best teacher is not the one with the most theories. 
Of the three views of educational theory which have been 
discussed the sceptical case seems to be by far the most 
coherent. However, it is not a position that has as yet been 
fully worked out. Obviously not everything could have been 
covered in two articles, and so there are many gaps and many 
unanswered questions. A clearer account of 'reflecting on 
experience' is needed, together with some analysis of the role of 
values in this kind of reasoning. Further, some appreciation is 
necessary of the different educational circumstances in which 
theories of different kinds may or may not be appropriate -
classroom teaching, curriculum development, government planning, 
etc. Finally, an analysis of the different types of theory, both 
practical and academic, and their possible relationships to 
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practice is essential. It is to this latter task that the second 
part of this chapter is addressed. 
2. Theory, Quasi-Theorw and Pseudo-Theory 
In the first part of this chapter three views of 
educational theory were discussed and it was concluded that the 
most coherent view was one which insisted on the autonomy of 
practice and cast serious doubts upon the need for theory. 
Nevertheless, the question as to whether there might be some role 
theory could play in guiding practice was left open. In 
considering this question we might begin by pointing out that 
neither theory nor practice are simple entities allowing of only 
a single relation between them. Practice has different aspects 
and theories are of different kinds so that a number of 
relationships might be possible. But first we need to look 
briefly at the nature of practice. 
A practice of whatever kind is necessarily made up of 
particular actions - what to do next is always a pressing concern 
- and it is in the choice of alternative actions, or courses of 
action, that theory is said to give guidance. Now we always act 
within a context, in the light of our circumstances; and 
knowledge, preferably objective knowledge, of the facts of the 
case, of the things or persons with which we are dealing, is an 
essential first step in deciding to act. But facts in themselves 
never tell us what to do. We need aims or purposes, no matter 
how trivial, in the light of which we may consider the 
alternatives. These aims or purposes give rise to two 
considerations applicable to all proposals for action: efficacy 
and rightness. These are separate; the most efficient means may 
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be rejected on moral grounds, while the morally laudable may just 
not work. Of course, in large areas of our activity our actions 
have no moral significance - making a sandwich, buying a car -
although in the right circumstances any action may be morally 
significant, and in certain practices where we deal with other 
people, such/politics or education, values are especially 
:\ 
important. Thus, practice has several aspects - facts, purposes, 
efficiency and justification - and different kinds of theory may 
relate to these aspects in different ways. 
Three broad types of theory may have a bearing on 
practice. The first is academic or 'pure' theory. We may regard 
this as theory proper or theory per se since it conforms to the 
most central, unambiguous and undisputed use of the term 
'theory': that is those theories which are explanatory, refutable 
and value-free. It is nearest to O'Connors meaning of the term, 
although O'Connor is mistaken in confining it to science. But 
academic theory is not the only kind of theory. Despite purists 
like O'Connor, there is a good case to be made for regarding 
practical theory as a legitimate form of theory. Practical 
theory is of two distinct kinds: technical and ethical. 
Technical theory, the second broad type of theory that will be 
examined, is concerned with the most efficient means of achieving 
specific ends and not with considerations of value. Thirdly, 
there is ethical theory which is precisely concerned with moral 
considerations, with values and aims and ideals. Traditional 
theory, of the kind advocated by Hirst, Moore and others, falls 
into this category. Such general theories do have many elements, 
but their central function is not explanation or efficacy but 
justification. However, although technical and ethical theory 
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are distinct from academic theory they are nonetheless related to 
it. Indeed, taking academic theory as the paradigm, it might be 
said that each is, in its own way, parasitic upon academic 
theory. Technical theory is particularly closely related, in that 
it shares some of the basic features of scientific theory, 
/'_p-
(indeed, a whole philosophy is drvoted to reducing academic to 
technical theory, namely Pragmatism>. With this in mind, 
technical theory might reasonably, be termed 'quasi-theory'. 
Ethical theory, on the other hand, does not so much partake of 
academic theory as impersonate it, so that much of the 
persuasiviness of ethical theory comes from its appearing to be, 
and claiming to be, academic theory. But such claims are 
spurious and hence it is 'pseudo-theory' rather than 
'quasi-theory' that best sums up their character. However, in 
order to substantiate these claims we need to examine these 
various forms of theory in detail. 
A. Academic Theory. The concept of theory is bound up with 
the concept of knowledge and so with other such concepts as 
truth, objectivity, evidence and explanation. Thus, a true 
theory is knowledge, an untested theory is putative knowledge, 
and so on. However, knowledge is of different kinds, is sought 
in a multitude of ways for a multitude of purposes, and varying 
standards of evidence and argument are appropriate for our 
differing needs and interests. But what we properly regard as 
knowledge in the fullest sense of the term is that which has been 
achieved by the systemtic and disinterested use of methods as 
rigorous as we can devise. In other words, the paradigm of 
knowledge is academic knowledge and the paradigm of theory is 
academic theory, both being the product of academic disciplines. 
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What academic disciplines there are and what exactly 
constitutes such a discipline are matters of dispute. Some take 
a broad view and are prepared to countenance almost any area of 
sustained study; but others are more restrictive. The most 
restrictive view of all is that of the positivists for whom 
scientific method is the only genuine source of knowledge and 
scientific theory the only authentic form. This is an austere 
doctrine but one which has its attractions. It is refreshingly 
rigorous and has acted as an effective antidote to much 
sentiment, rhetoric and pretention in intellectual matters. It 
does, however, have its weaknesses. For one thing, positivism is 
itself a theory, though not a scientific one; yet it is one that 
can be tested, not for it relationship to empirical fact but for 
its logical coherence. It is a philosophical theory and 
therefore stands or falls by tests of logical adequacy. Another 
body of knowledge which has its own distinctive criteria for 
determining the adequacy of its claims to knowledge is history, 
where documentary evidence can confirm or refute a theory or 
explanation of a set of past events. These examples make it 
quite clear that not only are there different kinds of 
substantial knowledge <even allowing for the positivist view that 
such as mathematics and formal logic are tautological in nature 
and essentially tell us nothing about the worldl, but that 
empirical testing is not the exclusive determinant of the status 
of academic discipline. These realms of knowledge, where there 
exists a rigorous apparatus of test and evidence with common 
rules of proced~re, has such status and provides a standard for 
others. Each discipline must have, so to speak, its 
constitution, its body of rules laying down what is to count as a 
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claim to knowledge, as evidence, as an adequate argument and, 
above all, how disputes over knowledge can in principle be 
settled, for without this there is no way of eliminating falsity. 
It is this which determines what is and is not a discipline. 
With clear criteria for identifying disciplines we can 
establish what disciplines there are and consequently the limits 
of academic theory. There are a good many candidates; a case can 
be made for subjects as diverse as economics and theology. But 
as we saw earlier (and will be discussed more fully in a later 
chapter) there are areas of intellectual endeavour whose claims 
to the status of academic, often vigorously asserted when they 
are not being taken as self-evident, are nevertheless 
questionable. These are the social sciences, with their 
confusion of incommensurable 'perspectives', and moral reasoning, 
with its fatal lack of dispute-settling procedures. We have also 
seen how these weaknesses must undermine both positivist and 
traditionalist assumptions about academic theory providing a 
close guide for educational practice. Academic theory can indeed 
relate to practice in important ways, but not as closely as many 
theorists would have us believe. 
What relationships can there be? Academic theories are 
concerned with how things are and how they came to be so. They 
are, therefore, theories which, as such, cannot tell us what to 
do or how to do it; they are not pieces of advice. This is an 
old point which the positivists make much of, and very properly 
so. Nor can the relationship be one of putting theory into 
practice. One can no more put a theory of this kind into 
practice than one can put a fact or explanation or description 
into practice. When the RAF were bombing Nazi Germany they were 
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not putting the theory of gravity into practice; they were making 
use of a feature of the world which theories may describe and 
explain. An academic theory merely widens our available 
knowledge in the light of which we can act. It might be said to 
be like a map which facilitates our travelling but does not tell 
us where to go, still less why we should go there. A route 
marked out on a map is, however, a different matter. This would 
be explicitly designed to guide us - by the quickest route, the 
scenic route, or whatever - and could be said to correspond to 
technical theory; while the question as to why we should go there 
at all is a different matter again, and is the province of 
ethical theory. 
B. Practical Theory: (a) Technical Theory. When the apprentice 
plumber goes to his local tech. to master plumbing theory, what 
he learns is the principles of good plumbing: how different 
systems work, which are the best techniques, why they are the 
best, and so on. He may be told a few very elementary scientific 
laws, but he would do nothing that could properly be called 
'learning science'; and he would learn nothing he could not be a 
good plumber without. His kind of theory is not a deduction from 
pure science but is derived from experience; it is a summary of 
good practice, the results of the practitioner's reflections on 
his best work. It is 'knowing how' verbalised and formalised; it 
is a description of the skilled man's technique, his 'mystery', 
and cannot be a substitute for it. The skilled man <plumber, 
teacher or whatever) has no need of theories. 
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On the other hand, there is clearly a relationship <not 
to say a family resemblance) between theories of this kind which 
tell us what to do next and the theories of the physical 
sciences. At its simplest, a physical theory asserts a causal 
regularity of such a kind that if you do A then B will happen and 
this confirms the existence of the regularity, thereby making it 
testable and predictive. Technical theories recommend A as an 
effective means of achieving B, and this can be confirmed by 
experience which can indicate future usefulness. Thus, there is 
a certain logical overlapping. But here the differences emerge, 
for while theoretical soundness is no guarantee that something 
will work in practice <"That's all very well in theory, but 
as many an engineering graduate has been toldl, something may 
work excellently well despite being theoretically wonky. No 
doubt at the most sophisticated levels the traffic between 
science and technology is heavy and constant. Yet they remain 
separate. They do not become the same thing, nor can one be 
deduced from the other. 'Is it true?' and 'Does it work?' are 
different kinds of questions with different criteria for 
evaluating answers. The point of a scientific theory is to state 
a truth whose usefulness is neither here nor there; the point of 
a technical theory is utility over which questions of truth and 
falsity do not arise because their function is not to explain 
anything but to guide our actions. Though related, technical 
theory and scientific theory are different in kind. 
- 32 -
But when we move away from the material world, the world 
of engineers and doctors and jobbing builders, and into the human 
world, then the nature and the role of technical theory becomes 
controversial and confused. In all forms of human activity where 
the practitioner deals with other people, in politics or 
salesmanship or entertainment as well as in education, some 
techniques work better than others, and this suggests some role 
for technical theory. What is in question is what kind of 
technical theory: where on the technical continuum (from, let us 
say, the nuclear engineer to the plumber) would this kind of 
theory fit; or does it vary according to the kind of practice or 
the needs of practitioners? Certainly positivists like O'Connor 
would want to see educational theory at the high technology end 
of the continuum, with social science playing the same role in 
relation to educational practice as physics plays in relation to 
engineering practice. But as we saw in the first part of this 
chapter, there are severe difficulties with this position: first 
because the social sciences are internally chaotic, and secondly 
because human action is not an appropriate object of scientific 
enquiry anyway. This, however, is not to say that social 
scientific study of education, or any other aspect of social 
life, is necessarily useless. It may produce insights rather 
than systematic knowledge. But while this may well increase the 
teacher's general awareness of his situation lin the way that, 
for example, a study of history would), it could not possibly be 
the foundation for his practice. 
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It is, therefore, at the craft or non-scientific end, 
rather than the high technology end of the technical continuum, 
that educational theory is properly located. That is, at that 
end of the continuum where science has become wholly dispensible 
and experience wholly adequate. As we have observed, the best 
teachers are not necessarily the ones with the best theories, or 
indeed any theories; they are rather those with experience who 
have made intelligent use of that experience. The primary result 
of this 'intelligent use' is more effective practice for the 
individual concerned, which is not manifest in a set of 
propositions but in refined intuitions as to what will be 
effective in different situations. The two further possible 
results are very much secondary and more problematic: these are 
the passing on of the benefits of this experience to others, and 
secondly, the further development of the practice. 
Passing on the fruits of experience can vary in its 
degree of formality. Having reflected upon his experience the 
good teacher may come to a set of conclusions which are 
systematised as 'the principles of good teaching'. This is the 
equivalent of the 'summary-of-best-practice' that the apprentice 
plumber learns. But more often than not, the outcome of 
reflection is a loose collection of generalisations or maxims 
about what tends to work best in particular circumstances. As 
mentioned in the first part of this Chapter, W.T. Moore in 
Educational Tneat'_tl: .:'m Introduction offers e:·:amples of what ar·e 
termed 'limited theory' such as 'begin from what the pupil 
already knows' and 'always proceed from the concrete to the 
abstract'. But these are not theories but maxims <though none 
the worse for that) which have been derived from experience. 
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Hints, tips, maxims and rules of thumb may not be theoretically 
impressive, yet in practice may be much more useful than more 
abstract theories. Indeed, the more abstract and distant from 
practice a theory becomes the more useless it is, especially to 
the novice. In some fields, including education and politics, 
there have been attempts to turn practical knowledge into a 
'science' but without success <though there are some who claim 
there is a 'science of management'; they are a diminishing 
number). 
But even where this kind of theory is kept close to solid 
experience and is thick with practical examples, the problem of 
making good use of the theory is by no means a straightforward as 
is usually supposed. The point is perhaps best illustrated with 
an example from politics. Machiavelli's The Prince ESJ is a 
handbook on how to be an effective ruler in the vicious world of 
Renaissance Italian politics. It is full of advice about what to 
do in a variety of likely situations and amply illustrated with 
examples from classical and contemporary history. However, for 
the inexperienced ruler, for whom the book is intended, following 
its advice must always be problematic. The situation he faces 
will never be exactly the same as the examples given in the book, 
so he can never be sure that any particular piece of advice is 
the right one for his immediate problem. What every prince 
needs, Machiavelle tells us, is an experienced and knowledgeable 
adviser (someone like himself). But then if he has such an 
adviser he does not need the book. Machiavelli goes on to say 
that the prince must not only be able to choose good counsellors, 
he must know when to take advice and when to ignore it. But 
surely if the prince has this amount of political shrewdness he 
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hardly needs the adviser, let alone the book. If he has got it 
then he does not need the book, if he has not then the book will 
not give it to him. The point is that dealing with people, in 
politics, or education or any similar activity, involves 
judgement, and good judgement cannot be reduced to a formula. 
This is not to say that technical theory is useless in 
human affairs, merely that there is a danger of overrating its 
usefulness, especially if it is abstract and not closely related 
to good practice. The danger is particularly acute in respect of 
the other potential product of reflection upon experience, namely 
the development of the practice. Wherever there is any kind of 
theorizing about the way things are or what will work, there is 
always the possibility of some kind of speculative theorizing. 
Not only do we have the imaginative scientist with his 
hypotheses, we may also have the enterprising plumber with ideas 
for new techniques which his experience suggests will work more 
effectively. Such developments may be occasioned by external 
pressures to find techniques which are quicker and cheaper, but 
they may simply arise from the craftsman's desire to do his job 
in a better way. The same applies to human activities like 
education, although this is a more complex activity where the 
pressures for change are often of a different kind. Such 
speculative technical theories may range from a better way to 
teach fractions to a total transformation of educational systems 
throughout the world (as advocated by the Deschoolers>, and 
include reading methods, streaming, open plan schools, curriculum 
development, comprehensive education, and many other matters -
though it should be said that when people speak of 'theory' in 
relation to such proposals they often mean no more than a set of 
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reasons rather than 'a theory'. More importantly, the extent to 
which such speculative technical theories are grounded in 
practical experience varies a good deal. Some are a genuine 
extension of good practice, while others are more like leaps in 
the dark. It is this kind of theorizing that tends to give 
theory a bad name, 'that might be all very well in theory, 
but ..• '. 
Nevertheless, speculative theorizing in education occupies 
a good many people. This is partly because there is widespread 
demand tor improvement in education tor all kinds of individual 
and social reasons, and partly because of a common overestimation 
of the power of theorizing (some, including Paul Hirst, think we 
can and should have a theory to cover all that we do). A further 
pressure to develop theories comes from peoples ethical beliefs. 
Some technical theories are developed and maintained because they 
are thought to promote equality or freedom, or democracy or 
social justice or some other such ideal, sometimes in the face of 
evidence to the contrary. For this and other reasons the 
introduction of ethical considerations into technical theory 
tends to distort it, just as it tends to distort and change 
academic theory. Theories with an ethical dimension are a 
separate category; one to which we must now turn. 
C. Practical Theory (b) Ethical Theory The third type of theory 
is educational theory in its broadest sense. This is sometimes 
called 'general theory' and is a comprehensive form of theory 
which sets out the proper aims of education as such together with 
the right means of achieving them, thus subsuming academic and 
technical theory within itself. It is the kind of theory we 
associate with 'great educational thinkers', and so may be termed 
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'traditional theory'. But despite its pedigree the nature and 
legitimacy of this kind of theory is a matter of dispute. As we 
saw in the first part of this Chapter, it is dismissed by 
positivists such as O'Connor as wholly bogus, while Hirst places 
it firmly within academic theory. However, it is upon W.T. 
Moore's fuller analysis and more elaborate, though ambiguous, 
defence that we shall concentrate. Moore's case is that general 
educational theory is a composite of values and aims, factual 
accounts (academic theory) and methodological prescriptions 
(technical theoryl, each of which can be separated and subjected 
to their own standards of truth and adequacy and thereby testable 
and refutable in their own right. It was concluded in Part I 
that the logic of values is such that they, and the theories that 
embody them, cannot be a matter of academic knowledge. This was 
to go part of the way with O'Connor, but not to the extent of 
dismissing this kind of theory as so much hot air. There is 
still a need to answer Moore's case more fully in a way that 
deals with general theory as a whole and assesses its possible 
relation to practice. 
The weakness of traditional theory is the absence of any 
decision-procedure for judging between claims of ultimate value, 
rendering objective knowledge impossible. Hirst sees this as a 
temporary problem, O'Connor as a fatal and permanent flaw. 
Moore, however, is ambiguous, not to say confused. He insists on 
the rationality of values, such that value claims are subject to 
rational scrutiny and reasoned rejection. At the same time he 
jibs at the consequences of this view, that there is an ultimate 
set of values more rational than any other. Indeed, he admits 
that: 
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... all assumptions of ultimate 
value •.. Carel, •• in a sense, unsupported. Cp. 
53) 
There is no doubt a case for saying that sets of values may be 
open to rational criticism if they lack internal coherence, but 
this is not the notion of rational values that Hirst and O'Connor 
are arguing about. Nor is it all that Moore has in mind, for he 
argues that the values and ideals a thinker promotes may be open 
to moral criticism, but then seems half aware that he is missing 
the point by remarking that the criticism itself may be open to 
such criticism. 
What is true of values is equally true of the aims which 
embody them. Educational aims are ethical in form, setting out 
those ideals of the good man, good life and good society towards 
which we have an obligation to strive in our educational 
practice. But there is still no higher standard in terms of 
which one set of aims can be shown to be superior to any other in 
any absolute sense. So the first part of Moore's case, requiring 
the rationality, testability and refutability of aims, must fall. 
However, much of Moore's case would seem to remain 
intact. All general theories contain a factual element with 
which the aims must be compatible if they are to be achievable, 
and a methodological element setting out methods which are 
demonstrably capable of achieving these aims. One might expect 
such further elements to be open to test and refutation. But if 
it can be shown that the factual and technical elements are not 
in fact independent of the aims, that they are equally 
value-laden and therefore not wholly susceptable to the normal 
standards of test and refutability, then Moore's whole case must 
fall. 
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The most important factual element Moore is concerned 
with is factual theories of human nature, which he insists is an 
essential element of all general theories. He writes: 
All see education as a means to an end, 
although the ends are differently formulated. 
All make assumptions about human nature, 
although the assumptions they make are not the 
same. All make the assumption that the 
pedagogy they prescribe is appropriate to the 
end they wish to realise. In each case there 
is a prescriptive means-ends model, of the 
form: Since men are like this, then, if you 
want to achieve a given end~ a 'just' man, a 
'natural' man, a 'modern' man, you must 
organise your educational arrangements in 
such-and-such a way. (p. 47) 
It is clear from this that Moore sees the function of theories of 
human nature as no more than guaranteeing the efficacy of the 
methods a theory prescribes. But this misses the point entirely. 
The essential point is that aims of good man, good life and good 
society are not just an attractive assemblage of possibilities 
selected from the wide circle of possibility set by human nature; 
rather, they are the expression of the essence of human nature, 
in the sense that ideal man and ideal life represent the human 
essence fully realised, and the ideal society and ideal education 
are those social and educational arrangements which facilitate 
this human flourishing. It is this reasoning that gives these 
general theories their moral force. But this could not be 
achieved if the theories of human nature were strictly factual. 
It is only because the theorist builds his values into his 
account of essential human nature that from it he can infer his 
ideals of man and society by way of the sort of argument 
characteristic of this form of theorizing: this is the nature of 
man, therefore this is the kind of society and the kind of 
education appropriate to his nature. That such accounts of human 
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nature function in this way, rather than merely underpinning 
method as Moore assumes, is clear from the examples of general 
theories of the past that Moore cites the theories of Plato, 
Rousseau, James Mill and Dewey. The essence of Platonic man, his 
rational moral soul, can only be fully developed through Platonic 
education in a Platonic state. And much the same can be said of 
Rousseau's 'natural man', James Mill's utilitarian man and 
Dewey's democratic citizen. They all represent an actualisation 
of human potential. But not all potentiality, good and bad: only 
those qualities the theorist regards as quintessential and 
definitive of man, and which are, in effect, a reflection of his 
values. 
Moore does in fact criticise these accounts of human 
nature on the grounds that they are 'metaphysical' and therefore 
not testable or refutable, which is indeed the case. But he 
fails to realise that they are necessarily so. He believes that 
modern general theory can dispense with such metaphysics 
replacing it with social scientific conclusions, a view that only 
has plausibility if accounts of human nature do no more than 
underpin method. But social scientific conclusions could not 
perform the same function as morally charged accounts of the 
human essence, for no educational aims, no ideals for which we 
should strive, could be inferred from them. Besides, in this 
kind of theorising mere facts can easily be sidestepped or 
interpreted into insignificance. If certain observed facts of 
human behaviour are suggestive of inconvenient limitation then, 
for example, a follower of Rousseau can invoke his theory of 
human perfectability, while a Marxist would insist that such 
limitations are historically specific and would no longer hold at 
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another historical stage. Finally, human nature, as manifested 
in human behaviour, is multi-faceted, and general theories, if 
they are to have any coherence, must be selective in that they 
must concentrate only on aspects of human nature picked out as 
peculiarly significant; be it man's rationality, inherent freedom 
and/or equality, moral sense, competitiveness, co-operativeness, 
or whatever. The manner and results of this selection is a 
function of each theorist's values, for selection is evaluation. 
The morally-charged and metaphysical character of these accounts 
of essential man, and their necessary connection with aims within 
a general theory, is therefore inescapable. Their truth is not a 
matter of evidence or demonstration but of faith, something we 
either believe in or not. As such they may help us to ethically 
evaluate the human world, but cannot add to our knowledge of it. 
Consequently, claims that any of these accounts of man are 
objective, factual or explanatory are bogus. The second part of 
Moore's case thus falls. 
The final element in Moore's case is the methodological 
or technically prescriptive. Technical theory, as we have seen, 
has its own criteria of adequacy concerned with efficacy rather 
than truth, and so is not part of academic knowledge anyway. 
However, what matters here is the relationship with aims. This 
is complicated because educational writings such as Plato's 
Republic, Rousseau's Emile or Dewey's Education and IJemocracy are 
full of practical educational ideas of various kinds and with 
various relationships with the rest of the theory; and many of 
them can indeed be detached and tested independently (many, 
indeed, pop up in different theories). But that a practical 
proposal can be independently tested in relation to some limited 
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aim is not the issue. All that is significant in respect of 
Moore's case is whether practical proposals can be independently 
tested as effective in relation to the overall aims of the good 
man or the good society. Thus, Plato may suggest a method of 
teaching geometry which happens to be effective, but this would 
not mean that a teacher using it was putting Plato's general 
theory into practice; the fact that for a Platonist geometry is 
the royal road to the Forms is neither here nor there. This is 
true of most practical proposals, even where, as with Dewey's 
problem solving methods, they appear closely related to the aims 
of the theory. Moore's problem is to demonstrate how the aims 
can be achieved by the methods, given that aims are not factual, 
as they may appear to be, but value-laden and metaphysical. Such 
aims cannot be set out in factual terms that could be acceptable 
to a neutral observer, nor in any way that would enable that 
observer to judge whether the methods were capable of achieving 
those aims. To put it crudely, how would we know Rousseau's 
'natural man' if we met him in the street, and so how could we 
tell whether or not Rousseau's method was effective in producing 
him. The need to satisfy the neutral observer is important here, 
since the convinced Rousseauist may insist that certain methods 
do constitute 'education according to nature' and any individual 
thus educated who happens to have the appropriate characteristics 
must therefore be a 'natural man' <and if he does not it is 
because the methods were not properly applied or the corruptihg 
influence of society was too strong in this case). This can be 
done, but only at the price of removing the possibility of any 
effective test, for then the theory must hold whatever the 
evidence. The whole thing becomes a matter of faith and nothing 
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to do with knowledge. Thus, either the methodological element in 
general theory cannot in principle be shown to achieve the aims, 
or their connection is a matter of necessary truth beyond all 
test. Either way Moore's case collapses. 
Thus, none of the criteria for objective academic 
knowledge are appropriate or operative in the case of general 
theory. They are simply not the kind of theories Moore and Hirst 
think they are. But if that is so then there is an obvious 
question as to what kind of theories they can be. The most 
obvious parallel is with political theory with which educational 
theory is often associated, indeed as Moore points out: 
An educational theory .•. may often be best 
understood in terms of a social or political 
theory, directly or indirectly connected with 
it. Cp. 261 
As this implies, general educational theory is often an 
extension of political theory, part of a wider system of 
political belief; though perhaps not necessarily so. The main 
difference is that the practical proposals are educational rather 
than political. What is much more important is that they appear 
to share a common form, in the sense of similar elements in 
similar relationships with each other. Traditional political 
theory is also characterised by fact and value, explanation and 
prescription, so arranged and so connected as to show us the 
means of achieving the good man and the good society. Certainly 
some, and sometimes all such theories are regularly described as 
ideological, and this suggests that some or all general 
educational theories might be similarly classified. Indeed, if 
the above arguments are correct and general educational theories, 
despite their claims, cannot be objective theories, then a very 
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good case can be made for classifying all of them as ideological. 
But before examining this matter more fully, it is necessary to 
complete the immediate task of relating different kinds of theory 
to educational practice. 
Ethical theories do not, as most claim to do, provide us 
with the factual knowledge that practice needs to take account 
of, for that is the business of academic theory. Nor, strictly 
speaking, do they provide technical advice, which is properly the 
province of technical theory. What they do provide is an ethical 
framework for evaluating and justifying institutions, practices 
and policies. They provide a bridge between the values we 
believe in and what we do in the world, and by so doing give 
substance and direction to our desire to do what is right. 
******* 
Academic theory is 'theory' in the fullest sense; that 
is, factual, descriptive, objective, explanatory and refutable. 
Technical theory embodies objective knowledge of a different 
sort, but which shares, in varying degrees, some of the logic of 
scientific theory. But it is nevertheless an attenuated sense of 
'theory', concerned as it is with effectiveness rather than 
truth; and so 'quasi-theory' seems an appropriate way of summing 
it up. What is curious about ethical theory is its seeming to 
appear all things to all men. It has a characteristic and quite 
spurious claim to comprehensiveness and objective knowledge and 
hence it is 'pseudo-theory'. But it is so only in a limited 
sense. It is not so to the extent of justifying O'Connor's jibe, 
quoted at the beginning of Part I, of it being no more than 
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'muddle, twaddle and quacksalving'. Properly understood ethical 
theory does serve a useful purpose as a means of evaluating and 
justifying our actions. O'Connor may still dismiss it as 
'pretentious and contemptible', but his own alternative of 
relying on 'currently accepted notions of human welfare' hardly 
bears examination. The interesting question this raises is how 
essential is the function that this kind of theory performs; can 
we indeed do without ethical theory? This is a question we will 
return to later. 
3. Educational Theory and Political Theory 
The analysis of educational theory in the last two 
sections answers some questions but provokes others, particularly 
in respect of general educational theory (henceforth simply 
'educational theory'). A starting point is provided by T.W. 
Moore's remark that certain educational theories may best be 
understood in terms of the political theories to which they are 
related. This would certainly seem to be true of the theories he 
discusses - those of Plato, Rousseau, James Mill and Dewey - each 
of which is closely connected with the political ideas of their 
authors. But even educational theories which are not formally 
integrated into wider political theories would nevertheless 
appear to have some relationship with political theory in terms 
of both form and content. Both kinds of theory are centrally 
concerned with ideals and the practical means of achieving them, 
while the kinds of ideals they pursue are ultimately the same: 
the good man, the good life, the good society. But what, then, 
is the relationship between these two types of theory? Is 
educational theory an appendage or extension of political theory, 
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or are other relationships possible? Again, even if it is 
generally true that some relationship exists, is this always the 
case? Must every political theory imply an educational one, and 
vice versa? And if not, what kind of educational theory would 
not imply a political one? However these questions may be 
answered, it would seem that to understand educational theory 
fully does require a wider understanding of political theory. 
But this is no straightfoward matter, since the nature of 
theory is even more controversial in politics than in education. 
However, in The Nature of Politic~?] Theory [7J, David Miller and 
Larry Siedentop present what is perhaps the standard view: 
Political theory is, therefore, an essentially 
mb:ed mode of thought. It not only embraces 
deductive argument and empirical theory, but 
combines these with normative concerns ... , so 
acquiring a practical, action-guiding 
character. Cp. 1) 
This combination of elements can, on their account, constitute 
objective knowledge because it is subject to the truth criteria 
appropriate as its separate parts Cpp. 11-12>; hence Siedentop 
calls it •academic political theory' Cp. 53). The contrast they 
draw is with ideology, which is concerned with "defending or 
propagating the interests of particular social groups or classes" 
Cp. 1). The distinction here appears to be not a matter of 
structure or content but, in somewhat Aristotelian manner, a 
difference between proper and degenerate forms of the same thing 
- one objective and the other biased. But this raises some 
awkward questions for the present analysis. If such a dichotomy 
exists in political theory, why not in educational theory? Why 
can there not be •academic educational theory'? In other words, 
is the suggestion of the last section, that educational theory 
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might be properly characterised as ideological, false, or 
misleading, or at least applicable to only some theories. 
Indeed, was the application of the term appropriate at all, 
particularly when group or class interests was not mentioned as a 
factor in the analysis? 
There are, therefore, a host of questions surrounding the 
nature of political and educational theory and the relationship 
between them, and the two types of theory are sufficiently 
related and similar for the examination of either to throw light 
upon the other. The key question in this is the nature of 
ideology. If that contentious matter can be settled then there 
is reason to hope that the rest will fall into place. We could 
then see if the account of educational theory in the last section 
is accurate and comprehensive; we could see if the distinction 
between academic theory and ideology can hold in respect of 
either education or politics; we might then map out the general 
relationship between political and educational theory, and see 
whether this is comprehensive or whether a wider, non-political 
notion of ideology is required that will have implications for 
educational theory. Finally, we may be able to offer some 
general reflections upon the role of ideology in our thinking: 
whether we can eradicate it and whether we ought to try. But the 
first task is to examine the nature of political ideology with a 
view to arriving at a neutral and objective concept, one not 
dependent on prior beliefs and values that would render it 
academically useless. This will take up the next seven chapters, 
and we will begin by looking at some existing theories of 
ideology to see what, if anything, they have to recommend them. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
IDEOLOGY AND CONFUSION 
Among political concepts none is more muddled or more 
fraught than ideology. This is not the want of theories to 
define and explain it. On the contrary, there is a perplexing 
array of definitions and usages which are all in strident 
competition. Escape from this confusion lies in determining what 
kind of theory can settle the matter, and the first step must be 
to assess the weaknesses and potentialities of existing types. 
There are broadly three of these, associated with the fields of 
normative political theory, social science and philosophy, each 
of which must be examined in turn. 
1. Ideology and Political Theory 
It was in the field of normative political theory that the modern 
debate about the nature of ideology originated and where it still 
centres. More precisely, it was Marx's theory of ideology that 
began the debate and which still tends to dominate it. 
I 
Marx's theory of ideology is a very large and complex 
topic. This is partly because Marx conceived of ideology as an 
all-pervasive feature of human lite and thought; but also, in 
part, because despite the concept's critical role in his overall 
system of ideas Marx never defined it, never gave a systematic 
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account of it, never indicated which of the different ways he 
used the term were the significant ones. As Professor Allen Wood 
points out: "Marx is conspicuously unclear as to what he means by 
'ideology'". [1) Nevertheless, it is possible to outline broadly 
what Marx seems to have had in mind. 
For Marx, ideology is thought that appears to be 
objectively true but which in fact is systematically biased in 
favour of a particular social class; it is the disguised 
expression of class interests. What at first sight may appear to 
be pure philosophy or theology or science, may in reality be 
ideological in that it obliquely but effectively promotes the 
particular interests and values of a class. This indirect 
promotion is achieved through the justification of the class's 
social dominance or aspiration to dominance. Thus, the mediaeval 
conception of the human world as a microcosm reflecting God's 
ordering of the universe effectively justified the dominance and 
power of the feudal aristocracy, while seemingly scientific 
classical economics effectively justified the power and position 
of the bourgeoisie. If the whole of society believes the 
ideology to be objectively true and the values of the class are 
upheld, then the position of the class is legitimated and secured 
or, in the case of an emerging class, its cause deemed just. 
The Marxist concepts of ideology and class are intimately 
related. All ideology is class ideology. Only with the 
acquisition of an ideology is a class fully formed; only then is 
it a class for itself as well as in itself, is it fully 
self-conscious. The ideology expresses the class's view of the 
world, its lileltansc!Jaut.tng; though it is a distorted view from a 
narrow, self-interested position. All classes may have 
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ideologies, but in any given society it is the ideology of the 
ruling class that predominates: 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every 
epoch the ruling ideas, ie. the class which is 
the ruling material force of society is at the 
same time its ruling intellectual force. The 
class which has the material means of 
production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production, 
so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas 
of those who lack the means of mental 
production are subject to it. 
('The German Ideology' p.64l [2] 
Within the ruling class there are those who are its "conceptive 
ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class 
about itself their chief source of livelihood" (ibid). Their 
function, albeit unconscious, is to keep subordinate classes in 
thrall, so that they see their own exploitation and oppression as 
part of a just ordering of society. Ideology, therefore is as 
much an instrument of class domination as the state and its laws: 
indeed, it is a more insidious and effective one. Ideology is, 
for Marx, a vital piece of social mechanism, being a principle 
means by which the ruling class maintains its position and social 
stability is preserved. 
Class domination and the ideology that sustains it, along 
with the alienation and oppression of those subject to it, are 
all features of every class society. But capitalist society is a 
special case. While the proletariat is destined to suffer more 
cruelly than any previous oppressed class, it is also destined to 
be the class that by the very harshness of its lot will, as a 
matter of brute survival, cease to be taken in by ideology and 
see its condition as it truly is. This will involve the 
recognition that capitalist society must be overthrown and 
replaced by a classless society where exploitation will no longer 
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be possible and in consequence ideology will cease to exist. 
This truth about the world is of course Marxism, which, despite 
being the f.tleltansc.baaung of a particular class, is nevertheless 
not ideology but true science. [JJ 
Marx's theory has much plausibility, but it cannot in the 
end be adequate. A great many objections can and have been 
levelled against it. But two kinds of objection are especially 
important in the present context since one or other tends to 
afflict most theories of ideology and generally bedevil and 
obscure the whole topic. These two sorts of objection relate 
respectively to the two dimensions of Marxism, as normative 
political theory and as sociology. Problems relating to Marxism 
as social science will be dealt with a little later. The problem 
in relation to political theory is the problem of objectivity. 
Marx's theory of ideology is of doubtful adequacy 
precisely because it is part of a normative political theory. An 
adequate theory of ideology must be an objectively true one. But 
no theory can be objectively true if it embodies political 
values, or if it depends for its sense and coherence upon a wider 
theory which is loaded with values and dependent on faith. Put 
another way, a political commitment to particular values and 
untestable beliefs cannot be a condition of the theory's 
acceptance. But this is just the case with the Marxist 
conception. The whole of Marxist theory presumes a vision of 
human nature which is necessarily distorted and degraded by the 
experience of class society, and will only flourish and fulfil 
its potential if a certain political programme is successfully 
pursued and society is organised in a particular way. None of 
this is open to scientific investigation or is demonstrable by 
- 53 -
any objective means. But it is just this kind of value-laden, 
non-testable network of ideas that the Marxist concept of 
ideology is firmly locked into. In consequence, ideology is 
necessarily an evil: it is a necessary part of the process by 
which class society dehumanises people; part of the process by 
which human beings are prevented from enjoying their true 
relationship with nature. It is a function of inequality and 
oppression, in that it can only arise in unequal and unfree 
societies and can only be eliminated in a fully free and full 
equal society. His concept of ideology is part of what Marx means 
by inequality and oppression, and these in turn are build into 
his concept of ideology. Consequently, to accept fully the 
Marxist concept of ideology involves accepting that capitalist 
society is an evil and that communist society embodies what is 
ultimately good for man. 
David Mclellan's recent book 'ideology' [4] illustrates 
some of these points. In it Mclellan gives a brief but scholarly 
and fair-minded account of the development of different 
conceptions of ideology, both Marxist and non-Marxist. He 
acknowledges that the situation is confused and comes to no firm 
conclusion of his own. But he does make clear in the very last 
paragraph, and on the basis of no previous argumentation, that a 
satisfactory account must: 
.•• preserve the concept's critical potential 
by linking it with analyses of control and 
domination ••. [Because] ideology is ... an 
aspect of every system of signs and symbols in 
so far as they are implicated in an asymetrical 
distribution of power and resources. [So that] 
although in principle there could be an end to 
ideology, it is certainly nowhere in sight -
not even on the horizon. [5] 
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In other words, we live in a world characterised by class 
domination which generates ideological illusions. This must be 
analysed and criticised, but ideology's disappearance and 
replacement by a genuinely scientific understanding can only 
follow a social transformation in which class domination is 
eliminated. Thus, Mclellan's essentially Marxist vision of 
social reality is contained in his concept of ideology, even 
though that concept is incomplete. In laying down limits to what 
is acceptable in an account of ideology he effectively affirms 
his Marxist faith. 
Finally, it could be argued that the Marxist concept can 
be assessed independently of the rest of Marxism; that we can 
have a concept of ideology which simply says that it is a 
disguised expression of class interest. We can strip away the 
connections with untestable beliefs and excise the Marxist 
values. This is true. But the point is that while we might have 
a similar conception of ideology, it would not be a Marxist one. 
II 
If the Marxist conception of ideology is unacceptable on 
the grounds that it is bound up with a wider normative theory, 
then Liberal and Conservative conceptions must be similarly 
rejected if they are inseparable from Liberal or Conservative 
beliefs and values. 
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A clear example of the Liberal conception of ideology is 
provided by Louis J. Halle's 'The Ideological Imagination'. [6J 
Of the meaning of 'ideology' Halle writes: 
••• I confine it to bodies of doctrine that 
present themselves as affording systems of 
beliefs so complete that the whole population 
may live by them alone, that are made known and 
interpreted by leaders ostensibly possessed of 
special genius or by organised elites not 
unlike priesthoods, that claim exclusive 
authority as representing something like 
revealed truth, and that consequently require 
the suppression of whatever does not conform. 
Perhaps I should put it that I am concerned 
here only with systems of belief that are 
implicitly totalitarian. 
It will be seen that "ideology", so 
defined, not only excludes liberal democracy 
but is its opposite. For liberal democracy is 
based on the assumption that none of us us 
mortals have a privileged knowledge of truth, 
that equally honest and intelligent men will 
disagree in their identification of it. 
Therefore, instead of undertaking to abolish 
diversity it seeks to accommodate it, providing 
an open marketplace in which men of varying 
beliefs may compete in offering their 
intellectual wares to the public. Such a 
marketplace, in order to accommodate diversity, 
requires freedom of speech and mutual 
tolerance. (pp.5/6) 
Thus, ideology is inseparable from totalitarianism, which is the 
antithesis of all the Liberal holds dear, embodying the very 
opposite of liberty, tolerance and rationality, of enlightenment 
and progress. An ideology is a 'closed' system of ideas which 
inevitably leads to a 'closed society' in which freedom has not 
place. Hence, Bernard Crick, in the course of a very similar 
account of ideology, insists that "the idea of an ideology of 
freedom is a contradiction in terms". [7J Like the Marxist, 
therefore, the Liberal defines ideology in terms of his own 
values, and in such a way as to embrace rival political beliefs 
but not his own. However, the Liberal does have to make an 
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exception for Conservativism which does not fit his definition 
and which must be attacked on other grounds. F.A. Hayek, for 
example, dismisses Conservatism for its distrust of theory, 
obscurantism and imperviousness to fact and argument; the 
Conservative, he says, is "essentially opportunistic and lacks 
pr in ci p 1 es. " [ 8 J 
Traditional Conservatives [9] do express their distrust 
in what they call 'abstract theory' in politics, and indeed this 
is precisely what the Conservative means by 'ideology'. Sir Ian 
Gilmour writes: 
No British Conservative has produced a system 
of abstract political ideas or an ideology ... 
The reason for the absence of British 
Conservative systems is the Tory dislike of 
abstract theorizing ... It is thus part of the 
essence of british Conservatism to be free from 
systems. [ 10 J 
This strand of Conservative thinking goes back to Edmund Burke's 
condemnation of the French Revolutionaries, and of anyone else 
who based their politics on such abstractions as 'the rights of 
man'. Government is seen as a wholly pragmatic business, 
attending to the real needs and interests of real people. The 
metaphysical theories of "speculists" and "visionary politicians" 
[11] can only lead to "wild and dangerous politics". [12] 
Similar views can be found in the writings of modern 
Conservatives, as with Michael Oakeshott's warnings against the 
dangers of "rationalism in politics". [13] However, it is 
important to notice that what is involved here is more than just 
the notion that the application of abstract theories to politics 
is generally unwise, since this is a practical judgement that 
anyone might hold. What the Conservative thinks is that it is 
necessarily produces evil consequences. This necessity in turn 
- 57 -
implies theory, so that despite what is claimed, Conservatism is 
far from theoryless. Gilmour, for example, claims that 
Conservatism is "based on fact and human nature", [141 but the 
selection of appropriate facts [15] and the determination of what 
is essential human nature both require some kind of abstract 
theory to guide them; while Burke's view that politics derived 
from abstract theory is "at war with nature" [16] must involve a 
sophisticated theory that explains what 'nature' in human affairs 
amounts to. [171 Thus, there is plenty of Conservative theory 
which expresses Conservative beliefs and values, and which 
defines rival beliefs and values as ideological. 
Each of the three accounts of ideology so far discussed is 
partisan. They are each designed to defend a set of values and 
beliefs by characterising rival values and beliefs as false and 
dangerous thinking. To hold any one of them as the true account 
of ideology involves holding the values and beliefs that go with 
it. Since it is an objective account of ideology that we are 
looking for, it is therefore necessary to look elsewhere. 
2. Ideology and Social Science 
The second major source of theories of ideology is social 
science, and particularly sociology. In considering such 
theories Marxism is again the obvious place to start, not only 
because of the theory's intrinsic importance but because other 
social scientific theories are frequently derivatives of it. 
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I 
Putting questions of values to one side, the adequacy of 
Marx's theory of ideology, as a sociological theory, revolves 
around two related issues. The first is the problem of 
determinism and social mechanism, while the second question 
concerns the appropriateness of using sociological criteria to 
determine the nature of a form of thought. 
Marx did not believe that human thought was autonomous 
but saw it as the automatic by-product of socio-economic 
processes: 
We set out from the real, active men, and on 
the basis of their real life-process we 
demonstrate the development of the ideological 
reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The 
phantoms formed in the human brain are also, 
necessarily, sublimates of their material 
life-process, which is empirically verifiable 
and bound to material premises. Morality, 
religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology 
and their corresponding forms of consciousness, 
thus no longer retain the semblance of 
independence. They have no history, no 
development; but men, developing their material 
production and their material intercourse, 
alter, along with this their real existence, 
their thinking and the products of their 
thinking. [18] 
Independent thought and intellectual progress are, therefore, 
illusory. Men's ideas and beliefs about the world are simply 
'reflexes' of their class experience: 
It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their existence, but, on the 
contrary, their social existence determines 
their consciousness. [19] 
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Consequently: 
... man's consciousness changes with every 
change in the condition of his material 
existence ••. intellectual production changes 
its character in proportion as material 
production is changed .. [20l 
so that to every kind of socio-economic structure there 
"correspond definite forms of social consciousnesses. (ibid). 
Furthermore, if ideas and beliefs are strictly determined in this 
way then it must be possible to explain ideas and beliefs in 
terms of the material conditions that gave rise to them. 
Beginning with the "real processes of production", it is possible 
to: 
•.• explain all the different theoretical 
products and forms of consciousness, religion, 
philosophy, ethics, etc., etc., and trace their 
origins and growth from that basis ... not 
explain practice from the idea but explain the 
formation of ideas from material practice. [21] 
Thus, Marx frequently insists that to understand the nature of 
most ideas one must ask whose interests are served by them. This 
will reveal their ideological nature. Ideologies, therefore, 
need to be 'unmasked', by showing that whatever their surface 
form may be, they are expressions of class interests. There can 
be no alternative explanations since men's ideas and beliefs are 
merely "the direct efflux of their material behaviour". [22] 
On the basis of these passages, and many more that might 
be added, Marx would appear to be a thoroughgoing determinist. 
But if this is so then the Marxist account of consciousness is 
open to some very serious objections. If 'social existence' does 
determine consciousness - that is, if class position does 
determine the way we think - then it simply does not make sense 
- 60 -
to say that the "ruling ideas of each age have ever been the 
ideas of its ruling class", E23J for that would mean that the 
vast majority of people throughout history did not have their 
thinking determined by their class position but in fact possessed 
the ideas and beliefs of a minority whose social existence they 
did not share. Still less does it make sense to claim (as Marx 
and Engels do of themselves) that people of one class can 
discover the ideas and beliefs appropriate to another class. 
Again, if social background determines consciousness then the 
same background must produce the same consciousness; but it is a 
matter of common observation that members of the same family do 
not always share the same beliefs, let alone whole social strata. 
Another point is that there is clearly something wrong with the 
notion that our social existence is the cause and our ideas and 
beliefs are the effects; this is because our social existence is 
largely constituted by our ideas and beliefs, leaving no room for 
the causal relation. It also makes little sense to recommend 
that people adopt Marxism because it is scientific and therefore 
rationally superior to other ideas and beliefs about society. If 
what people believe is causally determined then they are not open 
to persuasion, and rationality does not come into it at all. We 
judge rational belief and action on the basis of whether they 
have been chosen for the best reasons; but since caused thought 
entails the absence of choice then it must entail the absence of 
rationality. If people are socially programmed to produce and 
respond to ideas by causal necessity then reason, meaning and 
understanding have no part to play, any more than they have to 
play within the computer. And if ideas have no meanings but only 
effects then no theory has any claim to be superior to any other. 
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Indeed, any theory asserting the causal determinism of thought 
undermines itself in this way. It follows from this that if Marx 
is as deterministic as the above passages suggest then his 
account of consciousness, and therefore of ideology, is 
self-destructive and incoherent. 
But although strict determinism is the official doctrine 
of Marxist-Leninists (for whom the keys were passed to Lenin via 
Engels), not all Marxists accept this. They point to passages 
where Marx insists that "men make their own history" [24] and are 
"both the authors and the actors of their own drama" E25J; that 
is, passages implying that men have free will. Such passages are 
a tiny minority of those that are relevant to the issue, yet are 
nevertheless sufficient to introduce a note of doubt. Wood 
points out that Marx never seriously addressed the question, and 
might be correct in suggesting that Marx was in fact a 
•compatibilist', simply assuming that there was no conflict 
between free will and determinism. E26J Marx may have been a 
compatibilist first of all in the broad sense of being a 
determinist in respect of the workings of society and the 
movement of history, while believing in free will in the ordinary 
sense of our everyday thought and action which might conceivably 
advance or retard wider developments but not alter them. He may 
also have been a compatibilist in the narrower sense of believing 
that the communist revolution will release men from historical 
determinism. In the words of Engels: 
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Man's own social organisation, hitherto 
confronting him as a necessity imposed by 
nature and history, now becomes the result of 
his own free action ... It is the ascent of man 
from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of 
freedom. [27] 
Either version of compatibilism would make Marx and partial 
determinist. But it is determinism or non-determinism which is 
the main issue, and one which must be settled. 
It is not numbers of passages leaning one way or the 
other that is the important criterion in this context, or even 
what Marx might have said had he been more forthcoming on the 
matter. Whether or not Marx was a determinist has to be judged 
according to what place free will or determinism has in Marx's 
system as a whole. The first and obvious point is that Marx was 
philosophically a materialist and ruled out the autonomy of mind 
or spirit, which consequently have no determining role in 
history. Furthermore, his stages of history are necessary 
stages; his sociology is founded on the principle that base 
determines superstructure; while the collapse of capitalism and 
the subsequent triumph of communism are guaranteed by the 
"natural laws of capitalist production ... working with iron 
necessity towards inevitable results". [28] But none of this 
would be possible if the activities of free-thinking men could 
cut across the pre-ordained historical sequence, or even 
interfere with such secondary features as "no social order ever 
disappears before all the productive forces ... have been 
developed" [29] and thereby set history off in a different 
direction. This argument works against full determinism and also 
against partial determinism. It is simply absurd to suggest that 
large scale events are governed by 'iron necessity' if the 
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individual human actions of which such events are composed could 
all have been different. Marx~ therefore, has to be a 
determinist because otherwise his system of ideas will not hang 
together. To this extent Allen Wood is wrong in suggesting that 
because Marx never directly addressed himself to the question it 
is impossible to decide whether he was a determinist or not. [30] 
Wood is also wrong in maintaining that nothing turns on the 
issue, [31] since if the earlier arguments showing the 
incoherence of determinism are correct then it is not too 
dramatic to say that everything hangs on the issue. Even if 
compatibilism does express Marx's view this cannot alter the fact 
that there is no room for free will in his system and that 
without determinism the Marxist account of reality does not make 
sense. 
*** 
Determinism is, therefore, essential to Marx's system of 
ideas as a whole. But more particularly, it is essential to the 
coherence of Marx's concept of ideology as the disguised 
expression of class interests. Without it the very notion of 
class interests is unintelligible, while determinism is further 
needed to link together the otherwise disparate elements that go 
to make up the concept: class interests; various kinds of ideas 
that are not logically connected with class interests; and false 
and distortionary thinking. 
- 64 -
Class interest is not the simple notion it may at first 
appear. One may speak in very broad terms about the interests of 
this or that class, but any attempt to be precise in these 
matters invariably runs into an array of difficulties. To take a 
very simple example, we may wish to say that it is in the present 
interests of the working class that it achieves a higher standard 
of living. But it is not self-evident whether a socialist, a 
social democratic or an unrestrained capitalistic society will 
best achieve this. Again, some would argue that the welfare 
state and the managed economy of the post-war world were 
manifestly in the interests of the working class; but some have 
argued that such policies have in the end only led to inflation 
and mass unemployment, while others still have insisted that 
prosperity and welfare services have only served to stifle 
working class demands for a just society and have therefore 
worked against their true interests. Among the working class 
themselves, and among those seen as their representatives, there 
is profound disagreement on such matters; and this is always true 
of any class. There is disagreement about values and aims, about 
short-term and long-term interests, and about what policies will 
succeed and how events will turn out. And since the past is 
ambiguous, the present confusingly complex and the future a 
blank, who can say with certainty where anyone's real interests 
lay? The Marxist, however, makes just such a claim to certainty 
because he has a theory which purports to lay down the course of 
events past, present and future, and from which the 'objective' 
interests of any class can simply be read off. But the theory 
can only do this if it is a deterministic one. That is, in 
judging the interests of a class in the past the theory must rule 
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out the possibility that history might have been substantially 
different if the class had behaved in a different way, and, more 
importantly, the theory must rule out the possibility of 
alternative futures, otherwise anything is possible and no-one 
can be certain what the best course is. Thus, it is only because 
he has recourse to a deterministic historical framework that the 
Marxist can claim to know what the objective interests of any 
class are, irrespective of what the members of that class 
themselves think. 
The same deterministic theory that is necessary for 
establishing what the objective interests of any class are, is 
also essential for picking out which ideas and persons, among the 
variety that may be available, best express those objective 
interests at a given time. But having identified these ideas the 
deterministic theory is essential yet again for demonstrating the 
necessary link between the ideas and the objective class 
interests they are supposed to represent. This is necessary 
because the kinds of ideas Marx and Engels deem to be ideological 
are not the explicit expressions of class interest but the 
disguised expressions of such interests. This has to be so, 
otherwise it would not make sense to talk of 'illusions' or 
'unmasking' or even of 'false consciousness'. As Engels points 
out, not even the ideologist is aware of the true nature of the 
ideas he develops, E32J or their true origins: 
••. the jurist imagines he is operating with a 
priori propositions, whereas they are really 
only economic refle}:es ... [33] ••• Ideology is a 
process accomplished by the so-called thinker 
consciously, it is true, but u..1i th a false 
consciousness. The real motive forces 
impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise 
it simply would not be an ideological process. 
[ 34] 
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The kinds ideas that Marx and Engels characterise as ideological 
are those expressed in universal terms, such a metaphysics, 
jurisprudence, ethics and economic theory; and precisely because 
of this universality they display no necessary connection with 
any class and contain no element that can be logically identified 
as necessarily ideological. Consequently, no logical analysis 
can reveal what is and is not ideological. The only kind of 
analysis that can identify is sociological analysis. What this 
kind of analysis consists in is the establishment of a congruence 
between the presumed social effects of a set of ideas (for 
example, to induce an acceptance of the status quo among the 
lower orders) and the supposed interests of a particular class. 
This would seem to be a very dubious methodology since the social 
effects of any ideas being widely accepted is quite contingent 
and wholly unpredictable. What makes it possible to establish 
any congruence by this means is that the sociological analysis is 
based upon a theory which sets out what the objective interests 
of classes are, what ideas are significant and what the social 
effects of these ideas must be; and the theory could do none of 
these things unless it were a deterministic one. The theory must 
show that there is a necessary relationship between a given set 
of ideas, irrespective of logical content, and the interests of a 
given class, irrespective of the views of its members; and it 
must also show that a certain class inevitably generates certain 
ideas in a given historical period. Without this deterministic 
framework the Marxian conception of ideology falls apart: what a 
class's interests are, what ideas are significant and what social 
effects these ideas will have, all become impossible to 
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establish, and any relations between them simply dissolve. 
However, the necessary relationship with a class's 
interests, which the deterministic theory establishes, is not in 
itself a sufficient condition for labelling a set of ideas 
'ideological' on the Marx-Engels view, otherwise their own theory 
would fall into the category. Ideology must also be 'false 
consciousness'. [35] Marxists do tend to assume automatically 
that ideas presumed to favour, or are favoured by, any 
non-proletarian class must be ideological, and therefore false 
and distortionary. [36] But there is no necessary relationship 
between false and distortionary ideas and class interests; one 
cannot entail the other. What is in a class's interest must be a 
matter of circumstance and be subject to change, and it would 
clearly be absurd if ideas could be true and accurate at one time 
and false and distortionary at another. It is therefore 
perfectly possible in principle that some true and accurate ideas 
be in the interests of the bourgeoisie or the aristocracy. It is 
only within a rigid framework that allocates world-views to 
specific classes that the history of ideas can be so interpreted 
that only the proletarian world-view is scientific, objective, 
true and undistorted. 
Thus, it is causal determinism that holds the 
Marx-Engels conception of ideology together. Marx may not have 
regarded himself as a determinist, and he may well have rejected 
any such description, but the nature of his system forces it upon 
him, and its logical consequences cannot be escaped. Since 
determinism in this context is incoherent, then Marx's system in 
general and his conception of ideology in particular must be 
incoherent. There is no way that either can be saved without 
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causal necessity. If determinism is replaced by contingency then 
nothing will connect with anything else. Objective class 
interests cannot be demonstrated, and even if they could their 
relationship with universalistic ideas cannot be sustained, while 
the notion of false and distortionary thinking cannot be firmly 
tied to either. If the human world is governed by contingent 
relationships then ideas cannot be explained by their social 
causes or identified by their social effects. We could still say 
that certain circumstances were conducive to the development of 
certain ideas; but we could not say that those circumstances 
necessarily produced those ideas, or determined what kind of 
ideas they were. Similarly, we can still say that the spread of 
certain ideas appears (we can say no more than 'appears') to suit 
the interests of a certain social group at a certain time; but we 
cannot say that this set of ideas is therefore the ideology of 
this social group; nor, again, that this relationship determines 
the nature of the ideas concerned. 
Marxism has to have determinism if it is to make any 
sense at all, but the mechanical determination of human thought 
and action is demonstrably false and contradictory. It is only 
logical characteristics that can determine the nature of any 
ideas and distinguish one kind of thinking from another. Marxism 
provides no such logical criteria by which we can decide what is 
ideological and what is not, and this is true of all sociological 
theories. It is for this reason that no sociological theory that 
defines ideology in terms of social causality or social function 
(the promotion of group interests or group solidarity, for 
example) can succeed in identifying ideology as a distinctive 




Non-Marxist social scientists with a view of ideology 
fall into two main types: those influenced by Marx and those not. 
Much the most influential among the former and much larger group 
is Karl Mannheim. 
r\arl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia [37] is an attempt to 
rescue Marx's conception of ideology from its non-scientific 
trappings and to use what were taken to be its genuine insights 
as the foundation of a 'sociology of knowledge'. This new branch 
of social science would investigate "the social or existential 
determination of actual thinking" (p.239l; that is, the "causal 
determinants" (p.54) of our knowledge, beliefs and categories. 
The most important, though not the only, causal factor is social 
class, which shapes "our whole mode of conceiving things" (p.239l 
and is responsible for the "inherently ideological character of 
all thought" lp.48l. Marx is criticised for not recognising the 
ideological character of his own thought, and for not realising 
that ideology, in the broad sense of thought distorted by class 
interests, [J8J is inescapable. This, of course, raises 
questions about the objectivity of Mannheim's own theory. He did 
not possess a theory of history, and, unlike Marx and Hegel, 
could not present himself as the 'owl of Minerva' able to 
comprehend the whole process of virtue of being close to the end 
of it. Instead his views imply a relativism that makes 
objectivity impossible. His answer to this problem is his 
conceptions of the sociology and the sociologist of knowledge. 
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Absolute objectivity may be impossible, but through the sociology 
of knowledge we can at least become more self-aware and 
self-critical and appreciative of the views of others. 
Furthermore, since every ideological viewpoints, every class's 
1-leltan!.--;c!Jauung, has its insights, its fragment of truth, then the 
sociology of knowledge can be "a constantly renewed attempt at 
synthesis of all existent perspectives aiming at a dynamic 
reconciliation" (p.152). But the achievement of these things is 
dependent upon the independence of mind of the sociologists 
engaged upon the enterprise. This independence is possible, 
Mannheim thinks, because his sociologists will be classless 
intellectuals who will not be unduly influenced by the narrow 
interests of class. 
This very brief outline is sufficient to show that 
Mannheim's account of ideology possesses features earlier 
criticised in Marx, as well as features peculiar to itself that 
may be open to separate criticism. The obvious starting point is 
Mannheim's determinism about which he is more explicit than Marx, 
as well as more revealing about the method of uncovering ideology 
that determinism implies: 
... proceeding to an understanding of what is 
said by the indirect method of analysing the 
social condition of the individual or his 
group. The ideas expressed by the subject are 
thus regarded as functions of his existence. 
This means that opinions, statements, 
propositions, and systems of ideas are not 
taken at their face value but are interpreted 
in the light of the life-situation of the one 
who expresses them. (p.50) 
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This characteristically sociological approach to ideas, which 
ignores content and assumes social causality, is also capable of 
brushing aside mere observation. Behind the commonly observed 
variety of people's ideas the sociologist perceives an inner 
structure: 
If we confine our observations to the mental 
processes that take place in the individual and 
regard him as the only possible bearer of 
ideologies, we shall never grasp in its 
totality the structure of the intellectual 
world belonging to a social group in a given 
historical situation ..• its inner structure is 
not to be found in a mere integration of these 
individual experiences. As a totality the 
thought-system is integrated systematically, 
and is no mere causal jumble of fragmentary 
experiences of discrete members of the group. 
(p.52) 
Thus, whatever the variety or nature of ideas held among a social 
group may be, that group will have a definite ideology causally 
determined by its social circumstances. Sociology of knowledge 
would not make sense without deterministic assumptions of this 
kind. On the other hand sociology of knowledge cannot be coherent 
with such assumptions, since, as we saw earlier, any causal 
theory of human action reduces all thinking to the same 
meaningless level and thereby denies its own rationality. 
Mannheim is also vulnerable to criticism for his 
relativism. It is well known that assertions of the relativity 
of all thought are logically self-defeating, since in effect they 
assert the universal truth that universal truths are an 
impossibility. But if objective truth is not possible it is 
difficult to see how sociology of knowledge can achieve it, and 
if it is possible there seems no good reason why it should be 
confined to sociology of knowledge. As Bhikhu Parekh puts it: 
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•.. his sociology of knowledge is impossible 
if his theory of knowledge is correct. In 
other words, paradoxically, his cure is only 
effective if his diagnosis is wrong. [39J 
And much the same may be said of Mannheim's class of classless 
intellectuals who have no class interests but are dedicated to 
achieving the truth. Furthermore, it is far from clear that 
synthesising elements from different ideologies will provide a 
better guide to political action than any of the ideologies 
discarded. 
III 
Most sociologists subscribe to a conception of ideology 
which comes more or less directly from Marx or Mannheim; [40J but 
this is not true of the majority of behavioural political 
scientists. They have, for the most part, adopted what was 
earlier described as the 'Liberal' conception which equates 
ideology with extremism, and have attempted to distinguish by 
various empirical means between 'ideological politics' and 
'pragmatic' or 'civil politics'. [41J It was a distinction of 
this kind that underlay the 'end of ideology' debate of the 
1950's, when it was widely argued by political scientists that 
extremist politics were in terminal decline and the pragmatic 
politics of interest-bargaining would triumph in most of the 
advanced world. But although those of the 'behavioural 
persuasion' [42J are positivists to a man and aspire to 
'value-freedom', it is nevertheless clear that their usual 
conception of ideology is in fact based upon Liberal values. One 
of the most distinguished behaviouralists, Seymour Martin Lipset, 
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writes in his Politic.:.7l f>f...:m: 
This change in Western political life reflects 
the fact that the fundamental political 
problems of the industrial revolution have been 
solved ... This very triumph of the democratic 
social revolution in the West ends domestic 
politics for those intellectuals who must have 
ideologies or utopias to motivate them to 
political action. [43J 
Ideological politics, the argument goes, is being replaced by the 
pragmatic politics of interests on the American model, a model 
Lipset call "the good society itself in operation" !ibid. p.430). 
More recently, in his Ideology and Politics [44J, Martin Seliger 
admits that if values did distort judgement then "even modern 
behavioural science would be hard put to it to claim any unbiased 
insight" lp.l56l. But as we have seen, and will see again, it is 
value content that makes it impossible for any account of 
ideology to be objective and therefore satisfactory. 
Seliger, however, is not one of those behavioural 
political scientists who equate ideology with extremism; and much 
of his book is devoted to revealing, with relentless 
thoroughness, the contradictions, conceptual imprecision and 
unacknowledged shifts of meaning charactersitic of the standard 
behavioural view, which he calls the 'restrictive' conception of 
ideology, (though he does not criticise its value content and 
thereby misses the main point). Instead he offers his own 
'inclusive' account of ideology. Seliger defines ideology in 
terms of both function and content. He explains that "the 
function of ideology is to guide concerted action of a distinct 
social groLIP or groups" (p. 146} in their political battles. 
There can be no such thing as a non-political ideology. 
Ideologies are political belief-systems, all of which have a 
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common structure comprising six essential elements: moral 
prescription, technical prescription, 'implements' (i.e. ways and 
means of implementation>, description, analysis and 'rejection' 
(i.e. of rival beliefs) (p.l06). Ideology also has two 
'dimensions': what Seligner calls the 'fundamental dimension', 
which is basic doctrine where moral prescription is the central 
element; and the 'operative dimension', which is ideology in 
action and where technical presciption holds centre stage 
(p.l00). However, it is moral values that is the essential 
element: 
.•. the reference to 'higher' values is 
ineradicable from any system of political 
beliefs, however low our opinion of some such 
values and their tangible contents in general 
may be. Their presence in political belief 
systems, together with the other elements of 
the formal structure of content, requires us to 
classify all political belief systems as 
political ideologies in so far as the belief 
system can be said to guide identifiable group 
action. (p.l46) 
But Seliger goes on to insist that not all political belief 
systems are ideologies. Political philosophies are not 
ideological, despite having the same structure and elements, and 
having both fundamental and operative dimensions (p.112). The 
difference is that philosophy deals with 'ultimate' questions 
while ideology concentrates on what is "immediately relevant for 
social and political action" (p.ll3). Thus, while Plato, 
Aristotle, Locke, Mill and Marx are political philosophers, the 
ideas of the 1 ikes of Paine, Lenin and the authors of TIN? 
Federalist Papers are merely ideological (p.ll5). 
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Unlike that of most behavioural political scientists, 
Seliger's account of ideology cannot be rejected for being a 
manifestation of Liberal values. There are, however, other 
grounds for rejecting it. For Seliger's account to be plausible 
he must have clear and unambiguous criteria for distinguishing 
ideology from other kinds of theory. He says that "any 
politically relevant belief system" will have the same essential 
elements and structure (p.l02). But 'politically relevant belief 
system' could mean practically anything, including Cromwell's 
Christianity or Wallenstein's astrology or Machiavelli's 
'historical method', none of which conforms to Seliger's 
structure. Then there is his baffling distinction between 
ideology and political philosophy, where the only difference is 
that one's concerns are more 'ultimate' than the other's. But 
how degrees of ultimacy are measured in this context is hard to 
imagine. Besides, it is far from obvious that the concerns of 
Tom Paine or the authors of The Federalist Papers uJere any less 
ultimate than those of Locke or Mill in their political writings. 
Furthermore, Seliger rather confusingly adds that as well as 
political philosophy the works of Plato, Aristotle and the rest 
also contain ideology (pp. 115-6>, so that presumably a work such 
as Pla.to's' Republic is composed of fundamental political 
philosophy, operative political philosophy, fundamental ideology 
and operative ideology. Some very subtle criteria would be 
needed to sort out these different elements; but Seliger does not 
provide them, and it is difficult to believe that he could. 
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What is really behind Seliger's distinction between his 
version of political philosophy (which is a travesty of what 
philosophy is, but that is a different matter) and his account of 
ideology is not degrees of ultimacy but the function of ideology 
in the political process. As a behaviouralist, Seliger's aim is 
"above all" to establish: 
•.. a definition which, in accord with the 
objectives of scientific endeavour, is suitable 
for the ordering of data and the formulation of 
confirmable hypotheses. (p.87l 
That is, to characterise ideology as a phenomenon that can be 
observed and measured [45] as a causal factor in the political 
process conceived in mechanical terms. To this end Seliger 
imposes a functional definition designed to screen out what does 
not fit into this pre-ordained scheme; and since some political 
philosophy (even as Seliger defines itl will not conform to the 
pattern, it is defined out. But as in this case there is no 
clear qualitative difference between what is included and what is 
excluded the functional definition is an entirely arbitrary one. 
One of the reasons why defining the nature of ideas in terms of 
social function never works is that the same functions can be 
performed by different kinds of ideas. In the present case we 
have seen that non-political beliefs <Cromwell's Christianity, 
etc.) can guide political action, while political philosophy, 
since it apparantly has an 'operative dimension', can also do the 
job of ideology. Seliger's definition of ideology, therefore, 
collapses. This in turn invalidates his determination of the 
content and structure of ideology by abstracting common features, 
for this only makes sense if there is an adequate definition that 
guarantees that the examples are examples of the same thing. 
- 77 -
This is a bad procedure in any case since common features are not 
necessarily essential ones, and it does not show how the features 
relate to each other in a structure, [46J it is perhaps 
significant that 'ideological composite' is used as an 
alternative to 'ideology'. Despite what Seliger claims, his list 
of features is no more than a list, while the assertion that one 
feature is central does not constitute an analysis of structural 
relationships. His whole account of ideology must, consequently, 
be counted a failure. The nature of ideas is not governed by 
social function, nor is it laid bare by measurement, testing 
hypotheses or looking for 'causal concatenations'Cp.l58). It can 
only be done by logical means. In other words, establishing the 
nature of ideology is essentially a philosophical exercise. 
3. Ideology and Philosophy 
The nature of ideology is a philosophical problem. Yet 
little enlightenment on the matter can be gained from examining 
works of political philosophy. Most general works do not so much 
as mention it, [47J while those that do have tended to be 
dismissive [48] Cat least until very recently, as we shall see). 
The few philosophers who have seriously attempted to analyse the 
concept have tended to fail for basically the same reasons as 
those discussed in the previous two sections. This is true of 
perhaps the most widely known philosophical accounts of ideology, 
those of John Plamenatz and Patrick Corbett, but it is also true 
of most later attempts. 
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I 
In his Ideology [49] Plamenatz's way of dealing with the 
concept is a rather curious one for a philosopher. In his 
Preface he writes: 
The first chapter is introductionary; but the 
five that follow become progressively less 
philosophical and more sociological and 
political. <p.12) 
He begins with a minimal definition as ideology as: 
•.. a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, 
or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or 
community. (p.15) 
So from the outset the sociological aspect is built in. Later 
this definition is refined. 'Ideology' it is argued, covers a. 
'family of concepts', of which two are particularly important. 
There is •total ideology'; this is: 
Ideology in the broadest sense, since it 
includes all the ideas and beliefs of a people 
•.. (it) cannot be distinguished from thought 
that is not ideological. (p.28) 
However, there is the more usual sense; 
Ideology in the narrower sense can, of course 
be distinguished from thought that is not 
ideological. ( p. 29) 
The notion of total ideology has its own problems which need not 
concern us here, except we might note that Plamenatz is clearly 
willing to regard absolutely anything as ideological. But it is 
the narrower view we will concentrate on because since the 
weakness of Plamenatz's case is bound up with whether he can show 
that it is possible to distinguish between ideology and non-
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ideology. One of the things he says is not ideological is 
science. Indeed, he seems to think that, at least in principle, 
in social science and in any other discipline where there are 
"definite, consistent and usable criteria for testing the truth 
of falsity of beliefs" lp.JOJ this is sufficient to make them 
non-ideological. Yet he appears to contradict this when he comes 
to characterise ideology more fully: 
••• for beliefs to be ideological, in this 
narrower sense, they must be shared by a group 
of people, they must concern matters important 
to the group, and must be in some way 
functional in relation to it: they must serve 
to hold it together or to justify activities 
and attitudes characteristic of its members. 
Nor does it entail that no true beliefs are 
ideological, for true beliefs can also be 
functional in these way. What makes beliefs 
ideological, in the sense we are now 
discussing, is their constituting a system of 
beliefs which is functional in these ways, and 
is accepted regardless of whether or not its 
constituent beliefs satisfy the criteria of 
truth. Ideologies, in this sense, often 
contain many beliefs that are false or 
unverifiable, but they nearly always contain 
some true beliefs as well. (p.31) 
Thus, not only untrue but true beliefs, presumably including 
scientific ones, can be ideological. More importantly, their 
truth or falsity is quite irrelevant since it is not logical 
features that define ideology but its social function. He goes 
on: 
An ideology is not 'ideological' in respect 
only of the false or unverifiable beliefs 
contained in it, for it is 'ideological' as a 
whole set of beliefs that serves to hold a 
group together or to justify its activities and 
attitudes or to promote its interests. (p.Jll 
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Now since anything can serve one or other of these functions then 
literally any thought can be ideological, and there is clearly a 
conflict between this and Plamenatz's claim that science, among 
other things, can be distinguished from ideology. But perhaps 
Plamenatz can be saved from contradiction here by taking his 
meaning to be that while true beliefs may be embedded in an 
ideological system (as Spencer, Kropotkin and others made use of 
the theory of evolution) without changing their nature as true 
beliefs, just as a block of woad may be built into a wall and 
serve the office of a brick without thereby becoming a brick. 
But then Plamenatz would be wrong to say, as he does say, that 
such true beliefs are ideological; he can only say at best that 
they are being used ideologically. 
On the other hand, there is not really much point in 
saving Plamenatz's position here since the question of what is 
and is not ideological has nothing to do with the logic of ideas, 
but with their social and, apparently, psychological function. 
He writes: 
to be ideological has nothing to do with 
the intentions of the theorist .•. ; it has only 
to do with the motives and feelings of the 
persons who accept the beliefs and with how 
they behave as a result of accepting them. 
(p.73) 
But if this is so he cannot then make general statements about 
the nature of ideological thought, such as that it is not 
science, or that it is always largely descriptive (p.79l or that 
it is not fantasy or fiction (p.BOl. He cannot talk as though 
ideological thinking is something that can be identified and 
analysed, when he has defined ideology in such a way as to allow 
- 81 -
any thinking to be ideological. In fact Plamenatz nowhere 
analyses any ideological position or even identifies a piece of 
ideological writing; <he discusses Marx at some length, but only 
as a sociologist). But he is hardly in a position to do so for 
he has not given himself a concept capable of picking one out. 
The consequence of Plamenatz's position is that the 
philosopher has not the competence to judge what is or is not 
ideology, or to say anything about it; that must be left to the 
social scientists. Thus Plamenatz, fails to come to terms with 
ideology, fails to identify the concept, simply because he fails 
to be sufficiently philosophical. 
II 
Turning to Patrick Corbett, his Ideologies, [50] though 
in some ways an intelligent and elegant book, is also 
philosophically weak. It has a kind of dialectical structure. 
The first part consists of a statement of three ideological 
positions - Marxist, American Democrat and Roman Catholic. The 
second part sets out the response of a thoroughgoing sceptic to 
these positions. Finally, the philosopher speaks, laying down a 
middle path between irrational faith and corrosive doubt, a path 
along which the sensible and rational are invited to follow. 
Corbett does not provide us with a systematic analysis of 
ideology, but rather an impressionistic portrait which we have to 
piece together from scattered remarks throughout the book. He 
does, however, have a working definition: 
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By 'ideology' is meant here any intellectual 
structure consisting of: a set of beliefs about 
the conduct of life and the organisation of 
society; a set of beliefs about man's nature 
and the world in which he lives; a claim that 
the two sets are interdependent; and a demand 
that those beliefs should be professed, and 
that claim conceded, by anyone who is to be 
considered a full member of a certain social 
group. ( p. 12) 
On this usage Gandhism, Catholicism, Leninism, 
Nazism, American Democracy, and the Divine 
Right of Kings are, or were, ideologies, and 
so, on a smaller scale, are the myths of 
English Public Schools or Amazonian tribes. 
(p.12) 
Corbett thinks there are hundreds if not thousands of such 
ideologies active today - moral, political, religious and many 
other kinds. Then Corbett tells us that: 
It will escape none but the simplest devotee 
that ideologies serve the interests of certain 
institutions, and therefore of those who hold 
office in those institutions •.. the social 
function of ideologies is to condition man 
intellectually to obedience. (p.57l 
But this is not as obvious as Corbett seems to think. And still 
less is his next point, which is that all ideologies are 
fundamentally about freedom: "each ideology purports to tell us 
how - by prayer, production, self-control, self-assertion or 
whatever else- we can be free." (p.l95) But it would take some 
fairly sophisticated reasoning to show that, for example, the 
theory of Divine Right of Kings is fundamentally to do with 
liberation, still less the myths of public schools or Amazonian 
tribes. But though these two points do not seem to fit together 
too well <though they do not actually exclude each other) both 
are essential to Corbett's wider vision of human reality and the 
role of ideology in it. 
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Corbett see human history as an endless striving for 
freedom, of which ideology is a by-product. There is overall 
progress towards human liberation, but it has been a zig-zagging, 
back-tracking, snakes-and-ladders sort of progress, and along the 
way men have expressed the miseries and frustrations of 
particular unfreedoms in terms of ideological absolutes. Thus 
Marx and Engels translated the particular need for freedom from 
economic oppression into the claim that such freedom constituted 
the ultimate freedom of mankind, a claim which, for all its 
erroneous metaphysics, bad logic and evil consequences, was 
nevertheless understandable and humane. Human freedoms are 
multifarious and often contradictory; the theory which purports 
to point men towards a total freedom can only lead to dogma and, 
Corbett hints (p.206), totalitarianism. But although reasons can 
show the irrationality of these gradiose dogmas of fr~edom, 
Corbett feels that, shorn of their metaphysics: 
... we may yet perhaps be able to accept them 
as explorations, perhaps essential 
explorations, of the power of man. (p.l70J 
By interpreting ideologies as "temporary distortions of a 
rational core" (p.l54), each making its contribution to a greater 
whole, we can see them, not as irreconcilably hostile, but as 
"complementary probings of the potentialities of man" (p.l95). 
There is a distinctly Hegelian quality about this view since 
Hegel saw all past philosophical systems as having the core of 
truth, contributing its part to an ultimate comprehensive truth. 
Somewhat Hegelian also is Corbett's notion of a dialectic of 
faith and doubt which characterises all spheres of intellectual 
achievement. In the sphere we are concerned with these are 
represented by ideology and scepticism. 
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Corbett's sceptic has a primarily destructive role. He is 
a positivist sceptic who 'shows' the irrationality of belief in 
God and historical inevitability; the lack of foundation for 
ethical systems and the impossibility of choosing between them; 
and concludes by insisting that all moral assertions are 
disguised expressions of personal interest and ideologies the 
instruments of the powerful. 
In true Hegelian fashion, Corbett's own position is a 
synthesis of what he takes to be the best of both positions. He 
accepts the sceptic's scepticism but not his cynicism about 
values. He accepts that ideologies have been the "consequences, 
vehicles and instruments of power" Cp.l54) but he feels that this 
may not necessarily be the case in the future. Indeed Corbett 
sees mankind as entering upon a new epoch in which growing 
prosperity, technological change and the growing interrelatedness 
of all human societies will compel men, willy-nilly to cooperate 
more and more and move increasingly towards ever greater 
economic, political and ideological unity. Differences of belief 
will remain, but men will hold them less dogmatically and 
increasingly see them as contributions to a wider vision, which 
men will need to "create and re-create the grand strategy of 
man's development" Cp.l91) 
Thus, Corbett has a grand vision of human progress 
remarkably similar to that developed in the 18th Century by men 
of the Englightenment, best represented in Condorcet's .':J"'ketc!J for 
an Historical Picture of the Progress of t.fte Hwnan Nind [51 J 
11795) which characterises history as mankind's struggle for 
rationality and freedom against the traditional enemies of priest 
and tyrant who keep men enslaved in ignorance and false belief. 
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But for Corbett there is one great disaster that could prevent 
this otherwise inevitable progress, namely a nuclear war. And 
this is only made possible by the hostility of seemingly 
irreconcilable dogmas. Hence the occasion for the book. Corbett 
believes philosophers cannot remain detached but must enter the 
debate and do what they can. His answer is that men need to 
cultivate wisdom, which he cannot define but which appears to 
consist in understanding history and ideology as he does and in 
opening a dialogue with the holders of clashing dogmas, sa that 
with patience, humour, tolerance and showing respect for others, 
we can bring them to see the intellectual weakness of their 
position. He writes: 
In each of these doctrines there are thus soft points 
through which liberal society, persistently working with 
its solvents of toleration and analysis, can insinuate 
itself into their structure and complete in theory the 
liquefaction of ideology that scientific and industrial 
dynamism has begun in practice. (p.l93l 
Ideologies is very much a book of the 1960's when 
unending growth of prosperity seemed inevitable and the 'end of 
ideology thesis' was fashionable. But even allowing for this it 
is a very naive book. He does not really bother to analyse 
ideology, seemingly because he takes a very simple view of the 
relationship between men's social conditions and their beliefs, 
beliefs that will all melt in the warmth of growing prosperity 
and cooperation. And his notion of what good natured (and 
perhaps rather patronising) tolerance can achieve with the 
ideologically entrenched seems positively simple-minded. 
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But a more fundamental criticism is that his own views 
do not seem any more rational, free of metaphysics, or 
independent of values and faith than any of those he criticises. 
He too has a theory of history as man's quest for liberation, he 
too has a theory of man, he too is promoting a vision of the 
future and persuading men to strive for it, he too has values 
that have no more foundation than anyone elses. Ideologies is an 
expression of Corbett's political faith. He does not analyse 
ideology philosophically but interprets all others in terms of 
his own. This is why Corbett emphasises ideology's social 
functions of solidarity and social control. Others are the 
victims of the powerful and the dogmatic, represented by church, 
party or state, in contrast to his own views which are 
characterised as the political beliefs of a free thinking 
individual. To put it at its crudest, Corbett fails to come to 
terms with ideology because he is less concerned to philosophise 
than to preach. And what he preaches is Liberalism: that is, 
human progress through the pursuit of Liberal values. His 
account of ideology fails because, whatever its other faults may 
be, it is partisan. 
Both these leading philosophical accounts of ideology 
fail because they are not sufficiently philosophical: one is too 
sociological, while the other is too much an expression of 
political belief. It is just these faults that a genuine 
philosophical account should overcome. However, the same faults 
recur again and again, though philosophers are usually less 
liable to wander into sociology than fail to be rigorously 
objective. The expression of personal political values is, 
therefore, the more common weakness. It can be seen, for 
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example, in the work of Kenneth Minogue. 
III 
~\enneth Minogue's Alien Pot.1.ters: the pure theory'of 
ideology [52] is a more recent attempt to "e:·:plore the logical 
and rhetorical character" ( p. 1) of ideology. This 'pure theory' 
asserts that the: 
.•. formal centre of ideological understanding 
..• consists in the view that the evils of life 
are not ... part of an immemorial human 
condition which it is beyond human power to 
change, or a set of problems to each of which a 
specific solution may be hazarded, as 
politicians often suggest, but that they are 
part of a single system of dehumanization which 
determines everything that happens, and which 
cannot be changed except by a complete 
transformation. (p.J2) 
The nature of the domination, the 'alien power' of the title, 
varies from ideology to ideology: for the Marxist it is the 
capitalist system; for the feminist it is 'patriarchy'; while for 
the nationalist it is imperialism. But whatever the alien power 
is conceived to be, its effect is to dehumanise man and prevent 
him realising his full potential. It must therefore be 
overthrown by means of a revolution which will transform 
humanity. To merely reform the system is to compromise with 
evil, and will in any case fail given the system's great powers 
of self-defence through mystification and deceit. The outcome of 
the revolution, what Minogue calls the "ideological terminus", 
will be a world free of all oppression and conflict and where all 
will be of one mind. This insistence on revolution and rejection 
of compromise amounts, on Minogue's view, to a wholesale 
rejection of politics as such, which, like Crick, he defines in 
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terms of Liberal democratic politics. Ideologists, therefore, 
are hostile to the political process and to democracy, and are 
even "categorically hostile to the state" <p. 215). There is a 
clear contrast with what Minogue calls 'ordinary political 
doctrines', such as Liberalism, Conservatism and Social 
Democracy, which are dedicated to pursuing their political aims 
through persuasion, election and reform, and which consequently 
are not ideological. 
Minogue believes that ideology, as "an independent mode 
of thought and practice" (p. 31) began with Marx, and indeed all 
subsequent ideology is but a "footnote to Marx" (p. 31). He 
therefore confines his detailed discussion of ideology to Marxist 
arguments, and only illustrates certain points with examples from 
feminism and nationalism: and even here he has in mind only 
Marxist inspired versions of these doctrines. As a result he 
talks of features that are characteristic of Marxism as though 
they characterised ideology as such. Dialectical reasoning, we 
are told, is a feature of all ideology <p. 45), while all 
ideologists believe that the outcome of history will be the 
"practical unity of mankind" (p. 147) in an "egalitarian society" 
(p. 151> "which will have transcended the alienations from which 
we now suffer" <p. 147). Despite this it is insisted that 
"ideologies are many and various" <p. 101>, with such as 
Anarchism and National Socialism referred to as ideologies and 
Comte, Mazzini and others as ideologists. But, to take just one 
example, Hitler did not think dialectically, was not preoccupied 
with alienation, still less with equality or the unity of 
mankind, and was not noted for his categorical hostility to the 
state. 
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Minogue's failure to embrace all that he himself deems to 
be ideological must entail the failure of his whole analysis. It 
is also indicative of a general lack of logical rigour. For 
example, ideology is portrayed as striving for a perfect world of 
freedom and justice and of interpreting the world in moral terms 
(e.g. p. 110>, yet elsewhere Minogue insists that the 
ideologist's perfect world "should not be confused with a 
realized ideal" ( p. 162) and that ideology "is in fact quite 
beyond good and evil", being merely parasitic on notions of moral 
and political reform (pp. 151/2). Thus Minogue's account of 
ideology is arbitrary, it does not even cover all he takes to be 
ideological and is logically vague. 
However, to insist upon too much academic precision is 
perhaps to mistake the real nature of Minogue's work. Despite 
much talk of logic and rationality, Alien Poaters is not a serious 
attempt to establish a "philosophy of ideology" analogous to the 
philosophy of science, as it claims to be <p. 68l; its purpose is 
essentially polemical and partisan. It is a defence of 
Liberalism against what Minogue considers to be its greatest 
enemy, namely Marxism and its derivatives. He therefore wishes 
to portray the enemy as a manifestation of evil, and the first 
step is to equate Liberalism with modernity, progress and 
civilisation: 
•.• ideologists can be specified in terms of a 
shared hostility to modernity: to liberalism in 
politics, individual ism in moral practice, and 
the market in economics. (p. 4. ct. p. 173) 
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The 'modern state' is represented as the true line of human 
progress, while the 'ideological state' (which appears to be a 
contradiction of Minogue's own terms) is, by implication, a 
degenerate version of the same thing. (p. 218) Ideology looks to 
a mythic past, and by rejecting "the very system of modernity 
itself" (p. 173) rejects all that is civilised and humane. It is 
against democracy, freedom, morality, individualism and 
ultimately it is against humanity itself: 
•.. ideology is a dagger pointing to the heart 
of modern Western civilization (p. 226l ... bent 
on ..• the utter destruction of everything that 
constitutes the modern world. Ideology is the 
purest possible expression of European 
civilization's capacity for self-loathing. (p. 
221) •.. In pronouncing the rottenness of a 
civilization, it is actually declaring a hatred 
of any possible human life. What it proposes 
is the cosmic equivalent of a suicide pact. (p. 
222). 
Thus, the reader is not so much invited to accept a logical 
analysis as to affirm a moral commitment to one side in a 
conflict where there can be no neutrals. And the reader is not 
given much of a choice: it is either morality, civilisation and 
all that is decent on the one hand, or chaos, evil and 
self-destruction on the other. Consequently, even if Minogue's 
account of ideology were more coherent than in fact it is, its 




Thus, these philosophical accounts of ideology are marred 
by being either too sociological or too partisan. They fail 
because they are not philosophical enough. Yet greater 
philosophical rigour has, until very recently, bred no more than 
a dismissive scepticism. 
It is not difficult to see why this has been so. 
Discussion of ideology, though confused and contentious, has at 
least been shaped by a consensus that ideology is to be found 
within the area of prescriptive political theory, and in 
particular where theories, facts, values, prescriptions, ideals 
and visions of the future are all combined into discrete systems 
of belief. It is this combination that makes the sceptical 
philosopher suspicious; facts and values do not mix, while 
disputes between values cannot be settled. T.D. Weldon, for 
example, insists that ideologies (or 'political foundations' as 
he prefers to call them) are "a delusion" that "confuse and 
distort political thinking" [5JJ, and which we can well do 
without. Ideology is not taken seriously and consequently is not 
properly analysed. 
However, there has recently appeared two full-scale 
philosophical studies of ideology of appropriate rigour, which 
take ideology seriously but without falling into the traps of 
sociological explanation or partisanship. They are D.J. Manning 
and T.,J. Robinson's The Place of Ideology in Political Life 
(1985) [54] and Gordon Graham's Politics in its Pla'--e (1986) 
[55]. Neither book can be dismissed easily and some of their 
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arguments will need to be dealt with later in this work. 
Nevertheless, in keeping with the theme of this chapter both may 
be said to contribute to the confusion surrounding the concept of 
ideology. This is particularly true of Gordon Graham's 
contribution. Graham defines ideology as: 
..• those sets of beliefs which have or are 
meant to have wide implications for the conduct 
of political life and even, in some cases, for 
its complete refashioning. The principle 
instances are very familiar - socialism, 
liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, Marxism 
and Fascism. -p. 48) 
This is not very helpful, particularly since Graham proceeds to 
backtrack on some of his examples. One case is Marxism, which he 
later insists is to be distinguished from Socialism because 
socialism is an ideology while Marxism is a "theory of society" 
(p. 103). Another case is Conservatism, which is described as an 
ideology, a non-ideology and an anti-ideology all on the same 
page (p. 172). Then again, the Liberal tradition appears to be 
mainly composed of political philosophy (p. 791, but it is not 
made clear whether Graham distinguishes between political 
philosophy and ideology, and if he does whether he would count 
his own work as ideological. [56J Furthermore, Graham insists 
that ideologies "cannot be reasonably understood to be sets of 
fundamental principles or values" (p. 48>, but his discussion of 
various ideologies in the second part of his book seems to be 
precisely about fundamental principles and values. On the other 
hand, Graham appears to exclude nothing from ideologies (not 
fundamental values or social theory or philosophy! when he 
writes: 
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••• in reality ideological beliefs are of many 
different kinds - factual, philosophical, 
theoretical,speculative, expressions of value, 
and political principle, subscription to ends, 
and belief in efficient means. lp. 58) 
It is not in fact clear whether Graham has a theory of ideology 
at all; but if he has it must be a confused one. Part symptom 
and possibly part cause of his confusion is his inability to come 
to terms with the 'is-ought' problem. He refers to it several 
times (e.g. p. 10) but fails to say whether he believes there to 
be an unbridgable gulf between them or not. Clarity on this 
matter may be a route to a less confused account of ideology. 
Manning and Robinson have a much clearer and consistent 
view of ideology. They do see the value-content of ideology as 
central. For them ideology is a form of ethical understanding 
lp. 20>; it is that aspect of ethical life that is concerned with 
political relationships. As such, they argue, it is essential 
to, even constitutive of, politics Cpp. 16 & 18). Unfortunately, 
they assert this rather than demonstrate it, and do so to the 
neglect of the descriptive and theoretical sides of ideology lin 
terms of the later discussion they lack a theory of ideological 
language and a theory of ideological structure). Nevertheless, 
theirs is an important conception that warrants further 
consideration below. For the moment it is sufficient to observe 
that in the absence of an adequate account of how their central 
premise is arrived at makes Manning and Robinson's account just 
one more addition to the confusion. 
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What is needed is a suitable place to start and a clear 
conception of what an adequate philosophical account can achieve. 
One starting point that at least has the virtue of being neutral 
is the fact that 'ideology' is now widely used by practitioners 
and observers of politics in a largely non-partisan way. A 
politician says that his party needs to define its own ideology 
more clearly E57J, or another politician is described as pursuing 
a policy for ideological rather than pragmatic reasons, and we 
understand well enough what expressions of this kind mean. They 
refer to systems of political belief, such as the varieties of 
Marxism, Conservatism, Liberalism and the like, with their 
analyses of social life, visions of the good society and 
prescriptions to guide political activity. But the analysis of 
'ordinary usage' in a Wittgensteinian manner will not get us very 
far, for such usage in this case is only recent and has only 
seeped into common political discourse out of a confused 
theoretical discussion. What is important is whether the rather 
vague notion in ordinary usage points to something that can be 
shown to be coherent. The proper role of philosophy here is to 
demonstrate and explore the logical possibility of a distinct 
form of understanding which is more than just a mixture of 
different kinds of thinking, and which embraces the ordinary 
conception of some kind of unity of theoretical knowledge, values 
and prescriptions. If this cannot be done then 'ideology' is an 
insignificant concept with no analytical utility. But if the 
logical possibility can be demonstrated then light may be shed on 
a number of problems, including which political theories are 
ideological and which are not; whether all ideology is political 
ideology; and how ideology relates to other kinds of theory, 
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including educational. 
However, before proceeding with the attempt to establish 
ideology as a distinctive form of understanding it is necessary 
to be clear about what exactly constitutes a form of 
understanding and what basic forms of understanding there already 
are. This will enable us to see what it is that ideology must be 
distinguished from, and it also might indicate where, within the 
broad realm of human understanding, ideology might find its 
proper place. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
- 96 -
NOTES 
l. Allen l.Jood, karlNarx, Rf\P., 1981, 'The Arguments of the 
Philosophers', p. 117. Wood goes on here to suggest that 
there are three basic meanings of 'ideology' in Marx. 
Bhikhu Parekh, on the other hand, in /'!ar .. v· ·'s Theor_t.; of 
Ideology, Croom Helm, 1982, suggests that there are two 
basic meanings and a variety of "sporadic usages' <p.l 
plus footnote 1 on page 230). 
2. harl Mar>: and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, led. 
C.J. Arthur>, Lawrence and Wishart, 1970, pp. 64-5. 
3. Later Marxists differ from Marx and Engels and categories 
Marxism as a 'scientific ideology'. See note 35 below. 
4. David Mclellan, Ideology, Open University Press, 1986. 
5. Ibid,, p. 8]. 
6. Louis J. Halle, The Ideological Imagination, Chatto & 
Windus, 1971. 
7. Bernar·d Crick, In .Defence of Politics, Penguin, 1964, p. 
55. The most distinguished exponent of this view is 
Hannah Arendt, especially in her (.1rigins of 
Totalitarianism, (3rd. ed.), Allen and Unwin, 1966. 
8. F.A. Hayek, The "'"'onstitution of Liberty, Rf\P, 1960, p. 
401. 
9. 'Traditional Conservative' is used here to refer to the 
distinctively Conservative view of the world, which must 
not be confused with views that may prevail in the 
Conservative Party at any given time. The view that 
currently prevails in the Conservative Party is best 
classified as 'nee-Liberalism', which, ironically, takes 
some of its inspiration from the works of F.A. Hayek. 
<See Raymond Plant, 'The Resurgence of Ideology', Henry 
Drucker et al. (eds) .Developments in .British 
Politics,Macmillan, 1983). Henceforth the use of 
'Conservative' will imply traditional Conservatism. 
10. Sir Ian Gilmour, Inside Right, Quartet Books, 1978, pp. 
11112. 
11. Edmund Burke, 'A Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol', in 
B.W. Hill led.), Edmund .Burke on 6o1...-ernment Politics and 
Societ..Y., Fontana, 1975, p. 198. 
- 97 -
Edmund Burke, Ret=lections on the Revolution in France, 
Penguin, 1969, p. 156. 
13. See the title essay in Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in 
Politics and other essays, Methuen, 1962. 
14. Inside Right, op. cit., p. 112 
15. F.A. Hayek explicitly accuses Conservatives as being 
immune to facts (see Con!:.•titution or Liberty, op. cit.' 
pp. 404/51, so that at the very least Gilmour's 'facts' 
are not Hayek's. 
16. Edmund Burke, 'Reflections 'op.cit., p. 138. 
17. Consider, for e:·:ample, ibid, p. 195: 
Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in 
the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking 
the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible 
and invisible world, according to a fixed compact 
sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all 
physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed 
place. 
From this passage alone it is clear that Burke's "method 
of nature" (p. 1201 involves some very complex 
metaphysics. However, for a sophisticated account of 
this matter which does take the conservative claims to 
theorylessness seriously see Gordon Grahame,Politics in 
its Place, OUP, 1986, p. 181 f. 
18. Karl Mar:< and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, 
op.cit., p. ·47, 
19. Karl Marx, Preface to 'A Contribution to a Critique of 
Politics Economy' in Nar .. v· and Engels: .Basic Mritings on 
Politics & Philosphy, edited by L.S. Feuer, Fontana, 
1969, p. 84. 
20. f\arl Mar:·: and Frederick Engels, The Commun.i!:.•t Nanifesto, 
Penguin, 1967, p. 102. 
21. f\arl Mar}: and Frederick Engels, The Germany Ideology, 
op.cit., p.58. 
22.. Ibid, p .. 47. 
23. f\arl Mar:·: and Frederick Engels, The Communist Nanifesto, 
op. cit., p. 102. 
24. Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', 
in /(ark Nar .. v·: Selected Mritings, edited by David 
Mclellan, OUP, 1977, p. 300. 
- 98 -
25. Karl 1'1ar:{, Tile Poverty of Pll.ilosopny, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1955, p. 100. 
26. Allen Wood, t.."P· cit., p. 116. 
27. Frederick Engels, Anti-lhtllring, Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, 
p. 336. However, this passage admits of a fully 
deterministic interpretation which Engels himself would 
no doubt have given it, while Marx may well have not. Ct. 
George Lichtheim, Tile Conce_pt of Ideology ~md other 
essays, Vintage Books, 1968, p. 21. Absolute 
compatibilism, in the sense of men's wills being both 
free and determined at the same time, is simply 
self-contradictory. But the less rigorous and more 
plausible version of compatibilism being suggested here, 
whereby so long as men lived in class societies they were 
locked into a sphere of necessity from which only a 
communist revolution could release them, also has its 
problems. It is difficult to see, for example, why 
communist society should not determine men's thinking any 
less than class societies; it must, after all, be a 
strange metaphysics that can switch causality on and off 
according to social arrangements. Besides, Marx's 
remarks about men making their own history and writing 
their own drama refer to men in the realm on necessity, 
which brings us back to absolute compatibilism. 
28. ~\arl Man:, C.."'.."lpital, Vol. I, Lawrence and Wishart, 1970, 
p. 8. This is at least as unambiguously deterministic as, 
for example, Engel's remark in Anti-Pullring, that history 
proceeded "in the manner of a natural process and is 
subject to the same laws of motion", which is quoted by 
McLellan in his Ideology, (op. cit., p. 22) as evidence of 
"the simplification of Marx's ideas into a general 
doctrine of economic determinism" <p.21) by Engels and 
others after Marx's death. 
29. ~\arl Mar:-:, Preface to A Contribution to a c.--:ritiqt..te of 
Pol.i tical Economy, op. cit. p. 85. 
30. Allen Wood, H~1rl Narx, op. cit., p. 116. 
31. Ibid, Ct. G. A. Cohen, f(arl Nar .. v· 's Theory of H.istor_1.1: a 
defence, OUP, 1978, p. 147: " ... the issue of determinism 
will not be discussed in this book", which seems to 
suggest a similar judgement. 
32. Bhikhu Parekh has a different account in Nar .. 1···'s Theory of 
IdeolOQI./ (op. cit., pp. 12-14). But this does not detract 
from the point that follows. 
- 99 -
33. Frederick Engels, Letter to Conrad Schmidt 27 Oct. 1890, 
in f>f...:w .. v· and Engels_. .Basic Mritings ••. op. cit ... p. 443. 
34. Frederick Engels, Letter to Franz Mehring, 14 July 1893, 
in ibid, pp. 446-7. 
35. Marxist-Leninists take a different view of this matter, 
which throws up problems of its own. See, for example, 
Maurice Cornforth, C.l,mmunism and Philosophy, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1980, pp 20-25, where he insists that "the 
definition of 'ideology' in terms of social function does 
not imply that ideology is necessarily of wholly false 
consciousness" and goes on to designate Marxism as 
'scientific ideology'. 
36. Cf. H.B. Acton, The Illlt5ion of the Epoch, Rf\P, 1972, PP 
115-6: "Marxists do not normally argue against the 
religious and metaphysical theories of their opponents, 
but claim to 'unmask' them as the expressions of class 
interests or socially determined wishes. Marxists do 
not, for example, give detailed 'refutations' of the 
arguments put forward by theologians and philosophers to 
prove that God exists, or that the world is fundamentally 
spiritual, or that there are two main types of 
essentially different beings, the physical and the 
mental. Instead of doing this sort of thing, they argue 
that this or that theological or metaphysical theory was 
developed in order to support this or that class 
interest." 
37. f\arl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Rf\P, 1936. 
Subsequent page references are to this edition. 
38. Within the broad category of Ideology Mannheim 
distinguished between 'ideology' as the defensive beliefs 
of a ruling class, and 'utopia' as the agressive beliefs 
of an aspiring class. But it is only the broad category 
that concerns us here. 
39. Bhikhu Parekh, 'The Problems of Ideology' in Robert 
Benewi ck et al. ( eds. ) J(noa:lege and .Belief in Politics, 
Allen & Unwin, 1973, p. 72. Parekh gives a fuller account 
of, and criticism of, Mannheim than is appropriate here. 
However, he goes on to draw some doubtful conclusions. 
40. See almost any general sociology textbook or dictionary 
of sociological terms. See also Donald ~1acRae, Ideology 
and Society, Heinemann, 1961. 
- 100 -
41. See, far example, Edward Shils, 'Idealogy and Civility: 
On the Pal it i cs of the Intellectual', T/;e SetL1.:mee Revie"'' 
Val. LXVI, 3 11958) and 'The Concept and Function of 
Ideology', in The lnternc7tionc?l Encyclopedia of the 
.::.t....,cial Scien'--es, Val. VII, 11968); Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Political Nan, Heinemann, 1960; G. Sartori, 'Politics, 
Idealogy and Belief Systems', The American Political 
5'cience RevietL', Vol. LXIII, 2 (1969>; R.D. Putnam, 
'Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology', 
The American Political Science R-evieu.1, Vol. LXV, 3 
(1971>; and others. 
4·-::- The phrase comes from Heinz Eulau's The .BelJcH··ioural 
Persuasion in Politics, Random House, 1966. 
43. Seymour Martin Lipset, Politicc7l Nan, op.cit., p.406. 
44. Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics, Allen & Unwin, 
1976. Subsequent page references are to this edition. 
45. Seliger engages in such arcane exercises as measuring the 
'distance' between his different elements of idealogy 
lp.l97) and between idealogies of the 'Left Right scale' 
lp.217t. ). His approach involves a causal explanation of 
idealogy Ia multicausal nat a monacausal one - see p. 
168), which is also a fatal weakness of his conception. 
But this topic was dealt with earlier. 
46. Cf. Malcolm B. Hamilton, 'The Elements of the Concept of 
Idealogy', in Political Studies, XXXV, No. 1, March 1987, 
pp. 18-38, which the similar but even more doubtful 
procedure of abstracting a definition of ideology tram 
the common features of previous definitions. The result 
is predictably vague, simplistic and unreliable. 
47. Far example, none of the following general works on 
political theory mentions idealogy: 
Ernest Barker, Frinciples of So'--ial and Politicc?l Theory, 
OUP, 1952. 
G. C. Field, Political Theory, Methuen, 1956. 
Stan ley Benn and R. S. Peters, S'-'cial Principles and the 
f)emcorat ic State, Allen & Unwin, 1959. 
J.R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics, OUP, 1966. 
Feli :-: Oppenheim, Political (1mcepts, Basi 1 Blackwell, 
1981. 
Norman Barry, An Introduction to Nodern Political Theor_tl, 
t1acmi llan, 1981. 
48. See, far e>:ample, D.D. Raphael, Problems of Political 
Philosophy, (2nd ed. ) , t1acmi llan 1976. I dealagy is 
curtly dismissed without analysis as "prescriptive 
doctrine that is not supported by rational argument" 
(p.l7). 
- 101 -
49. John Plamenatz, Ideology, t1acmillan, 1970, Subequent 
page references are to this edition. 
50. Patrick Corbett, Ideologies, Hutchinson, 1965. Subsequent 
page references are to this edition. 
51. A-N de Condorcet, b .... ketch for a Historic.:?] Picture of the 
Progress of the Human /'lind, The Noonday Press, New York, 
1955. 
52. Kenneth Minogue, Alien Poaters: The Pure Theory of 
Ideology, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1985. Subsequent page 
references are to this edition. 
53. T.D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics, Penguin 1953, p. 
172. 
54. D.J. Manning and T.J. Robinson, The Place of Ideology in 
Political Life, Croom Helm, 1985. Subsequent page 
references are to this edition. 
55. Gordon Graham, Politics in its Place, OUP, 1986. 
Subsequent page references are to this edition. 
56. In fact from his criticism of various ideologies it is 
not particularly difficult to see which particular 
political values Graham favours; although it would be 
unfair to say that his work is partisan in the way that, 
say, Minogue's clearly is. 
57. This is the avowed purpose of Roy Hattersely's c'Yloose 
Freedom: The Ft.tfure of /Jemocratic Socialism, ~1ichael 




FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE CONCEPT OF AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE 
We have, then, a rough working notion of ideology as some 
kind of unity of theoretical knowledge, values and practical 
proposals. The first task will be to see how such a unity might 
fit into or otherwise relate to the map of knowledge. However, 
charting the map of knowledge is a vast and hazardous enterprise 
and it will be convenient, and sufficient for our purposes, to 
concentrate on the work of Paul Hirst on this matter, set out in 
his influential paper 'Liberal Education and the Nature of 
Knowledge' (1965), and in subsequent writings. [1] 
I 
Hirst argues that there are different forms of knowledge 
which are discreet, autonomous and irreducable. What 
distinguishes them are their logical features, crucial among 
which are: 
public criteria whereby the true is 
distinguishable from the false, the good from 
the bad, the right from the wrong. It is the 
existence of these criteria which gives 
objectivity to knowledge. 
These "disciplines that form the mind" (p. 45) have at least four 
distinguishing marks: 
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(1) They each involve certain central concepts 
that are peculiar in character to the form. 
For example, those of gravity, acceleration, 
hydrogen, and photo-synthesis characteristic of 
the sciences; number, integral and matrix in 
mathematics; God, sin and predestination in 
religion; ought, good and wrong in moral 
knowledge. 
(2) In a given form of knowledge these and 
other concepts that denote, if perhaps in a 
very complex way, certain aspects of 
experience, form a network of possible 
relationships in which experience can be 
understood. As a result the form has a 
distinctive logical structure. For example, 
the terms and statements of mechanics can be 
meaningfully related in certain strictly 
limited ways only, and the same is true of 
historical explanation. 
(3) The form, by virtue of its particular 
terms and logic, has expressions of statements 
(possibly answering a distinctive type of 
question) that in some way or other, however, 
indirect it may be, are testable against 
experience. This is the case in scientific 
knowledge, moral knowledge, and in the arts, 
though in the arts no questions are explicit 
and the criteria for the tests are only 
partially expressible in words. Each form, 
then, has distinctive expressions that are 
testable against experience in accordance with 
particular criteria that are peculiar to the 
form. 
(4) The forms have developed particular 
techniques and skills tor exploring experience 
and testing their distinctive expressions, for 
instance the technique of the sciences and 
those of the various literary arts. The result 
has been the amassing of all the symbolically 
expressed knowledge that we now have in the 
arts and the sciences. (p.44) 
But there is no doubt which is the most important: 
The central feature •.• is that the major 
forms of knowledge, or discipline, can be 
distinguished by the dependence on some 
particular kind of test against experience for 
their distinctive expressions. <p.45) 
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On this basis Hirst offers the following forms of knowledge: 
physical sciences, human sciences, history, philosophy, 
mathematics, art, religion, and moral knowledge . (p.46l. 
(Although later in the same paper Hirst does admit that moral 
knowledge is not a 'developed discipline' (p. 49), thereby 
implying a distinction between 'discipline' and 'form of 
knowledge' which appears to contradict earlier statements and is 
nowhere elucidated). 
However, as a result of reflection and criticism Hirst has 
modified his position somewhat in subsequent writings. 'The Form 
of Knowledge Revisited' 11974) is a more cautious and less 
confident reassertion of the case. Here he admits to have 
changed his mind over a number of areas; though not, he insists, 
over the status of moral knowledge. What troubles him most is 
the recognition that the academic subjects corresponding to his 
forms of knowledge are, as they are taught as academic subjects, 
'logically complex'; the most difficult area in this respect 
being history and the social sciences: 
In part they are concerned with truths that 
are matters of empirical observation and 
experiment, truths that logically differ not at 
all from the kind with which the physical or 
neutral sciences are concerned. Large tracts 
of sociology and psychology, and indeed parts 
of history, are therefore of the physical 
science variety ... On the other hand, history 
and some of the social sciences are in large 
measure not concerned simply with an 
understanding of observable phenomena in terms 
of physical causation, but with explanations of 
human behaviour in terms of intentions, will, 
hopes, beliefs, etc. The concepts, logical 
structure and truth criteria of propositions of 
this latter kind are, I would now argue, 
different from, and not reducable to, those of 
the former kind. For this reason it now seems 
to me correct to speak of one form of knowledge 
as being concerned with the truths of the 
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physical world and another as concerned with 
truths of a mental or personal kind. (p. 86) 
Thus, Hirst wishes to make a distinction between academic 
subjects which are logically complex, and forms of knowledge 
which are the forms of different kinds of true proposition. But 
Hirst rescues the purity of his forms of knowledge only at the 
cost of some confusion. He has introduced a new category which 
amalgamates most of history with those parts of those social 
sciences that deal with human action in terms of reasons rather 
than causes; the new category being called, rather confusingly, 
'history and social science'. Where those social sciences and 
parts of social sciences that deal in causes should now be placed 
is not clear. No doubt some, parts of psychology for example, 
can be accommodated in the physical sciences, but not all and 
certainly not what is left of sociology. Further, there is the 
more important question of what relationship there could be 
between reasoned explanation and causal explanation within a 
single social science such as sociology. More generally, Hirst 
also has problems concerning the reformulated forms of knowledge 
and the subjects that primarily embody them. Does the term 
'discipline', for example, now apply to forms of knowledge or to 
their related subjects or to something that pertains to both or 
neither? Then there are admitted difficulties with religious and 
aesthetic knowledge; and there must be some doubt about the 
humping together of mathematics and logic. In all, Hirst's case 
is not as convincing as when originally put forward, and is 
arguably in need of some restructuring if it is to stand. 
- 106 -
There is much to be said for Hirst's general position but 
it does suffer from at least four serious and related weaknesses: 
(1) the lack of a clear concept of an academic discipline; 12) 
confusion about the relationship between knowledge and 
experience; (3) confusion about the nature of moral knowledge; 
and (4) the lack of a clear account of practical knowledge and 
consequently of a proper understanding of the relationship 
between theory and practice. We will deal with each of these in 
turn. 
I I 
For a form of understanding to be an academic discipline 
it must contain a body of rules which must be observed by those 
who practice the discipline if knowledge is to be achieved. 
These rules lay down what constitutes a valid claim to knowledge, 
and the proper forms of reasoning, of fact and theory and 
explanation. Above all, the rules lay down a decision procedure 
for settling claims to knowledge, so that disputes between claim 
and denial, and between rival claims can, in principle at least, 
be resolved. This is possible by recourse to an independent 
test, the authority of which is accepted by all who engage in the 
discipline, including the disputants. The form of the test 
varies from discipline to discipline, and may be a physical 
experiment, documentary evidence or an appeal to the form of 
reasoning the rules of the discipline prescribe. But whatever 
its form there must be some sort of decision procedure, since 
without it anything goes and nothing can count as knowledge. Of 
course there may be instances, perhaps many instances, of 
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insufficient evidence for deciding between rival claims; but at 
least we must know in principle what kind of evidence would 
decide the matter; and in the meantime we do not have knowledge. 
Thus, the form of understanding not only provides the 
concepts and principles in terms of which we can view the world 
(as does astrology for examplel, but also sets up the possibility 
of objective truth and knowledge through its procedures. It is 
the framework that guarantees whether any given fact, 
explanation, theory or theorem can properly count as knowledge, 
can be true or false. But the framework itself is not true or 
false, any more than are the rules of a game. There is a degree 
of analogy here with law. A form of understanding operates in a 
similar way to a constitution, which guarantees the legality of 
ordinary law having the proper form and passed in the proper 
manner; but the constitution itself is not legal in the same way. 
We can illustrate this analysis by applying it to the 
problem which Hirst seems to find particularly difficult: that 
is, the relationship between history and the social sciences, 
which Hirst originally held separate but subsequently partly 
conflated. As we have seen, this leaves a somewhat confused 
situation, in dealing with which we will look first at history 
and then at sociology as representative of the social sciences. 
History is concerned with the explanation of past events; 
though only human events, physical events being a matter for 
sciences such as geology. In order to do his work the historian 
must conceive present reality as evidence for the past. There are 
rules governing the proper treatment of evidence, and for an 
historical conclusion to count as knowledge it needs to have been 
inferred in the proper way from present evidence. (It is not 
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knowledge because it corresponds to the past, for the past does 
not exist, and so nothing can be measured directly against it.) 
Historians do, of course, disagree and support different 
interpretations of the same evidence. There is nothing wrong 
with this, except that until the matter is resolved, usually by 
finding further evidence, we can accept neither interpretation as 
knowledge. 
The primary form of historical evidence is the document, 
the written word. This is because it is via documents that we 
have the most direct access to reasons; the physical evidence, 
from archaeology, is only indirect in this respect. The 
importance of reasons is that human actions can only be explained 
in terms of reasons. We may indeed take any action and 
redescribe it as causal behaviour, but insodoing one must leave 
out the actor's understanding of what he is doing since the logic 
of thoughts cannot be reduced to a causal sequence. As an action 
it must have a reason and this is related to the identify of the 
action; that is, what kind of action it is is logically connected 
with the sort of reasons the actor has for doing it. 
A work of history is typically a narrative which explains 
events as outcomes - intended or unintended - of the actions of 
historical actors, acting for reasons formed in the light of 
their understanding of their circumstances. But not all 
historical accounts are in narrative form, we also have accounts 
of the 'daily-life-in-Ancient-Rome' variety. However, such 
accounts can only be broad generalisations of multitudes of 
instances, each one explicable as the outcome of actions, and are 
consequently parasitic upon the typical form. The same is true 
of massive events which we are inclined to explain in a causal or 
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quasi-causal way. We may, for example, seek to explain the 
Barbarian invasion of Europe in what appears to be a causal way: 
pressure from tribes further east and lack of resistance in the 
west, a Dark Age 'domino effect'. But this is not a covering law 
explanation; there is no causal necessity here. What we do have 
is a vast generalisation of what we take to be the reasonable 
actions of millions responding intelligently to what they 
understand to be their circumstances. Other people in the same 
situation may have had their own reasons for acting differently. 
An ideal account would be a description of the actions of all the 
individuals involved, however absurdly impossible that might be 
in practice. Much the same is true of the large scale theories 
historians from time to time put forward, (e.g. Henri Pirenne's 
theory about the origins of mediaeval feudalism in 'Mohammet et 
Charlemagne' (19371). [2] The only place for causal explanation 
in an historical account is in explaining physical events. An 
historian may wish to include in his account the physical details 
of some natural disaster that had an impact on human affairs -
the eruption of Vesuvius or the spread of the plague - in which 
case he must make use of the geologist or medical scientist. 
There is, however, another more general kind of theory 
that claims to give us historical knowledge. They are sometimes 
called 'philosophies of history' and include the theories of Marx 
and Hegel, and progress and Christian providence theories. These 
offer a comprehensive explanation of history over and above the 
humbler kind we have been discussing. Two things need to be said 
about these. The first is that they are all consistent with the 
same sequence of events; they are different interpretations of 
the same events. Their truth or falsity is not, therefore, a 
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matter for the historians; the historian, for example, has not 
the means to judge the divinity of Jesus, a crucial matter for 
any Christian interpretation of history. The adequacy of these 
theories is something quite external to the work of the 
historian. Secondly, the purpose of these theories is moral, 
being concerned with freedom, human salvation or whatever; their 
concern is not to determine what events have occurred, but with 
the moral significance of whatever events the historian has shown 
to have occurred. We shall argue later that as such these 
theories are ideological and consequently cannot be part of 
historical knowledge. 
We have in history a coherent form of understanding 
having within it a procedure for assessing claims to knowledge, 
principally by reference to documentary evidence, and possessing 
characteristic concepts, principles and forms of explanation 
involving persons, actions, intentions, reasons, etc. Now it 
might be said that all this is no different from our ordinary 
everyday understanding of people and events. And indeed this is 
largely true, though not entirely. It is untrue to the extent 
that our everyday understandings and explanations can be coloured 
by our own concerns, individual or collective. Consequently, our 
selection of evidence and interpretations of what is significant 
may be determined by our desire to relate the object of 
explanation to our own concerns. This introduces an element of 
distortion which militates against the achievement of objective 
knowledge. To examine history with a view to finding a guide to 
our present activities; or to finding 'where things went wrong'; 
or to finding whether, say, the French Revolution was a 'good or 
bad thing', may be a perfectly legitimate exercise; but it is not 
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academic history, which necessitates a rigorous detachment. 'How 
we got where we are' is a layman's view of history, for 'where we 
are' is necessarily a function of our present hopes and fears, of 
our values and preoccupations, which are difficult enough to 
eliminate in studying the remote past but virtually impossible on 
our own historical doorstep. The practical view of history is 
necessarily a narrow, distorted and parochial view. Thus, while 
history as an academic discipline is very close to our everyday 
thinking (unlike physical science, which has long passed beyond 
its commonsense origins), there is still a rigour to be observed 
that is easy to fall short of. Historians often do stray beyond 
the line and make statements that are, so to speak, 
unconstitutional. An historian may, for example, put in a 
statement expressing his moral disapproval of some character or 
action, and this could not be an historical statement; the rest 
of the work may be perfectly good history, although a moral 
preoccupation can marr a work. But within the rules we have a 
fully coherent and independent academic discipline capable of 
systematically producing knowledge. 
However, this account ignores what at first sight may 
seem a telling objection. That is, that the social sciences also 
provide knowledge of human actions, situations and events, from 
which it can be argued, with seemingly faultless logic, that 
social sciences can explain the past and that its methods can at 
least supplement, if not subsume or replace, the methods of the 
traditional historian. But for this to follow it must be 
demonstrably the case that appropriate social sciences are fully 
coherent academic disciplines, unambiguously capable of producing 
objective knowledge. In examining this question we will 
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concentrate upon sociology as the most obvious candidate, 
although much of what will be said will equally apply to other 
social sciences. 
If the account of the nature of an academic discipline 
given above is correct then sociology fails to qualify. 
Sociology is not a distinctive form of understanding that 
provides an overarching framework of concepts and principles 
common to all who engage in the study. The various theoretical 
systems within sociology do not have any 'constitution' which 
guarantees their claims to knowledge, as physical theories have. 
Thus unconstituted, sociology is a chaos of what are misleadingly 
called 'perspectives': structural functionalist, symbolic 
interactionist, Marxist, phenomenological, 
Marxist-phenomenological, Weberian, neo-Weberian, 
ethnomethodological and many more. The perspectives metaphor is 
misleading because it implies that these theoretical positions 
are all compatible and commensurable, simply looking at society 
from different points of view just as we might look at a statue 
from different angles to get a complete impression. But this is 
naive. Structural functionalism, ethnomethodology and the rest, 
are not different ways of looking at the same things. What 
constitutes society, social relations, social processes, etc. 
varies from theory to theory; each operates with its own basic 
categories so that in each case the object of study is a 
construct of the theory, and to this extent, despite appearances, 
they are all studying different things. Thus, positivists study 
structures and processes whose existence phenomenologists would 
firmly deny; thus, for the structural functionalist value-freedom 
is an essential condition of achieving knowledge, while for the 
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Marxist the correct political commitment is an essential 
condition of achieving knowledge. Given this confusion, there is 
no way of assessing the merits of accounts based upon different 
'perspectives'; and this is a function of the absence of any 
framework within which different theoretical positions can be 
evaluated in relation to each other. Adherents of these 
different positions can settle nothing between them because they 
are not standing on the same ground. It is not therefore 
surprising that sociology is subject to chronic internal disputes 
over the nature of the enterprise. 
Many sociologists recognise this situation but insist 
that it is only temporary. Sociology, they argue, is a youthful 
discipline and the work must go on while they await the advent of 
their saviour who will one day wear the crown as 'Newton of the 
Social Sciences'. In the meanwhile sociology cannot stand as an 
academic discipline. Indeed, even 'aspirant discipline' seems 
too kind, since neither positivist nor interpretive theories of 
sociology, nor any combination of the two, seem capable of 
providing the basis for some future discipline. 
The application to man and society of concepts and methods 
derived from the physical sciences was long the dominant 
'perspective' in sociology, but has come under attack, especially 
in recent years, from both within and outside sociology itself. 
There are several lines of criticism, but perhaps the most basic 
turns on the appropriateness of human actions as an object of 
scientific enquiry; that is, of explaining human actions in terms 
of cause and effect, causal necessity and mechanical laws in the 
same manner as physical objects. However, the concept of action 
- as distinct from unreasoned behaviour like hiccupping - is 
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logically connected with the notion of having reasons. The 
normal everyday manner at explaining our actions is to give 
reasons, and indeed, the kinds of reasons determine the kind of 
action it is. But reasons are not causes and neither are they 
caused; since reasons are nat physical objects or events they 
cannot be part of a causal chain. Further, performing actions is 
bound up with following rules and this cannot be reduced to a 
causal sequence. And these problems cannot be avoided by 
confining causal explanations to large aggregates of actions, for 
there remains the problem of relating the causal explanation of 
the mass action to the constituent actions of the individuals who 
make up the mass. To take an example, a vast amount of research, 
mainly by means of statistical corrrelation, has gone into 
finding 'the cause of voting behaviour'. [JJ As a result of this 
we are told that in Britain by far the most important causal 
factor is social class, followed by such lesser factors as age, 
sex, religion and others for which significant correlations have 
been found. But what is the relationship between these figures 
and the individual voter? A man may have voted Labour in 1979 for 
any of a thousand reasons. It adds nothing to say in addition 
that it was 70% because he was working class; 10% because male; 
5% because non-conformist, and so on. And if causal factors do 
not explain the individual vote, what then do they explain? The 
answer would seem to be: nothing whatsoever. Finally, if it is 
the task of the sociologist to discover the laws at social 
behaviour, then it is reasonable to ask just what laws have been 
discovered so far. But the response to this question is merely 
silence. These and ather considerations would appear to rule our 
a positivist basis for sociology. What then of the alternatives? 
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The main party of opposition, so to speak, is social 
phenomenology. 
Social phenomenology, at first sight, seems more promising 
since it rejects positivism altogether and insists upon 
understanding human action in terms of the individual's own 
understanding of his world. It is concerned with how 
individuals construct their social reality day by day, and how 
their actions are influenced thereby. Each person, it is 
claimed, has a unique stock of knowledge and therefore to some 
degree views the world differently from everybody else. 
Interaction is possible on the assumption that peoples' 
viewpoints can overlap just sufficiently for there to be common 
understanding, in spite of many differences. These common 
understandings (called 'typicifations') must be constantly 
constructed and maintained to enable social life to go on. 
Phenomenologists speak of 'multiple realities' all equally valid, 
with the 'reality' of the sociologist no more valid than anyone 
elses; which leaves them open to the common charge that their 
views lead to relativism and ultimately to solepsism. 
Phenomenological theory, as elaborated by such as Schutz, is 
really a philosophical theory which no amount of empirical 
evidence could confirm or deny (and reminding us of Peter Winch's 
jibe that much sociological theory is •misbegotten 
epistemology'); as such it is open to a number of criticism. But 
these aside, there is the problem of what sociologists of this 
persuasion actually do, and the status of what they do once they 
have done it. If sociological accounts are no more adequate or 
objective than any other then it is difficult to see that the 
sociologist is engaged in the disciplined pursuit of knowledge. 
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It is equally difficult to see what the sociologist can be 
explaining, since it seems that he can do no more than describe 
how certain unique individuals, each with their unique 
understanding, responded to unique situations. There would 
appear to be no scope for generality here, no general explanation 
of anything. They can only be doing what the historian does 
perfectly well without the metaphysics or the jargon, and within 
a more adequate framework. Social phenomenology, therefore, 
seems to offer no better prospect for a coherent and distinctive 
academic discipline we could call 'sociology' than does 
positivism. 
From what has been said about positivist and interpretive 
sociology there would not seem to be much hope for any 
combination of the two. This was the position of Max Weber who 
insisted that causal explanation needed to be supplemented by the 
social actors own accounts of their situation. It is a view 
favoured by others, especially non-sociologists, who believe in a 
vague sort of way that each 'perspective' must have its element 
of truth. Paul Hirst, it would appear, holds some such views, 
arguing on one occasion [4] that: 
Explanations in terms of beliefs and values, 
of reasons as well as causes, seem to me 
logically necessary 
This is in spite of placing reason-type explanations with history 
and causal ones we know not where. But this view will not bear 
examination, for even if the two main kinds of sociology were 
more coherent than they in fact are, there would still be the 
problem of the incompatibility of reasons and causes in 
explaining the same events. 
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Thus, far from following the logic of applying the methods 
of social science to history, it would seem more sensible to 
examine the appropriateness of applying historical explanation to 
problems and situations normally considered the preserve of the 
sociologist; that is, in the present. After all, the data of the 
sociology is necessarily historical data, albeit very recent; the 
line dividing past and future is like the geometer's line, it has 
no thickness. The difference lies in what the sociologist does 
with his data: how he evaluates it, aggregates it, relates it and 
arranges it into patterns laid down by his theory. But if, for 
the reasons we have suggested as well as others, this patterning 
is unproductive of academic knowledge, then the only coherent 
patterning we are left with is that of the historian. But though 
this may be true in principle, it is also true that in practice 
academic historians are chary about investigating matters too 
close to home. The historians of 'the present' is in fact the 
journalist, who, though committed to truth, is to a large extent 
subject to the whims of editorial and public curiosity. (It 
could be said that much that is good in sociology is really good 
journalism). Part of the reason for the academic historian's 
diffidence is that our concern for, and our perception of, the 
present is persistently, almost inescapably, practical. It is 
virtually impossible to investigate present realities in a wholly 
detached way, so that the question 'why do we want to know?' is 
always pertinent. In studying present realities it is very 
difficult to avoid dealing with social problems. Now 'social 
problem' is a practical concept, the application of which is 
governed by our beliefs and values and practical concerns, all of 
which determines the selection and arrangement of material. What 
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we seek here is not knowledge for its own sake but information 
that will guide action, and this alters the whole logic of the 
matter. The social sciences are extremely useful at gathering 
information of this sort. Statistical research, for example, may 
well help a government tackle a social problem, and even studies 
of the causes of voting behaviour may greatly assist politicians 
in planning their campaigns; and if the information is useful and 
contributes to effectiveness then it is neither here nor there 
that its status as academic knowledge may be dubious. Further, 
if numbers of intelligent people study and think about some human 
activity or situation in great detail they are bound to produce 
new facts, reveal unconsidered aspects and gain insights of some 
kind, quite irrespective of the theoretical framework they bring 
to or derive from their study. Thus it is not the purpose here 
to argue that sociology is a waste of time, merely that it cannot 
have the status or an academic discipline that history has. 
However, before leaving this topic one further matter 
needs to be clarified. While much of what has been said about 
sociology applies equally well to psychology and other social 
sciences, it does not seem to apply in the same way to economics. 
Indeed economics has long been pointed to as the success story of 
the social sciences and an intimation of things to come in the 
wider field. But economics is a peculiar case. It differs 
fundamentally from other social sciences in that its laws are not 
empirical generalisations. They are wholly deductive in the way 
that Hobbes and Descartes once believed, erroneously, that the 
laws of physics could be deduced, given the right axioms. They 
modelled their notion of science upon geometry, but while 
successful physical science cannot be like geometry, economic 
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theorizing can be and is. Economic theory is a self-enclosed 
deductive system resting upon axioms. This is so because pure 
economic activity has its own peculiar rationality, related to 
the fact that it is, almost uniquely among human activities, 
quantifiable. It is therefore possible to both identify and 
evaluate economic actions. This means we can postulate an 
economic situation and work out what an economic actor must do to 
maximise his economic advantage. A whole theoretical system can 
be built in this way without recourse to empirical data. As 
Robert Brown has observed: 
It is a perennial criticism levelled at 
economists that they produce deductive systems 
or calculi without being able to apply them 
usefully. [5] 
The question then arises as to the relationship of the body of 
theory to the realities of economic activity. In a certain sense 
economic theories, like geometrical theorems, are not refutable 
by empirical fact. However, businessmen, politicians and the 
rest of us persistently demand that economics be 'useful', that 
its theories fit the world and be predictive. So economists 
develop more sophisticated theories; but they also cover 
themselves with qualifications such as 'given perfect knowledge' 
<which nobody ever has) and 'all things being equal' <which they 
never are). The other device of economists is to construct 
economic models of particular economies, into which empirical 
generalisations and trends (such as the propensity to save) can 
be fed. But these are highly abstract and are inevitably a long 
way from the messy reality of the market place where peoples' 
economic actions may be influenced by a multitude of non-economic 
reasons. Much more might be said about the nature of economics 
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but perhaps there has been enough to indicate that it can rank as 
an academic discipline with its own concepts and principles and 
forms of reasoning. But it is not an empirical science in the 
way that physics is and sociology aspires to be. On the other 
hand, there could, in principle, be other disciplines similarly 
built upon some notion of rational action, but it is difficult to 
find or imagine an activity with such a distinctive rationality 
or so quantifiable as the economic. (Some have put hopes in 
games theory, but its use by American military planners in Viet 
Nam was strikingly unsuccessful.) 
In conclusion we can say that, economics apart and for 
peculiar reasons, the only coherent and distinctive academic 
discipline concerned with explaining human actions is history, 
the social sciences being at best no more than collections of 
more or less useful information. 
III 
The second major difficulty with Hirst's account concerns 
the relationship between knowledge and 'experience'. He tells us 
that: 
' ..• the major forms of knowledge, or 
disciplines, can be distinguished by their 
dependence on some particular kind of test 
against experience for their distinctive 
e>:pressions.' ( p. 45) 
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But it is difficult to see what Hirst means by 'experience'. We 
might contrast history and economics. At a stretch, historical 
statements might be said to be tested against experience in the 
sense of testing them against surviving evidence (not of course 
against the events they describe, which is impossible). But in 
economics the test is the logic of economic reasoning. 
The same is true of mathematics and logic, which Hirst 
lumps together. In mathematics, and logic, it is not experience, 
in the sense of empirical observation, which is the test of 
truth. Presumably Hirst means something else by 'experience' in 
this case, though what it could be is not clear. But there is a 
further point. Karl Popper, it may be remembered, tells us that 
he came to his falisifiability criterion for distinguishing 
science from non-science as a result of reflecting on the fact 
that certain purportedly scientific theories - namely Freudian 
and Adlerian psychology and Marxism - appeared to be confirmed by 
any and every experience, and that was just what was wrong with 
them.[6] Testing against experience, then, will not do as it 
stands. But neither will it do simply to replace it with 
falsifiability as a defining characteristic of disciplines as 
such. To take again the case of mathematics: if it is unclear 
what 'testing against experience' could mean her, then 'falsified 
by experience' would not be any clearer. Yet the notion of the 
test of experience does contain a large element of the truth 
which can be brought out if the misleading term 'experience' is 
dropped and the nature and function of testing is clarified. 
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Claims to mathematical knowledge are tested against the 
particular logic of mathematical reasoning, as with logic; in 
science there is the appeal to empirical observation and 
experiment (though there are other criteria when these are 
insufficentl; in history it is the historical evidence which 
provides the test of a claim. A means of testing claims is a 
necessary feature of the rules that are constitutive of each 
discipline. But such tests are not adequate unless they can be 
decisive in settlement of disputes over claims to knowledge. 
Where we have a dispute between rival claims which cannot in 
principle be settled - as is arguably the case with Adlerian and 
Freudian accounts of the same behaviour - then either we do not 
have a properly constituted discipline, or else we are not 
dealing with properly constituted claims within that discipline. 
In other words, it is the existence of an adequate decision 
procedure which is the essential mark of an academic discipline. 
Without one nothing can be excluded and nothing can be 
distinguishable as knowledge. 
This analysis raises severe difficulties for Hirst's 
three remaining forms of knowledge - art, religion and morals 
largely because they involve values and beliefs with their 
attendant commitments, passions and intractabilities. It is in 
this area that Hirst's failure to operate a notion of academic 
disciplines results in more confusion. He is too committed to a 
concept of forms of knowledge which puts all the forms on the 
same footing. But this is mistaken and confused. What Hirst is 
really dealing in is not forms of knowledge but forms of 
understanding, some of which - history, mathematics, physical 
science, etc. - have the necessary decision procedures for 
- 123 -
generating objective academic knowledge. Those forms of 
understanding that remain have a different and more complicated 
relationship with the disciplines. In this section we will deal 
with art and religion and leave morals to the section following. 
The artist views the world aesthetically while the 
religious believer views the world in terms of some concept of 
the divine. In both cases we speak of knowledge or truth, yet in 
a special sense. The deepest experiences of religious truth 
appear to be incommunicable to others of the same faith, let 
alone those of other faiths; 'knowledge' here is not of a sort 
that is supported by argument. Something similar is true of 
'artistic truth'. Whatever this may amount to it is not 
something coldly stateable: a painting is not an argument that 
could be refuted by another painting. Knowledge in these cases 
is something altogether different from academic knowledge. 
On the other hand, both art and religion are connected 
with discipline-like studies, with artistic criticism and 
theology respectively. Within artistic criticism there are 
undoubtedly arguments and controversies, and undoubtedly a piece 
of criticism can be shown to be false and inadequate. Yet at the 
same time, two pieces of criticism of the same work of art can be 
equally insightful and cogently argued while coming to contrary 
conclusions, with no clear way of settling which is right. 
Indeed, we may legitimately feel that both are right. And this 
is related to the fact that we do not regard the history of 
criticism in terms of an accumulating body of knowledge, in the 
manner of science or history. Partly this is a recognition that 
different critics, particularly of different periods, can have 
different aesthetic values, and that there is no decision 
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procedure for deciding between these. We may be able to 
demonstrate that the Victorian critic who insisted that the moral 
of Shakespeare's O~ello was quite plainly "Let not your daughter 
consort with a blackmoor" was a phillistine fool; and we may 
grant that given a shared set of aesthetic values one critic may 
be able to prove his case against another; yet in the end we have 
to recognise that as between such sets of values there is no 
ultimate test of truth. Artistic criticism may perhaps be fairly 
called a 'quasi-discipline' since such knowledge as there is 
would seem to be relative to a set of values; indeed, we pursue 
the enterprise less in hope of knowledge for its own sake as of 
cultivated sensibility and judgement for their own sakes 
Theology is a rather different case. Here we do have 
argument and refutation and a decision procedure based upon a 
Holy Book, the authority of which can be decisive in settling 
disputes. On the other hand, this procedure does not cross 
faiths, and may not even cross sects. Hence, theological 
knowledge is not universal in the way that historical or 
scientific knowledge is, but is relative to particular religions. 
Both aesthetic and theological knowledge, therefore, share some 
of the features of full disciplines, but not all, and 
'quasi-discipline' seems an appropriate characterization of both. 
But it should be noted that in neither case is the 'discipline' 
coextensive with the form of knowledge, still less with the form 
of understanding. In both cases the pervasive problem is that of 




There is something odd, and perhaps even distasteful, 
about the notion of moral reasoning as an academic discipline. 
That is, that moral conclusions can be calculated like 
arithmetic, that moral reasoning can be some kind of calculus 
into which one feeds a moral problem, turns the handle and the 
correct solution comes out the other end. Yet in the past moral 
reasoning has been conceived of in this way by many philosophers; 
and indeed, since the 17th Century there have been many chairs of 
Natural Law in European universities. Since then, however, we 
have generally become more sceptical. This scepticism turns on 
two issues: first, the relationship between facts and values, and 
secondly, the possibility of settling fundamental moral 
disagreements. 
First it is necessary to rehearse, briefly and roughly, 
the distinction between description and evaluation. To describe 
is to state what is there, what is in the world independent of 
our describing it; it is to state facts. To do this we use 
descriptive terms whose utility lies in their reference to 
features of the world, so that we can use them to pick out the 
features we observe and construct descriptions. Since there is 
some sort of correspondence between descriptive terms and 
reality, disputes over the accuracy of a description can be 
settled by checking it against the facts. But when we evaluate -
when we use terms like 'good' or 'bad', 'beautiful' or 'ugly', 
'superior' or 'inferior' -we do not say what is there; we do not 
make statements that correspond to reality since there is no 
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independent features of reality to which terms like 'good', 
'beautiful' or 'superiority' can refer, and so these terms cannot 
be used to pick them out. And since there is nothing in the 
world to which these terms can be said to correspond, criteria 
for their application are indefinitely variable, deriving from 
peoples' values and beliefs, not from the world itself. This 
being so, we can apply such terms freely according to what we 
believe is desirable, important or otherwise significant to us. 
That is, according to our evaluatory frameworks, which are things 
we bring to experience not things we derive from it. The nature 
of these frameworks is such that there is no way of showing that 
one is superior to another in any absolute sense. In consequence 
of this, when there is a dispute over an evaluation and the 
disputants have fundamentally different values, there is no way 
of settling it conclusively. Men, of course, frequently do 
differ in their fundamental values. But it is equally true that 
over large areas of experience, and certainly within communities, 
values are widely shared; and perhaps social life would not be 
possible if this were not so. It is only against such a 
background of shared values that disagreements over evaluations 
can be settled. But where there is no such background there is 
deadlock. Thus all evaluations are endlessly contestable; they 
are always open to dispute, by those of different values. 
Now in characterising the forms of knowledge Hirst 
insists that: 
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... it is a necessary feature of knowledge as 
such that there be public criteria whereby the 
true is distinguishable from the false, the 
good from the bad, the right from the wrong. 
(p.43) 
But if the account of moral concepts given earlier is correct, 
then there are no such public criteria for settling questions of 
good and bad, right and wrong, in any absolute sense, as between 
fundamentally different value systems. However, this possibility 
is not considered, and Hirst goes on- to develop his position by 
setting out four 'distinguishing marks' of a discipline. First, 
each has its own concepts peculiar to the form. Secondly, each 
has its own logical structure which relates the concepts in a 
system. The fourth 'distinguishing mark' is that each form has 
its own techniques for amassing a body of knowledge. It is the 
third that is important here and worth quoting: 
The form, by virtue of its particular terms 
and logic, has expressions or statements ... 
that in some way or other, however indirect it 
may be, are testable against experience. This 
is the case in scientific knowledge, moral 
knowledge, and in the arts ... Each form, then, 
has distinctive expressions that are testable 
against experience in accordance with 
particular criteria that are peculiar to the 
form. (p.44) 
Now it is difficult to see what Hirst could possibly mean by 
testing moral and aesthetic judgements against experience, 
however indirectly. Evaluatory frameworks are not derived from 
experience nor confirmed by it, and there is no way of 
determining the 'correctness' of any one framework as compared to 
another. If this is so then the whole notion of a moral 
discipline is incoherent. 
- 128 -
On the other hand, morality is not necessarily to be 
excluded from the forms of knowledge. It is undoubtedly a 
distinctive form of understanding with its own concepts and 
manner of reasoning; and given a set of values from which to 
start conclusions may be reached that could reasonably be called 
'moral knowledge'. But this knowledge can only be relative. It 
does not count as knowledge for all who employ the same kind of 
reasoning but only for those who reason from the same values. 
The point about a discipline, however~ is that conclusions can be 
reached which are compelling for all who engage in that 
particular form of reasoning. Consequently, while a case can 
perhaps be made for regarding morality as a form of knowledge, 
what it is not, and could not be, is an academic discipline. 
Paul Hirst, however, continues to hope that a logic or 
moral reasoning will soon be found that will satisfactorily 
relate acts and values, and enable fundamental moral disputes to 
be decisively settled. [7] What his grounds for hope are he does 
not tell us; and since hope will not substitute for philosophical 
demonstration, we must conclude that moral values and arguments 
fall outside the scope of academic discipline. 
v 
Practical knowledge does not figure in Hirst's scheme of 
things, and receives only a few passing and dismissive remarks. 
This is perhaps surprising in one who is chiefly known as an 
educational philosopher. It is also a pity because it might have 
given him a more adequate framework for dealing with some of his 
forms of knowledge; religion perhaps, and certainly moral 
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knowledge. 
Practical understanding is concerned with how we live our 
lives and what we do. It involves seeing the world in terms of 
its relationship to our actions, individual and collective; that 
is, in seeing the significance or insignifican~e of anything and 
everything for our enterprises, needs and pleasures. It embraces 
all that pertains to acting and doing; to what is effective and 
to what is right. It is upon these two dimensions of practical 
activity that we deliberate. We can engage in technical and 
moral reasoning, and, correspondingly, we can have technical and 
moral knowledge. However, the ability to reason in either of 
these fields is no guarantee of good performance. Technical 
knowledge must be supplemented with skill, or 'knowing how', and 
moral knowledge by character. Indeed skill and character are 
essential to good performance, while knowledge, in the sense of 
what can be stated is very much secondary. 
Leaving skill and character aside, however, we might ask 
what is the relationship between technical and moral knowledge on 
the one hand, and academic knowledge on the other; that is, 
between theory in its purest sense, and practice. Some, like 
Hirst [8] believe that the relationship can and should be close 
and tight, in human affairs as much as in engineering. But this 
is a mistake. We have already argued that moral knowledge does 
not belong in the sphere of the academic disciplines, and much 
the same is true of technical knowledge, especially in the case 
of people. What will and will not work in human affairs is not 
something that can be determined a priori by any theoretical 
means. People are infinitely variable and inherently 
unpredictable. Being successful in human affairs is not a 
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function of theoretical ability but, as Aristotle pointed 
out, [9] of experience. There is, therefore, a gulf between 
academic theory and practice, at least in the sense of such 
theory directly guiding practical affairs, !though there may be 
other relationships as we have seen). 
Practice, then, is an autonomous sphere of its own. It is 
also a complicated sphere with understandings and knowledge of 
different kinds, with practices and values, techniques, rules and 
traditions. It is arguably the appropriate sphere of religion 
and, if anywhere, the proper sphere of ideology. 
VI 
If ideology really is a unity of the theoretical, the 
moral and the practical then in the light of the above account it 
would seem to be not so much a distinctive form of understanding 
as a logical mess. That ideology does achieve a kind of logical 
consistency and coherence is entirely due to the special nature 
of ideological concepts. 
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CHAPTE~ FOUR 
THE VOCABULARY OF POLITICAL BELIEF 
To be possessed of a set of political beliefs, an 
ideology, is to understand the world in a certain way. And to 
have an understanding is to be master of a vocabulary, to be able 
to apply it appropriately. Each of the various sets of political 
beliefs - Liberalism, Nazism, Marxism and the rest - has a 
distinctive vocabulary of its own. The terms to be found in 
these various vocabularies would seem to vary a great deal, and 
go together with various sorts of reasoning: the scientific, 
philosophical, historical, moral, technical and so on. But this 
appearance is illusory. Despite an apparent diversity, 
ideological concepts are of a single sort. The purpose of this 
chapter is to show what sort they are. 
At first sight this seems an unlikely prospect. When we 
speak of someone's political beliefs we usually have in mind some 
system of ideas in which an apparently factual account of how 
things are in the world is combined with an account of how they 
could be and ought to be. But it this is so then it suggests 
that such beliefs must contain at least two sorts of concept, 
descriptive and evaluative. It also suggests that these beliefs 
must be based on a logical fallacy, and that with the aid of 
'Hume's law' they can be easily analysed into two parts, with 
facts and theories on one side and values and prescriptions on 
the other. However, a close examination of ideological writings 
shows that illicit moves from tact to value are not common and 
that ideology does not in fact work in this way. How the fallacy 
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is avoided, how the trick is worked, is central to the nature of 
ideology and to its distinctiveness as a form of understanding. 
The basis of that distinctiveness is the ethical element found in 
all political beliefs. 
Whatever other characteristics political beliefs may 
have, they do have moral force: they tell us how we should live 
and what we should strive for. Insofar as we are Marxists or 
Nazis or Liberals, we are committed to beliefs about how the 
world ought to be, what relationships should prevail, what is 
just and what is conducive to human flourishing. Thus, despite 
the horrors that may be committed in its name, any system of 
political beliefs constitutes a moral vision, a set of ideals 
which provide a standard of what is right and what is important 
in social lite, and consequently a yardstick against which the 
present world, the imperfect world we occupy, may be judged. 
These theories go on to suggest the means by which this imperfect 
world can be transformed into one in which its ideals are 
embodied - though revolution, democratisation, the elimination of 
enemies or some other means and as such act as a guide to right 
action in political life. 
The moral force of an ideology is most clearly carried in 
certain of its concepts. Some of these are peculiar to 
particular ideologies, as are 'progress', 'alienation' and 
'master race'; while others, such as 'democracy', 'freedom', 
'inequality' and 'justice', are common to several. 'Progress', 
'alienation' and 'master race' seem to be quite definitely 
descriptive concepts, and yet at the same time are evaluative in 
the sense that progress involves improvement and so must be a 
good thing, alienation is necessarily an evil and master races 
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cannot be other than superior. The other concepts- 'freedom'~ 
'justice' and the rest- are more obviously moral, but 
nevertheless are thought to describe some state of affairs, 
whether actual or possible. But it is notorious that the 
realities to which these common concepts are thought to refer 
vary from ideology to ideology; Marxists and Liberals, for 
example , have very different notions of what realities 
correspond to such as justice and democracy. These concepts are, 
to use W.B. Gallie's phrase, 'essentially contested' [1J. We 
have, then, a group of concepts playing a central role in 
ideology which appear to combine both descriptive and evaluative 
elements, and this rather odd duality has logical consequences. 
To see what these consequences are we might begin by 
looking at an ordinary moral concept, the relatively homely 
notion of murder. The term 'murder', in its moral sense !not its 
legal sense which is logically quite different), might be thought 
to refer to a specific kind of action, let us say unprovoked and 
premeditated killing, where correct application of the concept is 
merely a matter of establishing the facts, as in law. But this 
is not the case. What makes killing a case of murder is not any 
feature that can be empirically determined, but that the killing 
was wrongful or unjustified. This being so the application of 
the concept can vary from person to person and from society to 
society according to varying moral beliefs. Certain sorts of 
killing may be condemned by most societies, but there will be 
some society or sect in which it is permissable and hence not 
murder. But even if some sort of killing were universally 
regarded as murder this would not alter the logic of the case, 
which is that what we count as murder depends upon our moral 
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beliefs and not upon the facts. The concept therefore has 
considerable elasticity and can be stretched to cover any kind of 
killing we disapprove of, far beyond the usual application. Some 
regard abortion as murder, others capital punishment, others 
still the killing of animals for sport, while some animal rights 
activists proclaim the slogan 'meat is murder', and so on. The 
term 'murder', therefore, does not refer to any specific class of 
events in the world. It is 'quasi-descriptive', the appearance 
of descriptiveness coming from its association with the purely 
descriptive concept of 'killing', which determines its field of 
application. In consequence, when there is disagreement over 
whether some particular kind of killing, such as euthanasia, 
shall count as murder, there is little use in appealing to the 
facts since it is not the facts that are in dispute. Yet when 
the disagreement stems from fundamentally different moral beliefs 
it is difficult to see what else could be appealed to. For there 
is no logic that can demonstrate that one set of moral beliefs is 
true and another false, or prove one superior to another. 
However much we may wish it otherwise, there is no such decision 
procedure in this area. This is the basis of essential 
contestedness, and of the endless disputes over the 'true' 
meaning of justice, freedom and the rest. That such terms may 
have a descriptive content does not alter the matter. In all 
concepts which combine the descriptive and the evaluative, it is 
their evaluative content that determines their logic. These 
points are perhaps best illustrated with an example from outside 
the contentious sphere of moral evaluation. 
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Consider the concept of a weed. Let us image two people 
living side by side who are both gardeners. One is a lady who 
grows mint. She loves the taste of it, the look of it, the smell 
of it, and she rejoices to see it flourish. Her neighbour 
loathes the stuff and is forever tearing it out as it spreads 
persistently and anarchically across their common border, 
threatening to ruin his neatly ordered husbandry. He insists 
furiously that mint is a weed, she, equally furiously, insists 
that it is not. This is clearly not the kind of argument that 
can be settled. Within gardening weeds are bad things: they are 
what gardeners pull up. What counts as a weed is relative to 
what any gardener wants to grow. The point is that 'weed' is a 
term of evaluation, and as such there is nothing actually in the 
world to which it can refer. There is no essence of weedness of 
which mint may or may not, as a mater of demonstrable fact, 
partake; there are no fixed public criteria for its application 
other than the limits set by the concept of a plant. That 'weed' 
is, strictly speaking, non-referential is clear from the case of 
someone who refuses to count anything as a weed and is happy to 
see anything grow. On the other hand, because the term appears 
to be a descriptive one the unsettleability of the dispute 
between our two gardeners is not perhaps as self-evident as, let 
us say, two small children squabbling over whether baked beans 
taste nice or horrid. So it is possible to imagine our gardeners 
each setting out to prove their case and searching through books 
on botany for support. But they are inevitably disappointed 
since because 'weed' is an evaluatory term it could not be a 
scientific one, and could have no place in any system of 
scientific classification and description. However, though our 
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two gardeners are theoretically naive they are nevertheless 
theoretically disposed, and proceed to rectify what they take to 
be a serious fault of current botantical description by 
constructing rival plant theories and classifications in which 
the concept of weed plays a central role, one proving the 
weedness of mint the other the opposite. But however elaborate 
or comprehensive or systematic these constructions might be, they 
could not constitute rival botanies; they could only be rival 
horticultural ideologies, with no means of deciding which was 
right and which wrong. 
There is a whole class of everyday concepts like murder 
and weed which are quasi-descriptive, where a descriptive 
appearance disguises an evaluative nature. But insufficient 
attention has been paid to them. However, Thomas Hobbes was 
aware of the phenomenon. In a section of Leviat/Jan entitled 
'Inconstant names' he wrote: 
The names of such things as affect us, that 
is, which please, and displease us, because all 
men be not alike affected with the same thing, 
nor the same man at all times, are in the 
common di scoLrrses of man 1 of in constant 
signification. For seeing all names are 
imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all 
our affections are but conceptions; when we 
conceive the same thing differently, we can 
hardly avoid different naming of them. For 
though the nature of what we conceive, be the 
same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, 
in respect of different constitutions of body, 
and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a 
tincture of our different passions. And 
therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of 
words; which besides the signification of what 
we imagine of their nature, have a 
signification also of the nature, disposition, 
and interest of the speaker; such as are the 
names of Vertues, and vices; For one man 
calleth Nisdome, what another calleth feare; 
and one cruelty, what another· justice; one 
prodigality, what another magnimani ty and one 
gravity, what another' stupidity &c. And 
therefore such names can never be true grounds 
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of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors 
and Tropes of speech: but these are less 
dangerous! because they profess their 
inconstancy; which the other do not. [2] 
There are several features of Hobbes' account that are 
significant in respect of the sorts of concepts we have been 
considering. He is clear about the disguised nature of these 
terms; that where they appear to refer to some reality their 
application is in fact variable, being a function of the user's 
attitudes. He is also clear that, this being so, such terms 'can 
never be true grounds of any ratiocination'; or, as we might put 
it, are out of place in academic reasoning. However, there are 
weaknesses in Hobbes' account! at least in respect of the present 
purpose. That account bears the marks of two of Hobbes' 
characteristic doctrines which are in themselves highly 
questionable and which limit 'inconstant names' as a means of 
analysing political beliefs. First is Hobbes' mechanical 
psychology which interprets moral thinking in terms of personal 
self-interest; and secondly, his naming theory of language makes 
him see concepts in isolation rather than as part of a network of 
meanings. (This is why 'quasi-descriptive' and, as we shall see, 
'pseudo-descriptive' are preferred to the more elegant 
'inconstant names' and even 'essentially contested concepts'). 
To be fair to Hobbes, his 'inconstant names' can be used 
individually and as expressions of personal self-interest. But 
the dropping of his psychology and theory of language allows a 
wider understanding of how 'inconstant names' operate within 
moral and political thinking. 
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These points can be illustrated through a consideration 
of one of Hobbes' own e~·:amples. In Cha.pter· XIX of Leviat/ran he 
writes: 
There be other names of Government, in the 
Histories, and books of PoliC\di as Tyral7l7_1.1, and 
Oligarchy: :But the\:) are not the names of other' 
Formes of Government, but of the same Formes 
misliked. For they that are discontented under 
Non.:wclly, call it Tyranny; and the\:) that ar·e 
displeased with A.ristocraq.;, called it 
()J igarclly... [ 3 J 
Hobbes may be quite right in that 'tyranny' can just mean 
'monarchy misliked' and used in a way that merely expresses an 
individual's personal discontent. But 'tyranny' can also be 
used, as it has been by thinkers before and after Hobbes, as part 
of a wider theory. It is this wider use in 'ratiocination' that 
Hobbes did not develop, and given his assumptions probably could 
not have developed, that is interesting in the present context. 
Lockes notion of tyranny, for e~·:ample, is logically bound up with 
his theory of limited government and natural rights, and has to 
be defined in terms of these. Rousseau, Mill and others have 
their own quite different conceptions of tyranny which are 
connected with their respective notions of freedom, democracy and 
similar concepts. 'Tyranny' is the wrongfull use of power; as 
ILiith 'murder', its badness is built into it. Why these theorists 
differ in their conceptions of tyranny is because they have 
different values, different conceptions of political right and 
wrong. The important point about this is that just as 'weed', 
because of its evaluative nature, could not be part of an 
objective theory about plants, so for the same reason 'tyranny' 
could not be part of an objective theory about politics. 
'Tyranny', like 'alienation', 'democracy' and similar concepts, 
- 140 -
has a moral content and so behaves evaluatively rather than 
descriptively, and because of the tight interconnectedness of 
language within theory must influence all the concepts that are 
connected to it. It makes some difference, therefore, whether or 
not particular usages of terms like 'tyranny' are part of a 
theory or not. 
The meaning of •weed' does not come from any theory, but 
from the practice of gardening (the person who would not count 
anything as a weed could hardly be called a gardener), and other 
practices have concepts of this type. There are also concepts of 
a similar logical kind whose evaluative content is moral and 
which relate to human conduct as a whole, to social life and to 
politics. Some of these also take their meaning from a practice 
or way of living - like 'murder' or Hobbes' virtues and vices -
but others are the product of theory. That is, either they are 
pure theoretical products, such as 'alienation', or, like Locke's 
notion of 'Tyranny', have been brought into a theory from outside 
and given a fresh coat of meaning. Concepts that have grown out 
of practice and form part of our common language, like 'murder' 
and 'weed', may be called 'quasi-descriptive', for they seem to 
make no claims tor themselves beyond what they are. But for 
concepts that owe their meaning to a theoretical system that 
purports to describe and explain the world, such as 'democracy', 
'alienation' and 'master race', the term 'pseudo-descriptive' 
would seem more appropriate. It is pseudo-description that 
characterises the nature of ideological concepts. 
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In employing such concepts the ideological believer is 
understanding the world in terms of morally charged categories. 
He has what appears to be a descriptive account of the world, but 
one which points in a certain moral direction and from which 
prescriptions can be drawn. It is in this way that the Humean 
objection is overcome, but at a price. The seemingly smooth 
transition between fact and value is only possible by building 
the values into the supposed facts, so that in ideology we do not 
have genuine descriptions or explanations of the world but only 
disguised evaluations of it. Only tor the believer do the 
descriptions describe and the explanations explain; they have no 
purchase on the rest of us. In ideology, therefore, there is no 
illicit inference of values from facts. Description and 
evaluation are fused in the same concepts, with the effect of 
turning concepts which retain their descriptive appearance into 
evaluative ones with no genuine descriptive force. Yet this 
suggests a new dichotomy. For not all the terms in the 
vocabulary of a given ideology would seem to be morally charged, 
in which case it seems that we must have a mixture of the 
ideological and the non-ideological and not a set of concepts of 
a single sort. To examine this question we need to look at one 
ideology as a whole. 
A Marxist commitment necessarily involves an understanding 
of society and its developement in terms of class conflict and 
class oppression. Western society is characterised as 
'capitalist society', which, despite its surface complexity, is 
fundamentally divided between a dominant bourgeois capitalist 
class and an exploited and oppressed proletariat. The state, 
with its apparatus of oppression, and the prevailing set of 
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ideological beliefs, with its rationalisations and 
justifications, both serve in their different ways to maintain 
the system. The educational process also plays its part by 
reproducing the labour force which has been indoctrinated into 
passively accepting its position as inevitable and right. The 
victims of the system are exploited, oppressed and deprived of 
their humanity, a condition summed up in the concept of 
alienation. However, the system cannot be reformed but only 
destroyed by a revolution of the oppressed, who, having achieved 
revolutionary consciousness, thereby have the means to rebuild 
society on the basis of humanity and justice. 
In Marxist eyes capitalist society thus stands condemned 
and its overthrow a moral necessity. It is precisely the 
function of the whole elaborate structure of Marxist theory to 
give substance to this vision of a morally incoherent world that 
can be transformed into a coherent one. The Marxist view of the 
world can be seen as essentially ethical. It is a moral vision 
that informs all Marxist thought and determines the nature of its 
distinctive concepts. Centrally important terms such as 
'exploitation', 'oppression', 'dehumanisation', and 'alienation', 
whatever their descriptive content, are clearly terms of moral 
evaluation, since anything to which they are applied (and their 
application can vary somewhat as between the different strands of 
Marxism) counts as an evil which socialist society will 
eliminate. It may seem possible to contrast such terms with 
others such as 'state' or 'class' or 'ideology' which, on the 
face of it, have no moral content. But this is a mistake. These 
apparantly neutral terms do have moral import which comes from 
being defined by means of the overtly moral ones. Marxists 
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define the state in terms of class oppression, while exploitation 
is built into the definition of class, as its is of capitalism. 
To be possessed of ideological beliefs may appear to be a neutral 
fact, but within Marxist discourse to have such believes is to be 
a victim of class distortions, which is an aspect of alienation. 
All the concepts of a Marxist understanding have a moral content; 
all take their meaning from, and are expressive of, the Marxist 
moral vision. It is this vision that makes Marxism an ideology 
and its concepts ideological. Ideologies are a form of ethical 
understanding and their vocabularies are made up of concepts of a 
certain sort, namely pseudo-descriptive ones. [4J The 
theoretical framework links together concepts in such a way that 
its moral force is carried by the whole vocabulary; that 
vocabulary consists of a network of pseudo-descriptive concepts 
in terms of which the Marxist understands the world. 
Given the kind of concepts involved, the Marxist account 
of capitalist society could not be an objective one. It is not a 
neutral description from which a condemnation is inferred or 
tagged on, so that a non-Marxist could accept the description 
while rejecting the condemnation. The condemnation is built into 
the description, or, more accurately, it is not really a 
description at all: it is an evaluation masquerading as a 
description. And that is true of all the individual descriptions 
and explanations which the theory makes possible; that 
individual institutions, practices and situations. An account of 
a classroom situation, for example, might be given in terms of 
the operation of the 'ideological state apparatus', or the class 
distribution of 'cultural capital' (there are variations here 
according to whether the observer is a phenomenological Marxist, 
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an Althusserian, or one of several other varieties). But 
whichever it is the pupils are seen as being yoked to a system 
that will oppress them and deny their humanity. Such accounts 
purport to tell us in some objective way what is really happening 
behind the immediate appearance that might be given in a humble 
description, of a maths lesson or whatever it might be. But an 
account of this kind can neither describe nor explain the 
situation in any objective sense. What it does, under the guise 
of description, is to endow the thing observed with a particular 
moral significance, so that those of the same beliefs will know 
how to regard such situations in the correct light, and, if 
appropriate, act accordingly. In this way the believer's 
evaluation of the world is extended to a new situation and his 
understanding thereby refined and developed. However, the 
important point is that the same situation 'described' by a 
Marxist observer would be 'described' differently by an observer 
with a different moral or political commitment. Instead of 
giving his account in terms of alienation and oppression, this 
other observer may do so in the entirely opposite terms of some 
kind of liberation, from the slavery of the passions, original 
sin, unenlightened short term interests or whatever; education 
being, tor this observer, the means to human happiness and 
fulfilment. These rival accounts of the same situation may 
present themselves as rival claims to knowledge, but are in fact 
rival evaluations which no amount of empirical research or 
neutral reasoning could decide between. They are incompatible 
and incommensurable; the dispute is, in principle, unsettleable. 
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That disputes between rival ideologies cannot in principle 
be settled is an extension of the fact that as between 
fundamentally different sets of moral values there is no decision 
procedure, no way of demonstrating that one is true and the other 
false, or that one is superior to the other. But because in 
ideology believers might be said to conceive the world in terms 
of their values, they not only evaluate it differently but 
experience it differently. Consequently, in disputes between 
rival beliefs the disputants are not standing on the same ground, 
are not talking about the same things, even though they may be 
using the same words. There is no possibility of objectivity and 
so ideological concepts, theories and explanations are 
necessarily incompatible with academic disciplines. That is, 
they can 'never be true grounds of ratiocination', and so, 
strictly speaking, notions such as 'Marxist history' and 'Liberal 
philosophy' are contradictions in terms. This is not to say, 
however, that words cannot be taken from their ideological 
context and neutralised •. A sociologist may wish to use a notion 
of ideology as disguised expression of class interest, yet shorn 
of its connections with alienation, class oppression and the 
rest. But though derived from Marxism this would not be a Marxist 
concept, but a neutralised version. Conversely and more 
commonly, just as concepts may be divested of their ideological 
meaning, words can also be taken from ordinary usage and invested 
with ideological meaning. We noted this above with the case of 
'tyranny', though in the present century examples such as 
'proletarian', 'Jew' and 'rational' have been more common. In 
making this transition these words change their meaning and their 
logical nature. 
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If a Nazi and a non-Nazi both make the statement 'Freud 
was a Jew' it would seem that they are saying the same thing, 
being just as accurate. But this is not so. For the Nazi 'Freud 
was a Jew' means the same as 'Freud was an enemy of 
civilisation', while it does not have this meaning for the 
non-Nazi. Further, the Nazi, unlike the non-Nazi, can go on to 
make the inference: 'Freud's works are Jewish, therefore Freud's 
works are degenerate'. Conversely, since Christianity was deemed 
a contribution to civilization it followed that Christ must have 
been an Aryan, and those aspects of Christianity which Nazis 
disliked or found inconvenient could be attributed to Jews like 
St. Paul. In the Nazi vocabulary 'Aryan' and 'Jew' are not 
descriptive terms but evaluative. They are used by the Nazi to 
indicate what is approved and disapproved of, in the same way as 
'bourgeois' and 'proletarian' are used by the Marxist. 
That ideological concepts are evaluative while appearing 
to be descriptive explains how ideologists make the transition 
from their accounts of the world to their prescriptions without 
apparent logical violence. Given their beliefs, the Nazi can 
make the inference 'Freud is a Jew, therefore his work should be 
destroyed'; the Marxist can say 'the police are the instrument of 
state oppression, therefore we should try to discredit them'. 
Arguably the crucial concept in any ideology is that of man, and 
the crucial inference is 't.his is the nature of man, therefo;~e 
t!Jis is the kind of society that is appropriate to hi:; nature'. 
Such inferences are possible because in these contexts the 
concepts of Jew, state and man are pseudo-descriptive. It is the 
nature of concepts such as these that integrates the seemingly 
disparate elements of ideology. And idealogy is a distinctive 
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form of understanding because it employs a distinctive vocabulary 
composed of concepts which, despite their apparent heterogeniety, 
are of a single sort. 
*** 
Pseudo decription gives ideology its logical consistency. 
But ideology also has a distinctive structure. To show this it 
is necessary to examine the nature of ideological theory and its 
ethical content, and the manner in which the various elements are 
bound together. 
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1. W. B. Gall ie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', in 
Proceedings of the Ar.istotel ian .:::l7ciety, Vol. LVI, 
1955-6, pp. 167-98. However, the analysis that follows 
differs somewhat from Gallie's. 
2. Thomas Hobbes, Lev.iat,?an, Penguin Edition, 1968, p. 109. 
3. Ibid, p. 239. 
4. Ct. David Nanning & T.J. Robinson, The Place of Idealogy 
ir, F"L7].it.ical Life, Croom Helm, 1985. They describe 
ideology as a "genuine form of ethical understanding" 
(p.20l. But this is an assertion. They have no account 
of why this must be so, and are simply neglectful of 
othe·!" aspects of ideology. Gordon Graham, in his tl;e 
.Place of Folitics: A Study L7f .!:J ... '.i..v· Idealogies (OUP, 1986) 
also lacks a theory of the logic of ideology, and he 
makes no assertions about its essential nature. 
Consequently, he has no means of differentiating it from 
any thing else, and his failure to assign to ideology any 
specific logical character seems to undermine the point 
of his using the term in the first place. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IDEOLOGY, SCIENCE AND THEORY 
In looking at ideologies as theoretical structures it 
will be useful to relate them to, and compare them with, 
scientific theories. This is not as simple as it might seem, for 
both the nature of science and its relation to ideology are 
contentious matters which will need some untangling before we can 
get a clear view. We will begin by considering the views that 
ideologies may be partially scientific and that they are bad 
science. 
1. Ideology as bad science: Karl Popper 
Against the account of Ideology given in the previous 
chapter it may be argued that to characterise such as Marxism as 
an ethical understanding is to ignore the obvious fact that, 
whatever its prescriptive implications, it does provide us with a 
description of capitalist society, and a very powerful one; and 
that as such it does have a place in academic enquiry. Of 
course, a whole sociological theory can be abstracted from Marx's 
thought, but as a set of hypotheses about the workings of 
society, shorn of any moral or political implications and made 
subject to empirical disconfirmation the result would be a long 
way from Marxism as a system of belief, and strictly speaking 
would have no logical connection with it. Certain terms such as 
'class' or 'ideology' (thought not 'alienation' or 
'exploitation'), retaining something of their Marxist sense, 
could be used purely descriptively as part of an objective 
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account of contemporary society, one that could figure in 
academic study. But then they would have to be neutralised, be 
stripped of their moral content. In which case they would cease 
to have Marxist meanings, and the resulting account would not be 
a Marxist account, no matter how much it resembled one. 
Such an argument, however, may not satisfy those who 
contend that ideologies are essentially bad science, belief in 
which is therefore irrational, just as, given present evidence, 
belief in phlogiston or a geocentric universe is irrational. 
Nazism is frequently dealt with in this way, implying that if its 
racial theories had better supporting evidence it would be 
rational to be a Nazi. But because there is no supporting 
evidence Nazi belief is irrational and it is the irrationality 
that produced the horrors of Hitler's Germany. Indeed it was all 
so irrational that we can only make sense of it by saying that 
Hitler was mad. However such vulgar simplicities do not 
characterise all attempts to view ideologies as bad science. 
Perhaps the best known and most successful approach to 
ideology in terms of its scientific status is Karl Popper's 
account of Marxism. But Popper's attack is upon an attenuated 
Marxism, one where the ethical dimension is deliberately ignored. 
The position is, simply, that whoever wishes 
to judge Marxism has to probe it and to 
criticize it as a method, that is to say, he 
must measure it by methodological standards. 
He must ask whether it is a fruitful method or 
a poor one, i.e. whether or not it is capable 
of furthering the task of science. [1] 
Marxists do of course make claims to scientific status (as do 
other ideologies, though not all of them) and Popper's case 
against such scientific pretentions is both powerful and 
important. Yet if, as we have argued, the ethical dimension is 
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the essence of the matter, then it must be said that Popper's 
case does to a considerable extent miss the point. Marxism is 
not just bad science like astrology and alchemy, any more than 
religion is bad science. Besides, Popper's case is not perhaps 
as sound as it is usually assumed to be. 
Popper has two main arguments. First, that Marxism is 
non-science because it is unfalsifiable, E2J and secondly, that 
its historicist method is mistaken and dangerous. On the first 
count Popper argues that for Marxists, as for Freudian and 
Adlerian psychologists in their field, all facts verify the 
theory because the theory has an explanation for every 
circumstance. But the consequence of this is that the theory can 
never be tested because there are no possible facts that could 
show it to be wrong. Thus: 
The most characteristic element in this 
situation seemed to me the incessant stream of 
confirmations, of observations which 'verified' 
the theories in question; and this point was 
constantly emphasized by their adherents. A 
Marxist could not open a newspaper without 
finding on every page confirming evidence for 
his interpretation of history; not only in the 
news, but also in its presentation - which 
revealed the class bias of the paper - and 
especially of course in what the paper did not 
say. [3J 
Thus every fact 'verifies' the theory. But the point about 
scientific theories, Popper insists, is that they can be tested; 
that is, they are so constructed that they exclude certain 
circumstances which, if they are then found to obtain, will 
falsify the theory. Thus, whereas true scientific theories are 
falsifiable, pseudo-scientific theories like Marxism are not. 
However, Popper is ambiguous in his dealings with Marxism 
on this point. A couple of pages later Popper writes: 
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The Marxist theory of history, in spite of the 
serious efforts of some of its founders and 
followers, ultimately adopted this soothsaying 
practice. In some of its earlier formulations 
(for example in Marx's analysis of the 
character of the 'coming social revolution'} 
their predictions were testable, and in fact 
falsified. Yet instead of accepting the 
refutations the followers of Marx 
re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence 
in order to make them agree. In this way they 
rescued the theory from refutation; but they 
did so at the price of adopting a device which 
made it irrefutable. They thus gave a 
'conventionalist twist' to the theory; and by 
this strategem they destroyed its much 
advertised claim to scientific status. 
The two psycho-analytic theories were in a 
different class. They were simply 
non-testable, irrefutable. 
('Conjectures and Refutations' p. 37) 
By 'soothsaying practice' Popper means "re-interpreting the 
theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation". But the 
implication of this is that the fault lies with Marx's later 
followers and not with Marx himself, and that Marxism, as it left 
the hands of Marx, was perfectly good social science, and that it 
in some sense still could be. So on this argument Marxism as 
such would seem to be scientific; it is Marx's followers adapting 
the theory to explain away inconvenient facts which renders 
Marxism unscientific. But this seems hardly fair, since, as Kuhn 
has pointed out Cas we will see below>, no scientific theory 
fully fits the facts and much scientific activity consists in 
developing theories in order to produce a better fit. As Popper 
himself says: 
In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a 
theory can ever be produced; for it is always 
possible to say that the experimental results 
are not reliable; or that the discrepancies 
which are asserted to exist between the 
experimental results and the theory are only 
apparent and that they will disappear with the 
advance of our understanding. 
<The Logic of Scientific Biscover_ll' p.SO> [4] 
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No scientist abandons lightly a theory he thinks is basically 
sound in the face of counter evidence, and the attempts by Lenin 
and others to show that capitalism had yet to go through a higher 
stage of development than Marx could have foreseen can be seen in 
this light. And this would not be unreasonable because it could 
be argued that the falsification of Marx's predictions do not 
essentially effect the core of Marxist theory: the class basis of 
society, necessary historical stages and the rest. Popper does 
have a point about the way Marxists automatically adjust their 
theory, but by approaching Marxism as social science the point is 
weakened by the fact that it is difficult to draw the line 
between legitimate persistence and illegitimate dogmatism. 
Popper is stronger on the second count. His account of 
the methodological inadequacies of what he calls 'historicism' 
(i.e. discovering the 'laws' of 'patterns' of historical 
development in order to predict the future course of history -
see Poverty of Histor.icis,7l p. 3 [5J) is convincing. Yet the 
force of his argument is undoubtedly weakened by the fact that he 
thinks small scale prediction is quite acceptable, and indeed 
gives us a slightly embarrassing example of the sort of thing he 
means !embarrassing because this is clearly in line with his own 
po 1 i t i cal be 1 i e f s ) . He wr i t es : 
There can be sociological laws, and even 
sociological laws pertaining to the problem of 
progress; for example, the hypothesis that, 
wherever the freedom of thought, and of the 
communication of thought, is effectively 
protected by legal institutions and 
institutions ensuring the publicity of 
discussion, there will be scientific progress. 
(The Open .!Ji..7c.iety a,?d .its £?e,7J.ies, vol. i i, p. 
322) 
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Now it could be argued that there is a rather better case against 
historicism as a part of the broader case against positivist 
social science and the possibility of predicting human action, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. But this line of reasoning is not open 
to Popper because he is himself a convinced positivist in these 
matters <though not of course a logical positivist}. Purely on 
the methodological issue Popper seems to be arguing over a matter 
of degree, and contributing to just one more methodological 
dispute by which the social sciences are notoriously plagued (and 
which are, if the analysis of chapter 3 is correct, all redundant 
anyway}. But then, Popper's case against Marxist historicism is 
not purely methodological. He writes: 
Why, then, attack Marx? In spite of his 
merits, Marx was, I believe,, a false prophet. 
He was a prophet of the course of history, and 
his prophesies did not come true; but this is 
not my main a.ccusation. It is much more 
important that he misled scores of intelligent 
people into believing that historical prophecy 
is the scientific way of approaching social 
problems. Marx is responsible for the 
devastating influence of the historicist method 
of thought within the ranks of those who wish 
to advance the cause of the open society. 
<The Open Society and if5 Enemie5 Vol. II, p. 
82} 
This makes clear that Popper's main objection is a moral or 
ideological one: belief in historicism leads to the 'closed 
society' with its attendant evils, while belief in Popper's own 
scientific methodology leads to the 'open society' which is the 
good society. But there are few things in human affairs more 
uncertain than the effects of ideas, and Popper's beliefs 
concerning their good or evil influence can only be based upon 
faith. This is quite apart from the problem of what constitutes 
good and evil in social affairs, a problem about which Popper is 
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remarkably naive and unsubtle, seemingly unaware that his own 
moral beliefs could be very different from those of any other 
reasonable person. 
Thus, in seeking to exclude Marxism from science it could 
be argued that Popper is only partially successful, and that he 
does not really get to the heart of the matter. The heart of the 
matter being that Marxism, like any other ideology, constitutes 
an ethical understanding which by its very nature is incompatible 
with all academic disciplines, including science. 
2. Science as Ideology: Thomas Kuhn. 
The conception of physical science as objective 
knowledge, which is common to Popper and others, is not one that 
is universally accepted. A very different account has been 
developed by a number of radical theorists, the best known being 
Thomas Kuhn. In his book The Structure of Sc.ientific 
Revolution [ 6 J f\uhn argues that a study of the history and 
sociology of natural science reveals that it is not the rational, 
consistent and progressive activity it has been traditionally 
assumed to be. It is rather a rigidly conservative activity, 
narrowly applying a received wisdom, though subject to periodic 
convulsions when, for what seems no very good reason, a new 
wisdom replaces the old; after which, following a fit of group 
amnesia, the scientific community returns to blinkered normalcy. 
One implication that has been drawn from this account is that: 
.•. from a sociological perspective there is no 
value in a fundamental distinction between 
'science' and 'ideology [7] 
Clearly, Kuhn's ideas pose a threat to the view of ideology being 
developed here, and consequently require close attention. 
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I 
In The Structure of b£.-ientific Revolutions, f\uhn argues 
that the traditional conception of science, as a cumulative and 
consistent progress towards ever greater truth, is simply false. 
This conception is propagated through scientific textbooks and 
the popularisations derived from them. But what these words 
picture is only what Kuhn calls 'normal science•, which is a 
situation where a branch of science is governed by a dominant 
theory of paradigm. Such 'normalcy' is the condition to which 
all sciences aspire, for it is the mark of maturity and a 
guarantee of fruitful work for the scientist, provided he is able 
enough. Such necessary security is reinforced by the traditional 
conception of scientific progress where the present is seen as 
the culmination of the common enterprise of scientists through 
the ages. But this is a false picture. It is not deliberately 
so, but such is the power of the scientific community's 
self-image, and so functional ts this image for the coherence and 
sense of common purpose of the community that the distortion of 
history that the traditional conception involves is more an 
unconscious reflex than any deliberate attempt to deceive. 
Nevertheless it is false, because 'normal science' is not science 
as such but is the product of 'revolutionary science', which is a 
period of dispute and some contusion when a new paradigm is 
established at the expense of an old one. Such changes are 
revolutionary because acceptance of a new paradigm necessarily 
involves the wholesale transformation of the scientific world 
which the old theory dominated. The crucial point here is that 
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dominant theories are never just theories, as scientific 
textbooks and philosophers of science would have us believe, but 
are a complex of concepts, relationships, model achievements of 
analysis and experiment (hence 'paradigm'), methods and 
instrumentation. They provide a theoretical framework and a set 
of procedures which define the problems and lay down standards of 
success for their solution. Normal science is not the 
investigation of the paradigm but its articulation, solving the 
puzzles involved in fitting it more closely to nature. They are 
puzzles rather than problems because the paradigm stands as a 
guarantee that there is a solution if only the scientist is 
clever enough to find it. The paradigm itself is beyond 
investigation: it is a 'given', a dogma [8), a matter of faith. 
The paradigm is constitutive of the world which the scientist, as 
scientist, occupies, defining both science and its object: 
••• paradigms are constitutive of science 
••. land) ... constitutive of nature as well. 
(p. 110) 
This being so, a change of paradigm is necessarily a great 
trauma, a total disruption of the scientific community with much 
conflict and passion. But once it has been accomplished the 
community reunites around its new conception of science and the 
world, and a new era of normal science begins. 
This picture raises an obvious question: if normal science 
is the narrow, paradigm-bound activity Kuhn claims it is, then 
how are revolutions possible? Kuhn argues that no paradigm 
solves all its problems, there is never a perfect fit with nature 
- a situation which provides the puzzles of normal science. Most 
puzzles are solved in time, but a puzzle may, despite the best 
efforts of the best minds, defy solution and become an anomaly. 
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This may come to be conceived as crucial, as calling into 
question the authority of the paradigm. In this state of crisis 
scientists are prepared to look at any potential solution within 
or beyond the paradigm. In such a situation a rival paradigm may 
emerge which appears to solve the anomaly but at the price of 
calling into question much that has been achieved under the old 
paradigm. In the ensuing conflict the new paradigm may triumph 
and issue in a new period of normal science under its aegis. When 
the dust has settled the whole field will be redefined and the 
textbook writers and popularists will set about explaining 
science in terms of the new paradigm and rewriting history in its 
image, showing it to be the natural outcome of steady, linear, 
cumulative scientific progress, and ignoring its revolutionary 
origins. 
Thus far Kuhn is reasonably convincing, at least when 
speaking of Newton or Einstein or Darwin (less so when 
paradigmatic status is conferred on almost any theory or 
discovery). The mare controversial and less acceptable aspects 
of his view - and which turn an interesting theory of scientific 
development into a radical theory of science itself - comes with 
his account of the relationship between rival paradigms and the 
process of paradigm change. The key point is his insistance that 
competing paradigms are necessarily incommensurable. In a crisis 
when the scientific community must decide between old and new 
paradigms, Kuhn argues that the conflict is nat at a kind that 
can, as one might suppose, be settled by scientific means, such 
as a critical experiment. There is instead a breakdown in 
communication; the rival camps are talking past each other. This 
is a consequence of incommensurability. They are in a sense 
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talking different languages: their conceptual schemes differ; 
their standards of what is problematic and what can count as a 
solution differ; to use Kuhn's striking metaphor, they live in 
different worlds. And because each paradigm carries not only its 
own theoretical structure but its own ontology and standards and 
conception of science, there is no higher framework in terms of 
which rival theories can be assessed. Kuhn writes: 
Like the choice between competing political 
institutions, that between competing paradigms 
proves to be a choice between incompatible 
modes of community life. Because it has that 
character, the choice is not and cannot be 
determined merely by the evaluative procedures 
characteristic of normal science, for these 
depend in part upon a particular paradigm, and 
that paradigm is at issue. When paradigms 
enter, as they must, into a debate about 
paradigm choice, their role is necessarily 
circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to 
argue in that paradigm's defence ... Yet, 
whatever its force, the status of the circular 
argument is only that of persuasion. It cannot 
be made logically or even probabilistically 
compelling for those who refuse to step into 
the circle. The premises and values shared by 
the two parties to a debate over paradigms are 
not sufficiently extensive for that. As in 
political revolutions, so in paradigm choice -
there is no standard higher than the assent of 
the relevant community. (p. 94) 
Thus, the superiority of one paradigm over another cannot be 
demonstrated, cannot be proven: 
The competition between paradigms is not the 
sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs. 
(p. 148) 
and since there is no logical basis for choice, then other, 
non-scientific factors must play a part in determining which 
paradigm the community opts for: social factors, the 
persuasiveness of those promoting the new paradigm, and so on. 
<Kuhn makes the point that to any problem there is in principle 
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an infinite number of possible answers, and there is the question 
as to why the scientific community chooses one rather than the 
others. But this is really a separate question). It is 
impossible, Kuhn argues, for a scientist to achieve understanding 
of a new paradigm gradually by following logical steps: 
Just because it is a transition between 
incommensurables, the transition between 
competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a 
time, forced by logic and neutral experience. 
(p. 150) 
It requires a 'gestalt switch', something akin to a religious 
conversion. But how, Kuhn asks, does a whole scientific 
community come to change its mind? There are a variety of 
.answers. Sometimes the new paradigm is a 'better fit' than the 
old; Lavoisier's theory of oxygen was superior to Priestly's in 
this respect and so was accepted (p. 147). Some are converted 
because the new paradig~ solves the problems of the old. 
Sometimes the new theory is more quantitatively accurate. 
Another criterion that may operate is the aesthetic; the new view 
may be 'neater' or 'simpler'. But none of these, Kuhn insists, 
is logically compelling. They will not shake everyone from their 
commitment to the old paradigm. The scientific community moves 
on leaving them isolated until they eventually die off. Such 
holding out is possible because a decision to adopt a new 
paradigm is not a matter of acknowledging a proof; in the last 
analysis: 
A decision of this kind can only be made on 
faith. (p. 158) 
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II 
Thus Kuhn presents a vivid and dramatic picture which, if 
true, has profound implications. The first is that the 
traditional picture of science as a body of knowledge which is 
steadily accumulating, brick upon brick, is false. Secondly, if 
the superiority of one paradigm over another cannot be shown 
according to any scientific or logical criteria then it is 
questionable whether science can be said to be rationally 
progressive at all. Paradigms cannot be checked against nature 
indepentently of any paradigms, for it is only through a paradigm 
that nature can be approached, and each paradigm confirms itself. 
So there is no superior and inferior, only differing conceptions 
of nature and science. Why one paradigm prevails at any one time 
is more to do with historical and sociological factors than 
scientific ones; and the notion of science progressively getting 
nearer to the truth is an illusion. Finally, and most 
importantly in the present context, the dividing line between 
science and ideology is brought into doubt. Kuhn's whole case 
must be shown to be substantially false if the main arguments of 
the present work are not to be fatally undermined. 
T!Je Structure of .!:>l::ientific /?evolutions is in many ways a 
brilliant book, intelligent, original and lucid. And yet its 
most dramatic assertions are by no means as unambiguous as Kuhn's 
admirers (especially sociologists) usually suppose. He tends to 
make a bold assertion, then qualify it drastically, only to 
reaffirm the original assertion as though the qualifications made 
no difference. There are several examples of this but the most 
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important is in respect of the crucial issue of 
incommensurability and paradigm choice. As we have seenl Kuhn 
insists that rival paradigms are incommensurable and that there 
are no rational grounds for choosing one rather than the other; 
and yet superior problem-solving abilityl better fit with nature, 
more quantifiability and greater simplicity are all cited (pp. 
147 & 153-6) as reasons scientists may have for changing their 
allegiance to a new paradigm. But these are perfectly rational 
reasons, and so Kuhn appears to be claiming both that there are 
no rational means and that there are rational means of choosing 
between paradigms. But it must be one or the other. If we are 
to take the notion of incommensurability seriously then these 
none paradigm-dependent decision-criteria would be an 
impossibility. Nor would it be possible for the achievements of 
one paradigm to be taken up by another; but Kuhn admits: 
••• though new paradigms seldom or never 
possess all the capabilities of their 
predessessors, they usually preserve a great 
deal of the most concrete parts of past 
achievement ••• <p. 169) 
It would not be possible for a scientist to say, as they 
sometimes do, that: 'so-and-so is doing some interesting work 
which could transform the whole field'; and the scientific past 
would be incomprehensible (cf. Toulmin in c-:riticism and the 
Groutfh of K!7outlecl_qe pp. 43-4). [ 9 J There may perhaps be some 
plausibility in some of Kuhn's examples of incommensurable 
concepts, but he cannot have it both ways; he cannot have partial 
incommensurability and then pick and choose examples to suit his 
argument. If he accepts, as he does and cannot avoid doingl the 
existence of rational decision-criteria then his case for 
incommensurability must fall, and with it his case against the 
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rational progressiveness of science. 
However, Kuhn feels that he has one argument which 
outweighs all the rest, which is that in a revolutionary 
situation there are those who resist the change and never accept 
the new paradigm. This may be a frequent phenomenon, but it 
would not follow from this that only incommensurability could 
explain it. It is probably best explained in terms of 
stubbornness and failure of understanding. But the contingent 
facts of human obduracy and obtuseness do not determine any 
logical relationships, and the logical status of science cannot 
be dependent upon how a number of scientists behaved in 
particular historical circumstances when faced with the difficult 
business of coming to terms with new ideas. Both Kuhn and (as we 
saw in the previous section) Popper agree that a theory cannot be 
absolutely disproved, which suggests that the scientist who 
stubbornly holds out despite the evidence is being unreasonable 
rather than irrational. It is not irrational to believe that new 
evidence will eventually swing the balance of probability back to 
the old theory; though no doubt faith in paradigm regained can be 
taken to strange lengths. But it does not follow from this, as 
Kuhn seems to think, that paradigms must be incommensurable or 
that there cannot be adequate grounds for choosing between them. 
Perhaps it does require a 'gestalt switch' to comprehend a new 
theory (and no doubt this was true of quantum mechanics, 
relativity and others), but again this does not preclude rational 
choice. Kuhn seems to confuse the business of understanding a 
theory with the business of assessing its merits. It may be 
quite impossible to say whether the picture is really a duck or a 
rabbit, but given the decision-criteria that Kuhn himself cites, 
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this does not apply to scientific theories. <Where they are not 
decisive, rival theories may both be accepted until such times as 
there is conclusive evidence for one or the other, or some 
reconciling theory is found, as is most famously the case with 
wave and particle theories of light.) Yet Kuhn insists that the 
decision-criteria are not compelling, and in an absolute sense 
this may be true. But this is not necessary; it is only 
necessary that they be sufficient to make a rational choice. And 
since they clearly are, Kuhn's stubborn scientist is neither here 
nor there. 
Thus, there are rational decision procedures in science; 
indeed, without them science would be a shambles. It would 
certainly be so on Kuhn's account, where paradigmatic status is 
conferred on a bewildering variety of phenomena from the cosmic 
theories of Newton and Einstein to the discovery of Uranus and 
the development of the leyden jar ElOJ; and where every new 
paradigm - that is, every significant new theory, discovery and 
technical innovation - carries its own conception of nature and 
science which is incommensurable with every other. If science 
really did go on in this way it would be a chaos which not even 
the most congenitally obtuse writer of science textbooks could 
fail to notice. But science is not like this. Paradigms may be 
incompatible <no one would wish to argue with that) but they are 
not incommensurable, while the decision-criteria bring order and 
coherence to the process of development. However, these 
decision-criteria are only part of the wider framework of 
scientific understanding which Kuhn denies by insisting that 
every paradigm has its own peculiar conception of science. What 
Kuhn does is to conflate understanding and theory. But a wider 
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framework of understanding above and independent of the paradigms 
is something Kuhn does occasionally appear to make reference to 
without explaining what he means. He writes: 
... at a still higher level, there is another 
set of commitments without which no man is a 
scientist. The scientist must, for example, be 
concerned to understand the world and to extend 
the precision and scope with which it has been 
ordered. <p. 42} 
and again: 
Observation and experience can and must 
drastically restrict the range of admissable 
scientific belief, else there would be no 
science. (p. 4} 
Now clearly these suggestions of a notion of 'science as such' 
would appear to conflict with Kuhn's insistance on 
incommensurable conceptions of science attaching to every 
paradigm, yet he discusses them no further. They imply a body of 
concepts and rules which constitutes the scientific understanding 
and gives science its logical identity over and above any 
paradigm. Part of that identity - the part that makes science an 
academic discipline - is a procedure for choosing between 
conflicting theories or paradigms; and the decision-criteria, 
which Kuhn accepts without recognising their importance, are the 
basis of just this procedure. Thus, Kuhn's conception of science 
is false. It cannot challenge the traditional notion of science 
as productive of objective knowledge, a notion from which 
ideology can be sharply distinguished. 
In truth Kuhn overstates his case. He has a plausible 
thesis about the history of science <though not an incontestable 
one), but then makes an illegitimate jump to the logic of science 
which results in confusion and contradiction. On the other hand, 
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Kuhn has created an interesting set of ideas that might prove 
useful if applied to a different and more suitable object. But 
discussion of this possibility will need to be postponed until we 
have a more adequate account of the nature of science. 
3. The Nature of Ideological Theory 
Neither Popper nor Kuhn can provide us with a 
satisfactory account of the relationship between science and 
ideology. Yet we must clarify this matter before a full account 
of ideological theory can be given. We may accept Popper's view 
that, given appropriate criteria of testability, science is 
capable of generating objective knowledge [llJ in contrast to 
ideology, which, because of its pseudo-descriptive nature, 
cannot. But there is more to the problem than this. To 
understand ideology as a theoretical structure it is first of all 
necessary to see that theory plays a quite different role in it 
than it does in science. 
I 
Within science there is an essential distinction between 
scientific understanding on the one hand, and scientific 
knowledge, usually in the form of true <that is, provisionally 
true) theories, on the other. An understanding is a body of 
concepts and principles in terms of which we comprehend the world 
or some aspect of it. Certain forms of understanding constitute 
academic disciplines, of which science is one. The scientific 
form of understanding is composed of a set of principle and 
concepts - including the uniformity of nature, the principle of 
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causality, experiment, prediction and covering law explanations -
all of which are intimately related and defined in terms of each 
other, and together constitute a framework by means of which the 
scientist can conceptualise any problem. This framework is not 
itself true or false, just as the rules of a game are not true or 
false: rather it sets up the possibility of making true or false 
statements. It is not itself the object of scientific 
investigation, but is the 'given' which allows scientific 
investigation to take place. Theories are only true or false 
within the framework. The framework determines their identity as 
scientific, and provides procedures for determining whether they 
are true or false scientific statements. This is what guarantees 
that a particular theory can count as knowledge. 
The situation is analogous to law. The distinction 
between the form of understanding and the theories generated 
within it is not unlike the distinction between the constitution 
of a state and the laws passed under that constitution. The 
legality of any particular law passed in the proper way is 
guaranteed by the constitution, while the constitution itself is 
not legal in the same way, its foundations being extra-legal. 
Similarly, scientific theories have to be 'constitutional' and 
successfully 'passed' as true, while the 'constitution' itself is 
of a different logical order. The exception to this in the legal 
sphere is constitutional amendments which must be passed in the 
proper legal way. Though even here there is arguably an analogy 
in physical science, since certain theories could be said to have 
changed or developed the conceptual framework, as quantum 
mechanics has, although these are rare. 
The distinction between theory and understanding is 
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crucial to the nature of science, and the absence of just this 
distinction is equally crucial to the nature of ideology. In 
ideology there is no division between theory and understanding: 
the two are conflated so that the theory is the understanding. 
That is, the theory is the unquestioned 'given' in terms of which 
the world is conceptualised. There is no overarching framework 
of understanding that gives to theory its identity and truth 
status (or, incidentally, for settling revisionist disputes), 
none for any particular ideology and none for ideology as such; 
these theories are self-validating. The statement "All history 
is the history of class struggle" is not, within Marxism, a 
theoretical statement in the same way that 'E=mc 2 ' is a 
theoretical statement in science. It is, in Wittgenstein's 
terminology, a statement of logical grammar; it states a rule of 
Marxist discourse not a putative fact, and thus has more in 
common with 'nature is uniform' than with 'E=mc2 '. Marxists no 
more investigate whether society is class-based, or Liberals 
whether freedom does increase rationality, or Nazis whether Jews 
were responsible for the ills of Germany, than scientists 
investigate whether nature really is uniform. This is the 
significance of Popper's remark (quoted earlier) about the 
Marxist with the newspaper seeing Marxism confirmed on every 
page. everything is automatically 'seen' in terms of the 
all-explaining theory, such that the world so 'seen' appears to 
be further evidence of the theory's truth. The ideological 
adherent is not, as Popper's view seems to suggest, a would-be 
scientist with a defective methodology, or someone who happens to 
think a particular theory happens to be true, but someone with a 
moral commitmeht to a view of the world that embodies his moral 
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beliefs. That view of the world may resemble some form of 
objective theory, but is of a different order; even though it may 
be an essential part of the adherent's commitment that he accepts 
the theory as objective knowledge. Thus, it is part of the 
Marxist's moral belief that Marxism is a scientific theory; but 
that cannot be taken at face value. Nor can the 'research' that 
Marxists do as historians or sociologists, for it cannot be 
research in-the academic sense (i.e. the disinterested pursuit of 
knowledge) but could be no more than a further articulation or 
extension of the moral understanding in its range and detail -
puzzle-solving in the Kuhnian sense - such that the believer can 
more effectively apply his understanding and comprehend the 
significance of situations and events in terms of his prior 
beliefs. 
This not only applies to internally developed theories 
such as Marxism, but also to those taken from elsewhere, such as 
evolutionary theory borrowed from biology. Taken out of context 
and embedded in an ideological framework such theories change 
their nature. They have to be, so to speak, 'wired up' to the 
rest of the ideology, becoming pseudo-descriptive in the process. 
But beyond this, they no longer have the context which guarantees 
their status as scientific or some other kind of knowledge; nor, 
in consequence, is it any longer provisional knowledge. It is 
religions and ideologies that deal in certainties, not science. 
In Kropotkinian Anarchism and Spencerian Liberalism evolutionary 
theory is made part of the unquestioned given, in terms of which 
the world is interpreted. 
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II 
Returning to Kuhn, we can now see the significance of the 
contradiction he falls into whereby he argues that each paradigm 
carries its own peculiar and incommensurable conception of 
science, implying that adherents of different paradigms are not 
engaged in the same activity, while at the same time allowing 
that there is a higher view of science to which all scientists 
must be committed. It results from a failure to recognise the 
distinction between understanding and theory which exists within 
science but which is noticeably absent in the sphere of ethical 
belief. But while for this and the other reasons discussed, 
Kuhn's account of science must be counted a failure, this is not 
to say that his ideas are without utility. Several writers have 
attempted to apply his ideas to matters of political 
understanding. 
In his paper 'Paradigms and Political Theories' [12J, 
Sheldon Wolin uses Kuhn to attack the pretentions of contemporary 
political scientists who dismiss traditional political theory for 
being normative, incapable of generating reliable knowledge and 
therefore 'pre-scientific'. Wolin's strategy is to suggest that 
the history of political thought is very similar to the history 
of science as revealed by Kuhn, and that the behaviouralist 
revolution in political studies is just one paradigm among many 
(p.l39). Their attack upon traditional theory merely reveals an 
ignorance and lack of sophistication about the history and logic 
of science. Unfortunately, Wolin's faith in Kuhn's account of 
science is unwarranted, and the behaviouralist case is therefore 
left unscathed (though it does fall for quite other reasons). 
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This leaves Wolin with a Kuhnian account of the history of 
political thought which, upon examination, is far from 
convincing. All Wolin in fact does is to draw a few suggestive 
parallels, such as the observation that political theorising 
tends to flourish in times of crisis, in a way similar to Kuhn's 
'revolutionary science'. But this is merely redescribing what we 
already know. Indeed, Wolin is nat even consistent in this, far 
he has twa versions of the equivalent of 'normal science'. One 
of these is that it is lesser thinkers developing the thought of 
a great thinker - as the Scholastics did of Aristotle - a view 
that Wolin thinks opens up the possibility of "cumulative 
knowledge in the history of political theory" (p. 141), whatever 
that might mean. But Wolin also offers the view that actual 
political systems may be viewed as paradigms, sa that their 
workings would be equivalent to 'normal science'. But these 
views are nat consistent, and each alone raises mare problems 
than it salves. Furthermore, Wolin fails to answer the 
behaviauralist charge that traditional theory is value-laden and 
incapable of producing objective knowledge. He appears to assume 
that the adoption of a Kuhnian model overcomes that abjection and 
so does nat discriminate between political theories with an 
ethical content and those without. Wolin in fact uses Kuhn as a 
set of metaphors to play with and not as any kind of genuinely 
explanatory theory. Had Wolin nat seen Kuhn as a useful stick 
with which to beat the behaviauralists it is difficult to believe 
he would have had any genuine use far Kuhnian ideas. [13] 
In his paper rNarmal' bcience or Pal it ical Idealogy [ 14 J, 
Alan Ryan claims to be taking up Wolin's suggestion of applying 
Kuhnian paradigms to political theories. However, unlike Wolin, 
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Ryan quite properly rejects Kuhn's account of science. But Ryan 
is not concerned with traditional political theory; instead he 
wishes to deploy a notion of paradigms as sets of social 
definitions, norms and expectations which we all need to 
understand our own and other's behaviour in the practical world, 
and how these P~late to the theories social scientists bring to 
the understanding of social life. But not only are these 'social 
paradigms' a long way from anything in Kuhn, Ryan also makes 
clear that it would be a mistake to attribute to them such 
characteristically Kuhnian features as universal and enforced 
acceptance. Again, as with Wolin, Ryan could perfectly well say 
what he has to say without reference to Kuhn, which he makes no 
genuine use of. 
But these rather abortive attempts to make use of Kuhn do 
not exhaust all the possibilities. It has been said that Kuhn 
destroys the distinction between science and ideology, and if 
Kuhn does not tell us anything about science then perhaps he can 
tell us something about ideology. In his contribution to 
c.-:riticism and the Grat.r.tfh of knDli.tledge (p. 33), J. W. N. Watkins 
makes the interesting point that Kuhn treats science as though it 
was religion. Indeed it can be argued that f\uhn f,:dls to 
understand science precisely because he attributes to it features 
that only properly belong to ethical belief, that is to religion 
and ideology, and that this is why those (like Barnes quoted 
earlier) who accept Kuhn's account of science have confused the 
scientific with the ideological. If this is so, then it is 
reasonable to suppose that Kuhn's ideas might provide the basis 
of an adequate account of ideological theory. This is indeed the 
case, but only given certain important modifications. 
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We have already noted two features of Kuhn's ideas 
applying to ideology: the fusion of theory and understanding, and 
the notion of puzzle-solving within the context of a theory that 
guarantees a solution but which itself is beyond investigation. 
These are, one might say, bi-products of the two central notions 
of paradigm and incommensurability. The paradigm is the 
unquestioned framework, providing explanations, concepts, 
vocabulary and model analyses. Each ideology has its unique 
complex of theory, concepts and intellectual techniques and 
instruments, and each is different from and incommensurable with 
that of other ideologies (though the relationship between 
ideologies can be more complex than this, as we will see below). 
Each ideological theory is constitutive of both the world and the 
way the world is to be understood. However, this picture of 
ideological theory is incomplete. Two further dimensions must be 
added, which will not only complete the picture but will explain 
why ideological theory has such distinctively Kuhnian features. 
These extra dimensions are first of all ethical content and 
secondly metaphysical status. 
It was stressed in the previous chapter that the fusion 
of the factual and the ethical was the nub of ideology, and in 
fact virtually everything that is distinctive about ideology can 
be traced back, more or less directly, to this central feature. 
Incommensurability as between different ethical beliefs can be 
explained in this way. Rival theories and the concepts they 
contain are incommensurable because of differences of values that 
cannot be reconciled. It was noted in the earlier discussion of 
Kuhn that he admits that in the last analysis 'observation and 
experience' are decisive in science. But because ideological 
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statements are pseudo-descriptive <that is, morally charged and 
without reference) they are not corrigible by facts; the 
flexibility of pseudo-descriptiveness mean that facts never need 
be embarrassing. This is a sphere of faith where evidence is of 
little significance. What the believer 'sees' in the world is a 
function of his values, which are embodied in the concepts he 
uses. The Liberal and the Marxist can 'see' the same situation 
quite differently, but there is no rational choosing between 
them, no proving one is right and the other wrong. There is no 
kind of logic that could settle their dispute; no 
decision-procedure as there is in science. It is thus the 
ethical content which explains this Kuhnian feature of ideology 
which Kuhn himself does not explain in respect of science but 
merely asserts. Kuhn only seeks to explain why scientists do not 
really attempt to settle their paradigm problems through 
discussion by insisting, implausibly, upon the blindness and 
obduracy of all scientific communities. But the kind of 
passionate commitment Kuhn attributes to every scientific 
community is far more characteristic of rival groups of 
ideological adherents, and for good reasons <that is, good 
logical reasons, not the dubious psychological reasons that Kuhn 
relies on). As between rival ideological beliefs there really is 
no common ground, there really are no public criteria that could 
settle the question of who is right. Ideological disputants are 
talking past each other and seeing past each other; they speak a 
different language. If one man sees freedom all around him which 
another sees oppression, or if one sees his fellow men as 
essentially good while another sees them as congenitally evil, 
then they are living in different worlds in a much more profound 
- 175 -
sense than any two scientists with rival theories. 
This is why ideological and religious conversions have to 
be 'gestalt-switches' that are dramatic and wholesale, while 
conversion to a new scientific theory need not be. The scientist 
may indeed be 'forced by logical and neutral experience' in the 
very way that Kuhn denies. It may happen that for reasons that 
are nothing to do with the logic of science, some particular 
scientific community is strongly attached to some theory, but 
this is not of the same order as the moral commitment which is a 
necessary feature of all ddeological belief. Ideological beliefs 
are genuinely incommensurable and can genuinely bind a community 
together. Equally, they can divide a community. Curiously, Kuhn 
illustrates his contention that paradigm disputes cannot be 
rationally settled by using the analogy of a society divided by a 
conflict of political belief, where, he says the issue can only 
be settled by which side the community decides to support. This 
is indeed true in the case of ideology where there are no 
decision-procedures, but not so of science which does have such 
procedures which Kuhn cites but does not recognise. Ideological 
belief is a more powerful commitment that goes much deeper than 
any factual theory, since it goes to the roots of our identity: 
it is concerned with all aspects of our lives, with who we are 
and what our place is in the world, with what values we should 
hold and how we should live. The community sees itself and the 
world in a certain way, and so sees the past in a certain way; 
and consequently the ideology must rewrite history in its own 
image, which adherents to a scientific theory may or may not do. 
A second feature of ideological theories or paradigms 
that must supplement a Kuhn-based view is their metaphysical 
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status, and this too is bound up with their ethical content. 
There are different accounts of what constitutes metaphysical 
theories and concepts, but common to all accounts is the idea 
that metaphysical statements about the nature of reality are 
beyond the reach of empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, 
not only in practice but in principle. Now if the analysis of 
the previous chapter is correct and ideological statements and 
concepts necessarily have a value content and in consequence are 
pseudo-descriptive and non-referential, then this must put them 
beyond empirical test and make them necessarily metaphysical. As 
with incommensurability, Kuhn cannot explain why it is 
necessarily the case that scientific paradigms are not themselves 
subject to investigation (a view that is in any case demonstrably 
false), but in the case of ideological theories there is, again, 
good reasons why this is so. In the first place, ideological 
commitment is to the theory alone and not also to some higher 
framework of understanding, as is the ~ase with science (which 
Kuhn both denies and acknowledges). Secondly, ideological 
adherents not only do not put their theories to the test, because 
of their ethical/metaphysical nature they could not if they 
wanted to. Thirdly, ideological commitment involves a moral 
commitment to see the world as the theory describes it. Because 
the theory is also the understanding, to investigate it is to 
acknowledge another and higher understanding; it is to step aside 
from the commitment, deny the faith and accept the authority of a 
higher truth which the theory does not comprehend. 
Thus, we have a picture of ideological theory where 
theory and understanding are fused, and where ethical and factual 
are fused, and which are, in consequence, both metaphysical and 
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incommensurable. But there is more to the matter than this. If 
this analysis is correct then we have to ask how this affects 
other aspects of theory (at least of scientific theory) to which 
ideological theory also lays claim: that is to be explanatory, to 
be predictive and to be true. 
Not all ideological theories take physical science as 
their model. Yet all such theories claim to be dealing in 
factual truths about the world, to be describing it accurately; 
and like scientific theories they claim to explain and predict. 
However, the same ethical element that vitiates their descriptive 
power also denies the possibility of proper explanation and 
prediction. But more important than this is that, at least where 
the explanations and predictions are central to the theory, they 
are part of the framework of belief that is not open to question; 
that is, they have the status of necessary truths. 
What ideologies seek to explain, potentially at least, is 
nothing less than the whole of human experience; though the 
immediate concern is the present situation of mankind. The 
theory an ideology contains is concerned with the identification, 
explanation and remedy of social ills. Thus is Marxism concerned 
with the inequality, exploitation and dehumanisation inherent in 
capitalist society and with how this is an inevitable outcome of 
the historical class struggle which will only be cured by the 
socialist transformation of society through revolutionary action; 
thus is Liberalism concerned with the oppression and denial of 
individual rights in so much of the world where irrational ideas 
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and institutions prevail and where progress must be made towards 
liberty and justice; thus was Nazism concerned with the pollution 
and debilitation of the Aryan race by the historical race-enemy, 
the Jews, against whom the struggle must be intensified to 
restore that racial hierarchy which is the natural and just 
ordering of mankind and the foundation of true civilization. 
Each ideology centres on an explanatory and prescriptive theory 
of social ordering in terms of which all other social 
manifestations - law, art, economy, etc. - and any ideas, 
institutions or events can be interpreted. Each ideology gives 
an all-embracing picture of the human condition. 
As we have seen, ideologies purport to describe the world 
but their descriptions can only be pseudo-descriptions. 
Similarly, ideological explanations are pseudo-explanations; 
although explanation is a more complex case than description. 
Take the Nazi belief that Germany's sufferings in the 1920s were 
the consequence of an international conspiracy of Jewish 
capitalists and communists. Now however wildly implausible this 
explanation may be, it is nevertheless logically possible that a 
group of capitalists and communists who happened to be Jewish 
were in fact responsible in some way for the horrors that Germany 
suffered. Though it is an extreme case it does suggest that it 
is possible for ideological explanations to be factually true. 
But it depends on what is meant by 'e:·:planation'. In an academic 
discipline what is recognised as a true explanation is not one 
that merely corresponds to the facts, but one which is adequately 
supported by appropriate evidence; that is, knowledge is 
justified true belief and only certain kinds of .justification can 
count. But in ideological explanation evidence has no such 
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essential role. For the Nazi, Germany's plight had to be 
attributable to the machinations of the race-enemy. It was a 
necessary truth and a confirming instance of a universal truth 
about Jews being the source of all evil. Any confirming evidence 
was no doubt welcome, but not essential; any counter-evidence 
could be interpreted as an extension of the original Jewish plot. 
In Marxist theory class struggle is all pervading and all 
explanatory. If we point to conflict not based on class the 
Marxist will tell us that we are being superficial and that class 
struggle is the deeper reality; and if we point to periods of 
social tranquility when there is no apparent struggle of any kind 
we will be told that the class struggle is there, only 'latent'. 
These explanations, which have nothing to do with falsifiability 
or demonstration or even evidence, are only explanatory for the 
believer. For the rest of us they are only pseudo-explanations. 
If ideologies can only produce pseudo-descriptions and 
pseudo-explanations we can hardly deny them the title of 
pseudo-theory, (taking academic theory as the standard). Yet 
they always claim the status of academic theory, that is, to be 
good science, good philosophy or whatever. But these claims 
cannot be sustained. Descriptions which only describe, 
explanations that only explain and truths which are only true if 
and only if one believes that a certain set of values is embodied 
in the world, can hardly count as objective knowledge. No values 
are embodied in the world, and no set of values can be shown to 
be absolute, and so no evaluations are absolutely true either. 
The Liberal enters the factory of a commercial firm and sees 
factory owner and workers in an economic relationship freely 
entered into in a free market and so he is seeing the good 
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society in action; while the Marxist observing the 'same' 
situation sees exploitation and dehumanisation. Their 
disagreement is not of the sort that can be settled; there is 
simply no procedure for settling which is right; their views are 
irreconcilable and incommensurable. To hold a view like this is 
not a matter of proof of evidence. You either see the world that 
way or you do not. 
Much the same is true of prediction. A prediction is 
related to the prescriptions of the ideology; with the 
consequences of following or not following them. Not all of 
these are of central importance, but those that are have a 
special status, and are in fact pseudo-predictions. As we noted 
earlier, ideologists weld together contingent relationships into 
necessary ones in order to preserve the coherence of their 
theory, and this is especially true of future events. Thus 
capitalism .must collapse through the weaknesses of its own 
structure; the Germa.ns ,'l}ust flourish in war and civilization once 
the race enemy has been destroyed; democratic participation .must 
make people more rational and tolerant. In each case a 
contingent possibility is turned into a necessary truth, an 
article of faith, such that no failure of expectations is allowed 
to challenge belief. Evidence can always be interpreted: if the 
extermination of the Jews does not promote Germany's greatness 
then there must have been more Jews in the world than originally 
thought and the secret Jews must then be eliminated; if 
capitalism does not collapse in the predicted manner then it must 
be because it has a yet higher stage to pass through first; if 
democratic participation has not made men rational and tolerant 
then more time is necessary before the educative process can 
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fully work. Thus, ideologies claim to determine what in fact no 
theory can determine, namely inevitable outcomes. But the price 
of this is to render these determinations untestable, irrefutable 
and lacking any strong grip on empirical reality. Although this 
really only applies to structurally essential relations. Those 
failures that do not challenge the basic theory are obviously 
less vital and can be replaced, so if one tactic fails another 
can be employed. 
The point of this whole apparatus of theory, explanation 
and prediction is not the disinterested pursuit of truth but to 
give substance and authority to the ideologist's vision of what 
is wrong with the world and what needs to be done about it, to 
his values and ideals and prescriptions. And, whatever the 
scientific pretentions of his theory, this comes first. As 
Ernest Barker says of Herbert Spencer: 
He did not really approach politics through 
science, without preconceptions drawn from 
other sources, and with the sole idea of 
eliciting the political lessons which science 
might teach. On the contrary he was already 
charged with political preconceptions when he 
approached science, and he sought to find in 
science examples or analogies to point a moral 
already drawn and adorn a tale whose plot was 
already sketched. [15] 
Hitler was a similar case. As Jackel points out [16], at 30 
Hitler was a conventional nationalist and anti-semite, but around 
these practical attitudes he build a theory of some originality, 
in order that he might 'deduce' the policies he had already 
decided upon. Locke's .!Jecond Treatise is a theoretical defence 
of prior Whig principles; and Lenin was a revolutionary before he 
was a Marxist. Given his principles, his moral vision, the 
ideologist seeks to make the world of objective knowledge serve 
his practical purposes in a way that cannot logically be done; 
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that is, deducing from the facts of the world the direction in 
which we ought to go. This is not to say that the ideological 
enterprise is an unintelligent or ignoble one; but it is 
logically flawed. 
Tolstoy once remarked that science was meaningless 
because it gives no answer to the only important question: "What 
shall we do and how shall we live?" [17J. But whatever the 
profounder point Tolstoy was making the remark does have its 
degree of mundane logical truth. From the point of view of 
practice, science itself can give no guidance. But ideologist 
are, so to speak, professionally committed to an opposite view. 
They characteristically perceive their task as revealing the 
practical implications of some body of established knowledge or 
putative knowledge - scientific, philosophic, historical, etc. -
which they embody in their theory. But they are not extending 
academic knowledge, as they often claim to be doing, but using 
it, making it do work for which it was not designed, embracing or 
absorbing it within a practical vision which already has value 
commitments. 
Their ideological understanding is a practical 
understanding, and the categories of such an understanding are 
quite different from those of the academic. From a practical 
standpoint objects and events in the world are viewed in terms of 
what is useful, efficient, possible, beneficial, morally right or 
wrong; and the ideologist views the sphere of the academic in the 
same light. The facts of the world are useful or irrelevant; 
ideas are judged in terms of the effects of believing them rather 
than their intrinsic truth or coherence; while the purpose of 
history is to illuminate our present concerns not the past 
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itself. Many examples could be cited. The efforts of 
Socialists, Anarchists, Liberals and others to demonstrate that 
the theory of evolution underpins their particular view of the 
world is a striking and obvious example. There is Bentham's use 
of classical economics as a model of society, and Popper's use of 
scientific method as a model of social reform, and many more. As 
to ideas, as we saw in Chapter Two both Marxist and Liberal 
accounts of ideology are based on the classification of ideas in 
terms of their effects, good or ill. The Liberal uses philosophy 
as a source of universal values, while the Marxist even condemns 
neutral conceptual analysis as disguised support for the status 
quo. But in some ways the most important case is history, since 
all ideological positions must have some view of it and the view 
is of a particular kind. Herbert Butterfield called it "reading 
the past backwards". His concern, in The /;/!Jig Interpretation of 
History and elsewhere, is with bad history done by Ltnwi tting 
historians: 
The study of the past with one eye, so to 
speak, upon the present is the source of all 
sins and sophistries in history ... It is the 
essence of what we mean by the word 
'unhistorical'. [18] 
But the distortions he is attacking arise from ideological 
influence. Following Butterfield, Oakeshott insists that to 
pursue history in order to discover how we arrived at our present 
plight, where we went wrong, or to reveal past glories that might 
yet inspire us, or from any similar motive, is to pursue 
'practical history' not academic history. [19J This is precisely 
the ideological approach to history. It is history interpreted 
in terms of the ideology's values and theoretical categories. As 
Kuhn alleges of scientific paradigms, ideologies recreate the 
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past in their own image. 
The ideologist creates a world, embracing past, present 
and future. The world he constructs from a variety of 
intellectual materials, often structured on quite different 
. . . , 
pr.i~ciples, is a world which men can occupy and, from a practical 
point of view, find satisfying. That is, a world that is morally 
comprehensible; a world where fact and value form a continuum, 
where man has a place and a direction. None of this would be 
possible without a framework of theory. Values, ideals and 
prescriptions are not enough; they cannot constitute a world. A 
theory is needed to hold the structure up. But as we have seen, 
a special kind of theory is necessary. It is a theory that is 
imbued with values; one what has been taken out of the sphere of 
investigation and criticism (the sphere that guarantees its 
academic truth and coherence), and which shares no common ground, 
no common language, with rival theories. It is a theory which 
explains the world, but only to the believer to whom it 
guarantees the future. It is a theory which, whatever its 
origins - whether borrowed like Spencerian evolution or purpose 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IDEOLOGY AND ETHICS 
The discussion of the nature of ideology so far points to 
the dominating influence of its ethical content! and therefore to 
the conclusion that it can be best characterised as a form of 
ethical understanding. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
where ideology fits in to, and in what ways it relates to, the 
wider ethical field. However, the nature of this wider field is 
much disputed so that it is necessary to begin by offering a 
general account of it, starting with the most basic question of 
what constitutes ordinary morality. 
1. The nature of Ordinary Morality 
1 
Much of 20th Century moral philosophy has centered on the 
question of the relationship between fact and value. Accounts of 
the nature of morality may be grouped into three broad types 
according to their response to this problem. Several, such as 
Emotivism and Prescriptivism, have taken as their starting point 
Hume's strict separation of fact and value, which denies any 
possibility of deriving one from the other. The most notable 
exponent of this view over the last thirty years has been R. M. 
Hare [1]. His account of morality is roughly that moral 
statements are cha~~cterised by their universality and their 
prescriptivity, particular judgements being syllogistically 
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derived from these general statements. If an individual decides 
that certain rules of conduct should apply to all, including 
himself, then these rules constitute his morality, irrespective 
of their content. All moral rules ultimately derive from such 
individual decisions. An individual may, of course, simply 
accept prevailing norms, but that is still his decision, and 
besides, the origin of these norms must have been the decisions 
of individuals in the past. But once an individual has decided 
on his principles then no-one can prove that he has the wrong 
ones, or that some other set are morally superior. Consequently, 
there is no decision procedure for solving fundamental moral 
disputes. 
This view of morality has been very influential, but it 
has come under increasing criticism in recent years. Hare's 
position has certain similarities with that of Kant, and many 
critics have argued that it shares the same weaknesses in its 
over-formality and lack of content, such that it can be 
manipulated in ways that can produce absurd and contradictory 
results. It does indeed seem absurd that, to use Phillips and 
Mounces example [21, 'everyone should clap hands every two hours' 
could, on its own, count as a moral rule. Furthermore, we could 
think of practical rules - 'everyone should be selfish' - which 
would cut across Kant's important distinction between the 
prudential and the truly moral. With sufficient ingenuity we can 
even, as with Kant, think up sets of rules which effectively 
allow us to do what we want while others may not, which destroys 
the whole point of universality. But though important, these 
criticisms do not actu~lly refute Hare's position; rather they 
reveal its inadequacy as a comprehensive account of moral 
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thinking. 
Hare's main critics - including G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter 
Geach and perhaps most notably Philippa Foot [JJ - have taken a 
quite opposite view of the fact/value relationship. Their 
starting point has been a rejection of Hare's notion that 
absolutely anything can count as a moral rule, provided it has 
the right logical characteristics. Instead, they argue that 
morality derives from certain basic facts about human existence: 
Anscombe speaks of the facts of 'human flourishing', while Foot 
of the facts of 'human good and harm'. Both have in mind an 
analogy with plants, which have certain basic needs such as water 
and sunlight, the provision or denial of which represents good or 
bad for plants. Human beings have equivalent needs in terms of 
which moral good and bad can be assessed. An individual action 
can, therefore, be morally evaluated according to whether it 
promotes or denies the basic needs of a human being or beings; 
doing either of these things will be a factual matter which will 
entail a moral judgement. Thus, we have an absolute morality 
applying to all men at all times irrespective of circumstances, 
since all men have the same basic needs. Such absolutism has 
undeniable advantages. There are no problems (as there are for 
Humeans) with other people's beliefs and practices that we find 
abhorent - like Nazism or primitive ways of dealing with unwanted 
babies - which can simply be dismissed as immoral. If 
alternative moralities cannot be reduced to the universal one, 
they can be rejected as wrong. Finally, there is a decision 
procedure that can, in principle, resolve all moral disputes. 
This approach has much in common with that of traditional Natural 
Law thinkers like Thomas Aquinas, from where perhaps the 
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inspiration came, but for the purposes of this discussion it can 
be grouped along with other absolute moralities which have much 
less in common with Natural Law. The obvious example here is 
Utilitarianism, where the absolute good is not human flourishing 
but human happiness. <It should be noted that the only concern 
here is with Utilitarianism as an account of what morality , or 
necessarily is; choosing to regard human happiness, or human 
flourishing etc., as one's ultimate good is a separate matter.) 
But although the absolutists rightly emphasise the problem 
of content in Hare's position, they cannot provide an adequate 
solution. Their alternatives are either too narrow or too broad. 
If <happiness' or <flourishing' or <good and harm' are taken in 
the narrow senses we often take them in everyday conversation, 
then they could not possibly cover all that people value or 
regard as morally significant. Philippa Foot sometimes talks as 
though the most important moral consideration was physical 
injury, but many would regard any physical injury, and even 
death, as a trivial matter compared with the loss of their souls 
or their honour. We might even conceive of a society where it 
was believed that a person's reward in Heaven was directly 
proportional to the physical suffering they had endured in this 
life, and where, in consequence, physical injury was not regarded 
as a bad thing. On the other hand, if we interpret <happiness' 
or <flourishing' or Foot's 'good and harm' sufficiently widely to 
embrace most people's highest values, then the terms would become 
meaningless. We cannot talk of the <facts' or human flourishing 
or happiness or good and harm if different people have quite 
different con~eptions of these things. Anscombe, in the article 
where she proposes <human flourishing' as the absolute good, goes 
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on to admit that she cannot define it [4J; and as we saw in the 
previous section, there are any number of different and 
incompatible accounts of what human flourishing is [5]. But if 
this is so, then how can the 'correct' account of human 
flourishing (or happiness or good and harm) be established? We 
cannot use the 'facts' of flourishing or happiness or good and 
harm as a standard, for it is just these 'facts' that are in 
dispute. And if a particular interpretation is simply laid down 
as the 'correct' one, then this can only be a narrow and partisan 
view, which has to answer the question of Bernard Williams 
<quoted in the Introduction) which asks by what right anyone 
legislates in these matters; to which no remotely adequate answer 
seems possible. 
Thus, we have two broad positions, Humean and absolutist, 
which are diametrically opposed. There is, however, a third 
position lying somewhere between the two. This has been 
developed by such philosophers as Peter Winch, D.Z. Phillips and 
Howard Mounce and R.W. Beardsmore [6J, and derives largely from 
the work of Wittgenstein. W.D. Hudson offers reasons for 
believing that Wittgenstein would not have agreed with them [7J; 
nevertheless it will be convenient to refer to this group as 
'Wittgensteinians'. What they have done is to take 
Wittgenstein's analysis of the rules of language and applied it, 
as far as possible, to the rules of morality. Just as 
Wittgenstein argued that the essence of the rules of language is 
that they are shared and grow out of shared practices and a 
shared way of life, so they have argued that moral rules only 
have meaning within the context of shared moral practices, a 
shared way of life. Phillips and Mounce <who we may take as 
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representative of this group) state, somewhat baldly, that there 
are no such things as 'theories of goodness' (/'!oral Practices, p. 
60) and what they seem to mean by this is that an abstract set of 
rules, divorced from any practice, can have no sense, cannot 
constitute a morality. Hare's position implies that an 
individual can, so to speak, step outside of morality and make a 
choice of commitments; but Phillips and Mounce deny this 
possibility. For them, one can no more step outside of morality 
than one can step outside language, and one can no more have a 
private morality than one can have a private language. They 
argue that a morality must be embedded in a way of life so that 
our moral understanding is part of our understanding of the 
world. Facts and values do not come in separate boxes but are 
bound together within moral practices. We do not learn the facts 
of lying, stealing, cruelty and murder, and then go on to learn 
that these things are wrong. We learn fact and evaluation 
together, and employ concepts that are both factual and possess 
moral import: 'deceit', 'kindness', 'murder' and the rest. These 
concepts have a crucial role in moral reasoning: 
Such concepts as sincerity, honesty, courage, 
loyalty, respect and, of course, a host of 
others, provide the kind of background 
necessary in order to make sense of rules as 
moral principles. It does not follow that all 
the possible features of such backgrounds need 
to be present in every case. The important 
point to stress is that unless the given rule 
has some relation to such backgrounds, we 
would not know what is meant by calling it a 
moral principle. /'!oral Practices, p. 47 
To make moral judgements some such· background needs to be taken 
for granted: 
In order for a man to hold a moral position at 
all, there must be certain things it does not 
make sense for him to question. In our 
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society, for example, it does not make sense to 
ask whether honesty is in general good, or 
murder bad, or generosity admirable. 
Nora! Practices, pp. 17118 
Phillips and Mounce argue that the moral judgements are not 
syllogistically derived from moral principles, but are 
applications of these concepts. Thus, to call something 'lying' 
or 'murder' is both to describe and evaluate at the same time. 
There is, then, no gulf between fact and values; though things 
can only be true within the context of particular moral 
practices. What can count as a morally significant fact varies 
from practice to practice, and there can be no facts of this kind 
that have a necessary moral significance for all men independent 
of any moral practices. There is, therefore, no position outside 
moral practices from which different moralities can be compared 
and judged. This means that fundamental moral disputes involving 
different moral practices may end in a deadlock which no facts or 
form of reasoning can overcome. And this is not only true of 
disputes between different cultures, but also of disputes within 
a culture. 
II 
It should be clear from previous chapters that it is the 
last of these three positions that is closest to the view of 
morality that informs this work. But the Wittgensteinian 
position will not do as it stands. It has substantial weaknesses 
that need to be overcome before it can be accepted. The 
Wittgensteinians go to some lengths to refute the positions 
represented by Foot and Hare. But though they are effective 
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against Foot, their attempts to refute Hare are rather less 
successful. On two issues especially - the fact/value 
relationship and the possibility of individual moral autonomy -
their arguments seem to create more problem than they solve. 
Phillips and Mounce in particular attack Hare vigorously for 
maintaining a strict divorce between fact and value. But this 
does not seem entirely fair, for their own position insists, in 
sharp contrast to such as Anscombe and Foot, that there can be no 
necessary connections between facts and moral conclusions 
independent of moral practices. But it is just at this absolute 
level, the same level as Foot and Anascombe and in direct 
response to views such as theirs, that Hare is dealing; whereas 
Phillips and Mounce are dealing in relative terms, at the level 
of societies and social groups. All they are doing is 
substituting social convention for individual decision, and to 
say that within moral practices people, so to speak, fuse the 
descriptive and the evaluative in various ways does not 
necessarily contradict Hare's view that ultimately there are no 
necessary connections. In other words, the two positions are not 
strictly comparable because they are operating on different 
levels. They are also not comparable in a second sense. When 
Phillips and Mounce speak of deriving moral judgements from fact 
within moral practices, they are not using 'fact' in the way Hare 
uses it. The sort of 'facts' they have in mind would include 
such as 'he is lying' and 'she has committed murder'. But as we 
saw in Chapter Four, the use of morally charged terms such as 
'lying' and 'murder' alters the logic of apparantly descriptive 
statements, so that although they may have a descriptive element 
they cannot, strictly speaking, be descriptive or factual 
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statements at all. It is, therefore, highly misleading of 
Phillips and Mounce to speak of 'facts' in this way. It would be 
better, perhaps to speak of them, as was suggested in that 
earlier chapter~ in terms of 'quasi-description' and 
'quasi-facts'; and from which moral conclusions can be derived 
because there is a moral content there already. Thus Phillips 
and Mounce are not refuting Hare on this point, as they seem to 
think they are. 
The second point upon which the Wittgensteinians seek to 
refute Hare is the possibility of the individual stepping aside 
from whatever morality he has inherited and choosing the 
principles he shall henceforth live by. They want to deny this 
completely and to insist that personal decision has no part to 
play in a person's moral commitments. Thus Beardsmore writes: 
Morality does not depend on decisions. On the contrary, 
if it means anything at all to speak of someone making a 
moral judgement or reaching a moral decision, this is 
because what he says can be understood as part of an 
established morality ..• no one decides what is to be 
regarded as having moral significance ... what does and 
does not count as a moral consideration is determined by 
the way of life to which an individual belongs. Outside 
some such way of life, there can be no connection between 
facts and values, no connection between the reasons we 
give and the judgements that we make. That is to say, 
there can be no such things as a moral judgement •.• 
whatever a man's convictions, they can only be understood 
in so far as they are founded on socially accepted 
standards. Otherwise they would not be moral convictions 
at all. Noral Reasoning pp. 134&130il [ 8 J 
Decision, therefore, is confined to choice of acting within a 
morality, and the notion of deciding between moralities, or 
principles or practices, is unintelligible since such deciding 
cannot of necessity form part of an established morality, an 
established way of life. 
The impossibility of detachment, of standing aside from 
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one's values, is connected the Wittgensteinian's insistence that 
only by taking certain things for granted is morality possible at 
all. Together, these rule out any deliberation upon, or 
questioning of our commitments; as Beardsmore makes clear: 
Would it, for instance, make sense to suppose 
that a man brought up to regard suicide, murder 
and adultery as evils, might somehow get 
outside these values and ask himself whether 
they were not perhaps virtues. It should be 
clear that on my account such a question would 
be incoherent. I am maintaining that the 
events in a man's life, the decisions he makes, 
his problems and judgements, have the 
significance for him that they do, only by 
reference to his moral viewpoint. So it is by 
no means clear what it could mean to suppose 
that he might simply set himself to question 
the worth of his viewpoint. 
Noral Reasoning p. 79 
This is not to say, however, that no questioning of basic 
principles is possible, but it is only possible from within the 
embrace of another moral commitment; so that the mere questioning 
of our assumptions implies that we have already abandoned them in 
favour of others. Phillips and Mounce show this in their 
discussion of family commitments u•toral Practices p 116); and 
they go on to argue that because modern society is so complex it 
is possible to judge one moral practice from within another, 
which gives rise to the illusion that we can deliberate upon and 
choose our moral principles, an illusion which is the basis of 
Hare's mistaken account. Hare's case, they insist, "involves the 
assumption that moral values come into our minds from nowhere" 
<p. 117>, which cannot be the case. 
The overwhelming emphasis of the Wittgensteinians on the 
morality we are brought up to accept suggests some difficulty in 
explaining moral change, both individual and social, and also 
moral communication. Beardsmore can only understand a change of 
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moral view as something like a religious conversion, where: 
Though the change in the convert's views may 
be a radical one, it is clear that it does not 
depend on a 'decision of principle' in Hare's 
sense. 
Nora] Reasoning, p. 90 
so that individual moral change can, on this account, only be 
explained in terms of some kind of wholesale Kuhnian 
'gestalt-switch'. And Beardsmore reinforces this conclusion by 
insisting that our values 'determine our ideas of reality' lp. 
79). But if this is so, and inhabiting a different morality 
involves inhabiting a different reality, then it becomes very 
difficult to see how, on this account, people with different 
moral views can make sense of each other. This is not in fact 
what the Wittgensteinians say. Phillips and Mounce speak of 
dialogue between different moral points of view, and of the 
diversity of moral influences people feel (p. 108). Yet such is 
their stress upon intelligibility, upon things only making sense 
in the context of the practices to which people belong, that the 
thrust of their argument seems to point in the opposite 
direction, such that intelligibility is at least a problem. 
Their argument rather moves towards the conclusion that the kind 
of detachment Hare requires can only put the individual in a 
position: 
like that of a man who has no moral 
practice of his own, and who can only look upon 
the practices of others •.• To such a person, 
moral judgements would be unintelligible. 
Ibid, p. 18 
They see moral change as evolutionary, dependent upon the 
evolution of practices in which individuals play no conscious 
part. Man does not decide his morality, but has it determined by 
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his social circumstances: 
Furthermore, any set of values which one can 
imagine will have a similar relation to some 
set of social conditions. This is why we have 
said that values are to be understood as they 
arise within ways of life, or, as we have 
described them, moral practices, which occur at 
definite times and at definite places. 
Ibid, p. 117 
This could be interpreted in the sense of Hegel's remark that a 
man can no more jump out of his own time than he can jump out of 
his own skin, and as such might pass as a general insight into 
the human condition. But as a necessary truth it is quite 
unnacceptably deterministic. Taken in conjunction with the rest, 
it would appear that we are all locked in cultural cages from 
which there is no escape, while if a person could step outside he 
would be condemned to a moral wilderness from which there is no 
return. 
This is hardly credible. Phillips and Mounce, like all 
Wittgensteinians, put great stress on how we learn things. But 
they seem to stop at a point somewhat short of maturity. We do, 
after all, grow up; we do reflect upon our moral inheritance, 
sometimes modify it or even reject it; we do deliberate and make 
moral choices, and sometimes we are influenced by 'theories of 
goodness'. Furthermore, if we are confined to practices outside 
of which we cannot step, and if practices are inseparable from 
established ways of life, then it would seem that a revolutionary 
new morality is a logical impossibility. But this also seems 
implausible in the light of some fairly obvious historical 
examples: Stoics, Cynics and Epicurians, Christianity and 
Utilitarianism, Marx and Nietzsche. Phillips and Mounce do not, 
and perhaps cannot, take account of these, though R.T. 
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Beardsmore, in his /'!oral Reasoning does make some attempt, at 
least admitting to the problem. Beardsmore says a little about 
both Christianity and Neitzsche. In both cases he stresses the 
continuity with what he has gone before, but essentially missing 
the point, at least the point being made here. He cannot say in 
either case that those aspects that are not continuous, that are 
radical departures, were based upon established ways of life. 
Part of the reason why the Wittgensteinians fail to cope 
with radical moral change is that they dismiss any alternative 
source of morality beyond established practices as an absurd 
conjuring of values out of nowhere, thereby denying the 
possibilities of moral reflection and moral imagination. But 
even given their strict intefpretation of the relationship 
between meaning and social context there seems nothing 
impossible, or even implausible about an individual reflecting 
upon his duties and coming to conclusions at variance with his 
inherited code. An individual may, for example, reflect upon and 
reject an obligation to pursue a vendetta by killing another for 
the sake of family honour. He may convince others of the 
stupidity and waste of the practice and help to bring about what 
amounts to a moral revolution in his society, without any 
recourse to values plucked from the air. The likeliest outcome 
is not the assertion of new values, but a change in what that 
society counts as 'honour', etc. Radical differences between 
moralities very rarely turn on absolute contradictions, such as 
Aristotle's view of pride as a virtue compared with Augustine's 
view of pride as the fundamental sin. Rather, they turn upon 
differences of priority and differences of application. The 
Wittgensteinians ignore this fact and distort the nature or moral 
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difference by the way they develop their doctrine of the 
necessity of certain things having to be taken for granted, 
having been drilled into us at childhood, for there to be any 
morality at all. The sorts of things they believe need to be 
taken for granted is apparent from a passage quoted earlier: 
In order for a man to hold a moral position at 
all, there must be certain things it does not 
make sense for him to quest ion. In our 
society, for example, it does not make sense to 
ask whether honesty is in general good, or 
murder bad, or generosity admirable. 
Nora] Practices, p. 17-18 
But this is a most peculiar way to characterise our morality, 
since it would be difficult to find any morality that does not 
regard honesty as good, or murder bad, or generosity admirable. 
Where the differences lie is in the fact that other societies and 
other moralities have different ideas as to what counts as murder 
or honesty or generosity, and this goes for a host of other such 
concepts; and they differ too in what values they take to be more 
important than others. Furthermore, as the Wittgensteinians 
themselves emphasise, we do not learn morality by learning 
principles such as •cruelty is wrong' or •honesty is good', we 
learn that this action is cruel and that action honest. In other 
words, what we learn is a set of applications identified in 
particulars, which in due course we learn to express in terms of 
principles. Now if moral differences do not depend upon 
disagreements over such principles as •murder is wrong' and 
•honesty is good' but upon the interpretation of ~uch principles, 
then it puts the problem of individual decision and creativity, 
and the possibility of radical moral change, in quite a different 
light. While it may be true that we cannot question that murder 
is wrong or honesty is good, we can perfectly well question the 
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interpretation of those principles which we have inherited. 
There is no reason why the individual cannot decide to extend or 
modify or reject and replace any given set of applications, 
without having to wait for new practices to have established 
themselves to give his ideas meaning. Nor is there any reason 
the individual cannot look ahead to possible futures and possible 
practices more ideal in his eyes than those which prevail, and 
adopt new values accordingly. The Wittgensteinians do not 
demonstrate the impossibility of any of this. Their attempt to 
deny any role for individual decision, or meaning to any moral 
view not embedded in established practices, must therefore be 
counted a failure. 
The failure of the Wittgensteinians to bring out the 
crucial significance of differences of application and priority 
is a major flaw in their theory, and it is connected with a more 
serious weakness. This arises from a failure to distinguish 
properly between moral statements that are tautologies and those 
which are genuine judgements. We have just seen Phillips and 
Mounce make the points that the goodness of honesty or the 
wrongness of murder could not be sensibly questioned in our 
society, as though they could be in other societies. But this is 
to treat the goodness of honesty and the badness of murder as 
though they were moral judgements, when earlier in their work 
(see /'!oral Practices Chapter 1) they treat such statements, quite 
correctly, as tautologies. Beardsmore is similarly in error in a 
passage quoted earlier where he denies the possibility of anyone 
brought up to believe in the evil or murder, suicide or adultery 
changing their mind on these matters. Again this is wrongly 
equating 'murder is wrong', which is tautologous, with 'suicide 
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is wrong' which is a genuine moral judgement; one could not 
change one's mind about the first, but one could about the second 
(as people dol, but this is nothing to do with upbringing. In a 
similar way, Beardsmore uses the impossibility of anyone 
'deciding' that murder was wrong quite illegitimately to suggest 
the absurdity of anyone deciding on their own moral principles: 
•.• While it makes perfectly good sense to talk 
of someone having decided to watch television 
or go to the pub, or of his having been forced 
to decide between doing his duty or taking the 
easy way out, I think that we should be less 
willing to talk of having decided that murder 
is evil, for example, or of his having adapted 
this as his standard. We should not know what 
to make of someone who talked as if the content 
of moral laws were dependent on the individual 
will in this sort of way. 
Nora] Reasoning p. 31 
This is more than just a simple mistake, since these writers all 
go on to assume that because the goodness of honesty and the 
badness of murder cannot be questioned, then things which are 
moral judgements - such as the wrongness of abortion within 
Catholicism and the special treatment of fathers within family 
life - cannot be questioned either. In other wards, they are 
using one piece of logic to justify assumptions about matters 
which are governed by quite different logics. In fact several 
very different things are being confused; on the one hand there 
are tautologies like 'murder is wrong', while on the other there 
are principles which we are brought up to accept, and could be 
otherwise, and there are systems of belief. In consequence, they 
are confusing what cannot be questioned because it is illogical 
to do so, with what people do not question because it is part of 
their way of life and/or part of their faith; the former cannot 
be questioned, while the latter can be. 
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Part of the reason for this confusion is that the 
Wittgensteinians are systematically ambiguous about systems of 
belief, which they do not properly distinguish from practices and 
their associated concepts and principles. They insist that a 
moral concept or judgement can only have meaning against a 
certain background. But sometimes this background is a network 
of similar concepts, while at other times they talk, seemingly 
interchangably, of ways of lite, practices, moralities, 
traditions and beliefs; and sometime these beliefs appear to be 
of the 'murder is wrong' sort (i.e. tautological>, sometimes of 
the 'parents are entitled to respect' kind (i.e. genuine moral 
judgements>, while at other times they seem to have in mind 
entire systems of belief such as Roman Catholicism or 'scientific 
materialism'. Yet, as we saw above, Phillips and Mounce are 
dismissive of 'theories of goodness', and what they seem to be 
saying is (a) no theory can demonstrate any absolute value or set 
of values, and (b) that abstract moral theories divorced from 
ways of life are effectively meaningless. The first is true and 
the second half-true (as we shall see below>, but one or both 
would seem to catch Roman Catholicism and 'scientific 
materialism', both of which they appear to regard as legitimate 
moralities. <They might argue that these have grown out of 
religious and scientific practices, unlike more abstract 
theories, but this hardly bears examination). Also caught would 
be Utilitarianism, Marxism, the theories of Anscombe and Foote 
and many more. It is difficult to see how the line is drawn 
between acceptable and unacceptable moral theories. Furthermore, 
it would be hard to maintain that these theories of goodness, 
however they are distinguished, necessarily cannot influence 
- 204 -
people's thought and action; and if this is possible it needs 
explaining. Both these problems could be, if not solved, at 
least illuminated by a clear distinction between ordinary moral 
thinking and systems of belief. 
A related area of difficulty surrounds the problem of 
intelligibility. If moral rules are only intelligible within an 
established practice, then any kind of stepping aside is 
necessarily self-defeating, since the individual must render 
himself incomprehensible to his fellows. But for this to be 
true, one would presume that it would also have to be true that 
incomprehension reigns as between conflicting moral practices and 
points of view. But as we have suggested, the Wittgensteinians 
are ambiguous on this point, insofar as they speak of 
understanding, even dialogue, while the thrust of their arguments 
seem to point in the opposite direction. They cannot have it 
both ways: if other practices are incomprehensible, then it 
would simply be consistent to deny intelligibility to stepping 
aside; but if other practices do make sense, then so should 
stepping aside. On the other hand, there is a problem about 
intelligibility, but it only becomes clear when we separate 
ordinary moral rules from related systems of belief. Another 
culture which equates kindness with weakness may not be 
attractive to us, but it presents no problems of understanding: 
nor would a Spartan who rated physical courage above honesty 
baffle an Athenian whose priorities were different. Where 
comprehension is much more difficult is at the level of belief. 
Mutual incomprehension between the Pagan and the Christian or the 
Communist and the Nazi is much more understandable because they 
see the world so differently; in a very real sense - to use 
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Kuhn's image which is more appropriate here than it is among 
scientists with different theories - they occupy different 
worlds. Thus, intelligibility is only a problem at the level of 
systems of belief, not at the level of ordinary morality Cthat is 
the level of ordinary human intercourse that involves such 
concepts as honesty, kindness, promise-keeping, murder, 
hypocracy, etc.). The Wittgensteinians are ambiguous on this 
matter because they run the two levels together. 
The heart of the matter is the denial of the possibility 
of stepping aside from or thinking beyond our moral commitments, 
which effectively rules out any moral autonomy or radical moral 
change. But the price of this denial is a denial of the obvious. 
People do on occasion choose their principles and moral 
revolutions do occur. Furthermore, Phillips and Mounce cannot 
talk of 'any morality we can imagine' or use Wittgenstein's 
technique of conceiving exotic societies with strange beliefs and 
practices, which they do, and then go on to deny that the 
individual can imagine and choose what has been imagined. They 
cannot maintain their own moral detachment (which they would 
consider, rightly, was essential for philosophy> and deny a 
similar detachment to others who do not happen to have 
philosophical purposes. In short, the Wittgensteinian attempt to 
confine morality to shared practice~ seems to deny the individual 
any possibility of freedom, choice, decision, deliberation, 
self-consciousness or creativity in moral matters, to an extent 
that is entirely implausible. 
- 206 -
I I I 
All of which rather brings us back to Hare. But not pure 
Hare. The Wittgensteinians are right to insist that not anything 
can count as a moral rule, and also right to insist that 
absolutism will not do as an alternative. Stressing the social 
nature of morality, they can properly rule out 'clap hands every 
two hours' on its own as a moral rule which someone can, upon a 
whim, simply choose; and also rule out the equally absurd notion 
that we can have a society of morally autonomous individuals all 
of whom have different values and follow different rules, which 
Hare's position does allow. They give the most convincing 
account of ordinary morality and how we learn and sustain it. 
What they cannot do is deny the individual the capacity to step 
outside, deliberate and choose moral commitments that he has not 
been brought up to, or are beyond his experience, or are embodied 
in his own or another's 'theory of goodness', in the way that 
Hare allows. Phillips and Mounce may well be right to say (if it 
is indeed what they are saying) that in practice one cannot 
escape one's own times, or even that, as a matter of fact, 
individuals never think much beyond what is available in their 
society; but philosophy is about the logically possible not the 
practically possible. On the other hand, Phillips and Mounce are 
surely right in insisting that morality is a social matter, 
concerned with relationships between people, and adherence to a 
theory of good that applies only to oneself and is 
incomprehensible to others is in some way empty and without 
validity. If, then, there is some truth in the position of Hare 
on the one hand, and Phillips and Mounce on the other, a 
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compromise or synthesis would seem to offer the best chance of a 
clear understanding of morality. 
In attempting to work out such a compromise we can begin 
by accepting Phillips and Mounce's analysis of what can be called 
<ordinary moral concepts' - honesty, murder, courage and the rest 
- and also Winch's argument, which they refer to approvingly, 
that certain of these concepts, lying and integrity for example, 
must exist in some form for there to be any society at all [9]. 
Though different societies may mean different things by 
<honesty', <murder• and the rest, and though not all societies 
will possess all the concepts, most will be common and some 
essential in any community. These basic concepts are essentially 
social. They are embodied in and take their meaning from 
practices and ways of life such as family, friendship, exchanging 
goods, playing sports, pursuing occupations, etc. They are 
quasi-descriptive concepts and we learn them through examples in 
a manner that does not distinguish between fact and value. We 
may live our lives and never question them, muddle through 
conflicts and dilemmas, and teach our children just what we were 
taught. But not necessarily. For a multitude of reasons or for 
no reason at all, we may reflect and reconsider and change our 
minds. We may speculate, entertain theories, use our moral 
imagination to conjure up ideal societes with ideal values which 
we may adopt as our own. Yet clearly there are limits. If we had 
a man before us who claimed to have a fully worked out personal 
morality, but when asked what he understood by <honesty', 
<courage' or <kindness' replied <clapping my hands every two 
hours' we would dismiss him as a fool and conclude that he did 
not know what morality was. The concepts of ordinary morality, 
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embedded in and deriving their meaning from practices to which we 
belong, are the means by which we acquire a moral understanding 
in the first place; and it is these which are necessarily the 
foundation of our speculations. In other words, the speculations 
of Hare's choosing individual are parasitic upon and limited by 
the conceptual background which he has inherited, even though his 
final commitments may be very different from those he has been 
brought up to value. This suggests a two-level view of morality, 
with the Wittgensteinians accounting for the basic level and a 
modified and limited version of Hare to account for the 
speculating, choosing individual. 
A two-level theory of morality is hardly new: examples can 
be found from Plato to the later writings of R.M. Hare. Hare's 
version, most fully set out in his bookNoral Thinking [lOJ, 
bears an initial resemblance to the theory being suggested here. 
His first level is the level of 'intuition'; that is, knowing 
directly that something is right or wrong. This is not 
Intuitionism, which misinterprets this phenomenon, since, as Hare 
points out in an earlier work: 
We have moral 'intuitions' because we have 
learnt how to behave, and have different ones 
according to how we have learnt to behave. 
Tile Language of /'/orals p. 64. 
The intuitive level derives from the morality we are brought up 
to accept and reinforced by social convention; it is similar, 
therefore, to what we have termed 'ordinary morality'. The 
second level is what Hare calls the 'critical' level, and it is 
the level at which the individual submits his intuitions to 
rational scrutiny, to what Hare calls 'logic and the facts', and 
accepts such principles as survive such scrutiny. It is this 
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second level that Hare regards as the superior; indeed, he goes 
further: 
Because intuitive moral thinking cannot be 
self-supporting, whereas critical thinking can 
be and is, the latter is epistemologically 
prior. 
/'!aral Thinking, p. 46 
However, Hare has a rather narrow view of what constitutes 'logic 
and the facts' which is closely connected with the growing 
tendency towards moral absolutism which characterises his later 
work, as is evidenced by his remark that: 
.•• if we assumed a perfect command of logic 
and the facts, they would constrain so severely 
the moral evaluation that we can make, that in 
practice we would be bound all to agree to the 
same ones. 
Nora] Thinking, p. 6 
and by his tendency to dismiss those who do not share his values 
as 'fanatics' [11]. But apart from the naivity of his beliefs in 
a single universal rationality and a realm of pure facts together 
pointing to unambiguous moral conclusions, it cuts straight 
across his formal position, since it appears to deny the 
individual the freedom to choose his own values and is a clear 
violation of Hume's law. If an individual does go beyond the 
morality he has inherited, and beyond whatever alternatives may 
be available in his society, he does not step into a world of 
pure rationality and pure fact, but into the world of theory. If 
the speculations of this individual are to be genuinely moral and 
universal (as Hare would demand), he must engage in some form of 
theorising, usually involving general considerations about the 
nature of man and the world. This is because new values and 
principles require justification. The important point here is 
that ordinary morality has no need to be justified theoretically; 
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as supportive of and partly constitutive of a way of life further 
justification is unnecessary, (and thus has an arguably better 
claim to epistemological priority than Hare's 'critical' 
morality>. To justify new values and new principles it is 
necessary that facts and values be fused artificially, a process 
that necessitates a theoretical framework to relate the concepts 
in a coherent whole. Put another way, theory-based concepts must 
replace or be grafted onto the quasi-descriptive concepts that 
are naturally at home in practices. However, acceptance of these 
pseudo-descriptive concepts involves belief in the wider theory, 
which is not the case with ordinary morality. Hence the second 
level may be seen as predominantly one of ethical theory and 
belief, the domain of the moralist, theologian and political 
theorist, as well as of the individual in search of fresh 
principles. This second level is not conceived of as being in 
any way superior to the first. Indeed, being abstract it lacks 
the fullness of meaning characteristic of ordinary morality, it 
has its boundaries of intelligibility set by ordinary morality 
and to that extent it is parasitic upon ordinary morality. 
2. Morality and Ethical Belief. 
We now have a two-level theory of morality, with a concept 
of ordinary morality based on practices, and a second level of 
ethical belief within which ideology may be located. However, 
neither Hare nor Foot nor the Wittgensteinians seem to see any 
point in distinguishing between ordinary moral rules and ethical 
belief. One of the few recent thinkers who do, and who can 
therefore give us a point of departure for looking at ethical 
belief, is Peter Strawson. 
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I 
Peter Strawson examines this question interestingly in 
his paper 'Social Morality and Personal Ideal' [12J, though he 
does not come to any very definite conclusion. Several examples 
are offered of ideal images of forms of life that may capture our 
'ethical imaginations' at different times: 
The ideas of self-obliterating devotion to 
duty or service to others; of personal honour 
and magnimanity; of asceticism, contemplation, 
retreat; of action, dominance and power; of the 
cultivation of 'an exquisite sense of the 
luxurious'; of simple human solidarity and 
cooperative endeavour; of a refined complexity 
of social existence; of a constantly maintained 
and renewed sense of affinity with natural 
things - any of these ideas, and a great many 
others too, may form the core and substance of 
a personal ideal. (p. 26) 
He goes on: 
I think there can be no doubt that what I have 
been talking about falls within the region of 
the ethical ••. Whether it falls within the 
region of the moral, however, is something that 
may be doubted •..• I should first like to say 
something about this region of the ethical. It 
could also be characterised as a region in 
which there are truths which are incompatible 
with each other. There exist, that is to say, 
many profound general statements which are 
capable of capturing the ethical imagination in 
the same way as it may be captured by those 
ideal images of which I spoke. They often take 
the form of general descriptive statements 
about man and the world. They can be 
incorporated into a metaphysical system, or 
dramatized in a religious or historical myth. 
(p.28) 
Thus, Strawson clearly differentiates between the 'region of the 
ethical' and the sphere of morality. The region of the ethical 
embraces a wide variety of phenomena: ideologies, religions, 
myths, visions and images of all kinds. Many of these may 
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capture the same ethical imagination at different times, yet they 
cannot be simply all put together to form a composite whole, and 
this: 
may be expressed by saying that the region of 
the ethical is the region where there are 
truths but no truth .•.• Cp.29) 
Strawson gives the example of the encounter between Bertrand 
Russell and D.H. Lawrence, one representing the life of reason 
the other the life of instinct, where they failed to find common 
ground: 
The clash was a clash of two irreconcilable 
views of man, two irreconcilable atttitudes. 
The spectator familiar with both may say: 
Russell is right; he tells the truth; he speaks 
for civilization. He may also say: Lawrence is 
right; he tells the truth; he speaks for life. 
The point is that he may say both things. It 
would be absurd to hope for a reconcilliation 
of the two conflicting attitudes. It is not 
absurd to desire that both should exist in 
conflict. 
The region of the ethical, then, is a 
region of diverse, certainly incompatible and 
possibly practically conflicting ideal images 
or pictures of a human life, or of human life; 
and it is a region in which many such 
incompatible pictures may secure at least the 
imaginative, though doubtless not often the 
practical, allegiance of a single person. 
(p.29) 
But what then is morality? Strawson is not certain, but he offers 
one 'widely accepted' account, namely, that morality is the: 
••. rules or principles governing human 
behaviour which apply universally within a 
community or class. The class may be variously 
thought of as a definite social group or the 
human species as a whole or even the entire 
class of rational beings. It is not obvious 
how these contrasting conceptions, or diversity 
or ideal and of community of rule, are related 
to each other; and in fact, I think, the 
relationship is complicated. Cp.JO) 
Strawson is offering what has been called a 'highway code' view 
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of morality; that is, the bare rules of honesty, refraining from 
harming others, etc. etc., which make social life possible. 
However, there is no corresponding attempt to define the region 
of the ethical. Nor is there any attempt to characterise in 
broad terms the relationship between the two regions. The 
relationship is, as Strawson says many times, a very complicated 
one. But instead of tackling it, he avoids it, choosing instead 
to affirm his own belief in a society where a variety of ideals 
is tolerated and deploring totalitarian societies where it is 
not; i.e. he affirms his own Liberalism. But at least some 
attempt must be made to state, if only crudely, what the 
rel~tionship between morality and the •sphere of the ethical' 
might be. 
We might begin by examining a distinction that Strawson 
does not consider, between the nature and origin of moral rules 
on the one hand, and their justification on the other. We can 
dispense with Strawson's functional •highway code' and substitute 
the notion of •ordinary morality' based on the Wittgensteinian 
analysis outlined above. This complicates the matter slightly, 
since the Wittgenseinians insists on seeing moral rules, 
concepts, beliefs and practices as a single whole. However, 
rules and their justification can always be separated 
analytically. The inclination to see them as inseparable is 
countered by the tact that any given set of rules can be 
justified in a number of different ways. Furthermore, while it 
is difficult and perhaps Cas Peter Winch has argued) impossible 
to conceive of a society devoid of any moral rules, we can quite 
easily conceive of one possessed of a morality but devoid of 
associated justificatory beliefs. Indeed, we could construct an 
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ideal case where a society has a morality that has simply grown 
out of its way of life and is entirely innocent of theory. We 
might then imagine an individual who for some reason (perhaps 
inspired by his travels) wishes to change the way of life by 
changing moral behaviour. To convince others, and perhaps 
himself, of the need for change he must produce some theory or 
vision or other form of ethical belief to justify the new values 
as against the old. This in turn may provoke another, who, 
seeing this as an undesirable threat to his way of life, produces 
a rival theory which justifies the morality that already exists. 
Strawson's 'sphere of the ethical' embraces the whole range of 
beliefs and values - ideals, myths, religions and ideologies -
all of which justify moral codes of different kinds. In the 
light of such beliefs existing rules may be justified; or they 
may be modified and reorganised; or they may be rejected and 
replaced by something else. 
The idea that moral innovation can be conceived 
theoretically and then imposed upon practice is ruled out by the 
Wittgensteinian position. As we have seen, they argue that 
thinking beyond established morality is unintelligible, and that 
there can be no 'theories of goodness' (which, if taken to mean 
that absolutist ethics are not philosophically viable, is not 
here doubted, but for the purposes of this part of the discussion 
it will be taken to mean that any substantive ethical theory is 
unintelligible simply because it is abstract>. This view is 
partly correct and partly incorrect. The correctness can be seen 
by comparing 'ordinary morality' with abstract theory. 
The notion of society is closely bound up with the notion 
of shared rules of conduct. Social life would be inconceivable 
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without some version of such moral rules as not telling lies or 
stealing and keeping promises. These rules must be part of 
people's lives, figure in judgements of each others characters 
and regulate conduct in a more detailed way than could possibly 
be covered by a formal legal system, or subject to the whim of a 
Hobbesian sovereign. What matters is the detailed application of 
what stealing, keeping promises, etc. means in particular 
circumstances familiar to those belonging to a particular 
community. The reality of moral life is in human practices, and 
the articulation of the rules in a code always to some extent 
misses this. Artificially constructed codes are even more remote 
from reality, to the extent that as they stand without embodyment 
in practices they are virtually meaningless. The point is that 
any set of written rules can always be interpreted in many 
different ways, <otherwise the notion of 'working to rule' as a 
trade union weapon would be absurd). Furthermore, it is in the 
detail that we learn morality, at our mother's knee, or perhaps 
across our father's; but either way it is not from books. The 
theory of 'universality' may say something about the logic of 
moral judgments, but, as Bernard Williams implies, (in the 
passage quoted in the Introduction) it does not touch the 
reality. 
Where the Wittgensteinian view is wrong is in its 
insistance on the unintelligibility of moral thinking beyond 
established practices. The new moral rules that may flow from 
such thinking may be deficient in meaning, in the sense that 
their abstraction makes their application necessarily uncertain, 
but they are not thereby unintelligible. This is not a trivial 
distinction, since the implication of characterising something as 
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unintelligible is that it is irredeemably so; whereas any 
abstract code can, over time, acquire a set of applications -
though never a definitive one - and be embodied in practices. 
Thus we may reject or modify our inherited morality in the light 
of reflection, and perhaps under the influence of some theory. 
Artificial codes may indeed, over time, become, so to speak, 
•operationalised', mixing with or replacing traditional rules. 
But as such they are not a morality in themselves. Kno1.JJing hoa' to 
be moral is not reducible to the ability to articulate a set of 
rules. Morality can exist independent of any articulation of its 
rules, let alone any theory or beliefs, to give it support; 
though no doubt one would be hard pressed to discover an example 
of such a completely independent morality. The important point 
is that it is possible in principle, and therefore while morality 
is arguably a necessary feature of any social life, theories or 
beliefs which justify or otherwise sustain it are not. 
Popular morality does evolve over time, and many factors 
are involved. The implication of the Wittgensteinian view, that 
changes in ethical belief cannot influence this evolution, is 
inherently implausible. No doubt there were young Philosophical 
Radicals who deliberately went about making felicific 
calculations in the Benthamite manner and acting accordingly; and 
it could hardly be doubted that Bolshevik Marxism has had its 
impact on the morality of ordinary Russians. On the other hand, 
given that an abstract morality is open to an indefinite number 
of interpretations the notion of simply •putting theory into 
practice' has little plausibility either. The reality would seem 
to be a complex interplay between ordinary morality and ethical 
belief with each continually modifying the other. Ethical 
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beliefs (especially religious) may become to a greater or lesser 
extent embodied in practices, but become changed in the process; 
values and concepts may become detached from their original 
setting and become part of the moral consciousness of many who do 
not adhere to the original belief, as is often true of Christian 
values in the modern world. What constitutes ordinary morality 
at any given time or place may, therefore, comprise a mixture of 
values, beliefs and rules from various sources. But rarely, if 
ever, is ordinary morality constituted by some tightly integrated 
theory. It is rather a collection of applications giving rise to 
a set of intuitions, and capable of existing independently of 
some or all of the beliefs that attach to them. In consequence, 
the relationship between any given ethical belief and the 
ordinary morality it seeks to influence is always a complex one. 
This is the advantage of the ideal case which contrasts a pure 
ordinary morality of practice-based rules and quasi-descriptive 
concepts that are not bound together by any theory, with a pure 
theoretical construction with its pseudo-descriptive concepts and 
explanations. It is only in this abstract way that we can 
generalise about the relationship between ideology and ordinary 
morality. 
II 
An ideology belongs to the sphere of ethical belief, and 
as such always justifies one moral position as against another. 
It either justifies what exists or else some alternative. At the 
same time, ideology is parastitic upon ordinary morality, even 
where it seeks to replace it; and it is dependent in two clear 
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and related senses. The first we have already discussed, which 
is that ideology has to be intelligible in terms of the 
prevailing morality, the limits of its intelligibility being set 
by the extent to which established moral concepts can be 
stretched. Its values must make sense to people in terms of 
those values they already possess; it must bridge the gap between 
what exists and what is proposed. In the ideal case people would 
not understand, let alone be influenced by an ideology unless it 
made moral sense to them. The ideologist must, so to speak, stay 
in touch with the moral understanding from which he seeks to 
depart; his ideas must be a plausible development of that 
understanding if they are to be comprehensible. 
The second sense in which ideology is parasitic upon 
ordinary morality arises from the fact that ideology must not 
merely be comprehensible but must also be persuasive, and to 
achieve this it must engage the moral intuitions of those it 
seeks to influence. The morality we grew up with equips us with 
such intuitions, so that in most ordinary circumstances we 'know' 
directly what is right and wrong. These intuitions also operate 
in respect of theories. To take an obvious example: an 
individual is convinced of the truth of classical Utilitarian 
ethics, until the well-known case is put to him of the healthy 
·person entering a hospital ward where each patient needs a 
different kind of transplant and where the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number is clearly best served by cutting up the 
healthy individual and distributing him around the ward. Now 
unless he is a blind fanatic, the Utilitarian will 'know' that, 
whatever his theory might say, this must be wrong, and that he 
must abandon his theory or modify it so that cutting up people is 
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not seen as promoting the general good. To be persuasive an 
ideology must not run directly counter to people's deep-rooted 
moral attitudes. But they can be manipulated in various ways; 
one of which is to present the situation where action is needed 
as one where normal standards do not apply. Thus, the Irish 
terrorist who kills a British soldier will not admit to murder 
because he is 'on active service' in any 'army' <the Irish 
Republican Army or the Irish National Liberation Army) which is 
engaged in a 'war' where killing an 'enemy soldier' of the 'army 
of occupation' is a legitimate act; others killed are either 
'civilian casualities' or else have been 'executed' for informing 
or other 'capital crimes'. The basic attitudes of ordinary 
morality are not being challenged here, but they are being taken 
account of by defining the situation in such a way that they do 
not apply. 
However, the ideologist must not just avoid running 
directly counter to the intuitions of those he would influence, 
but must directly engage them. In the case of the Republican 
cause in Northern Ireland the minority population feels itself to 
be discriminated against in a way that would not prevail if 
Ireland were politically united. Their case could be interpreted 
in terms of the denial of those civil rights enjoyed by other 
U.K. citizens; but a radical nationalist ideology offers a wider 
interpretation in terms of the denial of national rights and the 
inevitable oppression of a subject people by an imperialist 
power. In Weimar Germany, the horrors of defeat and economic 
collapse could be 'explained' by the Nazis in terms of betrayal 
and conspiracy by race-enemies. And for the misery and squalor 
created by early industrialisation, socialists offered 
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'explanations' in terms of the evils of the capitalist system. 
In all these cases people 'knew' that something was wrong, that 
their world had become morally incoherent [131, because their 
ordinary sense of right and wrong told them so quite 
independently of any theory. To be effective ideology must make 
use of such intuitions. It must explain why the world is morally 
incoherent, or else in what way a coherent world is threatened; 
and that explanation must be of such a kind that guarantees the 
efficacy of appropriate action that will create or preserve a 
world that will satisfy those prior intuitions. This is also 
true where the individual has no initial sense of moral 
incoherence and only acquires one when the ideologist says, 'see 
the world ~is way' and its moral inadequacy stands out; it is 
still a prior moral understanding that has to be engaged, and, if 
necessary, manipulated. 
We might put this another way by saying that what the 
ideologist must do is to lock a set of pseudo-descriptive 
concepts onto the individual's prior set of quasi-descriptive 
ones, thereby converting a moral understanding into an 
ideological one. Quasi-descriptive concepts are the concepts of 
ordinary morality - honesty, cruelty, murder and the like -
where, as the Wittgensteinians suggest, the descriptive and the 
evaluative are fused, so that in using them we both describe and 
evaluate at the same time. But while such concepts have 
conceptual links with each other they do not form part of an 
explanatory theory about human reality. Sometimes theories of 
this kind are said to be implicit, but this cannot be shown to be 
necessarily so. It is perfectly possible to imagine a morality 
without the benefit of theory, i.e. the ideal case, so that the 
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relationship with theory can at best only be a contingent one; 
and if only one possible theory could be derived from a morality 
it would hardly be implicit, in which case an indefinite number 
of other theories would be consistent with it. Besides, 
moralities are never that rigid. Even within a closely knit 
community people differ over what is right or wrong in particular 
situations, and who is absolutely right is impossible to 
determine. We are also, with quasi-descriptive concepts, more or 
less aware of their essentially evaluative nature. We know that 
telling lies is wrong, but telling 'white lies' is not so wrong. 
We know that justified killing is not murder, and that 'being 
cruel to be kind' is not true cruelty. This is very different in 
the case of ideological concepts, such as proletarian and 
bourgeois, Aryan and Jew, 'the people', 'rational government', a 
'free society' and 'true democracy', all of which present 
themselves as wholly descriptive concepts and take their meaning 
from a purportedly objective account of the world. These are 
pseudo-descriptive concepts, for the very reason that they 
proclaim themselves to be what they are not. Thus, for ideology 
to take hold of an individuals mind the quasi-descriptive 
concepts of his prior moral outlook must be harnessed to a 
theoretical understanding of reality in terms of concepts whose 
ethical purpose is disguised. Good and evil thereby becomes 
implicit in the world, and the need for action is presented as 
growing directly out of the reality the individual faces. And 
this is perhaps part of the reason why, as with religion and 
myth, ideology motivates so powerfully. 
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I I I 
Along with the great diversity of actual moralities has 
gone an, if anything, greater diversity of theories and beliefs 
associated with them. Religious beliefs and political beliefs, 
myths, doctrine5 and ideals of all sorts exist in profusion, and 
seem to answer to a persistent need, albeit a contingent need, to 
give morality a particular content and a foundation. Whatever 
need or needs these beliefs do answer to - sustain social life, 
explain a confusing world, make sense of evil, give life meaning, 
facilitate group action, and perhaps others - they are deeply 
important to us. So much so that we require that they give a 
foundation to morality as deep-rooted and secure as human thought 
can conceive; that is, the moral order must be seen to grow 
directly out of reality itself, either natural or supernatural. 
But in the nature of things this is not possible and consequently 
all such beliefs, however they may be presented, must ultimately 
be sustained by faith. 
Religions, myths and ideologies are all, in one way or 
another, concerned with determining, justifying and securing 
commitment to a morality. Religion has always sought to embrace 
the whole of human experience, including the morality of everyday 
life. Indeed, it was once held that common morality could not 
exist without religious sanction: John Locke would not extend 
toleration to atheists because they could have no obligation to 
keep promises or contracts, threatening the very existence of 
society [14J; many late Victorian intellectuals, like Mathew 
Arnold [15J, agonising over the conflict between science and 
religion, emphasised the social necessity of religion even when 
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they could no longer accept its truth. Ideologies, while they 
may embrace all aspects of social life, including personal 
relationships, tend to centre upon the political order, 
moralising the political by evaluating actions, policies and 
institutions in terms of a moral order. But that moral order 
must be firmly embedded in reality, in the nature of things; a 
circumstance guaranteed by an appeal to what the community will 
accept as genuine knowledge of that reality. The ideologist must 
appear to be making a contribution to objective knowledge. But 
ideologies are not concerned with knowledge for its own sake. 
They are action-guiding theories which divide the world into good 
and evil, friend and enemy. They determine the believer's moral 
and political identity: whose side he is on, his place in the 
world, in the story, in the struggle, in history. Their function 
is to point the way, to arouse and above all to justify. They 
use every device to persuade and inflame, which is why they are 
so often decked out with analogy and metaphor, mythic dramas and 
utopian tableaux. These are necessary, for we no longer live in 
a world where within communities all share the same morality and 
the same beliefs, but in a more complex world where moralities 
overlap and systems of belief compete for adherents. There is a 
chaos of faiths, religious and ideological. 
Morality is about rules. But in a confusing world the 
problem of by what rules we should conduct our lives, 
individually or collectively, is acute. It is argued by some 
that we all can be and ought to be moral self-legislators. But 
this is not only unrealistic in practice but logically doubtful; 
if the basis of morality is shared practices it hardly makes 
sense to say that everyone could, let alone should, be going 
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their own way, playing a different game. <Such basically Kantian 
notions of absolute moral autonomy gain plausibility from the 
unspoken assumption that there is an absolute rational morality 
which all reasonable men will, upon reflection, approximate to.l 
Yet a total reliance upon traditional morality, mother's-knee 
morality, is in some ways equally unrealistic, particularly in a 
rapidly changing world. Morality grows and changes as people 
respond, with unavoidable creativity, to new situations. We 
cannot, collectively at least, simply shed our moral inheritance; 
at the same time we still have a large measure of free choice. 
Ethical belief bridges that gap, though in time beliefs may 
interpret traditional values out of existence and replace them. 
The sphere of ethical belief is a complex one of theories, 
religions, myths, ideologies, doctrines and ideals, and it 
operates at different levels. At the most comprehensive level is 
religion and ideology, either of which can embrace the other 
forms. To fix the position of ideology within the sphere of the 
ethical we need to distinguish it, if we can, from religion. 
3. Ideology and Religion 
Ideology and religion have much in common. They are both 
ethical understandings of the world. They both offer a moral 
vision and are concerned to interpret the world in terms of that 
vision. Thus, when there is some great event a thousand pulpits 
bloom with sermons on the Christian significance of the crisis. 
So too the Marxist is overwhelmed with pamphlets, articles, and 
speeches on the significance of the event. And not only great 
events: the death of a child, or the fate of a local strike have 
their significance for the Christian and the Marxist 
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respectively. This process of constantly applying the doctrine 
to new instances goes on against a vast background of solid 
interpretation with heavy treatese on the 'The Christian 
Significance of the Family', 'The role of the I.M.F. in 
Capitalist Imperialism' and so on, and on. However, this 
interpretation in the light of an ethical understanding is not 
seen as such by those who undertake it, but rather as describing 
the world correctly in an objectively true and factual way. But 
since religions and ideologies offer morally charged accounts of 
reality, those accounts are not compelling for the ethically 
neutral. They are only compelling for those who have faith. 
Having so much in common it is not surprising that many 
have said that ideologies are religions, or that religions are 
ideologies. The point of saying these things is often no more 
than to point up the similarities, without really addressing the 
question of whether the similarity does in fact amount to 
identity: they are also often said with no more serious purpose 
than to denigrate either ideology or religion. Thus, Marxism is 
sometimes said to be a 'secular religion' in order to suggest 
dogmatism and even fanaticism. The claim that religions are 
ideologies sometimes has a serious theoretical purpose, but often 
the point is to dismiss religion as false and irrational belief 
(e.g. 'false consciousness'). In both cases the attempt to 
identify religion and ideology is frequently theoretically 
pointless and question-begging. On the other hand, the above 
account does suggest an identity unless we can show there to be 
significant differences. 
What appears to be central to all religions, though 
usually absent from ideology, is a sense or concept of something 
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divine; god or gods, a pattern or a process. The relation 
between man and man's world on the one hand, and the divine world 
on the other, may vary from Augustine's worlds apart to 
pantheistic integration. But religion is man's world conceived 
from the point of view of the divine. The obvious question is 
whether ideology also has such a defining conception. 
Glib though it may sound, the ideological equivalent of 
the divine is the human. Just as different concepts of the 
divine issue in different religious understandings, so different 
concepts of man issue in different ideological understandings; 
each standing at the keystone of the arch of their respective 
understandings. Keystones, however, do not stand alone. 
Doctrine, in the case of religion, must spell out how man and 
man's world is and ought to be in relation to the divine; and in 
relation to man's true self, in the case of ideology. The 
framework of the understanding needs to be set out in such 
statements as 'God created the world', 'the Church is the body of 
Christ', 'all history is the history of class struggle', 'all men 
are created equal', and so on. These are not statements of fact, 
but, in Wittgenstein's sense, statements of grammar; they state 
the concepts, rules and principles of the understanding. This 
means that they are the 'given' in terms of which the world is 
judged, and not, as with plain factual claims, to be judged in 
relation to the world. Some, like all history being the history 
of class struggle, may appear to stand as empirical statements 
that could be investigated. But this is not the logic of their 
actual usage; within ideological thinking they are taken for 
granted. Besides, given their pseudo-descriptive nature, they 
could not be empirically investigated without giving them 
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meanings that are quite different from those they have within the 
ideology. 
Ideologists do not speak of themselves as developing 
doctrine or dogma; tor one of the rules of the game, so to speak, 
is the presentation of belief as objective knowledge where 
demonstration is adequate and faith unnecessary. But ideologists 
do develop doctrine just as theologians do, only they call it 
'theory'. Religions, or at least some of them, are perhaps more 
self-knowing in this respect. They may not go as far as Oscar 
Wilde's 
Religions die when they are proved to be true. 
Science is the record of dead religions. 
but they recognise the central role of faith and deem it a 
surpreme virtue. Ideologists, on the other hand, persistently 
claim that their doctrines are theories in the academic sense; 
that is, objective and demonstrable. But as we have discussed at 
length above, the status of academic theories as objective 
knowledge depends upon their conforming to those criteria and 
satisfying those procedures which constitute those forms of 
understanding which are academic disciplines. In science, for 
example, the uniformity of nature, causality, prediction, 
experiment, etc., which are all .interdefinable and mutually 
supporting, together constitute the scientific understanding. 
This framework of understanding is not regarded as 'true', for it 
contains no assertions of fact and embodies no substantive 
theories about the way the world is, but is neutral as between 
such theories; yet at the same time it guarantees the possibility 
that theories that do satisfy the appropriate criteria are 
factually descriptive, explanatory and refutable. But in 
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religion and ideology things are very different. Particular 
substantive doctrines of God, the church, prayer, salvation, 
etc., also interdefinable and mutually supporting, constitute the 
framework of understanding of a religion, without any higher 
framework to guarantee their objectivity or status as knowledge. 
And similarly so with ideology. The theories of Marxism, 
Liberalism and others are not theories in the academic sense, 
whatever ideologists may claim, and have no higher framework in 
terms of which they may be judged (or disputes over revisionism 
or heresy may be settled): theory and understanding are 
conflated. This common feature of their logic distinguishes 
religion and ideology from academic understandings, together with 
their related characteristic of being forms of ethical 
understanding. What separates them is that while the central 
feature of a religious understanding is its concept of the 
divine, the central feature of an ideological understanding is 
its conception of human nature. 
The theories of human nature which give rise to 
ideologies, or variants of ideologies, are legion. There are 
notions, not only of socialist, autonomous and race-determined 
man, but also of rational, or moral, or competitive, or 
cooperative man; he is not only homo sapiens but homo faber or 
homo ludens; he may be seen as essentially spiritual or material, 
body or soul, as God's creature (a just God, a rational God, a 
vengeful God, etc. l or as basically a pleasure/pain machine, or 
driven by passion, libido, aggression or ego; he may at birth be 
good or bad, perfectable or imperfectable, or merely a stranger 
in a meaningless universe, and his tate ultimately tragic or 
comic or romantic or absurd. Each of these views of man - and 
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there are many more and many variations - has implications for 
the kind of society in which he can develop most fully. We may 
thus characterise the root conception of political ideology as: 
this is the nature of man, therefore this is the kind of society 
appropriate to his nature. From this basic proposition is 
inferred a moral obligation to create (or preserve or restore) 
that society. All the basic political ideals - freedom, 
equality, order, justice - can be interpreted in terms of this 
theoretical complex. But all this is implied in a basic 
conception of man from which the rest is deduced much in the 
manner of Natural Law. But either these deductions involve a 
logical fallacy, as Hume showed with Natural Law, or the notion 
of man is morally loaded so that prescriptions can be inferred, 
though only at the price of abandoning the possibility of 
correspondence with reality. Either way, faith is involved; 
faith in a vision of human society and how to get there; faith in 
the values that that society embodies; faith in a conception of 
human nature that fits the good society; and faith that the 
theory that embodies all this constitutes a true and total 
account of human experience, past, present and future. 
Apart from obvious similarities with religion here, there 
is also a clear overlap in certain religious conceptions of man 
upon which political beliefs are based. The political ideas of 
Aquinas, Calvin and others, we may wish to regard as religious 
and ideological. This raises semantic and classificatory 
problems, but not of an important kind; though they do raise the 
interesting question as to whether all ideologies are necessarily 
political ones, a question we will return to later. For the 
moment it is sufficient to note that while upon the map of 
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understanding ideology has its particular place (close to 
religion within the realm of the practical), it nonetheless seeks 
to embrace everything: the academic, the political, the 
aesethetic, the economic and the educational. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
HUMAN NATURE AND THE STRUCTURE OF IDEOLOGY 
There is perhaps a certain obviousness about the 
suggestion that conceptions of human nature are at the heart of 
ideology. This is because political theory in the past has often 
been characterised in this way; so much so that Martin Hollis can 
casually caricature 'traditional political theory' thus: 
(1) Take about 2,000 hom.sap. dissect each 
into essence and accidents and discard the 
accidents. 
(2) Place essences in a large casserole, add 
socialising syrup and stew until conflict 
disappears. 
(3) Serve with a pinch of salt • 
... the exact ingredients vary with the chef. 
In particular the magic socialising syrup 
varies with the analysis of human nature. [lJ 
Yet the suggestion is not the commonplace it might at first 
appear, and for several reasons. To begin with, it is far from 
common to equate ideology with traditional political theory. 
Hollis, for example, does not. [2] The most widely held view is 
that ideology is connected with mass politics, mass manipulation, 
propaganda and ultimately totalitarianism; very much features of 
the modern world, and in sharp contrast to 'legitimate' political 
theory resulting from the noble reflections of great minds. 
Marxists and traditional Conservatives are rather less inhibited 
about labelling past thought ideological, but then their accounts 
of ideology take little account of human nature. It was noted in 
Chapter Two that accounts of ideology within political doctrines 
tend to analyse it in terms of its causes and its effects, and 
not its internal structure. They stress those features which 
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tend to show rival beliefs to be dangerous and wrong, and not 
features that may be shared. Ideology is thus associated with 
totalitarianism or class oppression or uselessly abstract 
reasoning, while the structure similarities between what is 
deemed ideological and that which deems it so is, no doubt 
understandably, ignored. Again, sociological approaches to 
ideology concentrate on the social functions - such as expressing 
class interests or fostering group solidarity - which they are 
thought to perform irrespective of their content. Indeed, among 
all the various accounts and discussions of ideology considered 
in Chapter Two (including the most recent philosophical studies) 
there is hardly a mention of human nature, and those that do 
mention it, like Corbett, proceed to ignore it in their 
subsequent analysis. 
On the other hand, there have been various accounts of the 
role of conceptions of human nature in political theories, 
especially in recent years as the high tide of behavioural 
political science has ebbed, but where there is little mention of 
ideology. Hollis' book, quoted above, is one example. Others 
include two recent volumes of essays on the topic - Human N.:"'fure 
in Politics edited by Pennock and Chapman, [ 3] and Politics and 
Human Nature edited by Forbes and Smith [ 4] - where, in a total 
of twenty-six essays, ideology is hardly mentioned and nowhere is 
a substantial link made between conceptions of human nature and 
ideology as such. [5] And where the connection has been made, as 
it has by Alan Ryan, its nature has been mistaken, as we will see 
below. Thus, seeing conceptions of the nature of man as central 
to ideology is far from being a commonplace. But even if the 
connection were more widely asserted there would still be a need 
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to analyse its nature, since if, as this work has sought to 
demonstrate, the nature of ideology is not properly understood, 
then the role of human nature within ideology will not be 
properly understood either. 
We have, then, the suggestion that theories of human 
nature have a crucial role in ideology, but we have yet to see 
how and why they are the key structural element. The first task, 
however, is to say what we mean by an ideological conception of 
human nature, as distinct from other possible conceptions. When 
this has been done we can show the role of such conceptions 
within the formal structure of ideological theory. 
1. Ideological and non-ideological conceptions of man 
We might begin the process of isolating Ideological Man 
by considering two statements which appear to put the matter 
correctly, but which, upon closer examination, need to be 
qualified substantially. [6) The first is a comment by Isaiah 
Berlin: 
The ideas of every philosopher concerned with 
human affairs in the end rest on his conception 
of what man is and can be. To understand such 
thinkers, it is more important to grasp this 
central notion or image <which may be implicit, 
but determines their picture of the world) than 
even the most forceful arguments with which 
they defend their views and refute actual and 
possible objections. [7J 
The quarrel with Berlin's remark lies in his use of the term 
<philosopher'. The passage occurs in an essay on the thought of 
George Sorel, and since Berlin opens his essay by identifying 
Sorel with "the other ideologists and prophets of the nineteenth 
century" [8) he is clearly using a different notion of philosophy 
than the one which informs this work. The philosophical and the 
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ideological need to be distinguished. 
In the above passage Berlin is using the term 
'philosophy' in the very broad sense of general theorising about 
the nature of the world and man's proper place within it. It is 
a very common use of the word Cas in 'philosophy of life') and in 
itself unobjectionable. But it is much too vague a notion to be 
of use in analysing the nature of general theorising. For this 
purpose a much stricter and narrower conception of philosophy as 
an academic discipline is needed. As we saw in Chapter Three, 
the concept of an academic discipline depends crucially on the 
idea of a decision-procedure by means of which disputes between 
rival claims to knowledge can be conclusively settled. In the 
case of philosophy disputes are settled by an appeal to logic, in 
the broad sense of the rules of meaning implicit in the way we 
talk. To this view there is a fairly obvious objection that 
philosophers are permanently at loggerheads and nothing is ever 
settled; and that this is manifested in the continuing 
controversies over empiricism and rationalism, idealism and 
materialism, determinism and free will, and other such endless 
debates. To answer these objections it is necessary to 
distinguish between broad conceptions or pictures on the one 
hand, and particular arguments on the other. Any general 
conception of ultimate reality or how the mind works or the 
nature of moral obligation, must have supporting arguments to 
justify its acceptance. These particular arguments may be 
refuted or otherwise shown to be inadequate. But this does not 
necessarily destroy the general conception; and it is quite 
reasonable to maintain belief in the picture while searching for 
fresh arguments or reworking old ones. From time to time certain 
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sets of arguments hold the field for a period, so that the matter 
seems settled in favour of one particular general conception. 
But rival conceptions tend to reappear eventually with new 
arguments to support them, and so the process goes on. It is the 
business of the philosopher to challenge accepted arguments and 
generate new ones, and the philosophical enterprise will continue 
so long as people possess intellectual ingenuity and creativity. 
Now this may seem depressingly inconclusive, not to say 
pointless. Yet there is progress of a sort, and there is an 
accumulation of knowledge, and the decision-procedure does 
operate. The point is that it operates at the level of arguments 
and not at the level of general conceptions, at least not 
directly; we know for example that Plato's world of Forms cannot 
be sustained by his argument from the universality of concepts. 
Particular arguments are refuted, distinctions are established, 
and the realm of possibility is thereby narrowed. 
If this account of philosophy is correct, and if as 
argued earlier disputes over fundamental values cannot in 
principle be settled, then it follows that such disputes cannot 
form part of philosophical debate, and the determination of 
values cannot fall within the scope of academic philosophy. On 
this basis the distinction between philosophy and ideology 
becomes clear. A moral evaluation of the world is central to an 
ideology and is implicit in all its concepts and statements. No 
matter how seemingly factual ideological statements may be they 
are in reality evaluations and behave logically as evaluations. 
Consequently, disputes between rival ideological 'descriptions' 
<that is, pseudo-descriptions>, unlike philosophical disputes, 
cannot in principle be settled. 
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An ideological concept of man embodies the values of its 
ideology; it is a pseudo-descriptive concept from which moral 
prescriptions may be legitimately drawn. A non-ideological 
concept, on the other hand, embodies no such values and implies 
no such prescriptions. It might be argued that any concept of 
man will have moral implications of some sort. But this is 
doubtful. An incontrovertable truth about our essential 
humanness is our common mortality; but while it is open to anyone 
to read any amount of moral significance into this fact, the fact 
in itself has no necessar_1.1 implications for how we ought to live 
our lives. Similarly, a fuller conception of man may be such 
that no moral implications follow of necessity from it. 
At this point we might consider the second pronouncement 
on the role of theories of human nature, one which, on the face 
of it, is a corrective to Berlin's. Alan Ryan writes: 
Our images of human nature are centrally 
important ideological phenomena, for the 
evident reason that what distinguishes ideology 
from a merely random string of moral and 
political imperatives is the way it 
incorporates the validating assumptions of 
those imperatives. The assumption that these 
imperatives - whether taken for granted, 
defended desperately, or pressed for the first 
time- have their roots in 'human nature' is 
one main condition of their very 
intelligibility. [9] 
Ryan makes this statement in the context of a discussion of 
Hobbes and Rousseau, both of whom he takes to be ideologists. 
But there are significant differences between them which, though 
Ryan does not draw attention to them, his analysis nevertheless 
makes clear. With Hobbes's 
•.• secular, mechanical, naturalistic approach 
to human nature, we are left with absolutely no 
forbidden actions, no intrinsically wicked 
behaviour. (ibid. p. 13). 
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For Hobbes, all human action is ultimately reducable to physics, 
and the natural laws which govern it are in themselves no more 
morally significant than the laws of planetary motion. Hobbes's 
ideas generally do not have positive moral force, and Ryan does 
not claim that they do. But Rousseau is a very different matter. 
His concern is a moral concern, provoked by his disgust with 
contemporary society as morally degenerate and alienating. Ryan 
summarises Rousseau's view thus: 
The depravity of society and the arbitrariness 
of social convention create an obsession with 
personal prestige that is utterly 
self-destructive .•• Civilisation is a 
condition in which we loose touch with 
ourselves. (ibid. pp. 18 & 16) 
Thus, on Ryan's own account of Hobbes and Rousseau they would 
seem to have two very different kinds of theory. However, this 
difference is not recognised by Ryan who treats them as being 
theories of the same kind, as equally factual and equally capable 
of being true or false. Values are not a determining feature, or 
even, it seems, an important feature of his view of ideology. 
This is confirmed in Ryan's treatment of James and John 
Stuart Mill in his paper 'Two Concepts of Politics and 
Democracy'. [10] Here again he treats these two accounts of 
politics and democracy as rival factual accounts, and differences 
of values, though mentioned, are only incidental. But what we 
have with James and J.S. Mill are two alternative visions of the 
proper ends of society which arise from differences of values. 
Of course, James Mill shared with Bentham a conception of human 
nature that has certain similarities with that of Hobbes. But 
Hobbes did not regard peace or security, or indeed anything else, 
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as intrinsically moral goods; we are, so to speak, simply 
programmed to pursue them, and we are certainly under no moral 
obligation to work for the peace and security of others. For 
Bentham and James Mill, however, pleasure, individual happiness 
and above all the happiness of mankind are intrinsic and absolute 
goods. They were not thoroughgoing nominalists in this matter as 
Hobbes was. 
Like Bentham and the Mills, Rousseau possessed a moral 
vision which is inseparable from his seemingly factual 
assertions. But this is not true of Hobbes. We might put the 
matter another way by saying that Hobbes's ideas are open to 
criticism and refutation, empirical or logical, in a way that 
Rousseau's are not. Observation and experiment could, for 
example, be relevant to many of Hobbes's important assertions: 
cases of social breakdown in the absence of government, or of 
states where sovereignty is divided between institutions, or of 
suicides that seem perfectly reasonable could all be adduced as 
evidence for or against his claims, while in principle if not in 
practice, an experimental state of nature could be set up to see 
if and how men might escape from it. But it is difficult to see 
what arguments, empirical or logical, could be used to refute or 
confirm Rousseau's belief that modern society is corrupting and 
alienating, or that unless men live according to laws which they 
themselves lor rather their better selves) have agreed to then 
they are slaves and are being denied their true humanity. 
Values play no part in Ryan's account of the conceptions 
of human nature that he says are central to ideological thought, 
and he clearly does not see ideology as any kind of ethical 
understanding. Consequently the nature of ideology eludes him. 
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As we have just seen with Hobbes and Rousseau, he cannot 
distinguish between the ideological and the non-ideological. 
Furthermore, he cannot explain the nature of ideological 
differences. This is clear from his discussion of James and John 
Stuart Mill, where he argues that it is not possible to reconcile 
their views of man and politics, but cannot say why. [11J But an 
adequate explanation is possible in terms of pseudo-description 
and incommensurability arising from differing values. These 
features are central to ideology's logical distinctiveness and to 
any ideological conception of man. By ignoring the ethical 
content, or at least its implications, Ryan cannot comprehend 
ideology as a distinctive way of thinking. In his 'Normal 
Science or Political Ideology?" he writes: 
To analyse what is merely ideological we 
enquire into the origins of the ideologist, or 
ask whose interests are served by putting 
forward the doctrine in question. [12J 
But as we saw in Chapter Two, defining ideology in terms of 
expression of class or group interest cannot be the basis of a 
coherent theory; and in accepting this account Ryan effectively 
denies ideology's logical autonomy. Finally, Ryan fails to see 
the necessarily metaphysical status of Ideological Man. In his 
discussion of Hobbes and Rousseau, he points out that in the 
Seventeenth Century the nature of lead was a seemingly insoluable 
mystery, but one which over time has been solved, and by the same 
token the nature of man may be similarly revealed to us in the 
future. [13] But the ethical content of ideological conceptions 
of man, which Ryan ignores, makes them, like all ideological 
concepts, pseudo-descriptive and non-referring. Consequently, 
Ideological Man is incorrigibly metaphysical. And the academic 
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pursuit of an ideological account of man which is also a true 
account, that Ryan seems to think is possible, is doomed not only 
to failure but to hopeless confusion. 
II 
Failure to distinguish between moral and non-moral 
conceptions of human nature or to understand the significance of 
any ethical content, is the abiding weakness of most accounts of 
the role of human nature in political theorising. Neither 
Pennock and Chapman nor Forbes and Smith make the necessary 
distinction; and both their volumes are conceived as contributing 
to the ultimate aim of discovering the true and ethically 
significant conception of man, as their respective introductions 
make clear. [14] In the second essay of the latter volume Graeme 
Duncan attempts to show how this is to be done. Although 
admitting that there are "no commonly agreed criteria for 
appraising political beliefs, including beliefs about human 
nature", [15] Duncan nevertheless insists that they can be 
objectively assessed according to empirical evidence, logical 
analysis and moral considerations which amount in practice to 
whether the consequences of a theory are "nice or nasty" (p.15). 
The kind of empirical evidence he has in mind includes what he 
calls: 
•.• laws of human nature or of human 
psychology, or the laws or imperatives 
governing all (complex) societies .•. (ibid). 
But even on the doubtful assumption that such laws existed and we 
knew what they were, they could not decisively refute or confirm 
the kind of conception of men where (as Duncan himself observes 
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in a rare moment of insight, p. 14} their moral and 'factual' 
components are inseparable. The ethical content of such theories 
puts them beyond the reach of empirical evidence and makes them 
necessarily metaphysical. The appeal to logic is, on the other 
hand, more promising in that gross contradiction is undoubtedly 
damning for any theory. But it would be naive to suppose that 
all theories of human nature are flawed in this way except the 
one true one. Besides, the kinds of questions Duncan has in mind 
under this heading concern such matters as the compatability of 
values, which tend not to admit of the kind of straightforward 
answers he aspires to. But much the most important criteria by 
which Duncan proposes to judge theories of human nature are 
moral. Unfortunately, in order to fulfil his evaluatory purposes 
Duncan needs a moral viewpoint which is objective and absolute: 
but this he neither has, nor, apparently, aspires to possess. In 
the end, what his moral criteria boil down to is personal 
preferences. He tells us that "personal preferences will 
certainly influence interpetations of the ideals and values of 
others" (p.l6l and goes on to give examples of theories he 
rejects because of his own preferences. But this is the very 
opposite of objective evaluation. Indeed, that everyone does 
evaluate according to preferences, with no independent way of 
choosing between preferences, is precisely the problem and not a 
solution to it. Thus, Duncan's attempt to devise objective means 
of choosing between ideological conceptions of man only succeeds 
in suggesting the futility of the project as an academic 
exercise. It also implies, conversely, that an attempt, however 
sophisticated, to create an objective theory of man possessed of 
moral significance, will only generate ideology and not overcome 
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it. This can be illustrated by the work of Martin Hollis. 
Martin Hollis's book Nodels of Nan [16] is specifically 
concerned with the role of conceptions of human nature in social 
scientific explanations of human action. He insists that such 
conceptions are necessarily implicit in any social scientific 
theory, and that despite claims that the assumptions of 
traditional political theory (caricatured in the passage quoted 
at the beginning of this chapter) are dead, they are in fact: 
•.• buried in the roots of the very theories 
which purport to reject them and they still act 
as premises for metaphysical systems with 
implications for social ethics. There is no 
dispensing with a model of man ... Every social 
theory needs a metaphysic .•. in which a model 
of man and a method of science compliment each 
other. There is not shirking questions of 
quasi-fact, of normative analysis and of 
pr a>: is. ( p. 5 ) 
What Hollis is arguing is that all the elements of traditional 
political theory, including values, are necessarily part, though 
often an unacknowledged part, of any substantial social 
scientific theory. 
This is a large and bold claim, and one which contradicts 
what has been said earlier by insisting on the impossibility of a 
morally neutral conception of man. However, when Hollis comes to 
make good this claim he does so in terms of the much weaker claim 
that the acceptance of a certain concept of man may rule out 
other conceptions along with their moral implications. But 
no-one would wish to deny this. It may be true, for example, 
that if Hobbes's account of human nature is a correct one then 
the kind of anarchistic society envisaged by Godwin is an 
impossibility; but this of itself does not make Hobbes's account 
a morally-charged one, and could not be evidence for Hollis's 
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larger claim that no conception of man can be neutral. 
It was noted earlier that Hollis draws a sharp 
distinction between traditional political theory and ideology, 
but in terms of the present analysis, what Hollis is trying to 
establish is that ideology is inseparable from social science 
because all social scientific theories imply a conception of man 
and such conceptions cannot be morally neutral. There are in 
fact three cases which Hollis fails to distinguish: there is the 
intrinsically moral and therefore ideological; there is the 
neutral conception that indirectly rules out certain moral 
possibilities <as with Hobbes); and there is the neutral 
conception which is used ideologically. Hollis can only make his 
larger claim by subsuming the last two under the first. An 
excellent example of the ideological use of an otherwise neutral 
concept is the use made of the Darwinian account of human 
evolution by Spencer, Kropotkin and others. In this case the 
neutral concept and its ideological use are clearly separate; but 
the distinction is less obvious where the neutral concept and its 
ideological use occur in the same writer's work. A good example 
is B.F. Skinner. As Leslie Stevenson points out in his Seven 
Ther...?r.ies of Human Nature [ 17J, the concepts Skinner uses in his 
psychological work are unimpeachably scientific, and this is 
quite separate from his social (that is, ideological) writings 
such as .Beyond Freedom and Dignity and the novel Malden Tti/o [ 18] 
where he sets out his ideas on how, given the nature of man as 
revealed in his psychology, society ought to be governed. There 
is, then, a distinction to be made between Ideological Man and a 
neutral conception of man, even though the latter may be turned 
into an ideological conception. This transmutation into 
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Ideological Man is accomplished by addressing to the neutral 
conception the question, 'What are the moral and practical 
implications of this conception?' But the important point here 
is that there are no inevitable answers to this question. Such 
answers as are arrived at merely reflect the prior values of 
those who do the asking, however much they may insist they are 
inherent in man. Hence the varieties of Social Darwinism. By 
contrast, Ideological Man by birth, so to speak, has his values 
built into him, and is designed to furnish a particular set of 
moral and social implications dictated by the values of his 
creator. 
Hollis's failure to recognise these distinctions turns 
out to be highly convenient for his overall proposes, which are 
clearly ideological. He wishes to argue, in effect, that since a 
morally charged conception of man is a necessary feature of 
social science it had better be the right one, one that is 
objective, philosophically sound and has the right moral content. 
He writes: 
The book's constructive attempt is to find a 
metaphysic for the rational social self. The 
conclusions are strictly to do with making the 
actions of Autonomous Man a subject for 
science .•• (p.l9) 
His account begins with an analysis of the polar opposites: 
Plastic Man (that is, wholly subject to and explained by causal 
laws, sociological or psychological) and Autonomous Man (who acts 
for reasons which are not causes and which are self-explanatory). 
His own account embraces both. In somewhat Kantian fashion he 
argues that: 
... the actor is autonomous when he is 
rational and plastic when he is not ... (p.l83l 
... rational action is its own explanation and 
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•.• departures from it have a causal 
e:-:planat ion. ( p. 130) 
But being rational is not, for Hollis, simply a matter of having 
reasons because it makes a difference to the explanation of the 
action "whether it was done for good or for bad reasons" (ibid). 
When we are being lazy, ignorant, stupid or otherwise not using 
the very best reasons possible then, apparently, we are behaving 
according to causal laws and not being fully human. Even just 
doing what seems best in the circumstances is not good enough, 
for Hollis insists upon the strictest possible interpretation of 
'rationality': 
He has good reason if he acts in his ultimate 
interest. His ultimate interests derive from 
what he essentially is. ( p. 101) •.. autonomous 
action is equated with fully rational action 
•.• and ..• that plainly prevents our regarding 
action as rational, merely because the agent 
desires to do it or believes that it is 
appropriate. (p.l37) 
Unfortunately, Hollis cannot tell us what man's ultimate 
interests are. Indeed, he admits that "we often cannot judge 
where reason lies" (p.l60>, and that "ultimate reasons are hard 
to come by" (p.l37) 
This is a very strange thesis. Quite apart from the 
difficulties of regarding any reasons as caused or causal, the 
problems of dividing reasons between those that are caused and 
those that are not on the basis of their quality as reasons would 
seem to be insuperable, especially if Hollis cannot be sure which 
reasons are the good ones. It is rather like a man who claims 
anyone can levitate if their reasons are good enough, of whom one 
is inclined to ask how the force of gravity can tell the good 
reasons from the bad ones so that it knows when not to operate. 
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However, the important point in the present context is the nature 
of the concept of man that Hollis is offering to social science. 
It is in fact an ideological concept, one that has its values 
built into it. The argument turns on the meaning given to the 
term 'rationality'. Hollis writes: 
What starts as a search for an active model of 
man leads first to a demand for actions which 
are self-explanatory because fully rational, 
thence to an account of rationality in terms of 
real interests, thence into ethics and finally 
to that ancient problem about the nature of the 
Good Society. Yet it should come as no 
surprise that questions in ethics and politics 
attend an analysis of human nature. We cannot 
know what is rational, without deciding what is 
best. <p.l37) 
'Rationality' is not, therefore, a neutral concept (as it 
certainly can bel, but is defined in terms of what is good for 
Man; that is, it is a pseudo-descriptive concept. It is through 
exercising this 'rationality' that men can achieve the Good 
Society, where the ends of every occupant of every social role 
can be rational ends <p.l86l, where each can identify with his 
social role and so do his duty rationally (p.l06), and where 
everyone can be fully rational and fully autonomous and thereby 
fulfil their essential human nature. 
With his concept of man, Hollis has the foundation of a 
complete ideological position. He has a set of values expressed 
in a pseudo-descriptive conceptual framework, with concepts such 
as 'man', 'Good Society', 'rational', 'autonomous', 
'self-expression', 'role' and 'duty'; and including 'ideology' 
which, we are told: 
..• can now be assigned to 
explained as products of a 
insofar as they are false. 
explanation. (p.l60l 
the superstructure and 
socio-economic base, only 
True consciousness is its own 
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He also has the outline of an ideal society in which, presumably, 
all will think clearly and ideology will be eliminated. There 
are, however, some elements missing. We are not given a 
systematic evaluation of the present world, or any account of how 
we arrived at it, or any instructions as to how we might arrive 
at the ideal society. But these things might be said to be 
-1mplicit in what he does say and in the form of social science he 
advocates. Criticism of the present world is implied in the 
extent to which it falls short of the ideal, and is explained to 
some degree by the prevalance of false reasoning, while the 
proper future course must lie in man's improved 
self-understanding and the cultivation of right reason. The 
fleshing out of these points must, of course, be the function of 
Hollisian social science. Hollis believes he is providing an 
objective and rational foundation for the social sciences, but 
the ideological nature of his concept of man is not a possible 
basis for any kind of objective study. Any social science that 
was build on his concept could be no more than an elaboration of 
his ideological position, in the same way that Marxist social 
science is an extension of Marxism. 
Hollis's conception of human nature contains the seeds of 
a fully developed ideology, and this indicates the central 
importance of such conceptions to this kind of thinking. 
Precisely what their role is and how the other elements of 
ideology relate to it, and to each other, we must now examine 
more closely. 
2. The Structure of Ideology 
In the last several chapters we have discussed or touched 
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upon a number of elements and characteristics of ideology, and it 
is now time to show how they relate together to form a coherent 
whole; a process that should indicate if anything more is needed 
to provide a complete picture. This may be approached by 
attempting to make good the claim of the last two sections which 
has accorded particular importance to ideological conceptions of 
man, as being in some way central to or definitive of ideology. 
It is the fusion of fact and value, of description and 
evaluation, and the consequences of this fusing, that gives 
ideology its particular logical character. Values have to be 
embodied in the objective world, and an ideology's concept of man 
is central to this process. On the one side, the values of an 
ideology are concerned with what is good or bad for man as such, 
and so must stem directly from that ideology's account of 
essential human nature. On the other hand, that same concept of 
man must play the central role in the ideology's explanation of 
the world, for what it basically explains is why the world is the 
way it is for man as such, and that explanation must be cast in 
terms of man's realisation or failure to realise his 
potentialities. It is therefore in the concept of man that the 
factual and evaluative sides of ideology are brought together, 
and through which the values come to pervade the whole of the 
theory. Therefore, this value/theory combination determines both 
the prescriptions of the ideology and its conception of the good 
society, since both involve a notion of what is humanly possible 
derived from the explanatory theory, and a notion of what is good 
and right which are an expression of the values. The ideology's 




Ideological man is first of all a bearer of values, the 
standard of good and bad. Ideologies have to have such a concept 
of man because they deal in solutions to human problems in 
absolute terms, and not with the temporary or local. The claims 
of ideology are universal claims. They are concerned with 
mankind as such; with the ills of mankind and the good of 
mankind. What constitutes human good and ill depends upon how 
human nature is conceived, and is expressed as a set of values. 
To evaluate the world in terms of a particular set of values is 
necessarily to understand the world in terms of a particular 
concept of man in which these values are implicit. Such values 
are what we take to be good for man, what answers to his needs, 
releases his potentialities or at least enables him to be at his 
best. For the religious believer the ultimate source of values 
is the Divine ("God is good", "God is love", etc.}, whereas 
ideology takes its starting point as man so defined that the 
values are built into the definition, so that man is the 
foundation of values, the sources of their certainty and 
justification. If, for example, essential humanness is conceived 
in terms of rationality, then whatever is deemed rational is good 
for man and whatever irrational bad; if freedom is a value it is 
because people cannot express their full humanity without it; and 
if order and authority are values it is because men need them to 
be at their best. 
Armed with this kind of morally-loaded, value-infused 
conception of human nature one can begin to evaluate the world. 
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Rousseau, for example, directly applied a moralised conception of 
man to produce his sweeping condemnation of contemporary society: 
"Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains." [20J By which 
he meant that freedom is part of man's essential nature, in the 
sense that man must be free to make moral choices and live 
according to his own rules, otherwise, as happends to be the case 
in most societies, his humanity is denied and he is effectively a 
'slave'. [21] Similarly, though less dramatically, John Locke in 
his Second Tre....:;tise on Government [22J, gives us an account of 
essential man as being possessed of certain natural rights which 
are an immediate yardstick for evaluating governments, dividing 
those that respect and protect their citizens's rights, and are 
therefore good, from those that deny or threaten those rights and 
which are therefore tyrannous and bad. Or yet again, in Marx's 
'Paris Manuscripts' [2JJ we have a picture of essential man as 
alienated and oppressed when the product of his labour is 
appropriated by another, so that all societies based on such 
appropriation, as all class-divided societies are, must 
necessarily be condemned as dehumanising. 
However, a pseudo-descriptive concept of man provides 
only the basis of an evaluatory framework. A Marxist evaluation 
of capitalism, for example, is more than a simple condemnation 
based on the extent of alienation and misery it creates, but also 
takes into account such matters as its contribution (much praised 
by Marx) to the development of productive forces. Ideological 
man, therefore, needs to be filled out with a wider social 
theory, an essential part of which must be some conception of the 
good society. Any evaluatory system implies a 'best possible', 
which in turn becomes a standard against which we can measure our 
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present or any other social circumstances; although ideologies 
vary in the degree to which they make this explicit. Indeed, the 
good society is implicit in any ideological notion of man, and 
may be viewed as a direct development from, and even an extension 
of, the ideology's account of human nature. Conception of man, 
evaluation and the social ideal form a continuum. The good 
society embodies the values implicit in the ideology's conception 
of human nature, while what is bad for man, equally implicit in 
that conception, is eliminated or minimised. Thus, if man is 
essentially rational, and the rational is the good and the good 
is the rational, then the good society will be a wholly rational 
one; or if equality is essential for men to flourish then the 
good society will be based upon equality, and inequality will be 
banished. 
On the other hand, the idea that all ideologies have a 
conception of an ideal society is not to say that such 
conceptions are necessarily utopian. Many ideological positions 
take pride in being 'realistic' and condemn any kind of utopian 
thinking. 'Utopia' has implications of individuals and social 
perfection, which anti-utopians tend to regard as ridiculous. 
Nevertheless all ideologies, conservative as well as radical, 
have some notion of the ideal or best possible society. Besides, 
the distinction between what is utopian and what is realistic is 
open to some question, if not "tendentious and misleading" as 
Arblaster and Lukes insist. [24] They are surely correct in 
arguing that: 
••• the distinction between realism and 
utopianism is itself a misleading and 
value-loaded, indeed polemical distinction, 
serving to conceal the value premises from 
which it is made. (p.lO) ..• [Realists] are not 
to be distinguished from those thinkers 
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commonly regarded as utopians by their having 
no general principles or no general idea of 
what society should be like - although it is 
often implied that just such a distinction can 
be drawn. 
Traditionalist conservatives, organisng 
technocrats, dogmatic and pragmatic liberals 
and piecemeal social reformers - although they 
attack socialists, anarchists and other 
radicals for attempting to produce blue-prints 
of the desired future society (which very few 
of the latter do in any detailed way) - are 
only able to do so by reference to rival 
conceptions of the good society. The 
anti-utopians are apt to claim, nevertheless, 
that their approach to politics is radically 
different from that of those they see as 
utopians. The latter are said to be dogmatic, 
doctrinaire, and inflexible, while they are 
naturally flexible and realistic ... But there 
seems no reason to accept this trite contrast. 
It is not self-evident that Burke is less 
dogmatic in his commitment to tradition, or 
Oakeshott to his belief in limited government, 
or Hayek to 'true individualism', or Lipset and 
Riesman in their commitment to the fundamental 
excellence of American democracy than is 
Condorcet in his commitment to the possibility 
of unlimited human perfection, or Lenin in his 
commitment to communism, or Proudhon or 
Kropotkin in their devotion to the anarchist 
ideal. [ 25 J 
Thus, whether it be acknowledged or not, every ideological 
position has at least an implicit conception of the good or best 
possible society. 
The ideal society is one which by definition cannot be 
improved; or, more accurately, is possessed of a framework that 
cannot be improved. Ideological positions, like those of 
Condorcet or J.S. Mill or Popper or even Marx, which have some 
kind of open-ended belief in progress, are clearly not advocating 
any Plato-like static perfection. For them the good society is 
not something that can be described in any detail, since the 
detail can and should change. What matters is the framework. 
The important thing for Mill and Condorcet is a society where 
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changes of the right kind are possible and encouraged; for Popper 
it is where change is pragmatic and piecemeal; for Marx it is 
where the obstacles to man's free creativity have been removed 
<the coming of Communist society, Marx believed, would mean the 
end of 'prehistory' [26] and the beginning of truly human 
history). But whether it be the details of relationships or 
institutions or a broader framework within which change can take 
place, something has to be fixed and permanent. It is the 
justification of that fixity and permanence that is problematic. 
Given the flux of human history it is evident that for any aspect 
of society to be unchanging it must speak to some permanent human 
need or potential or aspiration. Or, put another way, it must 
relate to essential human nature. Herbert Spencer once wrote: 
The co-existence of the perfect man and the 
imperfect society is impossible. [27J 
Not all ideologists would wish to put the matter in this way; 
there must be some necessary link between the good society and 
human nature. Unless the good society is particularly suited to 
essential man then it will not work, or at least could not be 
permanent. In which case there must be a society which suits 
human nature better. Hence, no picture of an ideal society can 
stand on its own without an associated conception of human nature 
to guarantee its possibility and its permanence. Indeed, a 
conception of an ideal society may be understood as an extension 
of a conception of man. Certainly without such a conception no 
picture of an ideal society can make sense. 
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II 
However, ideologies are more than just evaluatory and 
visionary. They also have to explain and prescribe. A 
conception of man by which we may measure what is good or bad in 
present society and picture the best possible society for man is 
not in itself enough, since evaluations or ideas cannot explain 
anything. Ideological man must also be at the centre of a 
descriptive and explanatory framework that must explain our 
present world and show how we might achieve <or preserve) the 
best possible one. Ideological theories purport to explain the 
whole of the human condition, or all of it that is significant, 
but being essentially practical systems of ideas their inevitable 
centre of attention is the relationship between our present world 
and the ideal, including the relationship of identity (as, for 
example, with Hegel>. That is, they explain the relationship 
between the actual and the possible; or why the world fulfils, or 
more usually why it falls short of, the ideal. Thus, if property 
and social hierarchy are evils which distort and dehumanise human 
existence then how can it be that we live in societies which are 
characterised precisely by property and social hierarchy?; or 
again, if racial mixing and the non-observance of racial 
hierarchies are the great obstacles to mankind's advance, then 
why are such evils unchecked?; or yet again, if the present world 
is the best of all possible worlds then why are some discontented 
or bent on its destruction? In other words, how has the present 
world, with its ills or its blessings, come about? 
However, there is a sense in which it is not the case 
that ideologists are all seeking to explain the same world, for 
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'the present world' means different things to different 
ideologies. It would be more accurate to say that what is 
described and explained is the 'state of the world' the 
'condition we are in'. Ideology describes and explains what is 
good and bad in the world and why the actual is or is not the 
ideal; whether and why the present state of affairs is morally 
coherent or incoherent. This is because the world that an 
ideological theory explains is not the world as such but the 
world as evaluated, and what is explained is what is deemed 
significant in terms of the values of the ideology and its 
version of ideological man. Of course, for the ideologist the 
world-as-evaluated simply is the objective world, and his 
ideological man none other than all of us. But to the 
non-believer, the ideologist occupies a world of his own, a 
theoretical construct which, in the manner of a Kuhnian paradigm, 
he cannot step outside. 
Ideological man is central to ideological description and 
explanation in several ways. The ideal world is the social 
expression of the values man is thought to embody, values which 
also determine the nature of the world-as-evaluated. In 
addition, all the concepts with which these worlds are described 
and the relationship between them explained are 
pseudo-descriptive and therefore carry the values that are 
derived from the ideol~gy's concept of human nature. <It is 
perhaps worth noting that ideological theories are more or less 
complex and the explanatory power of their concepts of man are 
more or less direct. In Marxism - the most complex of 
ideological theories - explanatory concepts such as 'surplus 
value" and the 'dialectic' put some distance between the Marxian 
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concept of man and the world to be explained; whereas in 
Liberalism there is a more direct relationship between rational 
man and an irrational world.) Furthermore, the actual content of 
the explanations must relate to how people are constituted. For 
the Nazi, race is the crucial feature of human nature and he 
explains the state of the world in terms of race, with the 
present being a critical phase in the world-historical struggle 
between Aryan and Jew. But what for the Nazi explains all, for 
the Liberal and Marxist explains nothing whatsoever. For the 
Marxist the principle explanatory category is social class; but 
behind class is the notion of property, which by definition 
systematically distorts the relationship between man and the 
world he has created. Thus, ideological man, as the standard of 
good and bad, is the source of what must be explained, while at 
the same time, is an essential part of the explanation. 
It is the value content of ideological description and 
explanations that makes it possible to infer prescriptions from 
what purports to be factual accounts of the world. What is 
prescribed is the ideal and how to reach, or defend, that ideal. 
Much attention is paid to the prescriptive element of ideology 
since it is that aspect which, one might say, engages directly 
with the actual world. The detail of social and political action 
is understood and justified in terms of moving from the present 
to the ideal, of transforming a morally incoherent world into a 
coherent one, or preserving a coherent one from disintegration. 
Ideological explanations explain what is good and bad in the 
world and ideological prescriptions prescribe the promotion of 
the good and the elimination of the bad; such explanations and 
prescriptions are therefore closely linked by values. But they 
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are also linked in other ways. 
One of the functions of ideological theory must be to 
guarantee the efficacy of the prescriptions in closing the gap 
between what is and what ought to be. Explanation and 
prescription are linked in the sense that, often as not, the 
solution is implicit in the explanation. If man's ills flow from 
some great lack (liberty, equality, discipline, education, 
national self-determination or whatever human nature is deemed to 
need), then making good that lack is self-evidently part or all 
of the solution. On a more practical level, the nature of man 
must determine what solutions are possible and permissible. For 
example, education is not a possible solution to the Nazi's 
problems, for, given the nature of man, it is futile; only 
struggle will suffice. For Kant, the 'republican constitution' 
could be brought about by violent revolution, but as a means it 
was not for him permissible. Then again, the explanation of 
society's ills may be in terms of social forces, which in turn 
are related to human nature; in which case solutions may well 
involve the harnessing and exploitation or directing of those 
very forces (which, for example, is to some extent true of Marx, 
especially as interpreted by Engels, and of Herbert Spencer). 
Finally, explanation and prescription are closely related 
in two further ways. Ideological theory identifies what is good 
or ill for man; what conduces to, and is an obstacle to, the good 
society; and this implies the identification of friends and 
enemies. Enemies are those who constitute the obstacles or 
threats - Jews, the ruling class, tyrants, bigots or the ignorant 
mass - and who must be overcome. But the power of enemies alone 
cannot account for why the truth held by the ideologist and his 
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adherents is not common property. Christians traditionally 
explain this in terms of sin. Liberals have the simplest 
explanation, namely ignorance (although totalitarian propaganda 
is now a secondary source). Marx developed an elaborate theory 
of idealogy, while Hitler attributed wrong thinking to the 
pervasive influence of Jewish thought. In bath of these cases 
the solution, whether the overcoming of enemies or the spread of 
right thinking, is implicit in the explanation. 
Thus, the conception of man is bath the centre of the 
value-system and the centre of the theoretical explanation of the 
world, the fusion of which is what makes idealogy logically 
special. One might say that ideology consists of two interlocking 
spheres: with, on the one side, a value-laden conception of man, 
an evaluation of the world and an ideal society forming one 
unity; and a conception of man as actuality and potentiality, an 
explanatory theory and practical prescriptions farming another 
unity. It is through ideological man that the two are fused 
together to form an ideological theory which can both explain and 
evaluate the w6rld at the same time. Ideological man is the 
lynchpin of the ideological structure, 'a hyphen that joins, a 
buckle that fastens' the values and the facts; although in the 
process the facts become pseudo-facts and disparate elements are 
transformed into a logically homogeneous system of ideas. 
But the elements of ideological man that make this 
possible are the very elements that prevent him from 
corresponding to ordinary empirical humanity as he is supposed to 
do. Ideological man is a theoretical construct. Just as is the 
atom; and like the atom he is posited in order to explain. 
Neither are observable; but the unobservability of ideological 
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man is not a practical matter (we have no problems with the 
limitations of instruments), but flows from the value elements of 
his composition. These make ideological man incorrigibly 
metaphysical and incapable of corresponding to people actually in 
the world. Furthermore, by infusing these values through the 
whole ideological structure, ideological man renders all of that 
structure both ethical and metaphysical. This is because the 
ethical content removes the apparaently factual and explanatory 
out of the sphere of what may be observed, tested or otherwise 
deemed true or false. Consequently, ideological theory cannot 
have a real grip on the world. It is not concerned with 
explanation, prediction or truth in any objective, academic 
sense, but with practice. Ideological theory, therefore, 
embraces, links and unifies present actuality with the future 
that is possible and desired. One might say that, being 
centrally concerned with the practical, ideology is necessarily 
preoccupied with the present and its transformation into a 
possible future. But ultimately all ideologies address the human 
condition as such; it deals in universals. It must therefore 
embrace the whole of human experience, past, present and future. 
III 
Clearly, if an ideology explains the present and predicts 
the future in terms of man's ultimate nature and needs, then it 
must be able to explain the past, explain how we came by our 
present condition, in the same terms. Not all ideologists have 
quite seen the need to do this, as Jeremy Bentham's "considerable 
disdain for history" [28] testifies. It is certainly true that 
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the past and its explanation will mean more to a Marxist or a 
Burkean Conservative than a philosophical radical, but, 
nevertheless, explanations of the past must be possible. 
Ideological man is universal man, not some phenomenon of the 
present age. Thus Bentham's lack of interest in the past can be 
seen as a personal idiosyncracy. No less a Benthamite than James 
Mill had a clear Utilitarian version of history, developed in his 
monumental History of India, which is perfectly consistent with 
the rest of Benthami te philosophy. [ 29] Thus, it is fair to 
conclude that an account of the past is necessarily at least 
derivable from all ideological positions. However, the result is 
necessarily an ideological past and not an historical past, being 
no more an objective account than is the ideological account of 
the present. The present from an ideological point of view is 
'the condition we are in', and the past is how we got into this 
condition; that is, where mankind went wrong or what it did 
right. It is a selective and distorted view of the past, a 
moralised view of the past. The ideological past is a function 
of the ideological present; it is an understanding of the past in 
terms of our present problems and preoccupations. The past is 
merely the preamble to the present; that is, the earlier part of 
the story which will ultimately lead to the good society as the 
happy ending. 
Talk of stories is suggestive of myth. Myths play an 
important role in political beliefs. However, before looking at 
their relations to ideology we need to be clear about just what 
they are. 'Myth' is a much misused term, often used as a term of 
abuse to denigrate any idea deemed to be false Cas, for example, 
is Gilbert Ryle's characterisation of the Cartesian theory of 
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mind as the 'myth of the ghost in the machine'). [30] Properly 
understood, a myth is a story which has significance for the 
lives of those who believe it to be true. Archetypal examples 
are the stories of the gods of the Ancient Greeks, which defined 
their religious beliefs, duties and way of life, and explained 
mysterious aspects of the human and physical world. Like 
ideology myths purport to be true, are explanatory and have moral 
significance. Of course myths are only called 'myths' by those 
who do not believe them (much like ideology>; for the believer 
they are simply the truth (witness the controversy provoked by 
the book Tile N_1.1t/J of God Incarnate and the response, The Truth of 
God Incarnate) [ 31 J. 
But myths can also be said to have a role in political 
life, and there are political myths of various kinds. Henry 
Tudor's account of political myth [32] suggests that there are 
essentially two kinds, which he calls 'foundation myths' and 
'eschatological myths', and which might be said to correspond to 
religious myths of creation and the end of the world. For the 
Russian Communist, for example, there is the foundation myth of 
the Bolshevic Revolution, which is a simplified version of actual 
events excluding whatever might detract from its contemporary 
significance (such as the role of Trotsky>, which explains the 
creation of the Soviet state in such a way as to bring out its 
moral significance; that is, the values the state stands for and 
which present and future Soviet citizens must live up to, as is 
set out in the preamble to the Soviet constitution. [33J Other 
examples include the American Founding Fathers, the World 
Communist Revolution, the Anarcho-Syndicalist General Strike, Mao 
Tse Tung's 'Long March' and so on. Myths of this kind have an 
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important place, though only a contingent one, in ideological 
thinking. They might be said to be a significant structural 
element in some, though not all, ideologies; as well as no doubt 
being important in the psychology of ideological adherence. 
However, it can be argued that myth plays a much larger role in 
ideology than this suggests. 
This wider role is indicated by ideology's tendency to 
mythologise the past, to turn it into a story with moral 
significance. But this is true not only of an aspect of history, 
but the whole of significant time, past, present, and future; 
that is, to see the present as one chapter <though perhaps the 
climactic one) of an unfolding story. In other words, in a fully 
developed ideology foundation myths and eschatological myths are 
merely end pieces of a larger mythological structure. The model 
here is also religious. Jewish and Christian myths of creation 
and the end of the world, tor example, enclose the story of man 
in a cosmic struggle of good and evil. [34] What is peculiar 
about such myths of universal history, unlike other types of 
myth, is that the believer is necessarily part of the story, is 
an actor in the drama; there are no neutrals, one has to make a 
choice between good and evil. Such myths may be characterised as 
participatory myths. That myths of this kind play a major role 
in ideological thinking is easily demonstrated. For the Marxist 
all history is the history of the class struggle and one must 
take one's stand with the oppressors or the oppressed. Similarly 
tor the Nazi, belief entails commitment to the racial struggle. 
Liberalism is more complex with many different versions of and 
attitudes to history. But Liberals are normally committed to the 
concept of progress and see history as in some sense a struggle 
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between the forces of darkness and enlightenment, although the 
concrete enemies change from time to time: the traditional ones 
are priests and kings as, for example, with Condorcet; for J.S. 
Mill it is the mass mind; for modern Liberals it is 
totalitarianism and bureaucracy. In all these universal dramas 
the central character is Man, oppressed, alienated, the victim of 
class, foreign or racial oppression. 
It is with such an archetypal man that the adherent can 
identify. The adherent therefore knows where he stands in the 
world, can gauge his moral status, knows who his enemies and 
comrades are, has a sense of direction, knows what part he has to 
play, knows his social, moral and political identity. However, 
this is to start to stray into speculation about what 
psychologically ideology does for us and our needs for it, which 
will be touched upon in the closing chapter. Sufficient far the 
moment to say that it would appear that a participatory myth is 
an inevitable feature of a fully developed ideology, and that 
this completes the set of structural elements, and of features 
bound together by the concept of man. 
The structure of ideology may, therefore, be summarised 
in the following way. Ideology developes conceptions of human 
nature in which observable aspects of humanity (rationality, 
competitiveness, sociability, creativity, etc.) are compounded 
with particular sets of values. Ideological man is the resultant 
theoretical construct, which is then used to both evaluate and 
explain the world as we know it. An ideological conception of 
man an its own can tell us broadly what is good and bad in the 
world; but for a fuller and more accurate evaluation it needs to 
be supplemented with a conception of the goad society. An 
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ideology's notion of the good society is usually little more than 
the extension or filling out of its conception of man; it is the 
values inherent in that conception made, so to speak, social 
flesh. But with such a conception it can be shown just how far 
the present world lives up to, or, more usually, falls short of 
the ideal. And just how this living up to or falling short is to 
be explained also involves the same concept of man; only this 
time extended and filled out into a wider theoretical framework 
that explains where we are in relation to the ideal, why we are 
where we are, and how the gap can be closed or prevented from 
widening. The process of explanation necessarily involves the 
uniting of past, present and future into a unified whole, which 
can then be aesthetically shaped into a universal myth, both 
explaining the world and making moral sense of it. 
3. Kant's political ideas as an example of ideology 
The structure of ideology outlined in the previous 
section might be illustrated with any number of examples. 
However, it is Kant's thought that will be considered. Kant did 
not set out his political ideas in a major work on the subject, 
though he did have a coherent and individual view which is worth 
studying. But more importantly, Kant is among the greatest as 
well as the most fastidious of philosophers, so that showing him 
in certain aspects of his thought to be an ideologist - that is, 
a confuser of logical categories, a speculative metaphysician and 
maker of myths - is particularly telling and instructive. 
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I 
Kant did not accept the conventional view of his age that 
it was reason as such that differentiated man from the animals. 
Insofar as reason was, inHume's phrase, 'the slave of the 
passions' then it was just a superior piece of equipment to that 
possessed by other animals for the satisfying of their needs, the 
difference being merely one of degree. As they pursued their 
interests and sought to satisfy their needs, men belonged to the 
same 'phenomenal' world governed by cause and effect as other 
creatures. What genuinely made men special, and qualitatively 
different from the animals, was their capacity for moral choice. 
This meant that men were capable of acting for moral reasons 
alone, independently of their needs and desires, and in so doing 
step outside that realm of necessity shared with the animals and 
into the realm of freedom. It was precisely when they did act 
for moral reasons alone, in despite of what their needs and 
interests dictated, that men were fully rational, fully free and 
fully human. 
Freedom was, therefore, a condition of fully developed 
humanity. But what Kant meant by 'freedom' was conformity to the 
moral law, which, being completely rational, was equally binding 
upon all rational beings. We remain free because the law we have 
to follow is precisely that law which, as rational beings, we 
give ourselves. We are free because in moral matters we are 
self-determining; we legislate our own moral law. But since the 
moral law is wholly rational, it will be the same law for all; it 
is both our own and universal. The very fact that we are capable 
of such rationality in itself confers a special dignity upon man 
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as a universal legislator, giving him intrinsic and absolute 
worth, since "Rational nature exists as an end in itself". [J5J 
And since the rational being is ruled only by his own laws he is 
truly autonomous, and autonomy is "the ground of the dignity of 
human nature and of every rational nature". (p.97> Kant 
conceived of all rational beings, human or otherwise, as 
potentially members of a 'kingdom of ends', since all are subject 
to the same self-imposed moral laws. The foundation of this 
system of universal laws is what Kant called "the supreme 
principle of morality" (p.57>, which is his 'categorical 
imperative' in its various formulations. This first of all 
enjoins us to act only according to those maxims we would 
willingly see as universal laws; it then requires that we treat 
each and every human being as an end and never merely as a means; 
and finally, it demands that in determining those maxims that 
will guide our actions we should do so as though we were 
legislating for a kingdom of such ends. (pp.67,91 & 95) Whether 
these three amount to the same thing, as Kant believed, may be 
doubted. However, the important things is that the categorical 
imperative provides the basis of a rational moral life. If we 
lived up to its demands we would always act unselfishly according 
to self-imposed universal principles, always treating others with 
respect as autonomous beings possessed of dignity and worth, and 
as fellow members of a kingdom of ends. This is the basis of a 
morality all men could live by, irrespective of their social 
circumstances. 
However, this analysis also has implications for man's 
social and political life. While even a slave has some scope for 
moral choice, and therefore for living according to universal 
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principles, nevertheless the life of a slave or serf is not 
consistent with the dignity of man as an autonomous moral being. 
Following Rousseau, whom he much admired, Kant believed that his 
status as a moral being gives man fundamental rights, and in 
particular a right o freedom. Men must have freedom in order to 
make moral choices and thereby live as fully rational and fully 
human beings. It is not sufficient to live an outwardly good 
life because constrained to do so by law, like the man Plato 
describes in the Myth of Er. [36] The genuinely good and fully 
human life must be freely chosen; and all men, even the depraved 
[37J, must have the opportunity to choose, even though they may 
choose wrongly. Futhermore, the demand of the moral law that men 
be treated as ends and not means !that is, the second formulation 
of the categorical imperative) implies that all men must be 
treated equally (i.e. equality of opportunity and equality before 
the law E38Jl. 
The good society, therefore, is one where all men are 
treated equally and all possess the maximum freedom consistent 
with good order. But 'good order' requires coercive laws, and 
Kant's problem, as with Rousseau, is how coercive laws can be 
justified if men are to be free. J.G. Murphy writes: 
Kant quite clearly believes that freedom does 
not stand in need of any positive 
justification, for it is good in itself. 
Rather it is coercion, bad in itself, that must 
be defended ... coercion is justified only in 
so far as it is used to prevent invasions 
against freedom. Freedom itself is the only 
value which can be used to limit freedom, for 
the use of any other value (e.g. utility) would 
undermine the ultimate status of the value of 
freedom. [39] 
Men have a right to be free to pursue their own ends. But this 
inevitably will bring men into conflict, and the purpose of civil 
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society is to ensure justice between conflicting claims. Kant 
writes: 
Justice is ..• the aggregate of those 
conditions under which the will of one person 
can be conjoined with the will of another in 
accordance with universal law ... Hence the 
universal law of justice is: act externally in 
such a way that the free use of your will is 
compatible with the freedom of everyone 
according to a universal law. [40] 
Thus, for Kant coercion is justified if it is used as a 
"hindrance to a hindrance of freedom"; that is, freedom may be 
limited only for the sake of greater freedom. (p. 134) 
The kind of civil society that embodies these ideals is 
what Kant called 'Republican'; by which he meant a system of 
government with a sovereign representative assembly based on a 
franchise limited to the independent and properted Cpp. 29, 78 & 
100-ll. Though he is vague about just what institutions, 
procedures and franchise his ideal government should have, Kant 
is nonetheless clear that: "the republican constitution is the 
only one which does complete justice to the rights of man". <p. 
112; see p. 99). Without a representative system a government 
cannot: 
accord with the concept of right .•• and 
without it, despotism and violence will result, 
no matter what kind of constitution is in 
force. ( p. 102) 
In the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781 he wrote of a Republican 
constitution: 
A canst i tut ion allowing the greatest possible 
human freedom in accordance with laws by which 
the freedom of each is made to be consistent 
IL'i th thG?t of all other:.--; - I do not speak of the 
greatest happiness, for this will follow of 
itself - is at any rate a necessary idea, which 
may be taken as fundamental not only in first 
projecting a constitution but in all its laws. 
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hant regarded this as an ideal, like Plato's Republic, to which 
all societies should aspire and approximate to as far as 
possible. He believed it to be not only the society most 
conducive to happiness but also one where, because men exercised 
their reason to its fullest extent, they would become 
increasingly rational and therefore increasingly good. He goes 
on: 
The more legislation and government are 
brought into harmony with the above idea, the 
rarer would punishments become, and it is 
therefore quite rational to maintain, as Plato 
does, that in a perfect state no punishments 
whatsoever would be required. This perfect 
state may never, indeed, come into being; none 
the less this does not affect the rightfulness 
of the idea, which, in order to bring the legal 
organisation of mankind ever nearer to its 
greatest possible perfection, advances this 
maxim as an archetype. [41] 
This was the kind of government appropriate universally to 
rational creatures. The principles underlying it and the kind of 
laws it ought to enact are universal principles. As an ideal, 
Kant believed it was "our duty to enter a constitution of this 
kind" Cp. 187>; that is, to make the ideal of a kingdom of ends', 
referred to in the third version of the categorical imperative, 
as far as possible a human reality. This involved both striving 
to bring about a Republican constitution by peaceful means, but 
also striving to bring about permanent universal peace as a 
necessary condition of the ideal society being permanent and 
universal, since war is the "destroyer of everything good" (p. 
187) and states with republic constitutions are "incapable of 
bellicosity" (p.l84). And although Kant did not believe a 
Republican world-government was feasible, he did believe that a 
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league of such states was both possible and, eventually, would be 
created (p. 104/5). For history is the history of freedom, and 
progress towards universal freedom was, even if delayed, an 
inevitablity. (p. 184). 
Contemporary society fell well short of Kant's ideals. 
His criticisms of it are often more by implication than direct, 
but they are clear enough for all that. Living in an absolutist 
authoritarian state marked by hereditary privilege and the 
absence of civil liberties, Kant's advocacy of republican 
government, equality of opportunity and maximum political freedom 
was criticism enough. More generally, we have just seen that in 
the good society men will be happier and more moral; there will 
be greater obedience to the laws, more honesty, charity and 
greater sense of honour, and generally less conflict and 
violence. (p. 187/8) This is because as a result of their 
freedom they will have developed into mature rational beings. 
But in the meantime: "mankind groans under the burden of evils 
which, in its ine:-:perience, it inflicts upon itself". [42] It 
would therefore seem to follow that in contemporary society an 
absence of freedom stunts that development and is responsible for 
much unhappiness and immorality. Again, Kant's ideal future is 
characterised by permanent international peace, which will only 
come about when all governments are Republican. Unfortunately: 
... the world's present rulers have no money to 
spare for educational institutions or indeed 
for anything which concerns the world's best 
interests (for everything has already been 
calculated out in advance for the next war) 
(p.51> 
To the objection of the "supposedly clever stateman" who says 
that all this is unrealistic because you have to take men as they 
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are, Kant replies: 
But 'as they are' ought to read 'as we have 
made t!Jem by unjust coercion, by treacherous 
designs •.• '. For that is why they are 
intransigent and inclined to rebellion, and why 
regrettable consequences ensure if discipline 
is rela:-:ed in the slightest. (p. 178) 
What modern man needs, Kant believed, is not discipline but 
enlightenment. 
In his essay M!Jat is Englig!Jtenment <1784) Kant defines 
'enlightenment' in terms of maturity. It is essentially thinking 
for oneself and not relying on others. Unfortunately, because of 
laziness or cowardice, too many people allow others to do their 
thinking for them, and this is exploited by those in power who 
argue that such independent thinking is highly dangerous. In a 
later work he argues that paternal government is the "greatest 
conceivable despotism". (p.74) This is at least part of the 
reason why men are less free than they might be. But although 
Kant admitted that he did not live in an enlightened age, it was 
nevertheless an age of enlightenment in the sense that 
enlightenment was spreading. (p.58) Mankind was moving in the 
right direction and the trend could not be reversed. 
Kant's confidence that mankind was moving towards an 
ideal future was based on more than an increase in general 
rationality through tolerance and education. He also believed 
that human progress was guaranteed by nature. In his Idea for a 
Universal Historyatif!J a Cosmapolitan Purpase <1784) he wrote: 
The history of the human race as a whole can 
be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan 
of nature to bring about an internally - and 
for this purpose also externally - perfect 
political constitution as the only possible 
state within which all natural capacities of 
mankind can be developed completely. (p. 50) 
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The good society (or rather, the good societies in a state of 
organised international peace; i.e. the •external' political 
constitution) is all part of nature's plan, which is "hidden' in 
the sense that its aim is attained by roundabout, even perverse, 
means. The means, implanted in man by nature, is what Kant calls 
man's •social unsociability'. Man is naturally a social animal, 
while at the same time his behaviour displays a strong bias 
towards the anti-social: he is ambitious, egocentric and 
aggressive. But while these lead to conflict, crime, tyranny and 
war, they also, ultimately lead to their opposites. For the 
horrors of crime and civil strife force men to create orderly 
societies with laws and institutions, and eventually to recognise 
the need to live within a rational legal order based on the 
principles of freedom. (pp. 44/5) Much progress, f\ant believed, 
had been made along these lines; though much still remained to be 
done in domestic politics and even more in international 
politics. Here states were in a state of nature in relation to 
each other. But in time the horrors of war would teach men the 
same lesson. Without an international order progress and 
security were threatened by continual preparations for war. But 
Kant had no doubt that in the end: " ... the highest purposes of 
nature, a universal cos.mapolitan existence" (p.Sl> will be 
realised. 
But althought this end is inevitable, Kant is somewhat 
ambiguous about exactly how it will be realised. Sometimes it 
seems that the growth of a general enlightenment will be 
sufficient, while at others man appears to be entirely dependent 
on the appearance of enlightened rulers, but at yet other times 
it seems that it will be providence alone, working not through 
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men's rationality so much as the evil side of their nature to 
force men to do things in their own interests that they would not 
otherwise do. Hence, on the prescriptive side of Kant's theory 
there is often an air of inconsistency about some of the things 
he says. For example, he repeatedly insists in all his political 
writings that resistance to established rulers, however bad, is 
wrong (e.g. p. 81-2>, while at the same time he is openly 
enthusiastic about the achievements of the French Revolution as a 
major step in human progress (p. 182-3). All of this perhaps 
reflects a deeper uncertainty about the nature of man, and in 
particular his capacity for evil. From this point of view the 
theory of man's social unsociability might be seen less as a 
solution to the question of man's nature as a restatement of the 
problem. There is, as Howard William suggests: 
... a fundamental tension in Kant's philosophy 
which manifest itself in a dualistic view of 
man as·rational and yet capable of radical 
evil. [43J 
This generates a certain doubt as to whether man's capacity for 
evil will, in true Liberal progressive manner, be eliminated by 
the spread of enlightenment, or whether what Kant sometimes calls 
in his more Augustinian moments "the depravity of human nature" 
(e.g. p. 103) will make the ultimate good society (a combination 
of the ideal republic, the kingdom of ends referred to in the 
categorical imperative, and the religious ideal of the kingdom of 
God on earth [44J) a practical impossibility. This ambiguity has 
implications for the role of education, as we will see below. 
For the moment it is sufficient to note this possible element of 
inconsistency within what is otherwise a clear and fully worked 
out theory of human nature, and the good society that is 
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appropriate to that nature. 
II 
This account of Kant's political thought, though no more 
than an outline, is sufficient to demonstrate its ideological 
character. To begin with, Kant holds certain values which are 
embodied in his conception of man and inform his account of the 
world, and which are the basis of his ideal society. His 
principle values are rationality and individual freedom which he 
contrives to intertwine logically with each other, and with his 
notions of moral good and human nature. Thus, men are only fully 
human when they are free, and only fully free when they 
rationally pursue the moral good. Other values - such as 
republican government, equality, tolerance and peace - play a 
supportive role, to be understood in terms of the conditions 
under which man can be at his free, rational, moral best. 
Altogether, these values define a society in which humanity can 
flourish and develop itself to the full. The good society in 
turn becomes a standard by which we measure existing societies. 
Where freedom is denied men's development is stunted, they are 
prone to crime and to unhappiness, and the majority remain 
immature and tail to reach their full moral stature. Men have a 
clear moral duty to work to transform the present world into the 
ideal one, tor the enlightenment and freedom of mankind. 
Kant's version of ideological man is thus the bearer of 
values that find expression in an evaluation of the contemporary 
world and are the foundation of the future one. It is also the 
foundation and the focus of a wider explanatory theory that 
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embraces all of reality. Kantian metaphysics divides that 
reality into two spheres and places man at their juncture. On 
the one side is the sphere of 'phenomena', which is the perceived 
physical world governed by causal necessity. On the other side 
is the 'noumenal' sphere, which is both the unknowable world of 
the 'thing-in-itself' behind perception and also (although how 
they are connected Kant never makes clear) of freedom and reason. 
Either can determine man's behaviour. But the moral good lies in 
the extent to which man chooses to accept the promptings of the 
noumenal world <i.e. do his moral dutyl. The whole of reality is 
apparently so constructed as to give man every capacity and 
incentive to live up to his full moral potential; he is "secretly 
guided by the wisdom of nature" <p. 48). 
Nature has laid down man's telos, and has so formed him 
that he is compelled to pursue his own perfection. The working 
out of this process through time, from man's barbaric state to 
the achievement of his telos, is the connecting threat of 
history. History is the story of man's climb from barbarism to 
the perfection which is his ultimate destiny; and it is a story 
in which we can all participate. It is substantive philosophy of 
history; or, put another way, it is speculative metaphysics and 
grand myth. Thus, Kant's values are not merely built into his 
definition of man, but pervade all reality to the extent that the 
good society appears to be the culmination of that reality. 
Kant's account of the human condition insists that we occupy a 
thoroughly moralised universe. The noumenal world has superior 
moral standing to the phenomenal, while nature is infused with 
moral purpose, is designed as a setting for man and imparts to 
him his telos together with the impulses that, over time, will 
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compel him to fulfil it. Thus, 'noumena' and 'phenomena', 
'nature' and 'history' are all pseudo-descriptive concepts, as 
much as the more obviously moral: 'freedom', 'autonomy', 
•tyranny' and 'war'. Thus, Kant's values are embodied in nature 
and above all in man, so that the good society is 'natural' in 
the Aristotelian sense of what is needed for man to fully develop 
himself and fulfil his telos. 
However, before finally deciding on Kant's status as an 
ideologist there is a possible set of objections that should be 
considered. Someone might argue that there are certain aspects 
of Kant's thought where he did no more than follow the common 
beliefs of his age - God's providence, human perfectibility, a 
benign and man-orientated nature, etc. - which seemed reasonable 
to most educated people of his time but somewhat implausible 
today. These 18th Century assumptions, compounded by a doubtful 
metaphysics, account for the ideological content of Kant's 
thought. They can be easily dispensed with, especially since 
Kant only accorded them the status of Ideas of Reason. This 
leave us with a rational core which is as philosophically sound 
now as it was then; a coherent moral and political philosophy fit 
for modern man. [45] 
The first thing that might be said about these objections 
is that one cannot just dismiss as dross those ideas of a thinker 
one finds to be inconvenient. The ideas of Kant that we find 
implausible today are not optional extras but are integral to his 
thought. But even if we could dispense with Kant's 18th Century 
assumptions and doubtful metaphysics what remained,the supposed 
rational core, would be just as ideological as the original; we 
would still be left with a moral ideology pointing towards a 
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political one. At its absolute bare minimum, we have a 
particular conception of man whose nature demands a certain way 
of life which is morally desirable. Man's humanity resides in his 
moral rationality which must have freedom to be exercised. The 
good society is one which recognises man's moral autonomy and 
consequent right to freedom, <thought today our assumptions make 
it self-evident that this must mean democracy - which Kant 
abhorred). This is the classical ideological formula: a 
conception of man with particular values defined into it, from 
which can be inferred a good society in which those values form 
the principles of social organisation. Only if it could be 
demonstrated that this conception was grounded in reality and 
that the values, because inherent, were logically superior to any 
others, might Kant's political ideas avoid being properly 
classified as ideological. 
But in fact there is nothing in Kant's substantive ethical 
theory that logically compels assent. His values and ideals may 
be attractive, but this is not to give them the logical status 
Kant and his followers attributed to them. Despite Kant's great, 
and deserved, reputation as a moral philosopher they are no more 
rational than any other values and ideals, some of which may be 
equally attractive. The foundation of his substantive ethics is 
the categorical imperative, the first formulation of which is an 
empty formula (the Nazi, for example, can consistently will that 
all Aryans persecute all Jews [46J), from which the other two 
versions, which do have content, simply do not follow. Treating 
all with dignity and legislating for a kingdom of ends, however 
desirable they may be as ideals, have no higher logical status 
than any other statements of value. It simply does not follow 
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that because human beings are rational, or capable of moral 
choice, every single one of them has infinite worth or right to 
political freedom. In fact in Kant both 'freedom' and 'reason' 
are pseudo-descriptive terms reflecting his own values rather 
than any standard usage. This is fairly obviously the case with 
'freedom', since for him being free means conforming to the moral 
law as he defines it; but 'reason' is equally a carrier of 
Kantian values. The concept of 'rationality' in Kant is not an 
objective one. It is used pseudo-descriptively: associated with 
the moral, with the superior noumenal world and identified with 
God and the angels. Kant does not use it in the everyday sense 
as a means to work out mundane problems (in which case one way of 
robbing a bank may be more rational than another>, but rather as 
the instrument of man's moral purpose. Like Aristotle, the 
rational life is the morally good life. And it is Kant's account 
of reason which is central to his definition of human nature. 
But his use of 'man', 'freedom', and 'reason', are arbitrary 
usages, not demonstrably better than anyone elses. They reflect 
his values which have not solid foundation in the sense that they 
grow from the categorical imperative, where the first formulation 
is empty and the others, because they do not follow from it, are 
merely assertions. Thus, there is no basis for assuming that 
Kant's substantive ethical theory is superior than any other, and 
consequently no further reason to accord his political thinking 
any special philosophical status. 
Kant's political thought fulfils all the criteria for 
ideology developed in previous chapters. Thus, we have a 
value-loaded conception of man, a pseudo-descriptive vocabulary, 
an ideal society, explanations, prescriptions and a participatory 
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historical myth; that is, all the ingredients of a fully 
developed ideological position. And Kant is, therefore, 
demonstrably a confuser of categories, a speculative 
metaphysician and a maker of myth; in other words, an ideologist. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
OBJECTIONS AND REFINEMENTS 
The conception of ideology developed over the last four 
chapters is no doubt open to many objections. Three, however, 
are worth considering in detail. This is partly because they are 
important in themselves and need to be replied to, but also 
because in answering them we may refine and extend our 
understanding of ideology. 
1. Ideology and 'Academic Political Theory' 
The first objection concerns the place of ideology within 
the wider field of political theorising. As was noted at the end 
of the opening chapter, Miller and Siedentop make a distinction 
between ideology and what they term 'academic political theory', 
and if such a distinction were sustained it would put the present 
analysis at risk. In fact a number of arguments deployed in the 
intervening chapters point to it being a false dichotomy. But 
Miller and Seidentop use arguments not hitherto considered and so 
their position needs to be looked at afresh. We will concentrate 
on their account of political theory in TheN..:"ifureofPolitical 
Theory [ 1 J as representative of views widely held, dealing first 
with their defence of 'academic political theory' and then with 
their theory of ideology. 
What Miller and Siedentop attempt to do is to update and 
strengthen the defence of political theory offered by John 
Plamenatz (to whose memory their book is dedicated) in his 
article 'The Use of Political Theory' and elsewhere. [2] To do 
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this they criticise Plamenatz's account in an attempt to 
eliminate what they take to be the unnecessary positivist 
elements in his work. Plamenatz accepted the current positivist 
wisdom that there are just three types of theoretical activity in 
relation to politics: conceptual analysis (i.e. political 
philosophy), empirical theory (i.e. political science) and 
normative theory (i.e. 'political theory' in its traditional 
meaning). But whereas the positivists would only allow the first 
two to be legitimate academic activities, and doubting the 
validity of the third, Plamenatz sought to defend political 
theory as legitimate by insisting on its intellectual rigour and 
the need for academically acceptable criteria, though without 
specifying precisely what these should be. Plamenatz's error, 
according to Miller and Siedentop, was to concede that political 
philosophy and empirical theory were value-free and quite 
independent of normative theory. This, they insist, demotes 
political theory to the status of "poor relation" (p. 121 and 
deprives it of "the requisite intellectual credentials". lp. 9) 
The positivist objection to political theory is that its 
value content and prescriptivity rule out any possibility of 
objective knowledge, and Plamenatz does not really answer the 
point. Perhaps the obvious answer to the positivists is to argue 
for or assume the possibility of an absolute ethics. But 
Plamenatz does not take this line and neither do Miller and 
Siedentop, although they correctly understand that Plamenatz's 
demand for greater rigour is not enough. They have the quite 
different strategy of denying the validity of any alleged 
divisions between political theory and either empirical theory or 
political philosophy that are based on ethical content. They 
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insist that in fact ethical content pervades all three, and that 
there can be no fundamental division between them in content or 
method. The three form a continuum: 
.•. the boundaries drawn between these three 
forms of intellectual activity are conventional 
in character, representing a convenient 
academic division of labour, but no clear-cut 
differences of method. ( p. 12) 
The implication is that the unchallenged academic respectibility 
of political philosophy and empirical theory is transferred to 
political theory, thereby giving it the academic status that 
Plamenatz wished to confer on it without succeeding. 
The first and obvious point to make i~ that even if all 
these claims to continuity were demonstrably true they would 
still not establish the objectivity and academic credibility of 
political theory. All it would do would be to cast doubt upon 
the objectivity and academic credibility of political philosophy 
and empirical method. But these claims are not true, at least 
not on the arguments presented by Miller and Siedentop. The 
crucial question is the pervasiveness of values. They base their 
claim that empirical theory is necessarily value-laden upon two 
arguments that are equally thin. The first is Charles Taylor's 
notion of 'value-slope' [JJ; that is, social scientific theories 
may not be directly prescriptive, but indirectly favour one view 
of the world by ruling out another. But, as we saw when 
discussing Hollis, this will not do. To take a moral example, if 
'Hume's law' is true then Natural Law is not, but this does not 
make 'Hume's law' value-laden; it would be a bit like saying that 
because Vesuvius destroyed a Roman city it therefore had an 
anti-Roman bias - it just does not follow. [4] Their second 
point is that in social science a given body of evidence may be 
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accommodated by more than one theory, and there may be no 
empirical way of deciding between the rival theories. The 
choice, therefore, must be on other than empirical grounds, and 
it is here that value considerations operate. But then even if a 
choice must be made (and it is not made clear why, or by whom, or 
for what purpose), these non-empirical grounds need not be moral 
or political; it could be on the basis of simplicity or elegance 
as in physical science. Besides, it is not claimed that all 
social scientific theories are in this situation. It is 
therefore difficult to see how this can support a claim that all 
social scientific theories are value-laden. Nevertheless, it is 
upon the basis of what are at best two rather shabby arguments 
that Miller and Siedentop conclude: 
Taking these two observations together, we are 
led to the conclusion that the theoretical 
position adopted by a social scientist must be 
value-related, inasmuch as it supports a 
political standpoint of a particular kind ... 
lp. 11) 
But this is an unwarranted leap that will not support the 
contention that there is no clear division between empirical 
theory and political theory 
The case for the necessary value-ladenness of political 
philosophy is equally unconvincing. Their argument is based upon 
what they take to be the nature of political concepts and how the 
philosopher responds to them: 
The concepts used in political argument are 
typically contestable concepts, in the sense 
that each may be interpreted in a variety of 
incompatible ways without manifest absurdity. 
Such contests cannot be resolved by formal 
means .•• establishing a preferred meaning for 
such a term involves engaging in substantive 
political argument, bringing forward both 
empirical evidence and moral principle to 
justify the general perspective to which the 
preferred meaning corresponds. (p. 10) 
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From this Miller and Siedentop conclude that political philosophy 
is value-laden; that it employs both moral and empirical criteria 
to reach its conclusions; and that the difference between 
political philosophy and political theory consists "at most in a 
difference of emphasis" <p. 10). However, these arguments do not 
bear serious examination. In the first place, there is no reason 
why the philosopher dealing with contested concepts need go 
beyond analysing their different meanings and relating them to 
political beliefs, and good reason why he should not go further 
[5]. Miller and Siedentop quite rightly point out that such 
disputes cannot be settled by formal means, and that they "can 
only be resolved by taking up and defending a political 
standpoint" (p. 14). But such a resolution could not be an 
objective academic resolution, and it therefore cannot be the 
business of the philosopher to attempt it, since he is restricted 
to •formal means' and to the ideal of objectivity. It is solely 
a matter for ideologists and their adherents to defend their 
'preferred meanings'. Secondly, not all political concepts, as 
Miller and Siedentop imply, are •essentially contestable': 
•democracy' is, but 'constitution' is not. However, the 
situation is not quite this clear-cut. The account of 
pseudo-description in Chapter Four suggests three possible types 
of political concept in this respect: the intrinsically 
pseudo-descriptive (i.e. •essentially contested'), the ethically 
neutral, and those otherwise neutral concepts that have been 
drawn into an ideological theory and invested with ethical 
significance <such as the Marxist concept of the •state' >, and 
therefore have had, so to speak, pseudo-description thrust upon 
them. It is the business of political philosophers to point out 
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logical distinctions of this kind, but not to take sides in 
ideological cant 1 i ct by defend'i ng their own versions of 
ethically-loaded terms. It is significant that in the passage 
just quoted 'empirical evidence and moral principle' only come 
into play when philosophers are justifying his 'preferred 
meanings'. But it is precisely when philosophers attempt this 
kind of justification that they cease to be doing philosophy and 
begin engaging in the quite different activity of political 
theory or ideology. Thus, political philosophy can be clearly 
distinguished from political theory, both in terms of ethical 
content and methodology; and the same is true of empirical 
theory. Miller and Siedentop's idea of a continuum must, 
therefore, fall; and, on their own criteria, must lack the 
'requisite intellectual credentials' for academic status. What 
then of their view of ideology? 
What, for Miller and Seidentop, distinguishes ideology 
from political theory is that ideology expresses class or group 
interests (p. 11, and has an economic basis (p. 21, which makes 
it systematically biased in a way that they believe 'academic 
political theory' is not. But we saw in Chapter Two that the 
expression of class or group interests cannot be a satisfactory 
basis for ideology, while the economic theory of ideology was 
also shown not to be viable. It is logic alone that can 
determine what is and what is not ideology, and ideology as it is 
analysed in the present work embraces all that Miller and 
Siedentop would count as academic political theory. In fact they 
seem somewhat unsure themselves. On the one hand, they count 
Liberalism as an ideology (p. 41, while giving the status of 
political theory to Rawls' Theory of Justice and Nozick's Anarchy 
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Anarchy State and Utopia .• both recognised as belonging to the 
Liberal tradition. Indeed, if the central arguments of this work 
are correct then 'academic political theory' is a contradiction 
in terms. 
It is not particularly difficult to see how Miller and 
Siedentop have fallen into these errors. Much of what passes for 
empirical theory and political philosophy is indeed value-laden 
and connected (logically connected) with one or other ideological 
position. Marxian sociology is the most obvious example in 
social science, while much of what is accepted as political 
philosophy is concerned with the determination of values and is 
bound up with Liberal beliefs. Many standard works of political 
philosophy are in fact works of Liberal political theory [6J, 
such as D.D. Raphael's 'Problems of Political Philosophy', in 
which, for example, a discussion of the concept of 'democracy' 
merely consists of a rather idealised description of the British 
Constitution from a Liberal point of view. [7J We have noted 
that it is characteristic of ideology to influence the apparently 
factual through the process of pseudo-description, thereby giving 
to the disparate sources of any particular ideological theory a 
certain homogeneity based on values. Miller and Siedentop have 
observed theorising that has been influenced by ideology and 
jumped to the wrong conclusion that all empirical theory and 
political philosophy must be like this. At the same time it 
could be said that they are particularly prone to this mistake in 
that they share Plamenatz's conviction that human beings need 
'practical philosophy' and they are clearly attracted to 
political theory's "practical, action-guiding character" (p. 1): 
••• political theory is associated with a more 
active impulse than either 'the study of 
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political thought' or 'doing political 
philosophy'. It involves, at least implicitly, 
the assumption that shaping social and 
political concepts is also, in the longer run, 
shaping social and political institutions. (p. 
2) 
What they do not seem to recognise is that the existence of a 
human need for objective political theory does not guarantee that 
such a thing is possible; we might say that there is an acute 
human need to be able to predict the consequences of our actions, 
but unhappily reality is not such as to make this possible 
either. In the end all Miller and Siedentop are doing is 
attempting to invest ideology with an academic status it does not 
and could not have. This is not to say, however, that the 
creation of ideology is necessarily a waste of time (any more 
than the creation of art is a waste of time). But that is 
another argument 
2. Positions and Traditions 
The second objection is the essentialist argument that a 
political doctrine is first and foremost a set of principles, and 
that various theories of man and society may be used to justify 
them at various times, but it is the principles that are 
essential while the theories are not. This may be said of 
Conservatism or Socialism or some other doctrines, but it is most 
often and most readily said of Liberalism, which can stand for 
the rest. The argument might be used against the present 
analysis in one of two ways: either the analysis is basically 
wrong, or the analysis is correct but does not apply to 
Liberalism which is, in consequence, not an ideology. 
For this objection to hold water at least three things 
must obtain. First, there has to be a single core of principles 
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to which all recognised Liberal thinkers subscribe. This means 
that such thinkers must share the same values, and that terms 
like 'freedom', 'reason' and 'justice' must have the same meaning 
for all. Secondly, this set of principles must be sufficiently 
clear-cut to enable anyone to identify who and who is not a 
Liberal. Thirdly, it must be possible to separate these 
principles from the various theories of man and society that are 
used in their support. In fact none of these conditions can be 
met. 
In the history of Liberal thought there are many instances 
where theorists have differed profoundly over principle. Usually 
the differences are masked by the process of using the same words 
in different ways. But sometimes they have been quite open. 
Competition, for example, has been an important value for various 
Liberal thinkers from Bentham to von Hayek. [8] For Herbert 
Spencer competition was the means by which man and society 
reached ever higher stages of civilisation [9J; while for Leonard 
Hobhouse competition was anathema because quite incompatible with 
'harmony' which was the highest human good and only achievable 
through cooperation. [101 However, differences of principle that 
turn on differences of usage are much more common. Freedom is 
one such case. Bentham, for example, believed a man to be free 
when he could pursue his own self-interest without hinderance; 
while for Kant man was not free at all when pursuing his 
self-interest, but only when acting according to some 
self-imposed moral rule against his self-interest. These 
conceptions of freedom are closely bound up, as we have seen, 
with different theories of rationality and what it is to be 
human. This was also true of the radically different views of 
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the proper extent of state activity put forward by T.H. Green and 
such contemporaries as Herbert Spencer. [11] A more recent 
example is the very different notions of justice entertained by 
John Rawls and Robert Nozick. [12J Many more examples could be 
cited, but the point need not be laboured. 
Nor, if the point has been well made, will it require 
elaborate demonstration to show that the boundaries of Liberal 
thought are uncertain and controversial. It is sufficient to 
point to examples of thinkers deemed Liberals by some but not by 
others, including such diverse figures as Rousseau, Hegel, Edmund 
Burke and R.H. Tawney. For example, John Plamenatz in his 
Readings from Liberal 1/riters [13] writes: "It is not often 
claimed for Rousseau and Hegel that they were liberal 
philosophers, and I am not now concerned to argue that they 
were." (p. 25). But he goes on to insist that Edmund Burke was a 
Liberal (p. 36), and to include passages from R.H. Tawney among 
his essential Liberal texts. Burke and Tawney are more often 
claimed by other ideologies than as a Liberal [14J, while Hegel 
is more problematic. He is often claimed as a Conservative; but 
a passage of his is included in J.S. Schapiro's, Liberalism: its 
Neaning and History [15J; while he is clearly not regarded as a 
Liberal by E.f\. Bramsted and f\. J. Melhuish in their //estern 
Liberalism [ 16]. The idea that Liberalism is essentially a set 
of fixed principles, to which everything else is secondary, must 
be rejected. [17] 
However, there is another version of essentialism that 
can be considered briefly, which takes the opposite course of 
locating the essence of Liberalism in theories of human nature 
rather than principles. This case is most forcefully put, and in 
- 296 -
great details, by G.F. Gaus in his book Thef!odern Liberal Tl1eor_l/ 
of Nan [18J. Gaus writes: 
The account of the modern Liberal tradition 
defended in this book might be called 
'essentialist' in the sense that it asserts 
that the essence of modern liberalism is a 
particular theory of human nature. (p. 9) 
This theory, he claims, is shared by all modern 
Liberals and underpins their various, though broadly 
similar, political proposals. However, 'Modern 
Liberalism' is not to be equated with 'contemporary 
Liberalism', nor with the 'new Liberalism' of the turn 
of the century. In fact Gaus ends up confining his 
concept to just six thinkers: J.S. Mill, T.H. Green, 
L.T. Hobhouse, John Dewey and Bernard Bosanquet. 
There may be something to be said for linking 
these thinkers in terms of certain shared features of 
their thought, but to insist that they all share the 
same conception of man is to overstate the case 
greatly. Gaus himself notes that: 
.•. we are struck by the tremendous diversity 
of ethical and metaphysical views that 'new 
liberals' have put forward to support their 
prescri.ptions ... utili tar ian ism, ideal ism (and 
the common good), harmony, instrumentalism and 
the social contract all have been offered as 
the basis for a revised liberalism. (p. 1) 
But clearly, these thinkers could only be said to share the same 
concept of man if these wider theoretical frameworks have no 
bearing on the matter, which is hardly plausible. To take just 
one example, J.S. Mill was an atheist who believed an individual 
could develop himself on his own, while for T.H. Green we are all 
manifestations of the divine consciousness and none of us can 
develop ourselves in isolation but only as part of a wider moral 
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community. To say, therefore, that Mill and Green have the same 
concept of man is absurd. Even less plausible is his contention 
that the ethical beliefs of modern liberals have no bearing on 
the matter either. He writes: 
.•• if the theory of human nature is so 
central, one may wonder if my account of modern 
liberalism allows any significant political 
role for modern liberal's ethical theories •. 
Well, it must be acknowledged that the main 
thrust of my account is that, indeed, they are 
not of central importance •.. modern liberals 
very often argue in support of liberty, 
democracy and economic proposa 1 s directly an 
the basis of their theory at human nature, all· th 
little or no reference to their formal ethical 
theories. (p. 272) 
But this is naive. Gaus simply treats terms such as 'growth', 
'harmony', 'development', 'happiness', 'democracy', 'liberty' and 
above all 'man' as simply factual terms, as purely descriptive 
(as does Ryan, as we noted earlier). These theories are not 
factual, nor the concepts simply descriptive, but are the 
vehicles for expressing the ethical beliefs of their respective 
authors. [ 19] 
The 'modern liberal theory of man' which Gaus puts forward 
is in fact his own construction. It is pastiche achieved by 
selecting and arranging points and arguments from his six 
thinkers; and by emphasising similarities and ignoring 
differences, sometimes at the cost of some vigorous Procrustean 
stretching: 
••• by positing additional psychological 
dynamics or by reconceptualising. notions like 
private property •.• Bosanquet can quite 
consistently embrace the modern liberal theory 
of man ... (p. 235) 
In spite of such contortions Gaus' theory of man is not tightly 
drawn, but is a rather broad elaboration of the view that the 
development of the individual is bound up with the developments 
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of others. But putting a hand in that bag one could just as 
easily pull out a Socialist or Anarchist (or Hegelian or Marxist 
for that matter) as a Liberal. Furthermore, Gaus admits that 
modern Liberals embrace a variety of not always compatible 
political prescriptions, and that if these all relate to the same 
concept of man then the relationship can only be a •loose' one. 
Nevertheless, he insists that these •loose' connections amount to 
good philosophy and not "mere ideology" (p. 5). 
But ideology is precisely what all this is. And this is 
not because of loose connections or baggy concepts, but because 
of its ethical content. Even though Gaus may indeed be 
identifying similar features in the work of his six thinkers, the 
'modern liberal theory of man' is still his construction, and one 
that expresses his own ideological viewpoint. This is especially 
apparant when he adds his own points to it (eg. p. 1821, and 
when, even more surprisingly, he criticises one or other of his 
six for straying away from it (e.g. p. 721. The idea that the 
individual can only develop in conditions of political freedom, 
and where all are equally free, and that denial of these freedom 
inevitably leads to "behavioural pathologies" (pp. 135-91, is not 
a factual theory but a set of ethical beliefs. Like most 
ideologists, Gaus believes himself to be dealing with the 
objective facts of human existence, when in reality he is 
articulating his own moral vision of the world. 
Thus, the essentialist objection, whatever its form, does 
not appear to stand up to examination. However, the disposal of 
this objection only throws up others. If the boundaries between 
ideologies are so fuzzy that it is a matter of controversy who 
does and does not belong to the ranks of a particular ideology 
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and different ideologies can claim the same thinker, then how can 
it be said that ideologies are incommensurable? Furthermore, if 
ideologies have no fixed care, then how can we say that, for 
example, Kant, Bentham, Spencer, Hobhouse and Rawls all belong to 
the same Liberal ideology? By what criteria can it be decided 
who belongs where? In the absence of an essence what holds the 
disparate sets of ideas together as one ideology? 
*** 
The idea put forward in an earlier chapter that different 
ideological beliefs are incommensurable tends to suggest that 
they are hermetically sealed, and that there can be no 
intercourse between them. Yet we can find instances of Liberal 
Socialists, Conservative Liberals, Liberal and Socialist racists, 
Marxist Catholics and other unlikely combinations. Part of the 
reason why we are inclined to think these combinations strange is 
our habit of thinking in essentialist terms: we think Liberalism 
ought to be one distinct doctrine and Socialism another. But it 
makes more sense to think of ideologies in terms of traditions of 
thought, each composed of a number of variations or positions, 
with a mainstream and a number of subsidiaries, rather than a 
fixed core of essential doctrine. Essentialist thinking, 
however, is not the only reason why we find ideological 
combinations strange. Ideologists spend so much of their time 
contradicting each ather and insisting that their views are 
diametrically opposed, that we presume that they are 
irreconcilable; which is a view that the notion of 
incommensurability was designed to confirm and explain. How then 
is it logically possible for ideologies to overlap, or for the 
ideological allegiance of a particular thinker to be ambiguous? 
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We can look briefly at an example of this overlapping in 
the history of Liberalism in the 19th Century. In the first half 
of the century Liberals and Socialists had rival and incompatible 
accounts of a situation where a labourer, because of the state of 
the labour market, had to accept below subsistence wages. The 
Liberal deemed him a free man and insisted that there was no need 
for the community to interfere in this situation, which would 
only diminish freedom in general; while to the Socialist the 
labourer was forced to accept poverty and squalor precisely 
because he was unfree, and that it should be the business of the 
community to interfere in this situation in order to extend 
freedom. But later in the Century some Liberals, such as T.H. 
Green, partially accepted the Socialist argument while remaining 
Liberals. This was achieved by reinterpreting the Liberal 
conception of freedom and the role of the community in fostering 
it, so that state interference (in such matters as contracts of 
employment) was interpreted as removing obstacles to freedom, 
which was now conceived as developing one's inner potential (and 
therefore involving a new conception of human nature). This was 
neither Socialism nor traditional Liberalism but a new position 
synthesising some elements of both, and to a large extent 
incommensurable with both. E20J In this way the Liberal 
mainstream shifted through Mill, Green and Hobhouse in the 
direction of welfare socialism, while Spencer's purist 
individualism, which was much closer to classical Liberalism, 
seemed increasingly obsolete. 
Changes of this kind are possible in ideology because of 
its logical nature. The possibilities of reinterpretation and 
adaption, of overlapping and merging, lie in the almost infinite 
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flexibility of ideological language. All concepts, and the 
theories which sustain them, are to some degree adaptable; but in 
science and other intellectual disciplines there are controls and 
limits to flexibility which are bound up with the relationship 
between assertion and evidence, or some other test of validity. 
But ideological concepts, because of their value content, are 
non-referring, and consequently there is no control provided by 
fact or evidence, and no authoritative test which can be appealed 
to in case of doubt. Values are the determining factor in 
ideology: the theory is changed in response to changing values 
and they in turn determine the logic of theory. There are no 
rules or logic forbidding overlapping or merging. In this 
situation compatibility and incompatibility between doctrines 
become a matter of choice and ingenuity. If an ideologist feels 
compelled to develop doctrine across ground occupied by other 
theories then only his own creativity need limit him; though 
where the will exists a theoretical way will usually be found. 
In this sense it might be said that in ideological thinking 
reason is the slave of the passions. 
There is no logic governing the direction in which 
ideologies evolve. They respond to their times. How they do 
this is comprehensible when we think of an ideology as a series 
of positions linked to each other in a variety of ways within a 
tradition. Each thinker contributes to the tradition, while at 
the same time his system of ideas is autonomous. Any ideology 
that persists beyond a generation will develop a variety of 
positions, and there is no control over this. There are no popes 
in ideology (the nearest equivalent was perhaps the "Moscow line' 
which was authoritative within Marxism-Leninism for a time), and 
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anyone is free to develop their own version. What the main line 
of development might be is largely a retrospective judgement. 
The development of ideologies is practice-led in response to 
current need. Or? to look at it another way, we might say that a 
kind of evolutionary law of survival of the best-adapted 
operates, in that of the various ideological positions available 
some will gain adherents, grow and develop, while others will 
not. When a theorist feels his inherited beliefs are no longer 
adequate to the times and need revision, then anything is 
possible, including the absorption of values hitherto associated 
with another ideological tradition. This, of course, is to 
create another variation or position. It may fall on deaf ears 
and wither, or inspire a sect, or it may attract wide support and 
be followed by other variants. If the latter, then we may speak 
of ideologies overlapping or merging. It is in this context that 
'strange combinations' become comprehensible. The need of the 
time may dictate that successful variants are closer to other 
ideological traditions than rival positions might be. 
As to the limits of a tradition, that depends on what 
adherents will accept. It just so happened that Green 
articulated what many other Liberals were coming to feel, and the 
future lay with the revised Liberalism that Green helped to 
develop. More generally, this is part of the answer to the 
problem of identity. That is, how do ideologies hang together? 
What then determines the identify of an ideological tradition? 
How can Kant, Bentham and Hobhouse all be Liberals when their 
beliefs and values were so different? The identify of a 
tradition is not determined by any logical process, but rather a 
combination of contingent factors, including consciousness of the 
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tradition, use of traditional themes and vocabulary, reference to 
revered thinkers of the past, and ultimately the recognition of 
other liberals. This later may not be forthcoming, or it may 
come from some but not others. This helps to account for the 
fuzziness of the edges, for there is no logical means of 
determining identity of this kind. 
What then of incommensurability? There seems little place 
for it within this picture of overlapping and merging doctrines. 
But incommensurability is a function of ideological conflict, 
both between and within ideologies [21J, so that in a stable 
situation of rivalry it does operate. But in situations of 
change and adaptation, where new answers are called for and old 
ones reassessed, then incommensurability becomes less of a 
barrier to ideological intercourse. In Kuhnian terms, 
incommensurability belongs to periods of 'normal' ideological 
controversy, while in periods of revolutionary change all things 
become possible. 
In dealing with the essentialist objection it has been 
necessary to develop a more complex and flexible notion of 
ideology. Dealing with the next objection opens up a wider 
conception still. 
3. Neo-Aristotelianism and the Range of Ideology 
Another important objection to the present analysis is 
inherent in what has been called 'nee-Aristotelian' ethics (the 
phrase is W.O. Hudson's [22J), as most vigorously expressed in 
A. C. t·1aclntyre' s widely read a.nd widely admired book After 
Virtue. [ 23 J A consideration of this work SL\ggests that a wider 
conception of ideology is needed. 
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I 
Macintyre's thesis may be stated roughly thus. The modern 
world is morally and culturally degenerate, and modern man has 
lost his sense of identity and sense of purpose. Part cause and 
part reflection of this state of affairs is the collapse of moral 
thought (both everyday and in philosophy) into a meaningless 
subjectivism. We still use a traditional moral vocabulary, but 
it has no real meaning for us because the traditional framework 
or context of thought within which it was developed, and from 
which it derived its meaning, has been lost. He writes: 
..• modern moral utterance and practice can 
only be understood as a series of fragmented 
survivals from an older past and that the 
insoluable problems which they have generated 
for modern moral theorists will remain 
insoluble until this is well understood. 
(pp.l04-5) 
What we use this vocabulary for today is manipulating each other; 
and we do so because the language of morality is more effective 
than the language of personal preference, so that 'It is your 
duty• is more compelling than 'I want you to'. Indeed, we live 
in a manipulative world, governed and persuaded as we are by an 
endless array of bureaucrats, technocrats, 'experts' and 
'therapists' who employ a technical-rational mode of thinking 
which in reality is pseudo-scientific and ignores the real nature 
of human beings. All this is shrouded in ideology which 
reassures us that everything is for our own good. So effective 
and benumbing have these forces of modernity become, Macintyre 
believes, that we are already living in "the new dark age" (p. 
245) without even being aware of it. 
Macintyre contrasts the modern condition with a happier 
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past when moralitu did cohere and did make sense because the 
framework that sustained it was in place. This framework may be 
called 'Aristotelian' because it was Aristotle who first laid 
bare its logic. It has three elements. First, there is 
man-as-he-happens-to-be; that is, untutored human nature. 
Secondly, there is man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realised-his 
-essential-nature; that is, if man fulfils his 'telos'. Finally, 
there are the values to be adhered to and the virtues to be 
cultivated if the individual is to progress from the first to the 
second. There were several versions of these elements, both 
classical and Christian, during the millenium in which this 
framework remained in place. But in the 17th Century the whole 
Aristotelian system came under attack. Aristotelian metaphysics 
and science were rejected along with the whole apparatus of 
essences, potentialities and teleology; and since Aristotelian 
ethics was bound up with these notions, it too fell under the 
general condemnation. Consequently, from the 18th Century various 
thinkers, including Hume, Kant and Kierkegaard, all attempted to 
put morality on new foundations. But all such attempts were 
doomed to failure because they only had two of Aristotle's 
elements to work with: man-as-he-happens-to-be and moral 
prescription. What they lacked was the concept of a telos, the 
fulfilment of the human essence, which gives coherence and 
meaning to the other elements. The ultimate consequence of their 
inevitable failure has been the moral and cultural emptiness of 
the modern world. 
In somewhat Hegelian fashion, Macintyre takes philosophy, 
especially moral philosophy, as summing up the age in which it is 
written (each moral theory, he thinks, implies a sociology and 
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vice versa). The moral philosophy of the modern world is 
Emotivism: that is, the view that moral utterances only express 
personal preferences and are essentially persuasive in purpose. 
But the nature of Emotivism has been misunderstood. It is not, 
as it has always been assumed to be, a theory about the /lJeaning 
of expressions, but in reality is a theory about their use. It 
tells us how people today actually use the moral vocabulary, 
which is to manipulate each other. With this interpretation, 
Emotivism is made to embrace Neitzschean ethics, Existentialism, 
Hare's Prescriptivism and other modern theories, on the grounds 
that they all reduce morality to personal preference. This 
reflects the reality of moral life today, where, devoid of 
objective moral purpose or criteria for moral judgment, modern 
man is the victim of bureaucrats and 'experts' who claim to know 
what is good far him. 
What Macintyre is in fact doing is telling a story of how 
Western Civilization went wrong and last its way, through the 
loss of a sense of the essence and telos of man, and of the 
cultivation of the virtues which that way of thinking sustained. 
He is deeply pessimistic about the prospects of recovery. But he 
does have a tiny sliver of optimism based on the possibilities at 
practice and community. Practices, in Macintyre's sense of the 
term, are complex activities like art or agriculture or sport 
which have their own internal goods, vigorously and healthily 
debated within a tradition, which provide a basis for identifying 
virtues and cultivating them. What is needed to bind these 
practices together into a coherent way of life is a conception of 
the good tor man as such. Another essential condition of a 
coherent moral life far man is an adequate sense of community, 
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which is difficult to achieve in the modern world where it is 
constantly undermined by the dominant culture of liberal 
individualism. Hotuever, it is only through the: 
.•. construction of local forms of community 
within which civility and the intellectual and 
moral life can be sustained through the new 
dark ages which are already upon u.s. (p.245l 
that there is hope that civilization might be rebuilt. It is the 
one small glimmer of hope in Macintyre's otherwise entirely bleak 
picture. 
I I 
In terms of the present analysis 'After Virtue' bears all 
the marks of a work of ideology. But this cannot just be 
asserted, since Macintyre directly attacks many of the 
assumptions upon which this present work is based. Clearly, if 
Macintyre is correct then the present analysis falls, and indeed 
will be seen as just another example of modern man's fragmented 
consciousness. Macintyre's case has to be shown to be fatally 
flawed before it can be shown to be ideological. 
After Virtue is indeed a much flawed book. Its sweeping 
generalisations, unsupported assumptions and clear 
inconsistencies go well beyond the allowances normally made for a 
book of this scope. To take just two of many examples: the 
assertion that we live in an emotivist age and use moral language 
mainly for manipulation begs countless questions and ignores the 
evidence of common experience. Secondly, debates over ends and 
values within practices are taken as being healthy and right, but 
when the practices are politics and philosophy Macintyre regards 
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such disagreement as a sign of deep malaise. However, in 
relation to the present work one aspect of the central thesis 
deserves particular attention. Macintyre's picture of modern man 
lost in a cultural and moral desert involves large 
value-assumptions, as does the view that all this stems from 
certain 17th and 18th Century thinkers finding Aristotelian 
teleology difficult to swallow. Such grand evaluations would be 
difficult to justify even if Macintyre could show that 'Hume's 
law' was false and merely a manifestation of the collapse of 
coherent moral thinking. Nevertheless, there are two points 
which Macintyre must establish if his case is to have any 
plausibility. He must show that the fact/value dichotomy is 
false, and he must also show that man does indeed have a telos. 
If these points cannot be established then his work has little 
defence against the charge that it is ideological. 
Macintyre's main case against the absolute separation of 
fact and value relies on what can be called the good man/good 
farmer argument (p. 55). This view makes use of the fact that 
the statement "X is a good farmer" can be cashed out in purely 
factual terms: "X looks after his animals, obtains good yields, 
maintains the soil" and so on; from which it can be argued that 
there is no good reason why similar factual criteria cannot be 
found for the judgement "X is a good man". But this view rests 
upon a confusion. "X is a good farmer" is a technical evaluation 
related to function, much as we call a watch a 'good watch' if it 
performs its function of keeping accurate time. But moral 
evaluation is not the same as technical evaluation. Men as such 
do not have a function. The technical use of 'good' in relation 
to man only makes sense within the context of certain specific 
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practices, such as farming or medicine or war, which have 
recognised ends. It does not make sense for life in general.E24J 
Furthermore, for Macintyre's argument here to be comprehensible, 
let alone true or false, he must demonstrate that human life does 
have an overall purpose or telos, a purpose that can be specified 
and demonstrated in purely factual non-evaluative terms. But 
this task Macintyre fails to perform. 
Despite the vital importance of a conception of man's 
telos to Macintyre's whole thesis, the nearest he comes to 
offering one is when he says that "the good life for man is the 
life spent in seeking the good life for man" (p. 204). But this 
strange and admittedly "provisional conclusion" is 
self-defeating, if only because presumably knowing what is good 
for man we no longer need to search for it, so that finding it 
deprives us of it. But it will not even do to be going on with, 
since it could hardly bear the weight Macintyre needs to place on 
it. It is difficult to see how it could sustain a social ethics, 
or express that sociability which is essential to Macintyre's 
conception of human nature. Nor is it clear that it could 
justify the cultivation of all the desirable virtues. Still less 
could it justify Macintyre's wholesale condemnation of the modern 
world, particularly since the pursuit of the good of man has been 
at least as vigorous over the last two centuries as at any 
previous time, even though, according to Macintyre, this is just 
the time that civilization has been going steadily downhill. 
Thus, 'life spent in seeking for the good life' is not much use 
even as a provisional telos, and would have to be very different 
from the ultimate telos, whatever that might be. Macintyre 
cannot so much as make a guess at what the ultimate telos could 
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be like, and this undermines his entire case. He is in no 
position to maintain that only a teleological ethics is viable, 
or that the fact/value dichotomy is a fallacy, or that the moral 
vocabulary has lost its meaning in the moral world. Even less is 
he in a position to reject the present analysis which would 
characterise 'After Virtue' as a work of ideology. 
'After Virtue' has all the features of an ideological 
position, although not all of them are fully developed. It 
purports to offer a factual and explanatory theory about the 
human world, which in reality is an ethical evaluation of that 
world. Past, present and future are turned into a moral story in 
which forces of oppression and (much weaker) forces of good are 
at work, and man's present predicament is explained. All is 
couched in a morally charged language, where, for example, 
'bureaucracy', 'therapist' and 'expert' denote bad things, while 
'community', 'practice' and 'tradition' (properly understood) 
denote good things. But on two vital points Macintyre is not 
wholly explicit: the nature of the good society and the nature of 
man. However, we can infer a number of things about each with 
some confidence. Modern man has an alienated and fragmented 
consciousness and lacks a sense of moral community, the 
restoration of both are essential to his nature and would 
presumably be accomplished in the good society. However, 
Macintyre is less interested in showing how the good society 
could be organised than in the problem of restoring to man a 
coherent moral life within a genuine community. This has the 
implication that if this could be achieved then the good society 
and an appropriate political theory would flow from it (all 
modern political tradition being exhausted, p. 244). A necessary 
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condition of this is that man must put his thinking straight. 
The pervasive influence of spurious technical-rational reasoning 
is a central feature of Macintyre's condemnation of the modern 
world. It appears that Macintyre believes that a key element in 
man's restoration is the recovery or development of true 
reasoning; that is, a form of reasoning which overcomes the false 
dichotomies of fact and value, and of individual and society, and 
enables man to come to a true understanding of himself <the model 
here would seem to be Hegel). Clearly, the concept of 
rationality is central to Macintyre's concept of man (as we have 
seen above with Bentham and Kant and with Hollis). 
Unfortunately, Macintyre does not tell us what his concept of 
rationality is. Perhaps this is difficult to do in the absence 
of a theory of man's telos. Nevertheless, he does promise an 
account in a later book (p. 242), which has so tar not appeared. 
Thus, there are good grounds tor characterising 'After Virtue' as 
a work of ideology, even though not an entirely complete one. 
III 
Macintyre's thesis is interesting as an ideological 
position, but perhaps more interesting tor what it might suggest 
about ideology as such. That Macintyre otters us moral 
prescriptions rather than political ones, with only the 
implication that the fulfilment of the first would lead to the 
second, suggests that we could classify 'After Virtue' as 
primarily a work of moral ideology rather than political, and 
that this might be true of other ideological positions. This 
suggests that the concept of ideology may be further developed 
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along one of two possible lines. The first is that moral 
ideology is the core concept and that a political ideology is 
only an extension of a moral ideology; or secondly, that the 
moral and the political are, or can be, two distinct forms of 
ideology. 
The first of these suggestions has a certain initial 
plausibility. We have seen in the case of Kant, tor example, a 
political ideology (a variety of Liberalism) that is simply an 
extension of a moral ideology, so that tor Kant, as Paul Hassner 
points out: 
In principle, politics is simply the 
application of that legal doctrine whose theory 
is morality. Any conflict between politics and 
morality is to be resolved by the pure 
subordination of the former to the latter. [25J 
An similar cases could perhaps be made for a number of other 
political thinkers such as Aristotle or Bentham. But the idea is 
much less plausible in respect of other thinkers, such as 
Rousseau or Hegel, and it is difficult to see what Marxism or 
National Socialism would amount to without their political 
dimension. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that there are 
at least two forms at ideology, the moral and the political; with 
perhaps, as Macintyre suggests, the logic of the former having 
been explored by Aristotle. There are a number of possible 
examples of purely moral ideologies among the Hellenistic 
'philosophies' (notably Epicurianism) and perhaps back to 
Socrates, which might or might nat have provided the basis of a 
political ideology (again we might follow Macintyre, this time in 
his A .!::1/'wrt Histar_t.l af Ethics, where he argues that all ethical 
theories imply a conception of man [26]). Perhaps the mast 
interesting case in this context is Existentialism, which while 
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displaying many features here identified with ideology, 
nevertheless appears at such a distance from politics that the 
notion of an Existentialist state or political party seems 
absurd. 
IV 
There are many varieties of existentialist thought and 
some fundamental differences between major existentialist 
thinkers, some of whom will not even accept the title 
'existentialist'. [27J Nevertheless, some generalisations are 
possible which will be sufficient for present purposes. 
All versions of Existentialism begin with an analysis of 
'existence', taken as that form of being peculiar to man. This 
means not creating abstract theories but analysing man as a 
concrete reality by concentrating on his individual uniqueness, 
his 'wholeness' as a willing and feeling as well as a thinking 
being, his 'finitude' and awareness of death, the 'facticity' or 
'givenness' of his individual existence; and, most importantly, 
his capacity for 'transcendance', for transforming himself from 
whatever he is at the moment to some future state. This latter 
characteristic of man's existence means that every individual has 
the capacity to make of himself whatever he likes; he is free to 
create his own being and is unavoidably responsible for what he 
makes of himself. This has certain implications for how men 
should live. John Macquarrie writes [28]: 
By the very way humanity is constituted, one 
is driven to talk of a 'true' humanity (and 
presumably also of a 'false' humanity). For if 
man is not a nature or essence that is simply 
given, but rather 'makes' himself what he 
becomes by his own deeds and decisions, then it 
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would seem that he can either become what it is 
in him to become, or fail to become it •.. Man 
must decide who he will be, and more than this, 
each individual must decide the question for 
himself. Each one's existence is his own, 
characterised by a unique 'mineness'. There is 
no universal pattern of a genuine humanity that 
can be imposed on all or to which all must 
conform. Indeed, to impose such a pattern 
would mean to destroy the possibility of a 
genuinely human existence for the persons 
concerned. They become truly themselves only 
to the extent that they freely choose 
themselves. (p. 1611 
Existentialists use the terms 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' to 
denote an individual's proper use of ill use of his freedom and 
power. Macquarrie continues: 
Existence is authentic to the extent that the 
existent has taken possession of himself and, 
shall we say, has molded himself in his own 
image. Inauthentic existence, on the other 
hand, is molded by external influences, whether 
these be circumstances, moral codes, political 
or ecclesiastical authorities, or whatever. 
<Ibid. p. 162/3) 
The central value here is the individual's freedom and power to 
determine his own destiny, the exercise of free choice being more 
important than the content of that choice. On the other hand, as 
Macquarrie points out, "no major existentialist philosopher has 
taught that everything is permitted" (ibid. p. 162) and adds that 
in his view the concept of existence itself suggests the general 
"direction of human fulfilment" (ibid. p. 164) which presumably 
rules out such choices as being a murderous dictator, a master 
criminal or whatever else we think undesirable; and it certainly 
rules out the decision to be a conformist. This is a general 
problem with Existentialist ethics which is dealt with by a 
variety of means (usually involving the introduction of some 
principle from outside Existentialism, but that need not concern 
us here). But however it is dealt with, the starting point is a 
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value laden and therefore pseudo-descriptive conception of man 
and the human condition by means of which the world and the 
individual's circumstances can be evaluated. 
Each significant Existentialist thinker has developed 
these basic ideas in their own way, but we may take Sartre as 
representative [29]. Whereas, for example, Heidegger took man's 
existence to be his essence, Sartre took the more radical view 
that man's essence precedes his existence (p. 4381, thereby 
taking much of what other thinkers had regarded as man's 
'factity' to be the individual's own responsibility, including 
his genetic endowment, his social circumstances and his 
psychological make up. Consequently theories, such as those of 
Freud, purporting to explain human behaviour are deemed worthless 
(p. 40). What does explain human behaviour is human choice; we 
are inescapably "condemned to be free" <p. 439l, though people go 
to endless lengths to escape the anguish of freedom (p. 44>; that 
is, to deny to themselves their own responsibility for what they 
do. This self-deception is what Sartre calls 'bad faith' 
(mauvaise foil, and it is only by learning to live without it, 
and by rejecting all moral codes and making one's own choices, 
that one can live, as far as it is possible [30J, honestly and 
authentically. He writes: 
.•• my freedom is the unique foundation of 
values and that l70f.hil7g, absolutely nothing, 
justifies me in adopting this or that 
particular value, this or that particular scale 
of values ... My freedom is anguished at being 
the foundation of values while itself without 
foundation. ( p. 38) [ 31 J 
There is nothing comfortable about a life of freedom, since one 
must live with perpetual anguish and uncertainty. Not even other 
people are any consolation, since our relationships are marred by 
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our ceaseless, frustrated desire to have power over them. [32J 
Human reality is "by nature an unhappy consciousness with no 
possibility of surpassing its unhappy state" (p. 90) The only 
consolation is the awareness of living an authentic existence. 
Other Existentialists have different though similar 
analyses of the human condition. Some put greater stress on the 
individual's relationship with fellow human beings, or with 
nature; while others emphasise the particular threat of modern 
society to individual freedom. These accounts each have their 
different conceptual schemes, with concepts such as 'mass man' 
(Jaspers), 'Being-towards-death' (Heideggerl and 'superman' 
(Nietzche), by which the world can be evaluated and the means to 
the 'good life' prescribed. At first sight at least, there is 
something odd about Existentialists prescribing anything beyond 
the injunction to exercise one's freedom. But as suggested 
earlier 'philosophers of existence' never stop there, but have 
additional values beyond the self-conscious exercise of freedom 
[331, which they recommend in order to assist the individual in 
working out his unique salvation. For Existentialists the 'good 
life' is not of course equated with the good society, nor even 
'good' in the sense of 'happy'; it is the life that is 
'authentic'. Whether this is achieved through Kierkegaard's 
'leap of faith', Nietzche's 'will to power', Heidegger's 
reordering one's life in the face of death, or whatever else 
Existentialist philosophers recommend, it will not be comfortable 
and it will be individual rather than collective. 
Being concerned with personal and not group salvation, 
Existentialism has little to say about politics and society. And 
this remains true despite the fact that Heidegger joined the 
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Nazis (albeit briefly), and that Sartre became a Communist. Both 
can be seen, as with Kierkegaard's Christianity, as an 
existential choice or 'leap of faith'; that is, not dictated by 
their Existentialism [34J, nor a choice their admirers have 
necessarily felt any need to follow. Possibly connected with 
lack of a collectivist dimension is the lack of any consistent 
Existentialist view of hist6ry. Existentialist analysis can 
always encompass the past in the sense of dealing with individual 
biography; but, apart from a tendency to reject views of 
progress, the need to deal with society or mankind as a whole has 
not been universally felt. Kierkegaard had nothing to say on the 
matter E35J, while Heidegger saw history in terms of decline 
[36J, a view shared with Nietzche who had added on his revival of 
the classical conception of eternal recurrence. But none, as in 
political ideology, see mankind as having a destiny to which the 
individual might contribute. It is the individual's destiny 
alone that has significance. 
Thus, we have in Existentialism a doctrine of personal 
salvation that has most of the structural elements previously 
identified as ideological. We have a conception of human nature 
and a theory of the human condition which embodies certain 
values, expressed in a pseudo-descriptive vocabulary, by means of 
which the individual can evaluate his immediate and his 
historical circumstances. He can determine whether his actions, 
his lifestyle and his relations with others are authentic; 
whether he is a member of a genuine community; whether he is a 
victim of modern mass society and so on. And having assessed his 
life he can seek in Existentialist writings guidance on 
reordering and living it more honestly in the light of 
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Existentialist ideals of human fulfilment. All that are 
'missing', in the sense of not being universal features, are the 
political and historical Cin the sense of a history of society or 
mankind) dimensions. From which it is reasonable to conclude 
that Existentialism is not a political, but some form of moral 
ideology. 
v 
If Existentialism is some form of moral ideology then we 
have established two kinds, the moral and the political. This 
prompts the question as to whether there might be more, perhaps 
many more. Could there be, or potentially be, a different form 
of ideology for every variety of human activity: a farming 
ideology, a sexual ideology, a sport ideology? Indeed it 
sometimes seems that this is just what we do have. But there 
has to be some limit, if not in principle at least in practice. 
There are two problems. The first is that not all practices are 
amenable (realistically amenable) to the notion that they may be 
the means by which humanity might achieve fulfilment. This might 
be possible in the case of art, but hardly so in the case of, 
~ay, bricklaying. The second problem is subsumption. It would, 
for example, be difficult to conceive of an economic ideology 
that would not be subsumed under some wider political ideology. 
An interesting case here is education, where both subsumption and 
non-subsumption seem possible. But we will discuss this question 
in the next chapter when we return to the nature of educational 
theory. For the moment it is sufficient to say that confining 
ideology to politics appears to be too narrow, and that other 
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forms of ideology seem both possible and actual. 
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IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
We can now return to the knot of questions concerning the 
nature of educational theory and its relationship to political 
theory which were left unresolved at the end of Chapter One. In 
that chapter educational theory was analysed into a number of 
different types, one of which was problematic. This was 'general 
educational theory' which synthesises the factual and technical 
with prescriptions, values and ideals. The analysis of this kind 
of theory suggested that it be provisionally classified as 
ideological, pending a fuller analysis of idealogy as such. A 
second and related question was whether there could be such a 
thing as objective or 'academic' educational theory of a general 
kind. Once these questions have been answered it will then be 
possible to examine the significance of political ideas in this 
area and develop a general account of the relationship between 
ideology and educational theory. 
All of the last five chapters tend to confirm the initial 
judgement that general educational theory is properly classified 
as ideological. It has much the same structural elements as 
political ideology - concepts of human nature, pervasive ethical 
values, explanatory theories, prescriptions, ideals of the good 
man and the good society, and so on - which relate to each other 
in much the same ways. Indeed, the more complete analysis of 
political ideology makes possible a much fuller understanding of 
general educational theory: demonstrating, for example, how by 
means of pseudo-description values can penetrate every nook and 
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cranny of a seemingly factual theory; why an ideological theory 
cannot by its nature fall within an overarching and 
knowledge-validating framework like science or history; and in 
what way an ideological conception of human nature necessarily 
has a central and unifying role in theories of this kind. 
Furthermore, elements such as concepts of man and the good 
society are in many cases shared between political and 
educational theories, as was seen in the opening chapter with 
Plato, James Mill, John Dewey and (though less straightforwardly) 
Rousseau; that is, in cases where education and politics form a 
continuum. 
However, the similarity of form between these two types 
of theory has never been much in dispute; it has rather been the 
nature of the common form itself that has been contentious. 
Consequently, conclusions arrived at concerning one type of 
theory should, in most cases, be directly applicable to the 
other. Thus, we saw in the last chapter that 'academic political 
theory' is not a possibility because of the pervasiveness and 
radical incommensurability of values, and this is directly 
applicable to any argument for an 'academic' version of general 
educational theory, which can be dismissed on exactly the same 
grounds. Equally applicable to both forms and equally false are 
the assertions (respectively of Miller and Siedentop and of W.T. 
Moore, described in Chapter One) that either political or 
educational theory can be broken up into their constituent parts 
and each separately justified by its own criteria. However, 
there is one assertion of the possibility of objective general 
theory that does seem to be peculiar to education alone. This is 
what might be termed the 'Peter's argument'; and it is necessary 
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to deal with 'l-1 ·- before moving on. 
R.S. Pete'r"·s is perhaps the most distinguished and 
influential educational philosopher of the last thir·ty year·s, and 
has written e;.( tens i ve 1 y on t.!lhat the proper aims and content of 
education should be. At the same time he maintains that it is 
not the business of philosophy to determine values or make 
prescriptions. He resolves this conflict by arguing that all he 
is doing is bringing out through analysis what is inherent in the 
concept of education itself. [1] Thus, while he insists that 
"moral decisions can never be extracted from conceptual analysis" 
(p.l7J he goes on to argue that we can see what ~education' means 
by unpacking the meaning of 'being educated' Cp.lSl and the 
"principles implicit in educational procedures" (p.21l, from 
which is deduced a vision of an educated person of wide 
understanding, devoted to pursuing intellectual activities for 
their own sake, to freedom, respect for persons, tolerance, and 
so on. But as more than one commentator has pointed out the 
concept of education is essentially contested (or as we would say 
in the light of the present analysis, it is a value word, like 
'freedom' or 'democracy', which is unavoidably 
pseudo-descriptive) in a way that Peters does not admit; and what 
in fact he is doing is reading his own values into the 
concept [2]. A society may regard Peter's vision of educating an 
individual as the cultivation of a free and tolerant intellect as 
a principal source of evil, and that what 'education' really 
means is understanding the will of God and learning to submit 
one's own will to it. How it could be shown that this usage of 
'education' was incorrect is difficult to say. Peters, 
therefore, is doing just what he says he is not doing, namely 
offering a persuasive or stipulative definition as a conceptual 
truth. (p.56). 
Classifying general educational theory as ideological 
opens up a number of questions as to just what this means. The 
analysis of ideology so far has concentrated on the political 
kind, although other possible forms have been suggested. Is 
general educational theory, therefore, merely an extension of 
political theory or is it, or can it be, autonomous? Can it be 
linked to other, non-political kinds of ideology? What different 
kinds of relationship can exist? We will first examine the 
relationship between general theory and political belief, then 
proceed to look at possible relationships with other forms of 
ideology, concluding with an examination of the possibility of an 
ideology that is purely educational. 
1. Political Ideology and Educational Theory 
Ideology is concerned with how men should live. One may 
regard this as a matter of individual conscience and will, but if 
it is taken as a matter for society as a whole then there are two 
main ways that the good life may be achieved: through the way 
society is politically organised, and through education. At 
least since Plato it has been recognised that these two areas of 
practice are complementary. In consequence, most political 
theories have educational implications, and most educational 
theories have implications for the political. Most educational 
ideals require a certain sort of political framework for their 
fulfillment, and there is a sense in which the political 
ideologist needs education. It is crucial that men see the world 
aright, and the younger the better. Men have been kept from the 
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truth of the world because of ignorance or false consciousness, 
or some other means that education might rectify. The family is 
a conservative institution and an inevitable block on radical 
social change, and for the radical ideologist it must be 
by-passed if a new generation with new values is to be created. 
Plato had just such a scheme, as did the Bolshevics. But for all 
ideologists, radical or otherwise, the good society must be in 
some way static (that is, wholly static as in Plato's 'Republic', 
or allowing change within an unchanging framework) and it must be 
a central task of education to maintain it. On the other hand, 
there is no single necessary relationship between the two kinds 
of theory, but several possibilities which vary from case to 
case. 
I 
In some ideologies, educational ideas amount to little 
more than an appendage, in the sense of merely requiring that 
children learn the 'truth' of their doctrine and absorb its 
values. This was the case, for example, with Nazi educational 
thought and practice. [3] On curriculum matters within the 
German national education system, greater emphasis was placed 
upon Nazi-approved versions of German language and literature, 
history and biology; physical training was accorded much greater 
importance; and girls were required to do more domestic subjects 
and discouraged from higher academic work. But these apart, the 
Nazis were not greatly interested in the national education 
system, despite the large number of schoolteachers who joined the 
party. This can be partly accounted for by the 
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anti-intellectualist bent of Nazi thinking ("We think with our 
blood"l, but also because of the importance given to 
organisations which the Nazis created outside, and to some extent 
in conflict with, the school system. The most important of these 
was the Hitler Youth, which emphasised political training, 
elitism and the cultivation of leadership. Thus, Nazi 
educational theory and practice was no more than an instrument of 
the political will, used as one instrument among others to shape 
the people in conformity to the political doctrine. 
II 
Soviet education has a similar subordinate role, though 
it is a more integrated part of a totalitarian system than in 
Nazi Germany. As might be expected, the aims of Soviet education 
are strictly subordinate to the political aims of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. Officially the overall, long-term aim 
is tor the Soviet Union to transcend its present condition of 
socialism and ultimately achieve a full communist society. The 
purpose of education is to turn out Soviet citizens dedicated to 
building communism, which will involve the creation of a new type 
at human being. As Kruschev put it at 21st Congress of the CPSU: 
"To arrive at communism, that most fair and perfect society .. we 
must start right now educating the man of the future". [4] But 
as many have observed, the ideal Soviet citizen, the dedicated 
builder of communism, the 'new man', is in many ways th~ very 
model of Victorian rectitude: honest and forthright, disciplined 
and industrious, and wholly devoted to the welfare of his 
fellows. He is, however, no individualist. He must be imbued 
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with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and recognise the necessary 
leadership of the CPSU. Much time in schools and ather 
educational institutions is taken up with the study of 
Marxism-Leninism, and egalitarian and communal values are 
stressed. Teaching is highly formalistic and much influenced by 
Pavlovian psychology, which fits well with the rather mechanistic 
version of Marxism derived from Engels and Lenin. Apart from a 
few years of experiment following the October Revolution, Soviet 
education represents a somewhat dull and mechanical application 
of Marxism. 
Marx and Engels themselves wrote nothing on educational 
theory, and outside the Communist world Marxists have made little 
positive contribution to the subject. There are, however, good 
theoretical reasons for this. In the bourgeois world education 
is necessarily a part of the capitalist system (in Althusser's 
rather brutal phrase it is an 'ideological state apparatus' [5Jl, 
and most Marxist educational theorising is devoted to analysing 
the functioning of bourgeois education in disseminating ideology 
and reproducing the class system. Rachel Sharp puts the matter 
starkly: 
Those who wish to understand education should, 
if necessary, forget about it for a number of 
years and concentrate their attention instead 
on more significant issues concerning the 
nature and dynamics of capitalist societies. 
[6] 
Her advice to the Marxist teacher is to preach Marxism at every 
available opportunity and otherwise try to subvert the system. 
But really there is no salvation through education. And there is 
little point in speculating on haw education will be after the 
final communist revolution !apart, presumably, from lacking 
- 331 -
ideological features and overcoming such false dichotomies as 
between theory and practice, and physical and intellectual 
labour), since not only will society be transformed but so too 
will human nature itself. We can neither prescribe nor predict 
what changes will occur, nor what the educational needs of the 
new humanity will be. 
There has, however, been some dissent from this orthodox 
Marxist line. The New Left Marxists of the 1950's 60's put much 
greater emphasis upon the liberation of consciousness than on the 
inevitable collapse of the capitalist system, and they left their 
mark on educational theory. An e~{ample is ~1adan Sarup's 1'/at'..\·-.ism 
and Educ:at ian in which he writes: 
Deterministic Marxism is rejected because it 
transfers political initiative and 
responsibility from self-conscious human beings 
to structural entities. This is why 
consciousness is so important ... (p. 193) ... 
Seeing the educational world as one of 
alienation, my starting point is a 
consideration of the ways in which sociology of 
education can become a mechanism for 
transforming social reality. [7J 
It is the transformation of consciousness rather than the 
transformation of social structures that has the greater 
significance on this view. Yet even here the centre of concern 
is the analysis of the existing repressive system and nothing of 
substance is said about what education should be like: education 
is still secondary to a social transformation into an essentially 
unfathomable future. 
Thus, in the Soviet system, as in Nazi Germany, we have a 
strict subordination to party ideology, while the broader stream 
of Marxist thought requires a postponement of creative 
educational thought until such times as the dust of world 
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communist revolution has settled and the new world can be planned 
and created, but in the meanwhile remaining a secondary matter. 
I I I 
Educational thinking within a Liberal framework, however, 
presents a more complex, various and creative picture. There are 
cases of strict subordination, such as Herbert Spencer. [8] But 
more interesting are the cases of parallelism, as perhaps with 
Kant; of integration, as with John Stuart Mill; and even cases 
where education predominates over politics, as is arguably the 
case with John Dewey. We will take Kant and Dewey as 
representing this wider variety of relationships. 
Kant did not devote the interest and energy to 
educational theory that he later came to believe it deserved. 
What we have of his educational thought is a series of lectures 
he was obliged to give as part of his academic duties. [9J They 
show the influence of Rousseau's Emile combined with his own 
philosophy. He follows Rousseau in insisting that a child must 
be treated as a child and not as a miniature adult, and he speaks 
of education 11 in accordance with nature". ( p. 110) On the other 
hand, in keeping with his own general philosophy, he took nature 
to be the realm of necessity and reason the realm of freedom; and 
saw education as leading from one to the other, from the animal 
to the human. There is no Romantic view of the childlike or 
primitive of Kant. The young child is at the animal stage and it 
is essential that it learns conformity to rules. He wrote: 
Evil is only the result of nature not being 
brought under control. In man there are only 
the germs of good. ( p. 15) 
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The aim of education is to develop a true human nature, by 
which he meant autonomous, moral, rational individuals. Early 
education is negative, helping to bring out what nature provides 
rather than adding to it. But following this there should be a 
gradual progress towards freedom, progressively encouraging the 
child to think for himself. 
One of the greatest problems of education is 
how to unite submission to the necessary 
restraint with the child's capability of 
exercising his free will. (p. 27) 
Obedience to the rules is learnt early, but in time the child 
will learn to perform right actions not from habit but from an 
understanding of the principles involved. 
Kant considered physical education and practical 
education lin the sense of mast~ring skills) as bath highly 
important. But his central concern is the development of 
character. The pupil must be taught that his duty to himself is 
to maintain the dignity of mankind in his awn person - which 
covers honesty, temperance, cleanliness and similar virtues. 
Equally important, the child must learn that his duty towards his 
fellows is reverence and respect far their rights. They must 
learn tolerance and cooperation (which is one reason why Kant 
preferred schools to private tutors). But while the helping of 
others was desirable, Kant stressed that it was not benevolence 
that was important but acting from a sense of duty and a rational 
understanding of, and adherence to, principles. Reason and not 
feeling was the essential quality, for feeling was too closely 
bound up with nature and instinct, and it is precisely in the 
overcoming of instinct and feeling that man is truly human and 
free. He wrote: 
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But is man by nature morally good or bad? He 
is neither, for he is not by nature a moral 
being. He only becomes a moral being when his 
reason has developed ideas of duty and law. 
One may say, however, that he has a natural 
inclination to every vice, for he has 
inclinations and instincts which would urge him 
one way, while his reason would drive him in 
another. (p. 108) 
The primary task of education was, as William K. Frankena puts 
it, to "make good men- men who will rightly". [10] 
Like Rousseau, Kant deplored the degeneracy of much of 
contemporary culture, and the related tendency of parents to 
concentrate on worldly success for their children. But Kant had 
hope of a better world, that history would eventually lead men to 
the ideal society: a kingdom of ends, of rational autonomous 
individuals united under universal law. It is to this future 
world rather than the existing one that his educational thought 
is directed. Hence his demand that the basis of any "scheme of 
education must be cosmopolitan" (p.lS>, for education must lay 
the foundation for the fulfilment of the destiny of all mankind: 
It is delightful to realise that through 
education human nature will be continually 
improved, and brought to such a condition as is 
worthy of the nature of man. This opens out to 
us the prospect of a happier human race in the 
future. ( p. 8) 
But although Kant's ultimate educational aims are essentially the 
same as his political ones, his educational thinking is 
nevertheless independent. It is not that one derives from the 
other, but rather that both are separate extensions of his moral 
theory. Education and politics are complementary routes to the 
same moral goal: the full development of human potentiality, or, 
what for Kant amounted to the same thing, the moral perfection of 
ma.n. 
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However, this is not to say that Kant had a clear view of 
the respective roles of education, politics and for that matter 
history. Indeed, he sometimes seems to dither between different 
alternatives, which might, superficially at least, be explicable 
in terms of a sense of impotence. At the time he was writing 
political activism tended to mean revolutionary activity, which 
he would not countenance, stressing over and over again the 
citizen's duty of obedience; while the kind of peaceful promotion 
of political views through parties and pressure groups that we 
take for granted was unknown to him !though no doubt he would 
have found it congenial). He would not advocate anything with 
which the political authorities might disagree las is seen by his 
response to political pressure concerning his religious 
writings). In these circumstances he is uncertain how his ideal 
world will come about. Sometimes he seems to put all his faith 
in education. In a moment when he was perhaps carried away with 
his subject he declares that it is "through education that all 
the good in the world arises". lp. 15) At other times he pins 
his faith on the enlightened ruler like Frederick the Great, the 
hero of his pamphlet f..I!J.::?f is EngliglJtenmenf.? in '.!lhich he argues 
that only rulers who: 
•.. have themselves thrown off the yoke of 
immaturity, will disseminate the spirit of 
rational respect for personal value and for the 
duty of all men to think for themselves. [11] 
But at yet other times the rough side of politics and war also 
appear to play the major part in human progress. This is where 
t\ant falls back on his theory of 'social unsocial ibi 1 i ty' (which 
is effectively a providential theory of God working through 
history). We learn from cruel experience as well as from books, 
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and on this theory Nature, in somewhat Hobbesian fashion, bangs 
men's selfish heads together until they learn what is in their 
long-term interests. 
These alternatives no doubt reflect Kant's reasonable 
uncertainty as to how the world will go. But they also might be 
said to reflect a deeper dither over the question of man's 
perfectibility. We have just seen above that in his short series 
of educational lectures Kant on the one hand says that in man 
"there are only the germs of good", which is redolent of 
Enlightement optimism, while a little later he says men has a 
"natural inclination to every vice", which rather smacks of 
original sin. Looked at from this point of view, Kant's theory 
of 'social unsociability' could be seen less as an insight than 
as a compromise, or even an equivocation. But however that may 
be, within the framework of a faith that in the last resort 
providence would eventually deliver the good society, Kant sees 
both politics and education, either working together or 
separately, as both viable routes to the "universal good and the 
perfection to which man is destined" (p.l5l, without either 
claiming priority over the other. 
We see in Kant, then, how politics and education can be 
complementary in the sense of being two possible routes to the 
same ideal. With J.S. Mill and John Dewey, however, the 
relationship between education and politics becomes significantly 
closer. J.S. Mill, in fact, wrote very little directly on 
education; nevertheless, it could be said that the education of 
mankind was his central theme, and that he regarded the political 
system as a vital part of that process. He supported 
representative democracy precisely because it was the most 
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conducive to mankind's improvement, and was in itself (despite 
its dangers, of which Mill was acutely conscious) educative. In 
other words, participation in the democratic process was an 
essential part of the rational man's education. Garforth, with 
some justice, goes so far as to sum up Mill's entire social 
philosophy with the phrase 'educative democracy'. E12J Dewey, on 
the other hand, wrote a very great deal directly on education. 
He had much to say about the nature and purpose of formal 
schooling, but saw this as only part of an ideal of an educative 
society. Indeed, in the case of Dewey it sometimes seems that 
what is good about democracy is that it provides the optimum 
conditions for mankind's education of itself; that the good 
society is merely a by-product of the good education. 
In contrast to Mill, however, Dewey had great faith in the 
common man and little respect for the great tradition of western 
learning. 'Higher learning' was revered because it was in the 
interests of those in power that it should be, for it kept the 
common man in awe. Similarly, it was in the interests of the 
powerful that schools teach the useless abstractions and habitual 
thinking associated with this sanctified knowledge, since it 
tended to fortify the status quo. [13J The modern world had not 
changed the old inequalities, since "the new industrialism was 
largely the old feudalism, living in a bank instead of a castle". 
[14J And the concern here was not so much with traditional 
societies of the Old World but with America, the land of freedom, 
democracy and individualism. Dewey believed that in fact a 
preoccupation with formal principles and traditional formulas had 
led people to ignore the reality of the growth of "a condition of 
dominant corporateness" [151 which had made the freedom and 
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democracy of which Americans were so proud increasingly 
meaningless: 
Individuals are groping their way through 
situations which they do not direct and which 
do not give them direction. [16] 
The concept of individualism had become restricted to economic 
individualism, which in turn was equated with capitalism, the 
modern development of which had the effect of diminishing 
people's power over their own lives, and consequently the 
development of their individuality. What was needed was a new 
and fuller conception of individualism, with a new epistemology 
and new conceptions of society and education to go with it. 
Crudely, Dewey's "Instrumentalist philosophy" teaches that 
'truth' is 'what works' <though the ambiguities of who it might 
work for are not explored). Science is based on trying things 
out with a view to controlling nature and solving practical 
problems. Unfortunately this is not the way we tend to approach 
human problems. Here our thinking tends to be dominated by habit 
and traditional formulas, which tend to favour established social 
authority. The problems of society can be solved if we could 
apply a scientific or 'experimentalist' approach to them; what 
Dewey calls "the method of intelligence". This is essentially a 
democratic approach since it does not involve authority or 
esoteric 'knowledge' but the "collective intelligence"; that isl 
the collective efforts and wisdom of all of us. Dewey was aware 
that this change of direction would involve some drastic changes 
in the distribution of wealth and power in society and a 
rekindling of a spirit of community. He wrote: 
A stable recovery of individuality waits upon 
an elimination of the older economic and 
political individualism, an elimination which 
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will liberate imagination and endeavour for the 
task of making corporate society contribute to 
the free culture of its members. [17J •.. We 
should either surrender our professed beliefs 
to the predominant material orientation, or we 
should through organised endeavour institute 
the socialised economy of material security and 
plenty that will release human energy for 
pursuit of higher values. [18] 
However, hopes for such a transformation lay more with education 
than with politics. Dewey was not in fact much interested in the 
form of democratic politics in the sense of constitutions and 
institutional arrangements. He was far more interested in the 
idea of democracy as a way of life. From this point of view what 
really mattered was not how things were organised but (as with 
Machiavelli) the quality of the citizenry; and this was the 
business of the educational system. In this sense Dewey saw 
politics as firmly subordinate to education. 
It was in education that he could develop his ideas about 
knowledge and its social consequences. His 'Instrumentalism', he 
believed, was the kind of approach that should be the foundation 
of a modern educational system. Experiment, problem-solving and 
working together are the themes of Dewey's educational thought. 
It was above all through education that he believed a truly 
democratic society could be built. This would be a genuinely 
participatory society, which would involve everyone in the 
running of their own lives, and in so doing encourage everyone to 
develop themselves to the full. This would be a true 
individualism; one that encouraged the full development of 
everyone through extending their experience and responsibility. 
People would have the opportunity to 'grow'; and 'growth' was for 
Dewey the ultimate human good, the "only moral end" [19]. By 
'growth' he meant the full development of human potentialities, 
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an idea closely associated with his notions of evolution, which 
he conceived in terms of 'progress', and which were inspired by 
Darwin. [20] This 'growth' was the ultimate aim both of 
education: 
Since in reality there is nothing to which 
growth is relative save more growth, there is 
nothing to which education is subordinate save 
more education. [21J 
and of democratic society properly conceived. A true democratic 
society was therefore an extension of education. This is not in 
Mill's more narrow sense of participation in democratic 
institutions rounding off the rational man's education. For 
Dewey it is the whole of the good soceity that is educational: 
When the identify of the moral process with 
processes of specific growth is realized, the 
more conscious and formal education of 
childhood will be seen as the most economical 
and efficient means of social advance and 
reorganisation, and it will also be evident 
that the test of all the institutions of adult 
life is their effect in furthering continued 
education. Government, business, art, 
religion, all social institutions have a 
meaning, a purpose. That purpose is to set 
free and to develop the capacities of human 
individuals without respect of race, sex, class 
or economic status. Democracy has many 
meaninqs, but if it has a moral meaning, it is 
found in resolving that the supreme test of all 
political institutions and industrial 
arrangements shall be the contribution they 
make to the all-around growth of every member 
of society. [22J 
Thus, for neither J.S. Mill nor Dewey is education subordinate to 
politics; indeed, in Dewey's case education is much nearer 
subordinating politics than the other way round. 
These examples drawn from Liberalism, Marxism and National 
Socialism indicate a variety of possible relationships between 
political ideology and educational theory; and no doubt closer 
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examination could reveal more subtle ones. But what has been 
shown is sufficient for our purpose. What we now need to 
determine is whether educational theory can be linked with 
non-political ideology. We will look briefly at Existentialism 
as our example of moral ideology, and see if educational theory 
can relate to it as readily as it does to political theory. 
2. Education and moral ideology: Existentialism 
By far the most common and significant relationship of 
educational thought to ideology is that of being an extension of, 
or partner of, a political ideology. But other relationships are 
possible. An educational theory arising out of a moral ideology 
is one such possibility; and this can be illustrated with the 
case of Existentialism. 
None of the major Existentialist thinkers - Kierkegaard, 
Jaspers, Nietzche, Heidegger or Sartre - has written any 
significant work on education. But if Existentialism is an 
ideology, and therefore possessed of a vision of the morally good 
life for man, then it must have some educational implications if 
only of a negative kind. And indeed, where major thinkers have 
neglected education, others have taken up the challenge on their 
behalf; seeking to show that the work of one or other thinker is 
an adequate foundation for education. Even Sartre, the bleakest 
of Existentialist thinkers, has his educational followers. There 
is now, in fact, a substantial literature of Existential 
education, of which Van Cleve Mort'is' book E1'istentia1ism in 
Education is among the best known and '.!lh i ch may be taken as 
representative. [23J 
One of the striking things about Morris' conception of 
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Existentialist education is how late it begins and how restricted 
is its scope. Because childhood is deemed "a pre-Existential 
phase of human life" (p. 112) Existentialism is "officially 
indifferent to and disinterested towards elementary educational 
theory" (p. 1161. The child, it seems is simply not very 
interesting until such times as it experiences what Morris calls 
its "Existential Moment" (pp. 111f. l, which for most of us occurs 
some time around puberty. [24J This is: 
..• the moment when the individual first 
discovers himself as existing. It is the 
abrupt onset, the charged beginning, of 
awareness of the phenomenon of one's own 
presence in the world as a person. Prior to 
this point there is no such awareness. (p. 1121 
Thus, the human condition, as Existentialists describe it, only 
fully becomes a reality for each individual at a particular 
moment, usually in adolescence, when they become self-conscious 
and aware that they are free to choose their conduct and 
consequently are ultimately responsible for their own lives. 
This is necessarily a very personal experience, so that although 
formal education involves groups of pupils: 
•.. they may still be understood as 
subjectivities existing alone as individuals. 
It is the latter aspect of human growth and 
development that can rightfully become the 
subject matter of an Existentialist theory of 
education. (p. 1041 
It is upon the insight and awareness that the Existential Moment 
involves that the Existentialist teacher has to build. 
The task of education, therefore, is to give the 
individual a sense of his own human situation, as entirely 
responsible for not only his own conduct but for endowing with 
meaning and value a world that is otherwise devoid of meaning and 
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value. This educational task: 
... can be stipulated somewhat as follows: to 
provide the occasions and circumstances for the 
awakening and intensification of awareness. To 
be more specific and concrete, education must 
become an act of discover_t..; ... Let education be 
t.he discovery of responsibility.' Let learning 
be the sharp and vivid awakening of the learner 
to the sense of being personally answerable for 
his own life. (p. 117l ••.• An education which 
reminds youngsters that they are constantly, 
freely, baselessly, creatively choosing in this 
way is the kind of education we are in pursuit 
of. (pp. 110-111) 
The central concern of Existentialist education, therefore, is to 
bring home to the individual the meaning of his own humanity and 
its potentialities. 
Morris claims that all other educational philosophies 
fail to do this, even those that aspire to achieve something of 
the sort. Reviewing rival theories, he writes: 
each viewpoint makes the same mistake, the 
mistc:1ke of believing that the young are things 
to be worked over in some fashion to bring them 
into alignment with a prior notion of what they 
should be ••• In every case the process of 
education is understood to have its aim and 
point outside the learner. ( p. 108 l 
These strictures also apply to Dewey and his followers. For 
despite their insistence that their methods above all help the 
learner to develop himself, the criteria for judging that 
development is public and not personal. 'Community' is for them a 
central value, and consequently they; 
..• deliberately play down private, individual 
decision-making in favour of social 
determinants. They intentionally make of the 
school an arena in which the group mind is 
shown to be superior to the individual mind. 
All the apparatus of Progressive educational 
theory ••. has been installed in our schools 
because of our abiding belief that the group 
thinking, the group considet'ing, the group 
choosing is a more authentic and reliable 
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avenue to true humanity than the individual 
thinking, considering and choosing. (p. 128) 
It is Existentialist education alone which "assumes the 
responsibility of awakening each individual to the full intensity 
of his own selfhood" (p. 134) 
In fulfilling his educational aims the Existentialist 
teacher has no new subjects to teach, but works through a 
modified version of some parts of the usual secondary curriculum. 
Cognitive understanding of all the standard subjects is necessary 
<p. 123), but as George F. Kneller writes: 
The existentialist attitude towards knowledge 
radically affects the teaching of those 
subjects which are dependent upon systems of 
thought or frames of reference: it states that 
school subjects are only tools for the 
realization of subjectivity. [25] 
For one thing, "the Existentialist educator would seek to 
intensify the normative aspect of all subject matter". ( p. 139) 
Furthermore, Existentialist epistemology, Morris insists, views 
knowledge not from the point of view of the spectator, but: 
••. ft'om the standpoint of the actor, on stage 
and actively implicated in the "role" of 
man ••. he must decide which propositions, among 
the world's billions of propositions, are 
meaningful and significant and therefore worth 
believing. He is the actor, the active agent. 
He chooses his knowledge. <p. 1231 
Indeed, the whole curriculum is not there to be 'mastered', or 
'experienced', but 'chosen'; it has to be "opted for, sought out, 
and appropriated "by the student. (p. 124) 
On the other hand, Morris admits that some subjects are 
more appropriate vehicles of Existentialist teaching than others. 
It is the arts and humanitites that are most stressed in what 
t·1orris calls "the curt'iculum of the free existent" (p. 123). All 
creative arts are important as means of individual expression, of 
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which drama is perhaps the most powerful of all the arts in 
"evoking e:dstential awareness" Cp. 138). History and literature 
are also important tor different reasons. The purpose of 
studying history is moral: 
•.. that is, such study presents to us various 
hypotheses as to how lite in the present might 
be lived, how we might solve our problems. Cp. 
126) [ 26 J 
This being so, it is up to the individual student to accept or 
reject what is being taught according to his own purposes. 
(p.142) The study of literature is "equally relevant tor the 
awakening of strategic choice on the part of the learner". (p. 
126) That is, choice relating to the shape and direction of 
one's whole lite. Great literature is capable of arousing "the 
existential awareness of the learner" Cp. 1271; through it the 
learner can begin to confront the central human experiences of 
love, freedom, guilt, suffering and the "most existential of of 
all human problems" (p. 1401, death. Even the question of 
nuclear anhiliation, which "somehow stands at the gate of 
authenticity" Cp. 127> can be dealt with in this way. 
The teacher's role is one of "awakening learners to 
themselves as learners and seekers and creators of their own 
truth from the starting place of the awareness of their own 
ignorance". (p. 152) This is a delicate task where much depends 
upon the relationship between teacher and taught. As might be 
expected the conception of the proper relationship between 
teacher and pupils which Morris suggests is one of very personal, 
special and unique rapport between individual teacher and 
individual learner; a profound contact between two human beings, 
which cannot be covered by any social scientific theory. [27J 
Fur· t her more: 
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The teacher's quest for awakening an awareness 
of freedom in the learner obviously requires a 
surrounding medium of freedom in the learning 
environment. ( p. 152) 
Fortunately, the "Existentialist educational revolution" (p. 131) 
which Morris believes is coming alr~ady has a model school to 
look to. This is A.S. Neill's 'Summerhill' which, though not 
directly inspired by Existentialist thinking (which Morris does 
not make entirely clear), nevertheless fulfills many of the 
ideals of Existentialist education. In particular it has been 
based on the principle that: 
The free child eventually becomes the 
respan:::.--;ible child; it is fr·eedom itself which 
makes this awareness possible. He who becomes 
responsible becomes capable of authenticity. 
Neill is creating authentic individuals. (p. 
150! 
Morris also describes Summerhill as a : 
... close approximation to a society of 
subjectivities - free, autonomous, independent 
selfhoods, each determining the essence and 
meaning of his own life. (ibid) 
In other words, Summerhill is not just a model for an Existential 
school but also for a Existential society. 
Morris does speak of such a society (which presumably he 
also believes is coming). He writes: 
If the authentic man is our aim, then the 
authentic society is also our aim. That 
society is authentic in the degree to which it 
fails to provoke in the individual citizen 
these urgings to escape from his freedom. That 
society is authentic which refuses to specify 
the "good" to its citizens. That society is . 
authentic in the degree to which it summons the 
citizen to stand by hirr,self, for himself, in 
shaping the direction of his life, and 
therefore the meaning of his existence. That 
society is authentic which never achieves a 
"national purpose", which is, in fact, 
uninterested in achieving one, but interested 
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only in being the host to individual purposes 
in its citizens. lp. 103) 
How this society will be organised we are not told, except that 
it will be a society in which: "each individual takes personal 
responsibility for the laws he obeys, the conventions he consents 
to, the values he appropriates for his own life". It looks like 
a society with very little in the way of common rules or values 
or organisation (in fact it is difficult to see in what sense it 
could be a society at all) but for Morris it hardly seems to 
matter what kind of political organisation there is so long as it 
is minimal and people do what they like. On the other hand, 
Morris makes a number of remarks suggesting some larger 
collective moral purpose. For example, he suggests at one point 
that any "life which hopes to be existential" must personally 
care "about the increase of good in the world" (p. SOl, which 
seems to evoke universal moral standards that are not derived 
from Existentialism itself, and be in conflict with the notion of 
the individual being the sole source of his own values. This is 
a recurring problem with Existentialist thought that was noted in 
the discussion on Existentialism in the last chapter. However, 
the purpose here is not to criticise but merely to illustrate the 
possibility of an educational theory being derived from a 
non-educational ideology; and the vagueness and inessentialness 
of the political content of Morris' educational ideas suggest 
that Existentialism is adequate for this purpose. 
All that is now required is an example of an ideology that 
is not derived from political or moral ideas but from education 
itself. This is difficult because once one goes beyond political 
and moral ideology the exercise begins to look rather tenuous. 
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However, one example at least seems to fit the requirements. 
This is the theory of 'Deschooling', which we will now examine. 
3. Deschooling as an educational ideology 
The 'deschooling movement' developed in the early 1970's. 
It is not an organised movement with an agreed programme and a 
card-carrying membership, but rather a loose collection of 
theories, projects and sympathisers. Several writers have 
contributed ideas, others have advocated similar proposals, while 
still others have acknowledged the influence of deschooling 
theory. The ideas of at least one distinguished educationalist, 
Paulo Freire [28J, can be said to overlap, and at least one other 
distinguished writer, Paul Goodman [29J, is recognised as a 
precurser. Nevertheless, two works are regarded as seminal: 
Ivan Illich's .Desc/Jooling bi:Jciety [30J, and Everettt Reimer's 
5'c.hool is .Dead [ 31 J. It is upon these two works, together with 
Ian Lister's collection lJesc.hooling [32J, that the analysis l!Jill 
largely concentrate. 
I 
The starting point for deschooling theory is a criticism 
of formal education, or 'schooling' (which, following American 
usage, includes all institutional learning up to and including 
university>, defined as: 
..• the age specific, teacher-related process 
requiring full-time attendance at an obligatory 
curriculum. (Illich quoted in Lister, p. 2) 
This now universal phenomenon is, according to Illich and Reimer, 
~niversally bad and universally ineffective. Schools simply tail 
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to do the job they were designed for: they fail to teach what 
they are supposed to teach. For example, the majority of 
children in school spend years and years failing to learn such 
subjects as mathematics, physical sciences and languages. 
Further, there are millions of children who are hostile to school 
and there are consequently massive truancy and drop-out rates. 
The failure of schools to educate is paralleled by their failure 
to fulfil their related function of providing equality of 
opportunity. Despite this, faith in the efficacy of formal 
education remains indestructable: the more it fails the more 
billions are poured into it. But these vast expenditures do 
nothing; if anything they are counter-productive since they seems 
to produce less real education not more, more inequality not 
less. Educationalists themselves hide their failure behind 
labels like 'low I.Q.' and 'culturally deprived' which imply that 
the fault lies with the material they are given rather than with 
themselves or the system they operate, a necessary deception "to 
preserve their mental health" (Lister p. 3). They also point to 
successes, to those who progress and gain qualifications. But 
Illich especially is anxious to expose all this as a sham, 
arguing that certification is no more than a self-perpetuating 
and self-legitimating device to preserve the system, and that 
certificates only demonstrate that the individual has been 
institutionally processed in the standard way, not that they are 
particularly fitted for a given occupation, still less that they 
have been educated. 
What then needs to be done? A minimal first step is the 
'disestablishment' of schools (one of many analogies with 
religion, usually more ingenious than convincing) and the 
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constitutional right of the child not to be schooled. 
Ultimately, Illich and Reimer want the complete abolition of 
schools and their replacement by wholly informal systems of 
learning where the onus is on the child lor parent - there is 
some ambiguity here) to learn as and when they please. These 
alternative systems are more than a little vague. They consist 
of various networks: there would be skill centres where students 
could meet actual practitioners and learn about any skill, from 
mending cars to speaking a language, through drills. There would 
also be networks giving students access to educational objects of 
various kinds from record players to power stations. Finally, 
for more intellectual pursuits, a different kind of network is 
required: some kind of contact service, perhaps using computers, 
to put students with a common interest in touch with each other 
so that they might meet and discuss. The role of the 
professional teacher would not be built into this system, but 
would be limited and entrepreneurial; selling his wares on the 
open market, yet released from those aspects of his school role 
which effectively prevent his form being a genuine educator. The 
essence of the matter is that students are free to conduct their 
own education. For all true learning, it is assumed, must be 
natural and spontaneous and self motivated; only then do we have 
real education. Ultimately, Illich and Reimer believe, the whole 
of society must become an educational environment in which all 
can develop freely without the distortions of institutions or the 
meaningless race for qualifications. 
Now if this were all that deschooling amounted to we 
would not classify it as ideological, but as a practical 
educational theory of a technical kind. That is, it would be 
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making factual claims about the effectiveness of formal education 
that could be tested, and making predictions as to the outcome of 
its proposals which could in principle be confirmed or falsified 
by experience. However, deschooling theory does go much further, 
going far beyond what can be observed or tested. The criticism 
of schooling and the advocacy of alternatives are only, so to 
speak, the operational part of a much wider theory which embraces 
the whole human condition. Schools fail to educate because their 
nature makes success an impossibility; they positively prevent 
education, and consequently human emancipation and flourishing. 
Thus, schooling is not merely condemned as inefficient, it is 
morally condemned. It manipulates, oppresses and alienates, and 
keeps the human mind in thrall. Accordingly, Illich and Reimer 
insist that deschooling must be "at the root of any movement for 
human liberation" lillich p. 52). 
Illich and Reimer see formal education as merely part of 
a much wider network of institutional oppression. It is one of 
the great bureaucratic structures of the modern corporate state. 
Illich is particularly scathing about the sheer incompetence and 
waste of these structures: state medicine that does not make the 
people healthier; state welfare that does not eliminate poverty; 
state defence that does not ensure security, and so on. Indeed, 
these structures create the very problems they are supposed to 
eradicate. The whole system is rather more successful in its 
undeclared purpose of fitting populations for the modern 
capitalist consumer economy, which is no less effective than the 
communist world in manipulating the lives of the people for its 
own purposes: 
There are many roads to ensalvement, only a 
few to mastery and freedom. Technology can kill 
- 352 -
by poisoning the environment, by modern 
warfare, by over-population. It can enslave by 
chaining men to endless cycles of competitive 
consumption, by means of police states, by 
creating dependence on modes of production 
which are not viable in the long run. (Reimer 
p. 20) 
Technology and bureaucracy are the modern instruments of the 
domination of the many by the few. It is only the latest phase 
of a long process that is the essence of human history: 
When techniques, institutions and ideologies 
were primative, man lived in relative equality 
and freedom, because there were no adequate 
means of domination. As techniques, 
institutions and ideologies developed, they 
were used to establish and maintain relations 
of domination and privilege. From that time 
on, the societies which succeeded in dominating 
others, and thus world history, were also 
characterized by inter-class and inter-personal 
domination, in tension 'JJi th efforts to 
establish equality. As techniques increased in 
efficiency and as ideologists gained in 
insight, they repeatedly threatened to upset 
the privilege structure of society~ 
Institutions were used to counter these threats 
by controlling the use of the techniques and by 
perverting the ideologies. When revolutionary 
breakthroughs occurred, institutions were 
re-established on a broader base, extending 
privilege to more people, but always at the 
same time maintaining the structure of 
privilege. (Reimer, p.9) 
At this point in its history mankind has a choice between 
submission to further oppression or taking active steps towards 
liberation. In the name of justice and humanity, not to mention 
survival, mankind must choose the latter. The first step in 
creating a truly free, equal, just and democratic world is to 
deschool society. 
While much of their criticism is directed at western 
consumer society, Illich and Reimer are concerned with the modern 
bureaucratic state in general and the role of the school within 
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it. Illich writes: 
In a basic sense schools have ceased to be 
dependent on the ideology professed by any 
government or market organisation. Other basic 
institutions might differ from one country to 
another: family, party, church or press. But 
everywhere the school system has the same 
structure, and everywhere its hidden curriculum 
has the same effect ••. in spite of contrary 
efforts undertaken by teachers and no matter 
what ideology prevails. In other words schools 
are fundamentally alike in all countries, be 
they fascist, democratic or socialist, big or 
small, rich or poor. This identity of the 
school system forces us to recognise the 
profound world-wide identity of myth, mode of 
production and method of social control, 
despite the great variety of mythologies in 
which the myth finds expression. lillich, pp. 
76-7). 
Thus, Deschooling is a creed for all mankind that is independent 
of all regimes and seemingly of all ideologies. 
In their criticisms of modern society Illich and Reimer in 
fact share a good deal of the analysis of capitalism and official 
communism current among American radicals (mainly Marxist 'New 
Left' thinkers but also liberals such as J.K. Galbraith) of the 
1960's. They depart from the Marxist analysis most substantially 
in seeing education as the key to social transformation. They 
have, not surprisingly, been criticised from this quarter for 
being 'naive', for 'not realising' that radical political and 
economic change is the necessary precondition of all other 
change. But the deschoolers reject this. They argue that the 
key to liberation is men's minds; transform schooling and you 
will transform men's minds. Reimer writes: 
Schools have grown so fast partly because they 
happend to be doing what was important to a 
technological era when this era began. Their 
monopoly of education has been achieved as one 
aspect of the monopoly of technology. The main 
reason we need alternatives to schools is 
because they close the door to humanity's 
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escape from this monopoly. They ensure that 
those who inherit influence in a world 
dominated by technology will be those who 
profit by this domination and, even worse, 
those who have been rendered incapable of 
questioning it. Not only the leaders but their 
followers are shaped by the school game to play 
the game of competitive consumption - first to 
meet and then to surpass the standards of 
others. Whether the rules are fair or the game 
worth playing is beside the point. 
School has become the universal church of a 
technological society, incorporating and 
transmitting its ideology, shaping men's minds 
to accept this ideology, and conferring social 
status in proportion to its acceptance. There 
is no question of man's rejecting technology. 
The question is only one of adaptation, 
direction and control. There may not be much 
time, and the only hope would seem to lie in 
education - the true education of free men 
capable of mastering technology rather than 
being enslaved by it, or by others in its name. 
(p. 19) 
Deschoolers reject the left's insistence on violent revolution 
(although Reimer at least admits some violence may be necessary 
to achieve total transformation of society - see chapter 13) and 
see at least the possibility of peaceful transformation through 
deschool ing. 
This possibility derives from the fact that schools are 
the lynchpin of the system and the most vulnerable to 
transformation. This is because over and above the overt 
function of education, which they perform so miserably badly, 
schools perform certain other functions which are critical to the 
maintenance of the system. These further functions include 
custodial care, social role selection and indoctrination. In 
performing them schools rule out the possibility of genuine 
learning and education. The reason is that these extra functions 
alienate those who are subject to them, and the necessary effect 
of this alienation is to deprive education "of reality and work 
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of creativity" lillich, quoted in Lister, p.2l. Illich calls 
schooling "pre-alienation" lillich p. 5ll, a preparation for the 
alienation of adult work and society. It is only the privileged 
and the very clever who survive (if that is the right word) this 
deadening process: 
Those who conform to the rules become the 
dependable producers and consumers of the 
technological society. Those who learn to beat 
the school game become the exploiters of this 
society. <Reimer p.l9l 
Yet at the same time, all are victims, for none experience true 
learning, none receive a genuine education. 
Illich and Reimer do not exactly deny that a little true 
learning might take place within a school environment, but it 
could only be an accident. Reimer writes: 
Of course exceptional teachers can teach and 
exceptional students can learn within the 
confines of the school. As school systems 
expand, claiming an increasing proportion of 
all educational resources, absorbing more 
students and teachers and more of the time of 
each, some trGe 
bound to occur. 
and nat because 
educational experience are 
They occur, however, despite 
of school. !Reimer, p.31l 
Reimer goes on to quote the work of Paulo Freire and Paul Goodman 
as providing support for this view. What he means by this is 
Goodman's view that schools can only teach 'alienated knowledge', 
which, because divorced from its origins and applications is 
'dead knowledge'. Freire holds a similar view, arguing that true 
learning only takes place in the process of people: 
... becoming conscious of their true life 
situation, eventually seeing this situation 
clearly under circumstances which permit them 
to act effectively upon it. <Reimer p. 167) 
Presumably this means that people are educated to the extent that 
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they understand that they are oppressed and what means can be 
used to over-come it. Acquiring 'dead knowledge', according to 
Freire~ amounts to 'domestication' not education; it induces 
conformity and mythical explanations of whatever does not fit the 
taught pattern. According to Goodman it induces a sense of the 
absurdity of the world, insofar as 'dead knowledge' has ~ny 
effect at all. Reimer thinks that in their different ways "both 
men are probably right" !Reimer p. 168). 
It is not entirely clear whether Illich and Reimer fully 
accept the views of Goodman and Freire, nor indeed whether the 
views of Illich and Reimer are always identical. Certainly both 
decry the divorce between formal education and the adult world of 
work and social life. Illich seems to put more emphasis on man's 
relationship to, and need to trust in, nature; although Reimer 
does echo this when he writes: 
If proper boundaries are established between 
men and nature, and if his weapons are removed 
before he enters her, nature can continue to be 
man's mentor. lp.ll2l 
But it is Reimer who particularly stresses the necessarily 
political character of true education: 
The basic objective of education must be an 
understanding of the world we live in and a 
world we hope for, understanding which can lead 
to effective action (p.99l ... In a free, just 
world, or in progress towards one, all people 
need to know how the universal values of their 
society are created and distributed and how the 
methods of creation and distribution are 
governed, i.e. how the society is governed (p. 
102) ... How society works needs to be learned 
by every responsible member of a free, just 
world. (p. 103) 
Reimer admits all this would involve considerable knowledge of 
political science, economics, psychology and other subjects (p. 
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100) What he does not explain is how these apparenly essential 
elements of true education will be acquired by all when in a 
deschooled society all are left to their own educational devices. 
Reimer appears to make the rather implausible assumption that in 
a deschooled situation this is what all would want to learn. At 
present we are schooled to ignorance, apathy and the belief that 
the world is as it should be, or at least could not be otherwise. 
But once the ideological scales fall from men's eyes all will see 
the world aright, and all will want to set the world aright. 
Reimer assumes, again somewhat implausibly, that all the freely 
self-educated will clearly recognise all the injustices and 
absurdities of capitalist society and refuse to tolerate it. He 
writes: 
True education is a basic social force. 
Present social structures could not survive an 
educated population ... An educated man 
understands his world well enough to deal with 
it effectively. Such men, if they existed in 
sufficient numbers, would not leave the 
absurdities of the present world unchanged. (p. 
137) .• an educated minority, above a certain 
size, would have to opt for justice and sanity 
.•. Nation states as they exist today could not 
for long survive an educated population. 
Nations made up of educated citizens, or 
containing a substantial minority of such 
citizens, would tend to merge with other 
nations .•. Class distinctions would also tend 
to disappear in educated societies ... lp. 138) 
..• They would realize, for example, that 
competitive consumption is an impossible way of 
life for more than short periods or small 
minorities. lp. 139) 
All this, and all the other absurdities of the modern world-
from the military-industrial influence on public policy to 
traffic jams (p. 138) - will be plainly seen by anyone who is 
self-educated and whose perception of the world has not been 
distorted by schooling. Thus, the deschoolers view of the world 
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is the pure truth obvious to anyone with an unclouded eye; and 
any contrary views are merely ideological distortions. Set men 
free from school and all will come to the same conclusions 
without the need for instruction or prompting. And if this be 
regarded as breathtakingly naive it is only because we have been 
schooled to think so. But "if one believes in people and in 
freedom" <Reimer p. 148) one knows that once men's minds are 
truly freed then mankind will spontaneously set about creating a 
truly free, just and humane world. 
involve the dismantling of the whole system of oppressive 
stateinstitutions - beginning with education - and of the 
competitive consumer economy. The consumer economy, which 
manipulates and distorts social life, and which pollutes man's 
environment, must be replaced by an alternative economy with an 
alternative technology based on human need. Similarly, 
institutions have to be recreated to fit human need, instead of 
people being manipulated to fit institutional need. People must 
gain control over their own lives; it is the only way to freedom, 
equality and justice. Only when people are free from economic 
and institutional manipulation, and therefore free from 
alienation, can they create their own lives and their own 
society. Only then can there be true human flourishing, with 
education playing its proper part. 
II 
We can now see how far deschooling conforms to the 
criteria for an ideology set out above. To satisfy the first 
criterion deschooling must be, or at least claim to be, factual 
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and explanatory on the one hand! and value-laden and morally 
prescriptive on the other; and it is clearly both. It is claimed 
that formal schooling fails to achieve its stated aims and that 
such aims would be far more effectively achieved if schools did 
not exist. But these apparently factual claims are accompanied 
by others to the effect that mankind is the victim of universal 
injustice and oppression of which schooling plays a significant 
part and that deschooling is a necess~ry step towards human 
liberation and social justice. Now this second group of claims 
is moral in nature: it involves a moral evaluation of the human 
condition and moral prescriptions which anyone who accepts 
deschooling theory is bound to promote. Thus, there are both 
factual claims and moral claims which are intimately connected. 
To understand these connections it is necessary to examine the 
kinds of descriptions and explanations and in particular the 
kinds of concepts which deschoolers employ. 
The vocabulary used to express deschooling theory 
contains, on the face of it, a mixture of descriptive and 
evaluative concepts. Terms such as 'oppression', 'social 
justice' and 'liberation' are not descriptive terms that can 
correspond to anything in reality. They are terms of moral 
evaluation which people apply differently according to their 
different values. This is also true, although perhaps less 
obviously so, of terms such an 'manipulative'. 'convivial' and 
'alienated'. If a follower of Illich calls institution 
'convivial' and institution 'manipulative', we then know that he 
morally approves of X and morally disapproves of Y without 
knowing what either of these institutions actually do. The 
concept of alienation is less simple. It derives from Marxism 
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and roughly signifies a state of existence in which individuals 
are 'alienated' from their true human selves, in which their 
humanity is distorted and stunted, and in which they are 
prevented from developing their full human potential. Yet it is 
not to be identified with any particular psychological condition 
- unhappiness, hopelessness, disillusionment or whatever - nor 
are there any set of necessary symptoms, so that it is not 
possible to observe or test for the condition. It is wholly a 
theoretical construct, so that if an individual exists in certain 
relationships - lives in a certain kind of society, is a wage 
earner in a capitalist enterprise, or, as in the present case, 
has been thoroughly schooled - then the theory requires that they 
must necessarily be alienated. But whatever reality 'alienation' 
may be thought to refer to, it has to be a great evil, just as 
its antidote, 'liberation', must be a great good; its application 
is a function of the values of the user, not a feature of any 
state of affairs he may be observing. Alienation is necessarily 
a bad thing and its badness is built into the concept, which must 
vitiate its status as a descriptive term. 
However, when we come to the most central concepts of 
deschooling theory- 'schooling', 'schooled'. 'deschooled' and 
related terms - we might seem to be dealing with a different 
case. They may appear to be descriptive because they are drawn 
from ordinary language where they are used descriptively; and 
when, for example, deschoolers point to particular failures, like 
language or mathematics teaching, we feel we know just what they 
are talking about. But this is deceptive. To begin with, 
schooling is a process that is morally condemned as a 
strategically vital part of the system of state institutional 
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oppression. Schooling is part of the process of alienation, and 
so of a system of domination and manipulation which has always 
denied men their natural liberty and has consequently been 
responsible for all man's self-inflicted miseries - injustice, 
poverty, ignorance and war. 'Schooling', as deschoolers use the 
term, is different from its ordinary meaning; it is defined in 
terms of alienation and oppression and consequently has moral 
badness built into its meaning. It can, therefore, only be used 
to evaluate and not to describe. That being so it would be 
logically inconsistent for deschoolers to allow anything good to 
be associated with schooling. In ordinary language we associate, 
though we do not equate, schooling with learning and education, 
which we regard as good things. But deschoolers make a point of 
denying that 'real learning' or 'real education' can come from 
schooling. Illich and Reimer do concede that a little real 
schooling might go on by mistake, so to speak; but it could not 
be part of schooling. So schooling, for the deschoolers, cannot 
simply mean 'what goes on in schools' as it does for the rest of 
us; it means 'what goes on in schools that is bad'. This may 
cover most of what schools do, but there is a certain flexibility 
in the term, as there is with all evaluative concepts. 
Whatever good may be thought to come out of school, the 
deschoolers must deny (e.g. the children have learnt it in some 
other wayl, or else redefine as not good, or not the true version 
of what is good. Hence, true education and true learning cannot 
result from schooling by definition. And if it is objected that 
at least schools impart a certain amount of knowledge, then the 
deschoolers reply by redefining knowledge. It is not real 
knowledge that schooling imparts, but only 'alienated knowledge', 
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which is apparently some kind of pseudo-knowledge which corrupts 
the mind and deadens the spirit. Deschooled learning is, by 
contrast, necessarily good. It is free, spontaneous, self 
motivated and results in genuine education and personal and 
social liberation. Someone, therefore, whom the deschoolers 
describe as 'schooled' is someone in a state of alienation; and 
this will manifest itself in the attitudes, values and view of 
the world that they hold. These would, of course, be just those 
values and beliefs that deschoolers disapprove of. This makes 
'schooled' an evaluative term. If it were strictly descriptive 
it would apply to anyone who had received a formal education, 
including, presumably, all deschoolers. What deschoolers would 
claim is that they had been schooled, but had managed to 
'deschool' themselves, meaning that they had achieved an 
understanding of the human condition 'as it really is' - that is, 
as described by deschooling theory and similar beliefs. This is 
clear from Reimer's insistence (p. 991 that the true purpose of 
education is to create a just world in which mankind is free from 
bureaucracy, totalitarianism and capitalism. Thus, 'schooled' 
and 'deschooled' are really evaluative terms expressing the 
deschooler's moral approval of disapproval of whatever attitudes, 
beliefs or ways of life they are applied to. They may appear to 
be descriptive but can produce only pseudo-descriptions. 
What is true of descriptions is equally true of 
explanations. Deschooling theory purports to explain many 
things: large scale learning failures; children's hostility and 
drop-out rates: the failure of the system to improve 
opportunities for the disadvantaged; the massive waste of 
resources; the effectiveness of non-school learning methods; and 
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so on. Ultimately all these things are explained in terms of one 
explanatory principle, namely a particular view of the human 
essence. For example, Illich stresses the sheer incompetence of 
state bureaucracies, state education being one. He is not saying 
that, as a matter of fact, these bureaucracies do not do their 
job very well; he is saying that it is impossible for them to be 
successful. Apparently this is because human nature is such that 
it cannot respond to bureaucratic manipulation but is alienated 
by it. The problems that bureaucracies are set up to solve 
cannot be solved except by people themselves when they are wholly 
in charge of their own lives, when they are completely free and 
fully human. Schooling fails because it is alienating, whereas 
nan-school learning, self-motivated learning, is liberating and 
therefore effective. Illich and Reimer do nat use the terms 
(although Paul Goodman does) but it is implicit in all that they 
say that schooling is 'unnatural' (i.e. distorts natural growthl 
and that their alternatives to it would allow individuals to 
develop 'naturally'. And not only in schooling against human 
nature, sa seemingly is the whole modern state, with its 
bureaucracy, economy and technology. Modern society is simply 
not viable because it distorts and suppresses human nature. Only 
a radical anarchist libertarianism can be the basis of a viable 
society in which there is freedom, equality and justice and in 
which human nature can flourish. 
Deschoolers assume that schooling, and the schooled, 
society it maintains are at odds with human nature, whereas a 
deschaoled one would be in harmony, and that our schooled world 
should be destroyed in order to make way for a deschooled one. 
The basic form of argument here is: ~is is the nature of man, 
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therefore t.h.is is the kind of society, or kind of education, 
appropriate to his nature, and against which all other societies, 
or forms of education, can be judged. Now if the view of human 
nature that deschooling assumes is factual and morally neutral, 
then we have a clear violation of 'Hume's law'. If there is so 
then, since it is built upon a fallacy, the whole theory must 
collapse with all its facts, explanations, descriptions and 
prescriptions. But if, as seems to be the case, the deschooler's 
concept of man has its moral goodness built into it then the 
p~escriptive inferences can be saved but only at the price of 
divorcing it from any objective reality and nullifying any chance 
of its explaining anything. It could only be another expression 
of the deschooler's values; a personification of them, rather 
like a character in a morality play, and no more explanatory. It 
certainly could not be used to describe or explain the facts of 
educational failure, even if it were assumed that it was a real 
world of actualities that deschooling theory purports to describe 
and explain. But as we have seen, this world of seeming fact is 
an illusion, no more than a tissue of pseudo-facts and 
pseudo-descriptions. It is a moral interpetation of the world 
dressed up to look like a factual account. Alienated man could 
not exist, and so the world that the deschoolers' condemn does 
not and could not exist, any more than could their liberated man 
in his liberated world. We could indeed abolish schools, but 
whatever the individual and social consequences there is no test 
that could show that mankind had been restored to its true self, 
or that human potential was fully actualised. Nor could any 
logic show that this at last was the 'good society', nor prevent 
it being despised by someone who held it to be the very 
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antithesis of the good society. Even if this new world were all 
creativity and joy, this would not prove the truth of deschooling 
theory, for it is just as immune to confirmation as it is to 
refutation. Deschooling theory is not sustained by evidence but 
by faith; its alleged facts, descriptions and explanations only 
count as such for those who are of the faith. 
But this may be thought to go too far. For surely it 
could be said that deschooling does deal in legitimate facts and 
explanations up to a point, for example in the failure of schools 
to teach languages when other non-school methods can be highly 
effective? But facts such as these were known anyway, and one 
does not have to be a deschooler or be attracted to their 
remedies, in order to acknowledge them. These facts are not as 
such part of deschooling theory. It could have been deschoolers 
who first pointed out these or other facts, but that would not 
alter the case. The point of deschooling theory is not to 
discover facts but rather to reveal the significance of the 
facts, and in particular their moral significance. The facts are 
to be 'explained' in terms of the theory and thereby shown to be 
symptoms of a deeper sickness of education and of society as a 
whole. At the same time, these facts may appear to stand as 
evidence tor the theory. But this is not so, if only because 
facts are allowed to count only if they favour the theory but not 
if they appear to contradict it. Other subjects may be more 
successfully taught than languages; or perhaps some new 
techniques may suddenly make language teaching universally 
effective. But neither would be acknowledged by deschoolers as 
evidence against their theory. A sudden improvement in language 
teaching would in no way disprove that the effect of schooling is 
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to alienate. Simple factual evidence of this kind is quite 
irrelevant to the truth or falsity of deschooling theory. It 
might make the theory more or less plausible (and thus affect 
recruitment, how widely the theory is discussed, and similar 
matters) but could in no way prove or disprove it. 
Indeed, nothing could disprove deschooling theory. Being 
an evaluation of the world - albeit a disguised one - it is 
immune to counter-evidence. Such is the flexibility of moral 
evaluation that inconvenient facts can always be interpreted 
away. It, for example, a sceptic were to point to someone who 
appeared to be educated as a result of schooling, this need not 
embarrass the deschoolers who could deploy several lines of 
defence. They could argue that this person must have gained his 
education in spite of school; by his own efforts or through 
parental or other influence. Alternatively they could argue that 
this person was not really educated at all, but merely well 
processed and stuffed with alienated knowledge. And if these or 
other arguments tailed to move the sceptic, they could say that 
he could not see the truth because he is 'all schooled up'. Some 
such defence would have to be deployed since if it were admitted 
that even one person could be genuinely educated through 
schooling it would imply that schools need only be reformed not 
abolished, and so call the whole of deschooling theory into 
question. <There might then be little to distinguish it from 
•treeschooling' theory, the other intellectual parent of 
deschooling, but a despised one; a view attacked by Illich as 
seducing children into school with a 'mirage of freedom' [J3Jl. 
But there is, of course, no danger of this. The integrity of the 
theory will always be maintained because the impossibility of 
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formal schooling producing real education, and the inevitability 
of deschooling producing liberated man and true education, 
operate as necessary truths in terms of which all human reality 
is systematically interpreted. These 'truths' are articles of 
faith at the centre of a particular moral vision of the world. 
Ian Lister's call for research to establish how true the claims 
of the deschoolers might be quite misses the point (Lister p. 
15). Research into the facts could establish nothing because it 
is simply not a factual theory. It does not describe or explain 
anything. Its purpose is to evaluate and to point the way; to 
identify friend and enemy; and above all to inspire, justify and 
guide action. Deschooling theory is, in short, an ideology. 
III 
This fuller analysis of Deschooling is designed to show 
that it has all those features of political ideology that have 
been discussed in earlier chapters: an apparently descriptive and 
explanatory account of the world, a pseudo-descriptive 
vocabulary, a set of values embodied in a conception of human 
nature and an ideal society, a series of prescriptions guaranteed 
to bring forth a better world, and even a theory of history. 
Yet, although it is not entirely divorced from political ideas, 
it would be eccentric to classify Deschooling as a political 
ideology. It demonstrates that educational ideology has to be 
placed alongside political ideology and moral ideology as as an 
independent, or potentially independent, form. Others might be 
added. But enough has been said to indicate that if the analysis 
of the nature of ideology offered here is correct then 
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ideological thinking has a wider range of forms and plays a 
larger role in our thinking than is usually supposed. This in 
turn provokes further questions as to just how important a role 
ideology does have in our lives. These are questions which to 
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CONCLUSION: THE PLACE OF IDEOLOGY 
It h~s hitherto been tempting to regard the concept of 
ideology as more trouble than it is worth. Its use invariably 
obscures more than it illuminates and arouses passions in an area 
where there is already passion enough. And even if we can 
approach the subject with detachment we find that behind the 
muddle of controversy is what seems a mystery that cannot be 
solved. We are faced with sets of ideas so multi-purpose and 
multi-faceted - with values, historical generalisations, 
technical recommendations, ideal societies, explanations, moral 
prescriptions, myths and much else besides - that it does not 
seem possible that there could by any unifying principle or 
logical coherence. However, it has been the burden of this work 
that the concept has to be persisted with; that the controversy 
it generates is a measure of its significance; that a logical 
unity can indeed be found; and that, whatever its limitations, 
ideology occupies an important place in human thought. 
The question of just what place ideology does have in our 
thinking can be understood in two quite different ways. On the 
one hand, we may take the question as a formal one and address it 
in terms of ideology's logical character: its constituent 
elements and how they fit together; how it relates to, and is 
distinguished from, other forms of thought; and so on. In other 
words, we can ask what area it occupies in the geography of human 
thought. But, on the other hand, the place of ideology might be 
interpreted in terms of an altogether different set of questions, 
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concerned with such matters as how important ideology is to us 
and to what extent is it necessary; what needs it satisfies that 
it should be so pervasive; and just how far we could manage 
without it. Questions of this second type are the more 
problematic. It is not obvious that there can be clear answers 
to them! and still less that the methods used to deal with the 
first kind of question are at all appropriate here. Yet the 
questions are sufficiently important and intriguing to risk a few 
speculative suggestions; that is! once the formal questions have 
been settled 
1. Ideology on the Map 
I 
The nature of ideology is a mystery that requires two 
keys: one to unlock its logic! the other its structure. At first 
sight ideology appears to contain an incoherent mixture of 
different kinds of thinking, and in particular an improper 
cohabitation of the moral and the factual. But it is precisely 
the illicit union of fact and value that is essential to 
ideology's distinctiveness as a form of thought. It is achieved 
during the formation of theory, at the stage when concepts are 
linked together to form a conceptual framework. Within any form 
of understanding or theory concepts are connected into a network 
by being defined in terms of each other. In ideology! and other 
forms of ethical belief! value concepts are used to define 
factual ones, both descriptive and evaluative, which in turn can 
be used to define further concepts. The outcome of this process 
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of pseudo-description las it might be called) is a vocabulary 
imbued with the values of the ideology, so that all descriptions, 
explanations and accounts of the world are expressions of those 
values. In this way a certain logical homogeneity and a unified 
moral vision are simultaneously imparted to all elements of the 
ideology. The resultant picture of the world may appear to be 
objective, and yet at the same time it makes clear to the 
believer, without apparant logical violence, what is good and bad 
and where his duty lies. 
But, for this logical consistency and the reassuring 
belief that true value is firmly anchored in reality, there is a 
price. The union of fact and value is an illicit one in that it 
produces a kind of thought that is not what it seems, that does 
not fulfil its promises in an honest fashion. Ideological 
pictures of the world can have no truth, they only deal in 
pseudo-descriptions and pseudo-explanations which cannot, because 
of their ethical content, correspond to any reality. Deriving 
prescriptions is possible only because values are artificially 
built into the picture in the first place. Furthermore, it is 
the ethical content of ideologies that make them incommensurable; 
their differing pictures of the world are absolute and 
self-enclosed and unable to enter a dialogue with each other. 
The nature of ideology ensures that they cannot be consistent; in 
Strawson's terms they form a world of truths that cannot be 
systematised into a world of truth. [1] Each ideological 
position, like each religious sect, land each work of art - there 
are parallels here with aesthetic understanding) has its own 
understanding of the world, its own moral vision, and therefore 
its own answers to questions of what we should do and how we 
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should live. This contrasts with academic disciplines, where c 
framework of understanding exists that is quite separate from any 
theories that manifest that understanding, and which provides a 
neutral context within which rivalries between theories can be 
decisively settled in a way that guarantees all successful 
theories are (despite Kuhn's assertions about science) ultimately 
consistent with each other and can claim, in the absence of a 
viable challenge, the status of knowledge. Ideologies have no 
such common framework; in each case the theory doubles up as the 
understanding. Nor do they respect any one elses framework, but 
freely appropriate the conclusions of other forms of 
understanding for their own purposes. Yet, however illegitimate 
ideology's claim to knowledge might be, it nevertheless does 
possess the logical consistency and moral unity that fusing fact 
and value bestows. 
The theory of pseudo-description broadly establishes 
ideology's logical identify as a form of ethical belief. What it 
does not do is to determine what the essential elements of 
ideology are and how they relate to each other; they remain 
separate and in need of a further principle of unity. This 
further principle is the centrality of a conception of human 
nature, a theory of man, which gives to ideology its 
characteristic structure, and, incidentaly, differentiates 
ideology (albeit imperfectly) from other forms of ethical belief, 
notably religion. Ideological man, so to speak, carries the 
ideological world upon his shoulders. It it were possible (which 
it is notl to substract from an ideology its conception of man, 
then what would be left would just be a collection of elements, 
which, despite a certain consistency, would not touch each other 
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and could not form a whole. Ideological man ties all the parts 
together into a system of ideas: he unites fact and value, 
explanation and evaluation, and guarantees the rightness and 
permanence of the ideal society envisaged, as well as the means 
of reaching it. To view the world ideologically is not 
necessarily to view it politically, for education or art or the 
moral life may be adequate vehicles for the fulfilment of certain 
ideals; but it is necessary to view it in terms of an 
interdefined set of morally charged categories which centre upon 
a particular conception of man. 
II 
The notion of a map of understanding was introduced in 
Chapter Three in order to provide a context of analysis. That 
analysis puts ideology firmly in the sphere of practice, the 
sphere of acting and living in the world. It is a wide and 
complex sphere which is concerned with our actions, individual 
and collective; with our plans and projects, hopes and 
expectations; with what we can do and what we ought to do. To 
understand the world in terms of practice is to conceive of 
everything in terms of human purposes. The philosophy that 
embodies the practical understanding, reducing all other forms of 
thought to the practical level, is Pragmatism; and although its 
limitations as a philosophy are great it does reproduce at a more 
sophisticated level a process we all engage in at least for much 
of the time. The categories of such an understanding include 
means and ends, actions and decisions, utility, efficacy and 
right. The sphere of practice is the sphere of choice, of 
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reasons and justificatons, of morality and of ideals, of 
technique and tradition. With almost any action, whether buying 
a pair of shoes or declaring war, we are faced with alternatives 
between which we must choose. Even doing nothing involves some 
kind of decision; we cannot escape choosing. This is not always 
easy and we seek guidance to aid our deliberations. Such 
guidance may be moral or technical or in the form of information 
or the wisdom of experience or homely maxims, according to the 
particular need. But if the need is of a more general kind 
concerning how to conduct one's life, or how a society can 
organise itself, or what aims humanity should pursue, then a 
comprehensive vision is needed which perhaps only religions and 
ideologies are sufficiently wide-ranging to satisfy. 
Thus, in the sphere of practice ideology shares with 
religion a special place by virtue of its comprehensiveness. To 
deliberate effectively there are three things we need to know: 
the facts of the situation; what will be effective; and what is 
right and wrong. As we saw in the analysis of educational 
theorising in the opening chapter, different kinds of theory can 
cater for these different aspects; it is only ideology and 
religion which seek to answer them all. Ethical belief not only 
answers to all these needs, it puts them in context of a unified 
vision with ovet-·all values and aims, a li.teltanc/Jauung. It puts 
everything into perspective and tells us what is significant. 
Like Pragmatism, it subordinates everything to its practical 
vision, including all I.!Je take to be independent knowledge. But 
as we have seen, this is where ideology has to make false claims. 
The logic of ideology is such that what appear to be factual 
accounts of the world, together with all the descriptions and 
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explanations within and flowing out of these accounts, are in 
reality disguised evaluations. On the map of understanding, 
ideology occupies a place alongside religion that is wholly 
within the sphere of practical understanding and wholly within 
the subsphere of the ethical. Apart from certain similarities 
with religious thought, ideology has a quite distinctive 
structure and logic, combining a whole range of elements into 
what is first and last an ethical understanding. 
However, it is a peculiarity of ideology that it is 
constitutionally incapable of accepting such an assessment of its 
place, since each ideology by its nature aspires to be more than 
what it is, or what it can be. It necessar11y makes claims to 
absolute truth, to academic status, and to moral certainty that 
it cannot sustain. It sees itself as, so to speak, the 
interconnection between multiple worlds of sense, between the 
factual and the moral, the theoretical and the practical, the 
spiritual and the secular, the academic and the everyday. It 
disdains self-knowledge and demands sovereignty at the minimum, 
accepting no independent assessment of its claims. More often 
than not it demands a kind of imperium, each seeing itself in the 
manner of mediaeval theology as 'the Queen of the Sciences', as 
that which can pronounce authoritatively on the rest, presuming 
to pass judgement upon, to evaluate and explain anything and 
everything of any kind of significance in human existence. It 
aspires to subsume all truth within itself. Ideology shares with 
religion the belief that scholarly truth is a mundane truth, a 
subordinate truth, that must be judged against the higher truth 
of the moral purpose of the world and the destiny of man. 
Ideologies and religions offer, when necessary, their own 
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versions of history, philosophy, social and physical science or 
whatever else is deemed of practical significance [2J. Yet it 
will allow none of these things to test or to conflict with its 
own truth. 
Ideology can only flourish by pretending to be what it is 
not, by arrogating to itself an intellectual authority it cannot 
possess, and claiming certainties that are not there to be had. 
To this degree it is a false and misleading form of thought. But 
this raises an obvious question. If ideology really is such a 
faulty mode of thought, why does it persist? Do we turn to it to 
provide the best answers we can find in the absence of something 
better? Or does it answer some deeper human need? In other 
words, can we live without it? 
2. Do We Need Ideology? 
Virtually all theoretical discussions of ideology portray 
it as an illegitimate manner of thinking which has to be exposed. 
As we have seen, Conservatives, Liberals and Marxists each in 
their different ways regard it as an evil to be rooted out. The 
present work, while it has not gone that far, has nevertheless 
insisted that ideology is an inherently defective mode of 
thought. Yet ideology has been a persistent feature of human 
experience and continues to be so. It provokes the question as 
to whether we need ideology, or at least some form of ethical 
belief; or whether, as some still maintain about religion, we 
will, so to speak, grow out of it. This is probably an 
unanswerable question, and certainly not a philosophical one; 
predicting the future and speculative psychology are both best 
left to ideologists. Nevertheless, some general points may be 
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made concerning the role and importance of ideology in our 
thinking that might cast further light on the nature of ideology. 
The Conservative, Liberal and Marxist assessments of 
ideology need not be taken at face value. In each case they use 
'ideology' in a pseudo-descriptive way that expresses their own 
values, so that we need not dismiss ideology as a radical evil on 
their testimony. This is equally true of much that passes for 
political philosophy and political science, but which in fact is 
ideologically inspired. But where ideology is not condemned as 
an evil it is still condemned for being, in a factual sense, 
untrue. Most accounts leave it at that, taking it as 
self-evident that if it is false then it is ipso facto bad; man, 
the assumption is, must live by truth alone. But it might be 
questioned whether in fact man can live by truth alone; could 
ordinary human life as we know it proceed in the complete absence 
of ethical belief? Can we operate effectively in the world 
without some conception or image of ourselves that tells us our 
place in it, where we stand in the order of things? Isaiah 
Berlin writes: 
In the end, men choose between ultimate 
values; they choose as they do because their 
life and thought are determined by fundamental 
moral categories and concepts that are, at any 
rate over large stretches of time and space, a 
part of their being and thought and sense of 
their own identity; part of what makes them 
human. [3] 
This suggests that what it is that ideology provides, the thing 
we need, is a sense of moral and political identity. 
This needs further clarification. The term 'identity' 
has several meanings and shades of meaning. In the oldest sense 
it means sameness; in logic A = A has the same meaning as 'A is 
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identical with A'. But in everyday language we use it with 
varying degrees of looseness: 'identical twins', 'identity of 
interests' and so on. Later, around two centuries ago, a new set 
of meanings developed which were concerned with the individual 
self; that is, with a person's identity, who the person is. At 
the mundane level a person may identify himself by reference to 
certain simple public facts: John Smith, white, male, working 
class, English, of such and such address, occupation, religion 
and similar details. These are the sorts of things that might go 
into a bureaucrat's file and go along with such items as identity 
cards and the like. But this in itself suggests that we can go 
more deeply into a person's identity, who that person really is 
beyond the official facts. There is of course an old 
metaphysical problem about the self that can be expressed in the 
ancient philosophical categories of substance (i.e. that which 
persists through time) and accident (that which does not persist 
and is therefore inessential). What is it of the self, if 
anything, that does persist: in what sense, if any, am I the same 
person I was as a child? Less abstractly, though no less 
metaphysically, we speak of the 'essential self' or 'true self' 
that is behind the public data and is implied in such locutions 
as 'who am I?', 'being in search of himself' and 'identity 
crisis'. This kind of thinking might be said to be legacy of 
Romanticism with its insistance on the uniqueness of every 
individual. 
But the notion of 'true identity' has outgrown that 
assumption, so that like 'freedom' or 'democracy' it has become a 
whore of a concept, there to be used by any theory in the 
intellectual vicinity. Thus, a person's essential identity might 
- 382 -
be conceived in terms of a God-given soul, beneath the social 
layers of John Smith, white, male, working class Englishman; or, 
at the other extreme, those social layers (or relationships) may 
be conceived as onion-like, which, if stripped away, would leave 
nothing left of John Smith. There are many more such theories, 
deterministic theories and voluntaristic theories; though on the 
whole the Twentieth Century has tended to favour the onion end of 
the spectrum. But without stepping into this morass we might say 
that most of us regard some, though not all, of the groupings 
that form our social identity are part of our essential identify 
-our sex or nationality, or perhaps our class or religion or 
occupation - some of which we choose and some not. Some may 
regard one such feature as overwhelmingly important in their 
lives - the IRA gunman his Irishness, the feminist her sex, the 
racist his race - and there is much room here for variation and 
choice. 
A further step towards the metaphysical is taken when we 
make the move from the identify of the individual to the identity 
of the group. We may indeed conceive of group identity in terms 
of flat facts - 'a minor Christian sect of northern Sudan' or 
whatever - but we easily slip beyond the reach of the empirical. 
This is even more dubious than with individuals. At least when 
we speak of an individual we know we have a definite entity in 
mind; but with national identity, or black or female or class 
identity this is not always clear. National identify obviously 
has some relationship with.the older notion of national 
character, though this is itself a somewhat doubtful idea, and 
there seems no equivalent to such modern constructions as the 
nation 'in search of its identity' or suffering 'an identity 
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crisis'. [4] On the other hand, the transition from individual 
group identify can come about in two ways that seem reasonable 
enough. One is through the locution 'I identify with •.. ' an 
individual or group or cause. Secondly, and not necessarily 
connected with the onion thesis, there is the idea that the 
individual's identity must in some way be bound up with group 
membership: nationality, sex, race, religion, family and the 
rest. 
The important thing from the point of view of our purpose 
here is the relationship between identify and action. My 
understanding of my identify has implications for what I do, how 
I conduct myself. The mundane dimensions of our identity - as 
husbands, sisters, parents, motorists, gang members, citizens, 
hockey players, Yorkshiremen, bank clerks, etc. etc. - are roles 
which imply expectations, rules and conventions about what is 
appropriate behaviour. These often have some kind of moral force 
since they imply duties, as parents for example, or as citizens; 
though not necessarily. There is a spectrum that runs from moral 
to neutral to immoral, as in the following: 
I am a doctor; there is c sick person needing help; 
therefore •.. 
I am a park attendant there is a beer can on the grass 
therefore ... 
I am a prostitute; there is a customer; therefore •.. 
I am a paederast there is a juicy young boy therefore •.. 
Thus, the rules that roles imply are rules of appropriate 
behaviour that may or may not be moral. But when we pass beyond 
the mundane to an 'essential self', a metaphysical identity, this 
is inevitably an ethical conception which does imply moral rules. 
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To look for one's 'essential self', one's 'true 
identity', is necessarily to try to penetrate beyond the surface 
of everyday reality. This may be to escape from it or to find an 
underpinning for it; to give one's life a new meaning and 
direction, or to give a deeper meaning to the life we have. But 
whichever it is we must go beyond direct experience. We may do 
this for either or both of what seem to be two quite contrary 
reasons; either to discover our own uniqueness, our separateness 
for others, or to find our true relation to others. These two 
are in fact compelementary, for it is when we know who we are 
that we know where we belong. And it is knowing who and what we 
are that gives us our orientation in the world. It is a 
necessary prelude to ariswering the question: what shall we do and 
how shall we live. 
We may pursue our metaphysical identity somewhat in the 
spirit of Rousseau searching for the nature and duty of man as 
such, independent of social roles, beneath the corrupting overlay 
of the sophisticated society he despised. Or we may seek to 
understand the 'true identity' of the groupings we belong to 
class, sex, race, nationality, etc. - in the sense of 'what does 
it illean to be black?' or working class or German or a woman?; 
and to determine which of these is the truly significant one. 
For a Northern Ireland republican his Irishness is his true 
identity and his British citizenship an alien imposition; for 
some it is class identity that outweighs all others, while for 
others still, sexual or racial or religious identity may be 
candidates for overriding significance. But significance in 
relation to what? It is significant in relation to how we live 
our lives and how we conceive our humanity. These identities 
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have varying degrees of significance in relation to the various 
practices in which we engage: politics, education, family life, 
earning a living, and so on. But also these identities are 
significant in relation to what we take to be our essential 
humanity. Thus, for example, groups who deem themselves to be 
oppressed, such as blacks or women or working class, see their 
liberation as the key to the liberation of humanity as a whole; 
and indeed often see their race or class or sex as in some way 
representative of humanity at its best. Their human identity is 
e:-:pressed t/"!rougl; their gr·oup identity. For to take one group 
identity as all-important, as more fundamental than the rest, is 
to imply something about the nature of man, about human needs and 
what is important in human life, about what we should do and how 
we should live. It is to manifest an ethical understanding of 
the t.iJorld. 
But not all of us have the intellectual ability or 
originality or emotional stamina to create such an understanding 
unique to ourselves. Besides, part of the point of such an 
understanding is that it is shared. It is plainly one of the 
functions that ethical belief has that it gives a sense of 
membership, of belonging. Eric Fromm writes: 
This identity with nature, clan, religion, 
gives the individual security. He belongs to, 
is rooted in, a structuralised whole in which 
he has an unquestionable place. He may suffer 
from hunger, or suppression, but he does not 
suffer from the worst of all pains - complete 
aloneness and doubt. [5J 
But ethical belief also provides a sense of common purpose and 
gives expression to the felt need of many to do and to create 
what is right and what is just. Ideology, like religion, can 
satisfy these needs. But this is not to follow Fromm and others 
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to the extent of assuming that these are absolute human needs 
that grow out of man's fundamental nature. These needs may be 
less or non-existent in some; and that they are the needs of 
anyone at all may be historically temporary. It is not necessary 
to define man as needing ideo log!:), noma ideologiCLts, in the way 
man used to be defined as a being needing to believe in r: ' aoa, in 
order to establish that ideology has an important part in human 
thinking. <It would hardly be appropriate to set up another 
theory of man when the futility of this exercise, in terms of 
establishing demonstrable truth, has been so much insisted upon.) 
The purpose here is not to offer any insight into the human 
condition but merely to show the logical possibility of a 
particular kind of understanding of the world that individuals 
may choose to adopt, and, at best, to show that it is 
comprehensible that such a choice is widely made. 
Whatever its logical limitations, adherence to an ideology 
is not as unreasonable as is often claimed (usually by those who 
do not recognise their own ideological beliefs as ideological). 
Ideology provides a total understanding of the world - as total 
as needs be- that for the believer is satisfying. In order to 
act in the world we need to be able to make sense of it, both 
causal sense of it and moral sense of it. We need a total 
understanding that is not fragmented but forms a factual-ethical 
continuum, and this is just what ideology offers. Few of us 
would opt to live in a bare cell. We humanise the world, 
anthropomorphise reality, in terms of what we understand 
ourselves to be. We create sense and must, for the sake of 
sanity, create envelopes of sense that give meaning to our life 
as such. We do this through creating ethical beliefs such as 
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religion and ideology, which give us an understanding of who and 
what we are, and thereby orientate us in the world. That they 
make the world make sense to us is more important than the 
satisfaction of formal principles of logical coherence or 
falsifiablity (and after all, do not the academics who insist 
upon these principles disagree about everything?), much like the 
practical problem-facing engineer for whom what is known to work 
is infinitely more important than what some abstract theory says 
should work. And if an ideology is congenial to our instinctive 
outlook, appears to fit the facts, provides plausible 
explanations and seems to cohere with what we think is right, 
then it is perhaps better to accept it than be crippled 
Hamlet-like by doubt (which is in any case a luxury of the 
privileged). 
Ideology is a kind of practical understanding, and by 
making a certain sort of sense of the world it facilitates our 
living and acting together in it. That idealogy may be logically 
doubtful, that rival beliefs seem to shout uncomprehendingly at 
each other, that clashes of belief undoubtedly generate 
bitterness and dangerous conflict, do not seem to outweigh its 
advantages. This is perhaps because the demands of practice are 
tao immediate, and cannot wait while we philosophise, even if 
that philosophising might produce something worthwhile, instead 
of digging a deeper scepticism. We must solve the political 
crises and educate the generations that are before us, using 
whatever practical principles seem most sound. In the end we all 




1. See Chapter Six, part 2. 
2. Many examples may be cited. Every ideology has a special 
account of its own relation to one or other of the 
disciplines (Liberalism is true philosophy, Marxism is 
true social science, and so on) and all tamper with 
history. Many make more general claims, so that for the 
Nazi there is true Ayran science and philosophy and false 
Jewish science and philosophy; while many Marxists have 
sought to set the physical sciences on the right track, 
from Engels' L7ialectics of Nature, through Lysenkian 
genetics to ideological objections to quantum mechanics. 
The map of understanding is always distorted, and every 
ideology (rather like every kind of map projection) has 
its own set of distortions. 
3 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays of Liberty, OUP, 1969, pp. 
171-2. 
4. See W.J.M. Mackenzie, Political Identity, Penguin 1978, 
especially Chapter 3. However, this book is not a very 
good guide to the topic in general, and Mackenzie comes 
to no very significant conclusion. 
5. Erich Fromm, Fear of Freedc1m, Rf\P, 1960, pp. 28-9. 
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